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HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
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MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY AND OF THE INSTITUTE.
&c., &c., &c.

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CONTENTS

OF

THE ELEVENTH VOLUME.

BOOK XXXVI.

TALavera AND WALCHEREN.

PAGE

OPERATIONS of the French in Spain during the Year 1809—Plan of Campaign for the Conquest of the South of the Peninsula—Want of Unity in the Command and consequent Mischiefs—The War in Austria awakens all the Hopes and Passions of the Spaniards—England multiplies her Expeditions against the Continental Coasts, and sends a fresh Army to Portugal—Opening of the Campaign of 1809 by Marshal Soult's March on Oporto—Fruitless Effort to cross the Minho at Tuy—Detour to Orense and March across the Province of Tras-os-Montes—Series of Engagements in order to enter at Chaves and Braga—Battle of Oporto—Difficult Situation of Soult in the North of Portugal—His Entry into Portugal being known at Headquarters in Madrid, Marshal Victor is sent to Estremadura, and is supported by a Movement of General Sebastiani on La Mancha—Passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and Arrival of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani on the Guadiana—Victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real—The Favourable Presage of these two Victories in the South is soon counterbalanced by Misfortunes in the North—General de la Romana, whom Soult had left in his Rear when passing through Orense, passes between Galicia and the Kingdom of Leon, raises the whole North of Spain, and threatens the Communications of Marshals Soult and Ney—Fruitless Efforts of Ney to put down the Insurgents in Galicia and the Asturias—In lieu of Marshal Mortier, detained by his Instructions at Burgos, six or eight thousand Men are sent under General Kellermann to re-establish Communications with Soult and Ney—Events at Oporto—Project to erect the North of Portugal into a Kingdom—Divisions in Marshal Soult's Army, and Relaxation of Discipline—Secret Communications with the English—Sir Arthur Wellesley lands near Lisbon, and Heads a fresh Army to Oporto—Which he surprises in broad Day, thanks to Confederates within the Walls—Marshal Soult obliged to fly, leaving his Artillery behind—Retreat to Galicia—Interview between Soult and Ney at Lugo—Plan concerted between the two Marshals, but not executed in Conse-

quence of Soult's Movement on Zamora—Disastrous Discord between these two Marshals—Order issued from Schönbrunn before the Events at Oporto were known, to combine under Marshal Soult's Command the three Corps of Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult—Unforeseen Consequences of this Order—Soult forms at Salamanca a Plan of Campaign, based upon the Supposition that the English would remain Inactive until September—This Supposition is soon belied by the Event—Sir Arthur Wellesley, after having expelled the French from Portugal, falls back upon Abrantes—He concert's with Don Gregorio dela Cuesta and Venegas a Plan of Action on the Tagus—His March in June and July to Plasencia, and his Arrival before Talavera—King Joseph, having re-called Marshal Victor to the Valley of the Tagus, joins him with General Sebastiani's Corps and a Reserve drawn from Madrid, at the same time ordering Marshal Soult to debouche by Plasencia on the rear of the English—Joseph attacks them too soon, and without sufficient *ensemble*—Battle of Talavera, July 28—Retrograde Movement on Madrid—Dilatory Appearance of Marshal Soult on the Rear of the English—Precipitate Retreat of the English Army into Andulacia, leaving behind them their Sick and Wounded—Character of the Events in Spain during the Campaign of 1809—Napoleon's Displeasure that better Use had not been made of the Vast Means collected in the Peninsula, and the Importance he attaches to these Events on Account of the Negotiations at Altenburg—Efforts of the English to afford the Austrian Negotiators the Aid of a Grand Expedition on the Continent—Project to Destroy the Naval Armaments prepared by Napoleon in the Roadsteads—Expedition to Rochefort—Prodigious Quantity of Fireships launched simultaneously against the Squadron at the Isle d'Aix—Four Ships and a Frigate wrecked on the Palles Rocks are burned by the Enemy—After Rochefort the English turn their Naval Forces against the Establishment of Antwerp, expecting to find it Destitute of all Means of Defence—Forty Ships, thirty-eight Frigates, and four hundred Transports disembark forty-five thousand Men at the Mouths of the Scheldt—Descent of the English upon the Island of Walcheren, and Siege of Flushing—The French Squadron contrives to fall back upon Antwerp, where it is out of all Danger—What is thought of the English Expedition at Paris and at Schönbrunn—Napoleon, foreseeing that Fever will prove the most formidable Adversary of the English, gives Orders to form Entrenchments, to shelter behind them all the Troops that can be collected, and not to risk a Battle—He prescribes the Levy of the National Guards, and appoints Marshal Bernadotte General-in-Chief of the Troops assembled at Antwerp—Surrender of Flushing—The English, having wasted their time in taking Flushing, are informed that Antwerp is in a State of Defence, and do not Venture to Advance—The Fever attacks them with extraordinary Violence, and obliges them to withdraw after enormous Losses—Napoleon's Joy on hearing of this Result, particularly on Account of the Negotiations at Altenburg

BOOK XXXVII.

THE DIVORCE.

PAGE

COURSE of the Negotiations at Altenburg—Napoleon would have desired the Separation of the Three Crowns of the House of Austria, or their Transference to the Head of the Duke of Wurzburg—Not wishing yet to make a Campaign for the Purpose of effecting that Object, he contents himself with new Acquisitions of Territory in Italy, Bavaria, and Poland—Reluctance of Austria to make the Sacrifice required of Her—Intentional Delays of M. de Metternich and General Nugent, the Austrian Plenipotentiaries—M. de Bubna carries a Letter from the emperor Francis to Napoleon—The Negotiations removed from Altenburg to Vienna—Last Discussions and Signing of the Treaty of Peace on the 14th of October, 1809—Napoleon's *ruse* to insure the Ratification of the Treaty—His Orders for the Evacuation of Austria, and for sending into Spain all the Forces set free by the Peace—Attempt to Assassinate him in the Courtyard of the Palace of Schönbrunn—His Return to France—Affairs of the Church during the Political and Military Events of the Year 1809—Intolerable Situation of the Pope in Rome in Presence of the French Troops—To put an End to it Napoleon issues the Decree of the 17th of May, uniting the States of the Church to the French Empire—Bull of Excommunication issued in Reply to that Decree—Arrest and Removal of the Pope to Savona—State of Feeling in France consequent upon the Political, Military, and Religious Events of the Year—Deep Change in Public Opinion—Arrival of Napoleon at Fontainebleau—His Abode there, and new Habits—Assemblage in Paris of Princes, Relations, or Allies—Napoleon's Return to Paris—The Resolution to be Divorced matured in his Mind during the late Events—He confides that Resolution to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès and to Champagny, Minister for Foreign Affairs—Napoleon sends for Prince Eugene to Paris, that he may prepare his Mother for the Divorce, and solicits the Hand of the Archduchess Anne, Sister of the Emperor Alexander—Arrival in Paris of Prince Eugene—Grief and Resignation of Josephine—Forms adopted for the Divorce, and Consummation of that Act on the 15th of December—Josephine retires to Malmaison and Napoleon to Trianon—Reception given at St. Petersburg to Napoleon's Demand—The Emperor Alexander consents to give his Sister, but wishes to attach to the Marriage a Treaty against the eventual Re-establishment of Poland—Intentional Delays of Russia, and Impatience of Napoleon—Secret Communications making known the Desire of Austria to bestow an Archduchess on Napoleon—Council of the Grand Dignitaries of the Empire, in

which the Choice of a new Consort is discussed—Tired of the Procrastinations of Russia, Napoleon breaks with that Power, and abruptly determines to marry an Archduchess of Austria—On the same day he signs, by Prince Schwarzenberg's Mediation, his Contract of Marriage with Marie Louise, copied from Marie Antoinette's Marriage Contract—Prince Berthier sent to Vienna officially to demand the Hand of the Archduchess Marie Louise—He is eagerly welcomed by the Court of Austria—Marriage celebrated at Vienna on the 11th of March—Marriage celebrated at Paris on the 2nd of April—Temporary Change for the better in Public Opinion and last Illusions of France as to the Duration of the Imperial Reign . . . 125

BOOK XXXVI.

TALavera AND WALCHEREN.

OPERATIONS of the French in Spain during the Year 1809—Plan of Campaign for the Conquest of the South of the Peninsula—Want of Unity in the Command and consequent Mischiefs—The War in Austria awakens all the Hopes and Passions of the Spaniards—England multiplies her Expeditions against the Continental Coasts, and sends a fresh Army to Portugal—Opening of the Campaign of 1809 by Marshal Soult's March on Oporto—Fruitless Effort to cross the Minho at Tuy—Detour to Orense and March across the Province of *Tras-os-Montes*—Series of Engagements in order to enter at Chaves and Braga—Battle of Oporto—Difficult Situation of Soult in the North of Portugal—His Entry into Portugal being known at Head-quarters in Madrid, Marshal Victor is sent to Estremadura, and is supported by a Movement of General Sebastiani on La Mancha—Passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and Arrival of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani on the Guadiana—Victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real—The Favourable Presage of these two Victories in the South is soon counterbalanced by Misfortunes in the North—General de la Romana, whom Soult had left in his Rear when passing through Orense, passes between Galicia and the Kingdom of Leon, raises the whole North of Spain, and threatens the Communications of Marshals Soult and Ney—Fruitless Efforts of Ney to put down the Insurgents in Galicia and the Asturias—In lieu of Marshal Mortier, detained by his Instructions at Burgos, six or eight thousand Men are sent under General Kellermann to re-establish Communications with Soult and Ney—Events at Oporto—Project to erect the North of Portugal into a Kingdom—Divisions in Marshal Soult's Army, and Relaxation of Discipline—Secret Communications with the English—Sir Arthur Wellesley lands near Lisbon, and Heads a fresh Army to Oporto—Which he surprises in broad Day, thanks to Confederates within the Walls—Marshal Soult obliged to fly, leaving his Artillery behind—Retreat to Galicia—Interview between Soult and Ney at Lugo—Plan concerted between the two Marshals, but not executed in consequence of Soult's Movement on Zamora—Disastrous Discord between these two Marshals—Order issued from Schönbrunn before the Events at Oporto were known, to combine under Marshal Soult's Command the three Corps of Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult—Unforeseen Consequences of this Order—Soult forms at Salamanca a Plan of Campaign, based upon the supposition that the English would remain inactive until September—This Supposition is soon belied by the Event—Sir Arthur Wellesley, after having expelled the French from Portugal, falls back upon Abrantes—He concert's with Don Gregorio de la Cuesta and Venegas a Plan of Action on the

Tagus—His March in June and July to Plasencia, and his Arrival before Talavera—King Joseph, having recalled Marshal Victor to the Valley of the Tagus, joins him with General Sebastiani's Corps and a Reserve drawn from Madrid, at the same time ordering Marshal Soult to debouche by Plasencia on the Rear of the English—Joseph attacks them too soon, and without sufficient *ensemble*—Battle of Talavera, July 28—Retrograde Movement on Madrid—Dilatory Appearance of Marshal Soult on the Rear of the English—Precipitate Retreat of the English Army into Andalucia, leaving behind them their Sick and Wounded—Character of the Events in Spain during the Campaign of 1809—Napoleon's Displeasure that better Use had not been made of the Vast Means collected in the Peninsula, and the Importance he attaches to these Events on account of the Negotiations at Altenburg—Efforts of the English to afford the Austrian Negotiators the aid of a Grand Expedition on the Continent—Project to Destroy the Naval Armaments prepared by Napoleon in the Roadsteads—Expedition to Rochefort—Prodigious Quantity of Fireships launched simultaneously against the Squadron at the Isle d'Aix—Four Ships and a Frigate Wrecked on the Palles Rocks are burned by the Enemy—After Rochefort the English turn their naval Forces against the Establishment of Antwerp, expecting to find it Destitute of all Means of Defence—Forty Ships, thirty-eight Frigates, and four hundred Transports disembark forty-five thousand Men at the Mouths of the Scheldt—Descent of the English upon the Island of Walcheren, and Siege of Flushing—The French Squadron contrives to fall back upon Antwerp, where it is out of all Danger—What is thought of the English Expedition at Paris and at Schönbrunn—Napoleon, foreseeing that Fever will prove the most formidable Adversary of the English, gives orders to form Entrenchments, to shelter behind them all the Troops that can be collected, and not to risk a Battle—He prescribes the Levy of the National Guards, and appoints Marshal Bernadotte General-in-Chief of the Troops assembled at Antwerp—Surrender of Flushing—The English, having wasted their time in taking Flushing, are informed that Antwerp is in a State of Defence, and do not venture to advance—The Fever attacks them with extraordinary violence, and obliges them to withdraw after enormous Losses—Napoleon's Joy on hearing of this Result, particularly on Account of the Negotiations at Altenburg.

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BOOK XXXVI.

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IT was not alone on the banks of the Drave, the Raab, the Danube, and the Vistula, that the French shed their blood during this year of 1809, but also on the Ebro, the Tagus, the Douro, the Scheldt, and on most of the seas of the globe. Everywhere, and almost simultaneously, they were seen lavishing their lives in this terrible conflict between the most ambitious of men, and the most vindictive of nations. Whilst with soldiers scarcely beyond the age of boyhood Napoleon terminated the Austrian war in three months, his generals, left without his guidance, or obtaining from him only a partial attention, and, unhappily, at discord among themselves, could not with the first-rate soldiers get the better of some undisciplined bands, and a handful of well-led English. Thus the Spanish war was endlessly protracted to the detriment of our power, and sometimes even of our glory, and to the confusion of the imperial dynasty.

After having made his troops in Spain perform a winter campaign, and fight, in December and January, the battles of Espinosa, Burgos, Tudela, Molins del Rey, Coruña, and Ucles, Napoleon resolved to grant them one or two months' rest, as necessary for the health of the men and the repairs of *matériel*, after which they should march from the points they had won to

the south of the Peninsula, to complete its subjugation from Lisbon to Cadiz, and from Cadiz to Valencia. The plan he left behind him when he left Valladolid on his way to Austria, and which, however well conceived, could not supply the place of a good general, has been already described; but a brief repetition of it in this place is requisite for the understanding of the operations of 1809.

Marshal Soult, with the Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet divisions, the Lorge and Lahoussaye dragoons, and Franceschi's light horse, making together seventeen regiments of infantry, ten of cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery, was after resting in Galicia from the fatigues endured in the pursuit of the English, to put himself again in motion, cross the Minho at Tuy, advance by Braga to the Douro, take Oporto, and proceed thence to the conquest of Lisbon. Napoleon had hoped that this *corps d'armée*, the nominal strength of which was 46 thousand, would actually furnish about 36 thousand fighting men. This calculation was, unfortunately, erroneous; for, in consequence of losses in wounded, sick, and fatigued, and numerous detachments, it was impossible to bring together more than from 23 thousand to 24 thousand. The orders were to march in February, and arrive at Lisbon in March, so as to take advantage of the mild weather of the early springtide of those regions. Behind marshal Soult was marshal Ney with the brave Marchand and Morice Mathieu divisions, reckoning only 16 thousand fighting men, out of a nominal effective of 33 thousand. His instructions were to remain in Galicia, complete its subjugation, and thus cover the communications of the expeditionary corps in Portugal.

Whilst marshal Soult was invading Portugal, marshal Victor, vanquisher at Espinosa and Ucles, was to quit Madrid with the first corps, consisting of the fine Villatte, Ruffin, and Lapisse divisions, and with twelve regiments of cavalry, and was to advance by a movement to his right, from Talavera to Merida, from the Tagus to the Guadiana, in order to execute in Estremadura and Andalucia a march corresponding to that of marshal Soult in Portugal. As soon as he was assured of Soult's entry into Lisbon, he was to march to Seville, where he would, if necessary, obtain the support of one of Soult's divisions. A besieging apparatus, consisting of short 24-pounders, was prepared for him in Madrid, in order that he might batter the walls of Seville and Cadiz if those capitals were defended. At that time marshal Victor had at hand only two of his three divisions, that of general Lapisse having remained at Salamanca since the concentration of troops which Napoleon had effected in the north against general Moore. Whilst Soult was moving from Tuy to Lisbon, Lapisse had orders to move from Salamanca

to Alcantara, join his superior at Merida, and accompany him into Andalucia. It was supposed that this corps, reinforced by Leval's excellent German division, and nominally amounting to 40 thousand men, would bring 30 thousand into the field, and would be sufficient, with such reinforcements as could be sent to it from Madrid, to command the south of the Peninsula.

King Joseph, having marshal Jourdan for his chief of the staff, was authorised to retain under his immediate orders the five French divisions of Dessoles and Sebastiani, Valence's Polish division, Melhaud's dragoons, and some brigades of light cavalry, forming altogether eleven regiments of foot, seven of horse, and an actual force of 36 thousand men for a nominal one of 50 thousand. In this total were included king Joseph's body guard, the general park, and a multitude of depôts. With this central force the king was to keep Madrid in subjection, afford aid at need to marshal Victor, and, in short, provide for all unforeseen contingencies. General Junot's corps, which had terminated the siege of Saragossa, and was then under the orders of general Suchet, having only 16 thousand men available out of 30 thousand, was to remain at rest in Arragon, keep watch over that province, and finally, if events took a favourable turn, quit it, and advance by way of Cuenca to Valencia. There remained behind, to support it or to guard Arragon, the corps of marshal Mortier, which had not suffered much during the siege of Saragossa, and which, out of 23 thousand men, numbered 18 thousand fit for service. Not having been able to foresee from the very outset what course the war in Germany would run, Napoleon had forbidden that Mortier's corps should be actively employed, and had ordered that it should be kept intact at the foot of the Pyrenees, between Saragossa and Tudela, ready to move to the south of Spain, or back to the Rhine, according to circumstances. General St. Cyr, victorious over the Spaniards at Cardedeu and Molins del Rey, was, with a nominal force of 48 thousand men, 40 thousand in reality, to complete the conquest of Catalonia, by besieging its fortresses. Lastly, the north of Spain, constituting our line of operations, was entrusted to a body of cavalry and a multitude of separate corps, which formed the garrisons of Burgos, Vittoria, Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Bilbao, and Santander, and which might, in case of need, furnish some moveable columns. Since the departure of general Bessières, it was general Kellermann and general Bonnet who commanded these corps, the one in Castille, the other in Biscay. This medley of soldiers of all arms, borrowed from every corps, appointed to do duty in our rear, amounted to 33 thousand or 34 thousand men, from 15 thousand to 18 thousand of whom were capable of full service, and completed a total of 200 thousand fighting men out of the enormous mass of 300 thousand devoted

to the war in the Peninsula. They were, in a great measure, the best troops of France, those that had made the campaigns of the revolution and the empire, and had vanquished Italy, Egypt, Germany, and Russia! To such a pass as this had we been brought by this conquest of Spain, which had been regarded in the beginning as a thing to be settled by a mere *coup de main*. It had lost us our reputation for fair dealing, the prestige of our invincibility, and we were sending to it to perish man by man admirable armies formed by eighteen years years of wars and victories.

Napoleon calculated that these 300 thousand men, whom he did not suppose so much diminished as they really were by fatigue, sickness, and dispersions, would be more than sufficient to subjugate Spain, even though reduced to 200 thousand, since the English would naturally have lost all relish for aiding the Spaniards since the campaign of Coruña. Under vigorous command, these 200 thousand would certainly have been sufficient, although the passion of a whole people in arms against the foreigner is capable of working many miracles; but the authority left by Napoleon at Madrid to interpret his instructions, and cause them to be executed, could not supply the place of his genius, or of his will, or of his ascendancy over men; and the most powerful means were destined to be wrecked, not by the resistance of the Spaniards, but by the military anarchy resulting from his absence.

King Joseph, in fact, though good tempered, rational, and of tolerably well-regulated habits, possessed, as we have said, none of the qualities of a commander, though he had a strong ambition for military glory as a family patrimony. But he had neither activity nor vigour, nor any experience in war, nor, in lieu of experience, any of those superior qualities of mind which make up for the want of it. He had, as we have also said, taken for his Mentor the worthy and discreet marshal Jourdan, to whose judgment he submitted his military plans, but most frequently without hearkening to his advice; and after long oscillating between the marshal and his familiar councillors, he would make up his mind as he could according to the impressions of the moment.

Napoleon, who had discerned his brother's pretensions during the last campaign, derided them at Madrid, and still derided them at Schönbrunn, with those who were going to Spain, or who had arrived from it. He did not like marshal Jourdan on account of his past opinions, and his present ones too, erroneously suspecting him of being the instigator of the somewhat severe judgments past upon him in the new court of Spain. He saw, in the sadness and coldness of that grave person, an entire censure upon his reign; and whilst he jeered at his brother, but could

not jeer at marshal Jourdan, who offered no mark for the shafts of ridicule, he openly depreciated him. Jourdan was the only officer of his own rank and length of service on whom Napoleon had not bestowed one of those opulent recompenses which he lavished on his servants. Sarcasms cast upon the king, and a visible aversion for his major-general, were not the means to raise either in the eyes of the generals who were to obey them. How, indeed, was it to be expected that marshals accustomed only to obey Napoleon, in whom they recognised a genius equal to his power, should obey a brother whom he himself declared to be no soldier, and an old marshal in disgrace, whose talents he denied?

The arrangements made for ensuring the gradation of command, were themselves very ill conceived. Napoleon had certainly stated in his instructions that king Joseph should fill his own place at the head of the armies in Spain; but each of the leaders of corps, marshals or generals, was to correspond directly with Clarke, the minister of war, and receive the orders of the latter for all their operations, so that they considered the authority of king Joseph as purely nominal, and that which had its seat in Paris as alone real. Napoleon, usually so precise in all things, had not been able to bring himself to entrust the effective command to a brother whom he did not deem capable of exercising it, and had, therefore, given him only the form of command, retaining the substance for himself. And however likely it might appear that a command prompted by himself would be preferable to any other, it is not the less true that Joseph's orders, though given without knowledge of war, and without vigour, yet, inasmuch as they were given on the spot, and were better adapted to the actual circumstances of the war, would have produced better results than Napoleon's orders given at a distance of 600 leagues, and no longer answering, when they arrived, to the actual state of things. The best course would have been, for the Emperor to have himself determined the general plan of the campaign, which he alone was capable of conceiving, and then to have left to Joseph's staff the task of commanding, with sovereign authority, the details of the execution. But mild, indulgent, fatherly, and confiding as he showed himself towards prince Eugene, whom he found modest, submissive, and grateful, he was stern, sarcastic, and distrustful towards his brothers, who manifested vanity, indocility, and very little gratitude. He had delegated then only a nominal authority to Joseph, and had thus unintentionally laid the foundation for a pernicious military anarchy in the Peninsula.

Besides these causes of discord there were others equally injurious. The Spanish war, besides being ruinous in men, was so likewise in money. Napoleon having found that he could not

meet the cost, had decided that the army should live upon the country occupied by it. Now Joseph, like king Louis in Holland, and king Murat in Naples, would gladly have made himself popular with his new subjects ; and, in order to gain their affections, he defended them against the French army, which was engaged in the task of conquering them for him. That army, conscious that it had made kings of its general's commonplace brothers, was astonished and indignant to see one of these prefer revolted subjects to soldiers to whom he owed his crown, and who, besides, were his own countrymen. Generals, officers, soldiers, and all, talked in the freest manner of the royalties created by their hands ; and, on the other hand, Joseph's courtiers talked of the French army and its leaders in such terms as the Spaniards themselves might have used. Napoleon had for his representatives at Madrid, M. de Laforêt, ambassador of France ; general Belliard, governor of Madrid ; and M. de Tréville, agent of the treasury for the management of the confiscated wealth of the proscribed families. These several authorities lived in a state of perpetual conflict with the agents of king Joseph. Napoleon, for example, had ordered the incarceration of all the members of the old council of Castille : Joseph had released them, saying that they were prosecuted only in order to get hold of their property. Napoleon had appropriated, by way of war indemnity, the possessions of ten of the greatest families in Spain, as we have seen elsewhere, and had, moreover, seized the wools belonging to the highest grandees in the conquered provinces. The total value of these confiscations did not fall far short of 200 millions of francs. " As for the ten great families," said Joseph, " I must abandon their properties to the Emperor, who has assigned them to himself ; but as for the other more numerous families prosecuted for revolt, their property ought to be left to me, either to restore it to their former owners if they submit, or, if they do not, that I may reward with it those who shall attach themselves to me." As for the wools, Joseph laid claim to a portion of these also, on grounds more or less disputable, alleging, moreover, that he had nothing to give to anybody, that he could not even pay the officers of his household, and that there were in Madrid six thousand domestics of the old grandezza and of the old court, part of whom he might attach to him, and who, for want of the means of subsistence, were exciting the population of the capital against him.

His distress, indeed, was extreme. The French armies in the provinces which they occupied, and the insurrection in those of which it had remained in possession, absorbed the whole produce of the taxes. What the French armies took directly was not sufficient, however, for their support ; for, if they managed to victual and clothe themselves by taking everything in the con-

quered provinces, there remained the general services of the artillery and engineers, both very costly and very important, which could not be provided for without seizing the cattle or the standing crops. Money should have been forthcoming for these services, and none entered the treasury but what was raised in Madrid. By laying hand on all the resources which proscription or confiscation might furnish, Joseph was deprived, as he alleged, of the means of making partisans and of providing for the most indispensable services. He asked that he should at least be allowed to complete a loan begun in Holland on his own account, which promised 15 or 20 millions for the Spanish treasury. On this point alone Napoleon granted his request ; but on every other point he replied to him with refusals, bitterly reproaching him for some acts of munificence to favourites who had not merited anything ; computing, with manifest regret that he had undertaken it, all that the war in Spain had already cost him, and was to cost him further ; for, though the French soldiers were maintained in that country, he had to send them thither clothed, armed, and organised, and to provide them, moreover, with *matériel*, which could not be done without great expense, independently of that incurred for the war in Austria, which was the sequel of that in Spain, and was destined to entail many other burdens on the finances of the empire. Napoleon, therefore, declared he was ruined by his brothers and reduced to the necessity of availing himself of every possible resource. Besides all this, having other wars to occupy him at a distance of six hundred leagues from Madrid, he left the task of settling these disputes to his agents, who behaved with unparalleled insolence, believing themselves, as representatives of the Emperor Napoleon, vastly superior to the mere representatives of king Joseph. Things had been carried to such a pitch as regarded the sequestered estates, that M. de Fréville, having got hold of the keys of the palaces in dispute, refused to allow the agents of the Spanish treasury to enter them, declaring that he was ready to have recourse, if necessary, to the French army to support him in that refusal. To this arrogant declaration king Joseph replied that he would have M. de Fréville put into a postchaise and sent back to France. It may be conceived how much discredit must have been brought upon the new royalty by squabbles such as these, known to everybody in Madrid. Hated by the Spaniards and despised by the French, it was very difficult for it to make itself obeyed by either, and scarcely could the best plans prove successful when executed under the direction of an authority so feeble and so contested.

Though the French forces were immense both in quantity and quality, the resistance was daily becoming more serious. Nowhere had the Spaniards stood their ground in line. At

Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, Molins del Rey, and Ucles, they had thrown away their arms in their flight. The English themselves, orderly and steady soldiers as they were, had been involved in the common defeat, and had been obliged to abandon the Spanish soil in all haste and seek a refuge in their vessels. But neither nation desponded in consequence of the disasters they had sustained. The Spaniards, in their inordinate pride, were incapable of appreciating all the power of the French army, and their ignorance saved them from discouragement. Running away almost without fighting, they suffered little, for it is only defeats in strongly-contested engagements that are deeply felt, and they were ready to recommence indefinitely a war which was disastrous only to the towns, which gratified their intense activity, and corresponded with all their religious and patriotic sentiments. Besides, if they had been for a moment discouraged by their numerous defeats, they had taken heart again on becoming aware of Napoleon's departure and the war in Austria. The junta having retired to Seville, where it was more deeply immersed in the ignorance and fanaticism of the nation, continued to fan the flames of the popular fury. Composed of a mixture of old statesmen incapable of understanding the new circumstances, and of young fanatics incapable of understanding any, and thwarted in countless ways, it directed the war in such fashion as is possible in times of disorder. But it animated exertion, and urged to arms the populations of Valencia, Murcia, Andalucia, and Estremadura, corresponded with the English, and sent incessantly fresh recruits to the armies of the insurrection. England supplied it largely with arms, ammunition, and subsidies. It had reformed the army of the centre, commanded since the battle of Tudela by the duke of Infantado, and since the battle of Ucles by general Cartojal. The army of Estremadura, beaten at Burgos, Somosierra, and Madrid, and having avenged itself by the murder of the unfortunate don Juan Benito, had been recruited and put under the command of old Gregorio de la Cuesta, who seemed to have resumed a certain ascendancy among the Spanish generals, solely because not having yet fought a battle he had not lost one. These two armies, echeloned, the one on the roads to La Mancha, from Odraña to Val de Peñas, the other along the roads of Estremadura, from the bridge of Almaraz to Merida, were to harass Madrid, and withstand the French troops that should attempt to march southwards. In the north of Spain, general de la Romana, who had accompanied the retreat of the English, but had taken the route by Orense, in order to leave that of Vigo open to them, had remained on the frontiers of Portugal, along the Minho, between the Portuguese, elated by their recent deliverance, and the Spaniards of Gallicia, the most obstinate of all the insurgents of

the Peninsula. In this way he kept up a dangerous focus of excitement in the north. In fine, where the French armies were not, there the junta publicly levied soldiers; and where they were, bands of adventurers, hiding in the mountains and the defiles, awaited our convoys of sick and wounded, or of munitions, to slaughter the former and carry off the latter. In the Asturias, general Ballesteros ventured to show himself within a few leagues of general Bonnet. In Arragon, the terrible example of Saragossa had impressed only the unfortunate town itself. In Catalonia, the battles of Cardedeu and Molins del Rey had affected only the army of general Vives, and the miquelets stopped our troops at all the passes, or harassed them at the sieges of Hostalrich, Girona, and Tarragone, which they had to execute one after the other. Though but two months had elapsed since Napoleon's generals, led by himself, had recovered half Spain in half a score of battles, and conquered all before them from the Pyrenees to the Tagus, the news of the war in Austria, propagated and commented in a hundred ways, had re-kindled all hopes, all passions, and converted a momentary terror into an excitement as great as that which had followed the battle of Baylen. It was thought that after having been obliged to quit Spain in person, Napoleon would soon be forced to withdraw his best troops from it, and that it would be easy to dispose of the remainder.

The English, who had been beaten in company with the Spaniards, had, like them too, recovered confidence, and flattered themselves that the withdrawal of our best troops to meet the exigencies of the war in Austria, would allow them to recover the ground they had lost during the two months of Napoleon's presence in the Peninsula.

The army of general Moore, which ought to have perished in its retreat through Galicia, and which, though feebly pursued, had lost its horses, a part of its *matériel*, and a fourth of its effective, had been carried back to the shores of England. There it was recruited with volunteers from the famous militia which had been destined to resist the expedition from Boulogne, but which, since that had ceased to be thought of in England, furnished ample materials for recruiting the regular army. Thus by agitating the whole world Napoleon had everywhere called soldiers into existence. England, rightly thinking that the war in Austria was a last opportunity presented to it by fortune which should by no means be allowed to pass, had resolved to make the greatest efforts in this campaign, to attack Napoleon at all points, and prepare obstacles and perils for him in all quarters. It was her design not only to send another expedition into the Peninsula, notwithstanding the ill success of that under general Moore, but also to organise a formidable one

against the coasts of France, Holland, and Hanover. The unprotected state in which Napoleon had been forced to leave the continental coasts from Bayonne to Hamburg, offered many chances of destroying the great fleets constructed at Rochefort, Lorient, Brest, Cherbourg, and Antwerp. The idea of assailing the Scheldt, and giving to the flames the magnificent dockyards on its banks, particularly occupied the British cabinet, and singularly excited its zeal. The least, indeed, it could do for Austria and for itself was to sweep the European shores with fire and sword, in order to divert from Vienna and Madrid a part of the forces directed against those two capitals. But pending the deliberation on these vast projects of destruction the most urgent object of attention was Spain, which should be succoured promptly lest it should be prostrated before Austria had succeeded in effecting a diversion in its favour. Of the English troops which had taken Portugal from general Junot, and which, being afterwards recruited, had taken part in general Moore's expedition into Castille, a part had remained in the environs of Lisbon, between Alcobaza and Leiria, under the orders of general Cradock. They had been promptly reinforced by detachments from Gibraltar and England; and it was intended further to reinforce them, so as to make of them an army capable of contending with marshal Soult for possession of Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had been the real liberator of Portugal, having been subsequently cleared of all blame with reference to the convention of Cintra, by the court appointed to try its authors, could now be employed without difficulty. His rising fame and his incontestible ability pointed him out as the natural leader of the new expedition. He undertook, he said, with 30 thousand English, 30 thousand Portuguese, and some 40 thousand Portuguese militia, which would cost the British exchequer about 70 or 80 million francs a year, to find occupation for at least 100 thousand enemies, preserve Portugal, and by that means render the situation of the French in Spain for ever precarious. Having weighed the events of the last two campaigns with singular good sense, he had clearly perceived how the English should proceed in the Peninsula; and, in spite of the opinion of those whom the fate of Moore's expedition had deeply dismayed, he affirmed that it would always be possible to re-embark in time, with the sacrifice, at most, of the *matériel* of the army. He even went so far as to point out, almost prophetically, a position in which, protected by the sea and by entrenchments, he would be certain of holding out for several years against the victorious armies of France. The confidence inspired by the sagacious and decided character of this general overcame the repugnance of his government to risk fresh armies in the interior of the Peninsula, especially as his plan consisted in keeping as close to Portugal as pos-

sible, and rendering the situation of the French in Madrid precarious, by reason of the mere presence of the English in Lisbon. It was therefore decided that he should be sent with forces which would raise the British army in Portugal to the number of 30 thousand men, and with resources, in munitions and money, which should make it possible to levy a numerous Portuguese army. The insurrectional enthusiasm of the Portuguese, which had reached the highest pitch since the expulsion of general Junot, gave reason to hope for everything on their part. They hailed the advent of the English with delight, and submitted to their military lessons with a zeal which nothing but the liveliest passion could have inspired.

Such were the changes which had supervened in the Peninsula at the mere announcement of the war in Austria. Submissive as Spain had seemed to be when Napoleon left that country, it now rose up again; forsaken as it had been thought to be by its allies, it was about to be again succoured by the English, and occupied by them, not to be quitted again until the end of the war.

Napoleon's instructions had fixed the month of February as the fit time for marshal Soult's entry into Portugal. He had calculated that the marshal, having arrived at Lisbon in March, would aid marshal Victor to occupy Seville and Cadiz almost at the same time, and that the conquest of the south of the Peninsula would thus be completed before the heat of summer. But events were soon to show that it was easier for him to master Vienna than for his marshals to pass beyond the line of the Tagus and the Douro. Marshal Soult's corps, but just recovered from the fatigues of its march to Coruña, had been collected between St. Jago de Compostello, Vigo, and Tuy, to repair its damages and refit its artillery, to which had been added several pieces of large calibre, to be used if there should be any town wall to breach. In spite of the impatience at head-quarters and Soult's own zeal, the army destined for Portugal could not be made ready to march before the middle of February. It was composed of the Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet divisions, taken from the old corps of marshal Bessières and general Junot, Franceschi's light cavalry, and the Lorge and Lahoussaye dragoons. It amounted to not more than 26 thousand men present under arms, though 30 and some odd thousands had been reckoned upon. Its nominal force had been upwards of 40 thousand, but fatigues, battles, and detachments had reduced it to its present numbers. Everything being ready, marshal Soult marched from Vigo on the 15th of February. His purpose was to cross the Minho, which forms the frontier of Portugal, forcing a passage a little below Tuy, very near the mouth of the river, and to advance by the great coast road from Braga to Oporto. But insurmountable

obstacles prevented this march, which the nature of the localities pointed out as the most obvious one.

The Portuguese, who shared the aversion of the Spaniards for the French, and were most highly encouraged by the expulsion of Junot, had all risen in arms, under the influence of their nobles and their priests. They had barricaded the villages and the towns, blocked up the passes, and appeared resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity. The tocsin was heard in all directions, and the roads were thronged with troops of the populace, led by priests bearing crucifixes in their hands, and nobles brandishing old swords that had long been hung up on their manorial walls. Expecting the arrival of the French, the Portuguese had taken care to collect all the boats on the Minho, and bring them over to their own side of the river. Our light cavalry, scouring the country in all directions, did not find a single boat.

Seeing this, marshal Soult resolved to march down the course of the Minho to the sea, and seize the numerous fishing-boats belonging to the village of Garda, near the mouth of the river. He found there a quantity of boats, which the Portuguese had not had time to remove, and of these he took a number sufficient for the transport of about two thousand men at a time, whom he attempted to send across the river, hoping they would be strong enough to make good their footing against the Portuguese, and establish a communication between the two banks. But as the passage was to be effected over that part of the Minho which was near the sea, the spring gales allowed only three or four boats to cross. Some fifty men at most reached the other side, where they fought bravely, in hopes of being succoured; but they were soon obliged to lay down their arms, and place themselves at the mercy of a ferocious populace.

After this unfortunate attempt, Soult saw no alternative but to ascend the course of the Minho to the mountains, and cross at Orense. He began his march in that direction on the 16th. But in going up the right bank of the Minho he was sure to find in his way la Romana's army, which, as we have seen, had established itself at Orense on separating from the English. That army was not very formidable in itself, but its presence had fired the minds of the whole population on both sides of the frontier, and the two nations so long at enmity with each other exchanged pledges of mutual support and joint resistance to the foreign invaders. The villages on the banks of the river and on the hills had all been barricaded, and were occupied by a fanatical populace. Marshal Soult was preceded in his advance by Lahousaye's dragoons along the river, and by Heudelet's division of infantry on the hills. The dragoons were several times obliged

to dismount, in order to clear a way for themselves, and to force barricades. General Heudelet had many formidable positions to carry, and terrible executions to make. Thus, marching in the midst of obstacles of all kinds, it was not until the 21st that Orense was reached, after having burned, destroyed, and slain a great deal, and also sustained such considerable losses as gave reason to fear that the army would arrive at Lisbon with but half its forces, if at all. In that case it might expect the same ill fate as Junot's, in 1808, for the English could not fail in 1809, as in 1808, to appear soon in the waters of Lisbon.

Had Napoleon inspired his lieutenants with a less blind submission, it would now have been the marshal's duty to foresee the disaster to which he was about to expose himself, and ask for fresh orders before venturing into a wild country, where at every step he would have to fight with a bloodthirsty population, and so arrive, spent and enfeebled, before the English army, one of the finest regular armies in Europe. He would, no doubt, have much displeased Napoleon by thus contravening his projects, but much less, assuredly, than by bringing him back, two months afterwards, a beaten and disorganised army.

Be this as it may, after having driven *la Romana's* partisans before him beyond Orense, Soult resolved to turn to the right, cross the Minho, and enter Portugal by the province of *Tras-os-Montes*. His intention was to direct his march to *Chaves*, and thence to *Braga*, so as to arrive, after a long detour, upon the high road from *Tuy* to *Oporto*, which he had before been unable to reach. As for the Spanish general *de la Romana*, driven back from Orense on *Villafranca*, he conceived the design of extricating himself by a stolen march worthy of a partisan leader. Upper *Gallicia*, which is conterminous with the kingdom of *Leon*, was open at that moment, marshal *Soult* having evacuated it to invade Portugal, and marshal *Ney* having quitted it to sweep the coast. It might be reached by passing through the French chain of advanced posts, which connected the troops of the two marshals with those of Old *Castille*. *La Romana* resolved to do so, were it only for the sake of the great confusion to be thereby caused in our line of communication, purposing to take refuge afterwards in the *Asturias*, if marshal *Ney* came back to pursue him.

Whilst the Spanish general was about to cause the French this disagreeable surprise, Soult made his arrangements for crossing the province of *Tras-os-Montes*. He had already more than 800 sick and wounded in consequence of his first operations. A part of his artillery horses were in a very bad state, from the severity of the roads and want of fodder. He resolved, therefore, to disencumber himself of whatever would too much impede his march, and he sent his sick and wounded and his heavy artillery

to Tuy, of which he was master, purposing, when he should have reached Braga, to have them conveyed thither by the direct and very short road to that town from Tuy. He sent then to Tuy 36 pieces of artillery, and about two thousand men, and took with him 22 guns, well horsed and provided with the necessary ammunition. On the 4th of March he crossed the frontier of Portugal, and intimated, in his despatches to Madrid, that he should soon be at Oporto.

The population of that part of Portugal was gathered round Chaves, with some militia and some detachments of regular troops, under generals Sylveira and Bernardin Frère. These generals, whose instructions had been dictated from the English head-quarters, had orders not to give battle, but to harass the French incessantly, and kill as many as possible in every defile, and at the passage of every village. In consequence of these instructions, after having disputed the road from Orense to Chaves, the two Portuguese generals would rather not have stopped in the latter town and uselessly endangered a part of their forces for its defence; but they were forced to obey the wishes of the insurgent populace, and to leave a detachment in Chaves to garrison it along with the latter. They then retired to Braga.

Arriving before Chaves after many conflicts, marshal Soult beheld a furious multitude, composed of peasants, priests, women, and soldiers, bellowing threats and curses from the top of the town walls. Such a fanatic mob might suffice to surprise a convoy, or cut the throats of wounded men, but was incapable of stopping 24 thousand French soldiers, led by able officers. Marshal Soult having threatened to put to the sword all who resisted, the town of Chaves was given up to him half-depopulated. He found in it artillery without carriages, and a considerable quantity of ammunition. A small citadel useful as a security against the populace, adjoined the town. He took advantage of it to leave, under the protection of a small garrison, the sick and wounded whom the march from Orense to Chaves had already disabled from proceeding further. Such is the sad condition of every offensive operation in the midst of insurgent populations, when these are fierce and resolved to defend themselves. Every sick or wounded man requires an able-bodied soldier to guard him, and a war of posts being that which puts the most men *hors de combat*, it may easily be conceived what soon becomes of regular armies in an invasion of some extent and duration.

Marshal Soult proceeded from Chaves to Braga, descending towards the shore through as long a space as he had ascended towards the mountains, in his march from Tuy to Orense. During the march, the Franceschi cavalry and the Mermet infantry, which formed the head of the army, had many impedi-

ments to overcome. In many narrow passes, where the columns were forced to lengthen themselves out in order to defile, and where the artillery had the greatest difficulty in making its way, they were assailed by swarms of insurgents from the adjacent mountains, and exposed to be cut off and destroyed before the rear of the columns could succour the van. The divisions were constantly separated from each other on their march by dense masses of enemies. At last, killing insurgents all the way, and burdened with more and more wounded, the invading army arrived before Braga on the 17th of March. General Frère was in possession there with 17 or 18 thousand men, partly regular troops, partly armed peasants. Wishing to fall back on Oporto, according to his instructions, without risking a battle, he was assailed by the populace, and murdered, with several of his officers, *to serve as an example to traitors*, as his soldiers said. A Hanoverian officer who succeeded him, made some arrangements for battle for the next day, the 18th; but the populace that murders is not apt to defend itself against old soldiers. Marshal Soult attacked and carried the post of Braga without difficulty, and with a loss of not more than 40 killed and 160 wounded. We lost more men in storming the villages along the march. Our soldiers made few prisoners, thanks to the excellent legs of the Portuguese; but all who were caught before they could run away were killed on the spot. Some thousands of dead and dying strewed the environs of Braga. The war thus assumed an atrocious character; for, in order to disgust that ferocious population with cruelty, it was necessary to become almost as ferocious as themselves.

Master of Braga, marshal Soult had won only a town; but he had acquired something better: viz., the direct road from Tuy, by which he might bring up the *matériel* left behind. The whole population around him was up in arms, and more furious than ever. Some Frenchmen, who had fallen into the hands of the insurgents, had been horribly mutilated by women, and their torn remains polluted the road from Braga. At the same time it was ascertained that the dépôt left at Tuy was blockaded, and in danger of being taken if not promptly succoured. After availing himself of the resources of Braga, which the fugitive population had not been able to carry off or destroy, Soult pursued his march to Oporto, leaving general Heudelet's division to garrison Braga, guard the wounded, *échelon* the road, and succour the dépôt at Tuy.

Some resistance was encountered at the passage of the river Ave, but it was overcome, and our men drove the Portuguese before them, who there again, by way of avenging themselves on a victorious enemy, murdered one of their generals, the brigadier Vallongo. They then fell back on Oporto, with the intention

of sustaining a general battle under its walls, where they assembled to the number of 60 thousand, including regular soldiers, peasants, and others of the populace. Their general-in-chief, well worthy of such an army, was the bishop of Oporto, who commanded in his episcopal vestments. The insurgent populace, much more alarming to the peaceful inhabitants than to the enemy, had made themselves absolute masters of Oporto, which they oppressed, obeying none but the bishop, and him only when he commanded in accordance with the popular passions. They had thrown into prison a number of French families, whose houses they had pillaged, and whom they threatened with death if marshal Soult attempted to enter Oporto. General Foy, whose excessive temerity had caused him to be taken in a *reconnaissance*, was among the prisoners thus exposed to extreme peril. Much more occupied in committing cruelties than in erecting defensive works, the Portuguese had hastily thrown up some redoubts in the form of a semicircle, which embraced the town of Oporto, and abutted at each extremity upon the Douro. A bridge connected the town, situated on the right bank by which we arrived, with the faubourgs on the left bank. The Portuguese works were badly devised, but mounted 200 guns of large calibre, and presented an obstacle not easily to be surmounted, if defended even by middling troops. But though reckoning 60 thousand men, including soldiers and volunteers, and though protected by entrenchments and 200 pieces of cannon, the Portuguese army, with its bishop-general, was not capable of withstanding the 20 thousand Frenchmen that remained to marshal Soult.

The latter having arrived on the 27th of March before Braga, was struck, but not intimidated, by the difficulties he had to overcome. He had no doubt he should surmount them all with the soldiers and the officers he commanded ; but he foresaw that the opulent town of Oporto, the most commercially important in the country, would be sacked, and he would fain have spared Portugal, humanity, and his own army, that calamity. Accordingly, he summoned the place by means of a letter, in which he appealed to the reason of its leaders, and he awaited a reply, regardless of the balls cast into his bivouacs by the heavy artillery of the town.

His overtures, as might have been expected, were of no avail, and he resolved to make the assault on the 29th of March. With such an enemy as he had before him, he had but to make one brisk and vigorous attack to carry the entrenchments of Oporto, formidable as they seemed. Having formed his troops out of range of the artillery, the marshal marched rapidly in three columns ; the right under general Merle, the centre under generals Mermet and Lahoussaye, the left under generals Dela-

borde and Franceschi. The word being given, the cavalry galloped forward and swept away the enemy's advanced posts; then the infantry assailed the entrenchments, covered with a furious multitude that did not obey, and whom the cannon filled with rage but not with valour. The entrenchments were all rapidly carried, and our columns drove the fugitive multitude before them at the bayonet point into the streets of Oporto, which soon presented but a scene of frightful confusion. General Delaborde, traversing the streets at quick step, reached the bridge of boats over the Douro, which connected the main town with the faubourgs. The enemy's cavalry, mixed up with the fugitive population, crowded to the bridge, and encountered the fire of grape, which the Portuguese discharged from the opposite side to stop the French. The bridge gave way under the pressure, and sank with all it carried. The French suspended their march for a while, in presence of this horrible spectacle, then re-established the bridge, and galloped over it in pursuit of the fugitives. On the right, a body of Portuguese, driven by general Merle to the Douro, plunged into it, hoping to escape by swimming, but perished almost to a man. Another body, having attempted to defend themselves in the bishop's mansion, were all destroyed there. Ere long, the hot blood of the French being stirred up by the fight, they gave way to those excesses which usually follow the taking of a place by storm, and spread themselves through the town to plunder. They behaved at Oporto as they had done at Cordova; but in the former place, as in the latter, our officers humanely exerted themselves to the utmost to restrain the fury of the soldiers, and strove to save the drowning wretches in the river. Marshal Soult did his best to restore order, and to give his conquest the character that becomes a civilised people. This important attack cost him but 300 or 400 men, whilst the killed, wounded, and drowned on the Portuguese side, amounted to 9 or 10 thousand. The marshal captured also 200 pieces of cannon.

The stores found in Oporto were considerable, and of great value to the army. They included abundance of provisions and ammunition, a vast *matériel* of war brought by the English, and innumerable boats laden with choice wines. Marshal Soult immediately took measures for the orderly disposal of this booty, so that the army might want for nothing, and that the population might gradually recover confidence, and become accustomed to their victors. But their rage against us was at its acme. The whole rural population beyond the Douro had joined the beaten people of Oporto and the English, who then occupied the road to Lisbon. Our army, reduced to a bare 20 thousand men, had already detached one of its divisions to Braga; it was now obliged to detach another to Amarante, above Oporto, in order to guard

the upper course of the Douro. Thus it was forced to divide itself, whilst it needed all its combined strength to resist the English. The position was becoming so critical as to require great ability on the part of the general-in-chief, whether to maintain his ground in Portugal, if that were possible, or to quit it without disaster, if he should have to retreat before greatly superior numbers. Marshal Soult declared himself governor-general of Portugal, did what he could to appease the people, gave orders on his rear to march from Braga, and raise the blockade of the depôt in Tuy, and sent several officers to Madrid by the route he had traversed, to make known the critical position in which he was certain to find himself ere long. It was probable—and this was precisely one of the dangers of this situation—that none of the officers he despatched could reach his destination. General La Romana was the cause of this interruption of communications. Neglected by marshal Soult, who had not thought of destroying him before entering Portugal, and favoured by the absence of marshal Ney, who had been constrained to descend to the coast to hinder the communications of the English from Ferrol to Vigo, the Spanish general had invaded the mountain region which forms Upper Galicia and the frontier of the kingdom of Leon. By his personal influence, and by spreading news from Austria, he had roused the people of the north, whom the campaign of November and December had terrified for a while. The departure of the imperial guard, which had now begun its march to the Danube, was a further encouragement to the revival of the insurrectionary spirit. Thus, Ney on the coast, and Soult in Oporto, were separated as it were from the rest of Spain by a vast insurrection, which did not grow into an army, but which sufficed to slaughter our sick and wounded and our couriers, and often to stop the best escorted convoys.

Since the 24th of February nothing was known at Madrid of what had become of marshal Soult; but relying on the strength of his *corps d'armée*, and on his military experience, they had no doubts at head-quarters of his success, and they calculated in what places he was likely to be from the number of days that had elapsed. Having received word from him that he should arrive at Oporto in the beginning of March, whereas he had not been able to reach it before the 29th of that month, it had been supposed that he would soon be at Lisbon, that he would of course be surrounded there with many difficulties, and the necessity of at last sending off marshal Victor to the south of the Peninsula was talked of, in order that he might draw off a portion of the enemy, who would otherwise fall *en masse* on the army in Portugal. Certainly nothing could be more reasonable, under all contingencies, for the English and the Portuguese, as

the event proved, could not be indifferent to the march of a French army on Merida and Badajoz.

Orders were therefore repeated from Joseph's headquarters to marshal Victor to execute that part of the imperial instructions which concerned him. To this he offered some objections, founded upon the dispersed state of his corps. He had, in fact, at hand only the Villatte and Ruffin divisions. Lapisse's was still at Salamanca, and he saw that before it could cross all Estremadura to rejoin him, it would perhaps be detained for the service of Castille or Portugal; that he would then have, including even Leval's German division, at most 23 thousand men, which would be too small a force to invade Andalusia, where general Dupont had been defeated with at least an equal number of soldiers. He was told in answer, that express orders had been sent to the Lapisse division to follow him, and that with the cavalry which had been given him, and with Leval's division, he would have 24 thousand men—a force sufficient to begin his offensive movement, the more so as he was sure to have the Lapisse division soon with him, and to be seconded by a *corps d'armée*, which was about to march from Madrid through la Mancha to the Sierra Morena. There were good grounds for being peremptory with marshal Victor, for, besides the necessity of effecting a movement to the south, parallel with that of marshal Soult, there was another motive of not less urgency for acting in that direction, namely, to hinder the Spanish general Gregorio de la Cuesta from establishing himself on the left of the Tagus, opposite the bridge of Almaraz. Having been for a month past left too much at liberty in that quarter, Gregorio de la Cuesta had occupied the left of the Tagus, destroyed the main arch of the bridge of Almaraz, and posted himself strongly on the steep hills bordering the river, whence it would be impossible to dislodge him, if steps to that end were not taken in time.

Pressed by these considerations, and by the reiterated orders he had received, marshal Victor began his movement in the middle of March. The old fourth corps, placed the preceding year under the orders of marshal Lefebvre, was partly reconstituted under general Sebastiani, and directed towards Ciudad Real, in order to effect a movement in la Mancha corresponding to that of marshal Victor in Estremadura, and draw after it the army of Cartojal, whilst the marshal himself was to deal with that of Gregorio de la Cuesta. The fourth corps, previously composed of the Sebastiani divisions, Leval's Germans, and Valence's Poles, was formed of the same divisions, with the exception of the Germans, who had been transferred to marshal Victor. Milhaud's dragoons made up its numbers to 12 or 13 thousand men.

The first thing marshal Victor had to consider, was how to cross the Tagus. The Talavera and the Arzobispo bridges could not serve his purpose, since they did not abut on the main road of Estremadura, by Truxillo and Merida. The right point was Almaraz, and the old bridge, a vast and magnificent structure of ancient times, had had its main arch, of more than a hundred feet span, broken down. Materials being everywhere deficient in Spain for want of internal trade, marshal Victor knew not how to set about constructing a bridge, and he was no further advanced in that part of his task in the middle of March than in the beginning of February. Some help was sent him from Madrid, and also general Lery and Senarmont, who, after great efforts, succeeded in making a bridge of boats fit for the passage of heavy artillery. On the 15th of March marshal Victor marched from Talavera with his corps, which, previously to the arrival of the Lapisse division, comprised the French divisions of Villatte and Ruffin, Leval's German division, Lasalle's light cavalry, and Latour Maubourg's dragoons, forming a total of 23 or 24 thousand men, of whom 15 to 16 thousand were infantry, 6 thousand cavalry, and 2 thousand artillery. To facilitate the operation, the marshal crossed the Tagus in three columns. Lasalle and Leval passed over the Talavera bridge, Villatte and Ruffin that of the Arzobispo, whilst Latour Maubourg, with the heavy artillery, descended the left bank of the river to Almaraz, where the most cumbrous part of the *matériel* was to cross. The first two columns, composed of light cavalry and infantry, were to dislodge Gregorio de la Cuesta from his position on the cliffs, and, having done so, rejoin the cavalry of the line and the siege artillery before Almaraz.

These arrangements were executed with as much judgment as they were conceived. Leval's Germans behaving like allies worthy of the French under whose eyes they fought, arrived on the other side of the Tagus before cliffs of difficult ascent, where the dexterity of the Spanish infantry, and their obstinate valour when fighting behind any cover, enjoyed the greatest advantages. They dislodged them, nevertheless, drove them from rock to rock, as far as the Mesa de Ibor, took from them seven pieces of cannon, and killed or wounded a thousand of them. During this time the brave Villatte division debouching after the Germans by the bridge del Arzobispo, supported their movement, taking up a position at Fresnedoso and Deleytosa, after several sharp and successful conflicts. This combined march having cleared the main road of Estremadura, Latour Maubourg's dragoons were enabled to present themselves before the bridge of Almaraz, the restoration of which was just on the point of being completed, and rendered practicable for the heaviest burdens. This was a necessary precaution, for, by Napoleon's orders, some

24-pounders and mortars had been annexed to Victor's corps, in order to batter the walls of Seville if they were defended.

General Gregorio de la Cuesta, who had counted on the natural impediments on the left bank of the Tagus for resisting the movement of the French, retreated to Truxillo on the 19th of March, and from Truxillo to Merida, intending to make another stand behind the Guadiana. Marshal Victor followed him with his light cavalry and his infantry, though his dragoons and his heavy artillery had not yet entirely crossed the Almaraz bridge. The duke del Parque brought up the enemy's rear guard with cavalry. The brave and intelligent Lasalle,* vigorously pursuing the Spaniards, charged them wherever he had an opportunity, and took 200 horse from them in one encounter. Unfortunately, the 10th chasseurs suffered themselves to be surprised next day, and lost sixty-two men, whom the Spaniards, after having killed them, mutilated in the most atrocious manner. Finding on their way these sad proofs of Spanish ferocity, our soldiers swore to revenge their companions in arms, and fearfully did they keep their words some days afterwards, as we shall see.

So long as the passage of the bridge of Almaraz was not completed, marshal Victor could not advance resolutely to the Guadiana. That operation having been terminated on the 25th of March, and Latour Maubourg's dragoons having come up with the marshal, he moved to the banks of the Guadiana and crossed it at Medellin. At that point he was obliged to detach some infantry and cavalry to guard his rear, and check the gatherings formed behind him in the wild mountains he had traversed. He left at Truxillo some Dutchmen detached from the Leval division, and deprived himself of two regiments of dragoons; the one to observe the Merida road, the other to watch the mountains of Guadalupe, which were infested with guerillas. These detachments being sent away, there remained to him not more than from 18 to 19 thousand men; but these were such choice troops, that there was no reason to be uneasy at the smallness of their numbers.

Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who affected a superiority over the junta and his companions in arms, which the latter had not acknowledged at first, but which was now conceded to him in consequence of the disasters which had befallen the other generals, could not prolong his retreat without being put on a level with those he assumed a right to despise. Besides, one step more would have lost him the line of the Guadiana after that of the

* The same we have seen in the preceding volume figuring with distinction, and meeting a glorious death on the banks of the Danube. He left Spain at the end of March, after the passage of the Tagus and the battle of Medellin.

Tagus, and would have uncovered Seville, the capital of the insurrection, the last asylum of Spanish fidelity. Being informed that marshal Victor had weakened himself on the march, being himself reinforced by the Albuquerque division, which had been detached from the army of the centre, and thus being at the head of 36 thousand men, the best organised in Spain, he thought himself in a condition to give battle, for he had just double the force of his adversary. Accordingly, he posted himself behind the Guadiana, a little beyond the small torrent of the Ortigosa, in a tolerably advantageous position, to receive the French. He could not have done anything that was more favourable to them, or which better suited their tastes or their interests.

Master of Medellin, which he entered without impediment, marshal Victor had assured possession of the Guadiana, and proceeded beyond it without inconvenience. Having crossed that river on the morning of the 28th, he soon discovered on his left the Spanish army, partly concealed by the form of the ground, and appearing rather disposed to advance than to retreat. He rejoiced greatly at this, and resolved to meet it forthwith. To do this it was necessary to cross the torrent of the Ortigosa, which falls into the Guadiana a little above Medellin, which he did with two-thirds of his army. He left the Ruffin division on the hither side of the torrent, at the bridge, to confront a strong detachment which appeared on that side, and advanced with Lasalle, the Germans, what remained of the Latour Maubourg dragoons, the artillery, and the Villatte division; the whole amounting to about 12 thousand men. Beyond the Ortigosa was discovered a very extensive plateau, somewhat elevated on our right, sinking down towards the left, and ending in a plain near don Benito. Nothing was discerned but the very edge of the plateau, and the part of the Spanish army stationed on it. The rest was hidden by the declivity of the ground. Marshal Victor promptly made his arrangements.

To the right he sent forward Latour Maubourg, two German battalions, and ten pieces of cannon, supported by the 94th of the line of Villatte's division. These troops were to carry the plateau, and rout the portion of the Spanish army seen on it. Towards the left, where the ground sank down to don Benito, and where also very dense masses of Spaniards were perceived, the marshal contented himself with despatching Lasalle with his light cavalry, and the two German battalions which remained with him. In the centre he placed the 63rd and 95th of the Villatte division in close columns, and the 27th light infantry a little to the right to connect them with Ruffin. He then gave Latour Maubourg the word to advance, waiting the result of this first attack before making further arrangements.

The Germans steadily ascended the plateau, followed by their

ten guns and Latour Maubourg's five squadrons of dragoons. No sooner had these troops reached the top of the plateau, than they discovered the ground in its whole extent, and the Spanish army covering it in the distance. On our right was seen a certain portion of infantry and cavalry, but on the left was perceived the bulk of the Spanish army marching *en masse* against Lasalle's small force, with the evident intention of cutting us off from the Guadiana.

At this sight, our troops on the right dashed forward to the attack. The Germans, after driving back the Spanish sharpshooters, brought forward their ten pieces of cannon, which were calculated to produce much effect on the even slope of the plateau. As soon as the Spanish infantry saw our artillery, they opened upon us a hasty, but confused and ill-directed, fire. Our brave artillerymen coolly advanced to within thirty or forty paces of the Spanish infantry, and swept it with grape; a sort of treatment it was not much accustomed to. Gregorio de la Cuesta then ordered his cavalry to charge our cannoniers, and sabre them at their guns; but such things were not to be done by Spanish cavalry against French artillery. The Spaniards, already shaken by the grape, and intimidated by the sight of Latour Maubourg's dragoons, advanced sluggishly, and with a foreboding of defeat. No sooner had they approached our pieces, than a charge in flank by a squadron of dragoons sufficed to make them wheel round, and ride down their own infantry in their headlong flight. Gregorio de la Cuesta, who had more pride than ability, but whose bravery equalled his pride, threw himself into the midst of his troops, and made ineffectual efforts to keep them on the field of battle. Latour Maubourg's five squadrons, overthrowing all before them, put to flight the infantry as well as the cavalry, and followed up the left of the Spanish line along the declivity to don Benito. The brave Latour Maubourg, knowing that the only way of dealing effectually with the Spaniards was to make them feel the point of the sabre, pursued them relentlessly, being supported by the 94th of the line.

But whilst all was ended on the right, so that not a single enemy was left standing, it was not so in the centre and the left; things were even becoming critical there. Whilst the Spanish left was running as fast as their legs could carry them, their centre and their right, at least 27 or 28 thousand strong, were advancing *en masse* against Lasalle's 3 or 4 thousand men, consisting, as we have said, of some regiments of light cavalry and two battalions of German infantry. Lasalle, behaving with equal coolness and intelligence, checked with timely charges the detachments of Spanish infantry which showed more boldness than the rest, and thus retarded the movement of the mass. But with their customary audacity, when they believed themselves

victorious, the Spaniards marched resolutely, shouting and threatening with certain annihilation the handful of French before them, and deeming the destruction of our army infallible if they succeeded in making themselves masters of the Guadiana. Though such a hope was very presumptuous, since we had the whole Ruffin division in our rear guarding the line of the Ortigosa and the town of Medellin, nevertheless the battle might be lost if decisive measures were not promptly taken. It was certainly too much to have left the Ruffin division on the hither side of the Ortigosa, to withstand some insignificant skirmishers, but with the three remaining regiments of Villatte's division, and the troops which Latour Maubourg had not taken with him in his adventurous pursuit, there were still means at hand for inflicting a heavy blow upon the Spaniards. Marshal Victor, with great presence of mind, took all the measures likely to conduce to that end. He ordered two of Villatte's regiments, the 63rd and the 95th, to move to the right, and deploy there, in order to stop the mass of the Spaniards. He ordered the Germans to perform the same manœuvre, and Lasalle to charge the Spaniards after they had been stopped by the infantry. Two German battalions, and the ten cannoons which had not accompanied Latour Maubourg, remained on our right on the platform. He ordered them to throw themselves, by a sudden conversion from right to left, against the flank of the Spaniards, and pour upon them a double fire of grape and musketry. Lastly, he ordered Latour Maubourg and the 94th to suspend their pursuit, and avail themselves of the too precipitate movement which placed them on the rear of the enemy to attack them on that side and complete their destruction.

These measures, ordered *à propos* and vigorously executed, were completely successful. The Spaniards, who were advancing with blind confidence, were surprised by the deployment of Villatte's two regiments. This movement, steadily executed, although in presence of troops very superior in numbers, and followed by a well-sustained fire, checked the Spaniards, who, not being able to discover whether they had before them the whole French army, or two regiments only, began to march less rapidly, and to fire awkwardly, confusedly, and without effect. Taking advantage of their hesitation, Lasalle charged them, and flung several of their routed battalions in disorder one upon the other. At the opposite wing, at the same moment, the ten pieces of cannon of our right opened their fire, which being pointed from above, downwards on a dense mass, did terrible havoc. Much less would have been sufficient to put to flight those raw troops, which had more impetuosity than steadiness under fire. They quickly gave way; and presently being surprised in their rear by Latour Maubourg, whose error thus became a happy incident in the battle,

they were seized with a panic impossible to describe. In an instant they broke their ranks, and fled in immense disorder. But Lasalle and Latour Maubourg were so placed as to do such execution as could be done on Spaniards only by hindering them from flying. Charging the dense mass with 3 thousand horse in opposite directions, they sabred them without mercy ; and full of the recollection of the sixty-two chasseurs butchered a few days previously, they gave no quarter. The cavalry was not the only arm in a position to touch the Spaniards. The 94th, placed far in their rear, was able to reach a good number of them with their bayonets, and did not spare them. In less than an hour 9 or 10 thousand dead or wounded lay on the ground. Four thousand prisoners remained in our power, with sixteen pieces of cannon, forming the whole Spanish artillery, and a great quantity of flags.

This battle, subsequently designated that of Medellin, did equal honour to our soldiers and to their general. It was in reality fought by 12 thousand men against 36 thousand, and it remained one of the most bloody *souvenirs* of that period, for never had more decisive results been obtained. The unfortunate Gregorio de la Cuesta could not have got together a single battalion in the evening. This fine exploit filled the commander of the first corps with confidence; and whereas a fortnight previously he hesitated to advance from the Tagus to the Guadiana, he immediately wrote to king Joseph that he was ready to advance from the Guadiana to the Guadalquivir, from Merida to Seville, provided the movement of the Lapisse division to join him was accelerated. He sent his prisoners to Madrid; but of the 4 thousand not more than half reached their destination. He encamped his infantry on the banks of the Guadiana, from Medellin to Merida, that it might live the more at ease, and sent his cavalry abroad to disperse the guerillas, and keep the region around him in awe. The season was then superb (March 28). The country was not yet exhausted, and our soldiers were able to enjoy the fruits of their victory quite at their ease.

Whilst marshal Victor was gaining this important victory on the road to the south, general Sebastiani performing a similar movement through la Mancha, obtained corresponding advantages proportioned to the strength of his corps. With his fine French division, general Valence's Poles, and Milhaud's dragoons, he had from 12 to 13 thousand men against Cartojal's 16 or 17 thousand, representing the old army of the centre, beaten under Castaños at Tudela, and under the duke del Infantado at Ueles. He had advanced beyond the Tagus by Ocaña and Consuegra to Ciudad Real, at the same time that Victor had marched from Almaraz to Truxillo and Medellin.

Having arrived on the 20th at the Guadiana, he sent general Milhaud, who was considerably in advance of the infantry, across the river. Milhaud having made himself master of the bridge, drove the Spanish army some leagues beyond it up to the walls of Ciudad Real. Perceiving that Milhaud was not supported, and that he had only his dragoons with him, the Spaniards plucked up courage and retraced their steps. General Milhaud fell back ably and steadily on the Guadiana, vigorously charging those that pressed too closely upon him. Having made his way back without loss to the bridge which he had rashly crossed, he blocked it up, and stationed on it some dismounted dragoons to defend it.

General Sebastiani having arrived on the following day, the 27th, at once resumed the offensive. He pushed forward the dragoons and the Polish lancers across the bridge to make the Spanish army evacuate the ground. He then defiled with his whole infantry, and forming it into an attacking column at the moment it passed the bridge, he assailed the Spaniards before they were well recovered from the charges of the French cavalry. In the twinkling of an eye they were routed by the magnificent regiments of the Sebastiani division, which had made the campaigns of Austria, Prussia, and Poland, and which no soldiery was capable of withstanding. The Spaniards fled in disorder to Ciudad Real, leaving behind them their artillery, 2 thousand killed and wounded, and nearly 4 thousand prisoners. General Milhaud passed beyond Ciudad Real, and pursued them to Almagro. Next day the French advanced to the Sierra Morena, to the mouths of those same defiles which had witnessed general Dupont's disaster, and took another thousand prisoners and 800 wounded. Thus on those days of the 27th and 28th of March, which were those of marshal Soult's arrival before Oporto, we inflicted a loss of 7 or 8 thousand men on the army of the centre, and 13 or 14 thousand on the army of Estremadura; and we should have deprived them of all confidence, had not the Spaniards been possessed with that singular presumption which makes men lose battles, but hinders them also from feeling that they have lost them.

The two brilliant victories we have narrated filled the court of Madrid with joy, and somewhat brightened the sombre picture it drew of its situation. Joseph hoped soon to become master of the south of Spain by marshal Victor's march on Seville, and by that of marshal Suchet on Valencia, which he never ceased urgently demanding. He renewed the order to general Lapisse to move from Salamanca to Merida, for the junction of his division with marshal Victor was indispensable to any further success on the part of the latter. Joseph even supposed that marshal Victor's appearance in the southern provinces would be sufficient

to bring them all under subjection. He had with him the famous M. de Morla, so arrogant towards the French at the period of Baylen, so humble at that of the taking of Madrid, unjustly accused of treachery by his countrymen, guilty only of interested versatility, and now seeking under the new royalty a refuge against the injustice of the partisans of the old. M. de Morla had numerous connexions in Andalucia, who encouraged king Joseph to hope for the speedy submission of that province, which they represented as disgusted with the government of the junta, and weary of the domination of the generals, the tyranny of the populace, and the overwhelming burdens imposed on it by the war. Filled for a while with such illusions, Joseph wrote to Napoleon that he hoped to be able soon to give him back 50 thousand of his fine troops to be employed in Austria.

It is certain that in any other country two battles like those of Medellin and Ciudad Real would have decided a campaign, and perhaps a war. But the Spaniards were not so easily discouraged. The junta voted rewards to all those who had fought well or ill, did not disgrace Gregorio de la Cuesta—for the system of repairing defeats by disgracing generals was beginning to be discredited—sent him reinforcements, and again addressed a manifesto to Spain and all nations, denouncing what it called the criminal enterprise of the French against the legitimate royalty. The people, responding to its zeal, was not less prompt to rise wherever it was not immediately under the hand of the French ; so that, in reality, the advanced movement of general Sebastiani and marshal Victor on the Guadiana was rather an aggravation of difficulties than an advantage. Several posts were actually taken on the road to Ciudad Real. The town of Toledo, seeing marshal Victor within twenty or thirty leagues of it, was near rising. The inhabitants of the mountains, from Salamanca to Talavera, flooded the banks of the Tietar and the Tagus with guerillas, so as even to menace the bridge of Almaraz. But a few days had elapsed since the two victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real, when it became necessary to send the adjutant-commandant Mocquery from Madrid with 500 men, to keep down Toledo, and the adjutant-commandant Bagneris with 600 men to guard the bridge of Almaraz. Lastly, it was necessary to repair the little forts of Consuegra and Manzanares, in order to *échelon* general Sebastiani's line of communication with Madrid. Thus, in that strange country, victories, by multiplying the points to be guarded, and by producing only a moral effect, soon forgotten, weakened rather than strengthened the victor.

It was in the north, especially, that the evil began to be seriously felt. Marshal Ney, always active and energetic, had conceived the desire and the hope of subduing Galicia, never imagining that his two fine divisions, which had vanquished the

Russian armies, could be beaten by fanatic mountaineers, who could do nothing but run away, so long as they had not some defile or some house where they could fight under cover. He was soon undeceived. Having more than a hundred leagues of coast to guard, from Cape Ortegal to the mouth of the Minho—having to defend points like Ferrol and Coruña, to hinder the English from communicating with the inhabitants, and to keep down centres of population, such as St. Jago de Compostello, Vigo, Tuy, and Orense—he had been obliged to descend with his whole corps to the coast—consequently, to abandon his communication with Old Castille, and even to ask for aid, instead of being able, as had been hoped at first, to master the whole north of Spain by himself alone. Certainly this was not what might have been expected of a corps so insured to war, and so well commanded as his; nor was it that he had been deficient in ability or energy; but difficulties had multiplied round him without end. Marshal Soult, having had a passing brush with la Romana's corps, and having given himself no more concern about it, that general had traversed the country between Galicia and Leon, surprised a French battalion left at Villa Franca, and roused the people to arms wherever he appeared. At last he threw himself into the Asturias, which general Bonnet could not keep in order with only two regiments. It was to make head against these difficulties that marshal Ney had been obliged to rush hither and thither, nowhere finding insurgents, however fanatic they were, who could resist his terrible impetuosity, but always seeing them reappear in his rear when he had beaten them in front. Thus, whilst he had detached general Maurice Mathieu to Mondonedo, to make head against the Asturians, he had been compelled to send general Marchand to St. Jago de Compostello, to destroy 1500 insurgents who had established themselves there. He had then been obliged to hurry to the ports of Villa Garcia and Carcil, and burn them, to keep off the English. Then, learning that the Portuguese insurgents were besieging the depôt of artillery left by marshal Soult at Tuy, he had hastened thither, and had some severe fighting to raise the blockade, which was effected just when general Heudelet was preparing to march thither. In these various encounters marshal Ney had killed more than 6 thousand Spaniards, and taken 22 pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of *matériel* furnished by the English, without sensibly diminishing the hostile tendencies of the population. What will appear still more strange was, that marshal Ney, though placed on marshal Soult's line of march, had received no news of him, except through the column he had sent to Tuy, which had there met with that of general Heudelet, and thus learned that Soult's force had not been able to enter Oporto until the 29th, by torchlight. As for marshal Ney himself, nothing

was known of his proceedings at Madrid, except that he was fighting vigorously against the insurgents, and that, although he beat them in all directions, he was not able to secure his means of communication with Old Castille.

Thus, in spite of the victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real, Madrid was soon saddened by the apparition of a multitude of guerilla bands in the north of Spain, by the capture of couriers on all the roads, by the absolute impossibility of having news of marshals Soult and Ney, and by the certainty that all the means of communicating with them were broken. The movement of general Lapisse, who had quitted Salamanca, traversed Alcantara, crossed the Tagus, and rejoined marshal Victor, fighting all the way, had but still more favoured the insurgents of Old Castille, who had now no force to keep them in awe. Accordingly, general Kellermann, who commanded in Old Castille, hastened to send word to Madrid that all the north of Spain was on the point of escaping from the grasp of the French, if vigorous measures were not taken against the guerillas that swarmed there in all directions. Though marshal Victor had been reinforced by general Lapisse, yet, when so much uneasiness was felt for the whole north of Spain, when it was not known what had become of marshal Soult, and whether or not he would be able to force his way to Lisbon, it was no time to push forward the armies of Estremadura and la Mancha to the south, and add to the difficulty of intercommunication by increasing the extent of territory occupied. It was resolved, therefore, before pursuing the execution of the plan laid down by Napoleon, to await the pacification of the northern provinces and news from marshal Soult.

The idea occurred very *à propos* to king Joseph and marshal Soult to send marshal Mortier from the environs of Logrono, where he had been stationed by Napoleon's orders, to Valladolid to reopen communications with marshal Ney, and succour marshal Soult if the latter's position was precarious, as began to be feared. Nothing could be better than such a measure, since it was one for which Napoleon himself sent orders from Germany on receiving despatches from Spain. But until his recent wishes, conceived and expressed on the Danube, were known in the Peninsula, marshal Mortier, whose orders were to remain at Logrono, durst hardly venture to disobey, and he would not. Such is the inconvenience of operations directed from too great a distance. King Joseph having written to marshal Mortier to repair to Valladolid, the latter was greatly embarrassed between the orders from Paris and those from Madrid. By way of compromise, however, he consented to proceed to Burgos. But it was not enough to repress the insurgents in the north and reopen communications with Soult and Ney. There were detached from the army of Arragon, by way of a temporary loan, two

regiments, which it was thought might be spared since the taking of Saragossa, and they were sent to general Kellermann. A Polish and a German battalion were taken from Segovia and the surrounding posts, and their places were supplied by troops from the garrison of Madrid. Some other detachments were taken from the garrison of Burgos, and with the whole there was formed for general Kellermann a corps of 7 or 8 thousand men, with which he was to proceed to Galicia, to re-establish the communications interrupted in the northern provinces.

These several musters were not completed until the 27th of April, and it was not until the second of May that Kellermann reached Lugo, after skirmishing all the way with the peasants of the district. He found general Maurice Mathieu at Lugo, whither he had been sent by marshal Ney to reopen his communications with Old Castille. It was agreed between these two generals that the main cause of the evil was the descent on the one side into Portugal, on the other to the coast of Galicia, without having previously destroyed the marquis de la Romana; they resolved, therefore, to pursue him in the Asturias, and endeavour to destroy him there, which would have the twofold effect of pacifying those regions and of extinguishing the author of all the agitation in the north of Spain. It was further settled that marshal Ney should march into the Asturias by the route from Lugo to Oviedo, and general Kellermann by that from Leon, so that coming upon la Romana from two opposite directions, they might hem him in between them. The two corps then separated, with a sincere determination to contribute to the best of their ability to each other's success.

The whole month of April was passed in wretched tentative efforts, in consequence of the uncertainty at Madrid as to marshal Soult's fate, and also of the inability at head-quarters to direct at will, and according to the requirements of the moment, the movements of the French generals operating in Spain. Not knowing what had become of marshal Soult, the central authorities durst not send marshal Victor's corps against Badajoz and Seville. Not having the complete disposal of the generals, they could not send marshal Mortier in the track of Soult and Ney. Thus was lost the most important month in the year, the month in which the most decisive advantages might have been obtained over the Spaniards and the English. The only operation executed during that precious time in Estremadura, was to recall marshal Victor's corps from Medellin to Alcantara to drive the Spanish and Portuguese insurgents out of the latter town, of which they had taken possession. King Joseph and marshal Jourdan were at first opposed to this retrograde movement on the part of marshal Victor, fearing the bad effect it would produce in Andalusia. But they decided on letting it be executed on the report of a spy from

Oporto, who announced that marshal Soult's position was in the highest degree critical, and that the English had again landed at Lisbon. The possibility of unpleasant events in that quarter rendered the possession of Alcantara indispensable, for it was by the Tagus and Alcantara that succour could be sent most directly to the army in Portugal. Alcantara was therefore retaken, the insurgents put to the sword, and immediately afterwards marshal Victor returned by Almaraz to Truxillo, in order to hinder Gregorio de la Cuesta from reoccupying the positions from which he had expelled him when marching to Medellin.

The news which had been received indirectly from Oporto was unfortunately but too true. Soult's position in Oporto had really become most difficult during the month of April; and for this both men and events were in fault. As soon as he had entered the town the marshal proceeded to establish himself there firmly, thinking he had done enough in arriving on the Douro, and leaving it to circumstances to determine whether he should retreat, or, on the contrary, should push his conquests further. Of all the courses he could have adopted this was the most dangerous, for remaining in Oporto without any settled purpose could evidently lead only to disasters. It was of itself a great danger to be with 20 and odd thousand men in the midst of an insurgent country, in which the popular frenzy against the French had reached the last degree of violence; still, with such a brave army and with such excellent officers, it was possible to maintain one's ground in the north of Portugal. But there were about 17 or 18 thousand English in Lisbon, and there was every likelihood that double that number would soon arrive in the fleets which had sailed from England. Under such circumstances, to defend oneself behind the line of the Douro against a regular army placed beyond it, and an army of insurgents within it, would be almost impracticable. The probability of this might be inferred from two recent events. The little garrison left at Chaves to guard our wounded had been captured by the Portuguese. The dépôt left at Tuy would also have been taken if the Heudelet division and marshal Ney had not come from Braga and Galicia, and raised the blockade. And, after all, a part of that dépôt, which had been sent to Vigo, was captured. It must be added, that they were no weak posts to which such accidents had happened; for the Tuy dépôt, reinforced successively by troops on the march, had been raised to 4500 men, and that which had been taken at Vigo amounted to 1300. Marshal Soult had, therefore, to apprehend at one and the same time both the English army, which could not fail to repair soon from the Tagus to the Douro, and the thousands of fanatical insurgents he had left behind him, from the Douro to the Minho. Succours of any kind he could scarcely expect, for Ney's corps

was wholly occupied in Galicia; and as for the armies which might have come from the centre (that is to say, from Madrid, by Alcantara or Badajoz), Napoleon's instructions provided for the case, in which marshal Soult, after making himself master of Lisbon, might be required to second marshal Victor at Seville, but did not advert to the possibility that marshal Victor, when master of Seville, might be called on to succour Lisbon. There was, therefore, the greatest danger in remaining at Oporto, in the midst of thousands of insurgents swarming in all directions, in presence of an English army ready to assume the offensive, and without any hope of aid against so many enemies; and Soult ought at once either to have retrograded to the Minho, or to have gone up by Braganza towards Old Castille, so as to be backed by the principal mass of the French army operating in the centre of Spain, thus putting spaces not easily to be traversed between him and the English, and reserving to himself the alternative of being useful in Spain, or of reappearing in Portugal with sufficient forces to maintain his ground. With the English especially he ought to have conducted himself in a way to incur no defeat, nor even to sustain an engagement with doubtful success.* But to retrograde *à propos* needs as much resolution as to advance boldly; and in war, as in other affairs, this is only the privilege of steadfast and sagacious minds.

Once in Oporto, marshal Soult, who durst neither march to Lisbon, which the English guarded with 18 thousand men, nor disobey Napoleon, who had prescribed the conquest of Portugal, contented himself with remaining where he was, leaving to fortune the determination of his future conduct. Unfortunate illusions, which arose in his mind out of purely local circumstances, contributed also to mislead him, and make him lose valuable time. He had, as we have seen, sent general Heudelet to Tuy, to raise the blockade of his dépôt, left a detachment at Braga to guard that important town, and distributed important posts on his left, at Penafiel and at Amarante, to secure the roads to Chaves and Braganza, and thus effect the double purpose of keeping the country quiet and occupying the roads. At Amarante on the Tamega he had placed a few thousand men under general Loison. These measures were well conceived, though insufficient, and by seizing the country on all sides at once, they put it for a short interval into a state, not of submission, but of inaction.

When the French were established in Oporto there was manifested in a part of the population a disposition which had more than once exhibited itself before, and which an interval of quiet rendered still more evident. The violent populace, who had

* This opinion is not mine, but that of marshal Jourdan and of Napoleon at Schönbrunn, expressed in a very detailed correspondence.

been let loose from all restraint, and who rendered existence insupportable to everybody who had some humanity and civilisation, was regarded with horror, we will not say by the enlightened classes, but by those in easy circumstances, who loved peace and quiet. These classes were not duped by the zeal which the English affected in behalf of Portugal. They saw clearly that ruling the commerce of that country in peace, and desiring in war to make it their field of battle, they thought only of using it for their own ends, as they proved, indeed, very clearly, by letting loose for their service a ferocious multitude, which had become the terror of all well-disposed people. So without liking the French, who in their eyes were still foreigners, they were ready, if compelled to choose between them and the English, to prefer them as a lesser evil, as a means of ending the war, and as holding out the hope of a more liberal rule than that under which Portugal had lived for ages. As for the house of Braganza, the classes in question were inclined, since the regent's flight to Brazil, to consider it as an empty name, which the English made use of to upset the land from top to bottom.

The presence of marshal Soult and his encouraging declarations did but confirm the more discreet inhabitants in their pacific inclinations. It was particularly in Oporto, a rich trading town, less exposed than Lisbon to the old court influences, and very intent on its own interests, that the disposition we have described was most obviously manifested, in spite of the patriotic and fanatical bishop who swayed the rabble. The middle classes responded with no little satisfaction to marshal Soult's assurances, and seemed resolved to remain quiet if he kept his word, maintained good discipline amongst his soldiers, restrained the populace, and procured for every man liberty to attend to his business. This feeling was particularly manifested by the Jews—men who are everywhere very numerous, active, and rich, but especially so in countries of backward civilisation, where trade is left in their hands, the rest of the inhabitants not understanding it. They were more than two hundred thousand in Portugal, living under harsh oppression, and delighted at the prospect of enjoying under the French a civil equality which seemed to them the most desirable form of government. After having entered into relations with the French administration for the sustenance of the army and the collection of revenues, they soon came to make political overtures as to the manner of establishing a regular government in Portugal. Many merchants of the country joined them; and it appeared that the idea of erecting Northern Lusitania into a separate kingdom, as a treaty made by Napoleon in October, 1807, had arranged, would be very acceptable to the province of Oporto. It was declared that such a resolution, publicly announced, and accompanied by an equitable and mild

administration, would cause the French to be looked upon not in the light of invaders who devour the countries through which they pass, but of friends who deal carefully by a country in which they intend to establish themselves permanently. It was for Napoleon to nominate as soon as possible the French prince who should wear the new crown of Oporto, perhaps ere long of Oporto and Lisbon. But as circumstances were pressing, were it not well to move as fast as circumstances; and since it was a time when kings were made out of generals, was it not quite natural to make a king of Northern Lusitania of Napoleon's lieutenant? Whether this thought was suggested by the little military court of the marshal to officious intermediaries, or by the latter to the former, is a fact which remains unknown, and as to which assertions varied much, when all the details of this singular adventure were afterwards laid before Napoleon. Be this as it may, the idea of making marshal Soult a king of Portugal soon spread through Oporto and the towns of the province of Entre Douro e Minho. It was thought rather absurd by the more rational, received with insulting jests by the army, but accepted by the trading classes, who wanted a protector; by the Jews, who wanted a representative of civil equality; and by those military intriguers who always flatter generals-in-chief, and are their most dangerous enemies. The latter affected to consider this arrangement as profoundly politic, for it would serve, they said, to attach the Portuguese to the French, and detach them from the English and the house of Braganza. What chiefly encouraged them to the audacity of making, or at least preparing a king without the express consent of the Emperor, was his absence in a distant part of the continent, where he was engaged in events of uncertain issue. All the ambitions excited by his example, being thus emancipated by distance, allowed themselves free course; and there were not wanting those who said to themselves that, since they were condemned to waste their blood in a corner of the world for the grandeur of an insatiable family, it was time they should think of themselves, and take advantage of the opportunity to settle well where they were. Napoleon, perhaps, would take it amiss, but every day's experience showed how much his power was diminishing from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, from the Pyrenees to the Tagus; besides, he had so much need of those he sent so far to conquer kingdoms, that they might well retain some part of what they conquered for him, to say nothing of the very probable chance that his death or defeat on the Danube would leave them free to keep whatever they should have taken on the Douro or the Tagus.

It was not every one, indeed, who went so far in this line of speculation, but there were some exceedingly rash spirits about the marshal, and they so beguiled his judgment as to induce him

to put forth a strange circular, addressed to the generals commanding divisions, which, after recounting the offer made to the marshal to accept a king from the Emperor's family, or from among the persons of his choice, proceeded to say that the population of Oporto, Braga, and several neighbouring towns, had requested marshal Soult to invest himself with the attributes of sovereignty, and to exercise royal authority until the arrival of Napoleon's answer; and that, meanwhile, they swore to be faithful to him, and defend him against all enemies—English, insurgents, and others—who should seek to resist the spontaneous act they solicited on his part. The circular concluded with a request that the generals would call forth the expression of a similar desire on the part of the several populations under their command.

Though this circular was in some degree confidential, it could not remain secret. It afforded matter for laughter to some, offended others, and alarmed the best men. Much ridicule was cast upon the marshal, who had so far forgotten his extreme reserve at the fallacious prospect of a crown as to manifest the most imprudent desires. A part of the army was highly incensed, especially the old officers, who retained at the bottom of their hearts the feelings of independence peculiar to the army of the Rhine, and who fought from a generous devotion to duty, but in secret, were indignant at seeing their blood lavished in every corner of the world, in order to make kings who were weak, or incapable, or dissolute, and, in general, not very faithful to France. There were many officers in the army of Portugal who entertained these sentiments, and one who did so in a pre-eminent degree, namely, general Delaborde, who had so well discovered the art of beating the English, and had done this in so brilliant a manner at the battle of Rolica. He was a man of high spirit, intelligent, and brave, and he held a language which was soon repeated by everybody round him. Men of more reserved temper, who were interested only in the maintenance of discipline, were deeply distressed at the moral effect which they foresaw would be produced by the commander-in-chief's example among officers and soldiers already too much inclined to emancipate themselves from all rule, and to indemnify themselves by license for the sufferings they endured in distant lands. Such proceedings were equivalent to a direct invitation to disorder, and, what was worse, they tended inevitably to divide the army, which, in its perilous position, had more need than ever of union, force, and good conduct. These sensible men were also curious to know what the Emperor would think of all those who lent themselves more or less to acts so strange, involving so striking though involuntary a censure of the imperial policy.

General Quesnel, commandant of Oporto, addressed some ob-

servations to marshal Soult, who received them very ill, and replied, haughtily, that the approbation to be obtained from the Emperor was his own affair, and did not at all concern the officers under his orders. "The fate that has befallen general Dupont's lieutenants," replied general Quesnel, "proves that the Emperor can, on occasion, make the responsibility of the general-in-chief extend to those who have participated in his faults."

Three parties were immediately formed in the army—that of the officers who, actuated by no other motive than their sense of duty and fidelity to the Emperor, would not lend themselves to an assumption of royal power which he had not sanctioned; that of the officers who had formerly been republicans, and whom the excesses of the imperial policy were bringing back to their primitive opinions; lastly, that of some more audacious malcontents, who cared little about disobeying the emperor, and felt no regret for the republic, but who were simply royalists—though perhaps they did not admit the fact even to themselves—and who regarded the republic, the consulate, the empire, and all that had happened in France for the last twenty years, as a series of frightful convulsions, all destined to end ill. The language of the old royalists was already heard from the lips of some officers, and notoriously from those of the colonel of the 47th regiment of the line, subsequently well known as general Donnadieu. What is most singular is, that this small party, which was beginning to make itself heard in the army (especially in Spain, where the sufferings were horrible, and the end for which they were endured too apparent), was not composed of old royalists (scarcely any of those men were of an age to come under that designation), but of ex-republicans of the army of the Rhine, disgusted at toils that no longer had for object the greatness of France, but that of a family. Glory had for a while concealed the emptiness or the selfishness of this policy. The first reverses induced reflection, and reflection induced disgust.

No sooner had these divisions broken out than the language of the army became incredibly audacious, and equalled in imprudence the acts that had provoked it. Nothing less was talked of than arresting the commander-in-chief if he acted upon his circular, deposing him, and putting the oldest of the lieutenants-general in his place. It may easily be conceived how dangerous was such a disturbance of discipline in the midst of an enemy's country, and in presence of an English army, led by an able commander. The effects were soon felt. The service was performed with a laxity and negligence that had deplorable consequences. Our soldiers, obliged to enter every inhabited place by force, and authorised to exercise there the right possessed over every place taken by storm, had contracted a taste for pillage; and unfortunately, many of them were loaded with gold since the sack of

Oporto. To wean them from such habits was urgently needful ; yet this could hardly be done in the state of indiscipline into which the whole army had fallen. If attempts were made to bring them into order, they complained that they were sacrificed to a population whose suffrages were to be won at that price. The officers who had been the first to set the example of this sort of language, were unable to put it down among the soldiery, and in a short while the mischief made rapid progress. A sad proof of this was seen in a strange incident which, some months afterwards, conducted an officer to a disgraceful death.

Assiduous attention to duty no longer prevailing, the officers often quitted their posts without any inquiry being made about them. A captain of the 18th dragoons, very intelligent, brave, and enterprising, having obtained the favour of his superiors by good means and bad, by bravery and complaisance, was among those who said openly that the consulate, at first so glorious, afterwards converted into the empire, was but the sacrifice of all the interests of France to a boundless ambition. Born in the south, a royalist region, he had been brought prematurely to the sentiments which flashed up in 1815, when France, wearied by thirty years of revolution, threw herself into the arms of the Bourbons. This officer had frequented the colonels and generals who complained the most openly of the commander-in-chief, and forming an exaggerated estimate of their thoughts from their language, he fancied he discerned in their discontent evidences of a conspiracy, which might be forthwith made use of to bring about the overthrow of Napoleon and his empire in 1809 ! Like all those restless spirits who rush headlong into conspiracies, he had wants fully as much as opinions ; and a craving for money, no less than an inordinate activity, prompted him to go and treat with sir Arthur Wellesley, who was then at Coïmbra.

That celebrated general, the victor of Vimcira, recalled to the command of the British army after the death of Moore, had been sent from England with a reinforcement of 12 thousand men, which raised the English forces in that country to a total of about 30 thousand. His temporary predecessor, general Cradock, had not ventured to oppose marshal Soult's movement against Oporto, in consequence of marshal Victor's appearance towards Merida, and general Lapisse's towards Alcantara, and he had remained at the environs of Leiria, on the road to Lisbon. Sir Arthur Wellesley was not a man to remain inactive, and he was resolved, without exceeding his instructions, which enjoined him to confine himself to the defence of Portugal, to shake the power of the French in the Peninsula as much as possible. He proposed, in the first place, to make marshal Soult evacuate Oporto, and, after delivering the north of Portugal, to proceed to the south, and see what he could do to baffle king Joseph's

designs against the south of Spain. He had established his headquarters at Coimbra, where he was at the head of 20 and odd thousand men, and he had pushed forward an English and a Portuguese division to Abrantes, to observe the movements of the French in that quarter.

Captain Argenton, the officer whose criminal intrigues we are recounting, in consequence of the incredible irregularity which had crept into the army, could withdrawn from his duty, repair in disguise from Oporto to Coimbra, and present himself clandestinely to sir Arthur Wellesley. The complaisance of the French authorities towards the inhabitants of Oporto who had business in Lisbon, and who were allowed to come and go notwithstanding the state of war, contributed not a little to facilitate communications of this kind. Argenton saw the English general, talked to him of the divisions in the French army, of the parties that had grown up in it, exaggerated, as usual with men of his kind, the too sad reality, made out of mere malcontent conspirators, out of people who murmured, people who wished to act, out of men who yielded to different impulses because they were sincere, men who had all one common desire, namely, to overthrow a power ruinous to France, and to revolt against the authority of the Emperor. True in all points to the usages of the too sanguine spirits that play such parts as his, Argenton, ascribed to himself a mission he had not received, and calumniously naming a host of generals and colonels, he pretended that he was deputed by them to present himself to the British commander and to treat with him. It was a falsehood, of a kind unfortunately too common in similar circumstances, and too often believed, though often unmasked. The plan this intriguer proposed was as follows. Marshal Soult, he said, would not fail, if the people of Oporto lent themselves to his design, to proclaim himself king, or at least, as the circular announced, to assume provisionally all the attributes of sovereignty. Such a step would be sufficient to produce a revolt in the army. The marshal would then be deposed, and, after that first explosion, the generals would go still further. They would proclaim the dethronement of Napoleon himself, and then, if the English army would treat with them and not pursue them, they would retreat by appointed marches to the Pyrenees. Their example would be immediately imitated by the 300 thousand men who were serving in Spain; and the old army of the republic and the empire, remembering what it had been, and incensed at being sacrificed to the projects of one ambitious man, would quit the Peninsula, retire to the Pyrenees, and there proclaim the deliverance of France and Europe, provided always the English accepted the proposals made to them, namely, that they should follow without molesting those who were going by this spontaneous movement to re-establish the peace of the world.

These were wild exaggerations. What was true in them was, that the army, which can judge as well as the nation what passes under its own eyes, whilst remaining faithful to its duties, had rightly appreciated the policy of Napoleon, and secretly blamed it though serving it heroically; that such were its sentiments, especially in Spain, and that a few days' disruption of discipline would have been enough to produce in the seven or eight *corps d'armée* serving in the Peninsula the same chaos of sentiments as prevailed in Oporto. But this state of things was as remote from the project talked of by Argenton as the inventions of conspirators commonly are from the reality.

The English general exhibited on this occasion the good sense which was his most distinguishing quality, and estimated the possible truth involved in Argenton's assertions. He saw clearly that Napoleon's conquering policy was condemned even in the French army, that that army was divided, that the bonds of discipline were much relaxed in it, that, great as was the valour in its ranks, its military duties could not but be ill performed; and without believing in a revolt which, beginning with the deposition of marshal Soult, was to terminate in that of Napoleon himself, he hoped for something more probable, and unhappily more practicable, namely, that he might surprise the French in the very town of Oporto, and make them suffer a humiliating disaster.

Though he put no more faith in Argenton's overtures than they deserved, he did not repulse him, but invited him to return, and supplied him with the means of doing so. But he refused to treat with the French army, or to induce the inhabitants of Oporto to proclaim marshal Soult king of Portugal, which, according to Argenton's showing, would have precipitated the crisis. On all these weighty matters he said he must refer to his government. But seeing what facilities the French army offered him for a surprise, he resolved to march upon Oporto, taking care previously to fill that town with his spies, who, in the character of inhabitants of Oporto or Lisbon, and under pretext of commercial business, obtained from the complaisance of the French authorities free leave to come and go.

Having returned to the camp without notice taken of his absence, which was attributed to amorous motives, Argenton frequently repeated his criminal excursions, again saw the English general, and tried to convert him to the idea of favouring marshal Soult's advancement to royal station, in order to precipitate a movement in the army, and of treating subsequently with its authors; but with all his efforts he only succeeded in more fully enlightening him as to the moral condition of the French troops, and confirming him in his design of surprising Oporto.

On his return from his last excursion, Argenton passed

through general Lefebvre's brigade, which furnished the French advanced posts on the left bank of the Douro, and finding that brigade exposed to the assault of the English army which he had left on its march, he was seized with a desire to preserve general Lefebvre, whom he liked because he had served under him, and also to affiliate him to the pretended conspiracy of which he himself was the sole artifice. He told general Lefebvre that his position exposed him to the greatest dangers. The latter wishing to know what these were, Argenton ended by revealing them to him. He told him that the English army was approaching; and to confirm the statement he confessed that he had just come from it, adding, untruly, that he had gone to it by deputation from the majority of the generals, who were indignant at being sacrificed to the ambition of the Bonaparte family, and he besought him to join his comrades, and contribute to the salvation of the army and of France.

General Lefebvre was deeply agitated by these revelations, and though it pained him to denounce Argenton, he disclosed what he had just learned to marshal Soult, begging him not to destroy a wretched man, who, criminal as he was, had yet a claim on his gratitude, inasmuch as he had sought to warn and save him. Marshal Soult had Argenton arrested instantly, and thus became aware of all that was passing in the army. The discontents excited in it had not escaped his notice, but, refusing to attribute them to their real cause, he was weak enough to believe in a conspiracy, about which, however, he made little noise, knowing that the situation was one of difficulty for everybody, for there was no one whose conscience was quite whole. The news of this arrest spread as that of the projected royalty had done; and then began a storm of mutual accusations, one party being charged with conspiring against the safety of the army, the other with meditating a usurpation. The disorder and confusion were but the more augmented.

Marshal Soult had been more than a month in Oporto, occupied in cultivating a good understanding with the inhabitants; but coming to no decision as to military operations, whether to advance or retreat. To advance was almost impossible; for, besides the Portuguese population, he would have had to beat the English army, and although with 20 thousand veteran French troops and an able general this was within the limits of possibility, it would have been supremely imprudent to attempt it. To remain was quite as impracticable; for, in this case, too, it would have been necessary to beat the English army, whilst there was the insurgent population to be kept down on our right, our left, and our rear. To retreat by the roads leading to Old Castille—that is to say, by Amarante, Chaves, and Braganza,—or better still, by the roads which led back to Galicia, by Braga

and Tuy,—so as to return to our point of departure, was, though not very brilliant, yet the only feasible course. Not to adopt it was to prefer a disaster to an unpleasant alternative.

Unfortunately, marshal Soult did not think of this. Intent on pacifying the new kingdom of Northern Lusitania, he had abolished certain taxes, founded perpetual lamps for certain Madonnas, and received addresses from the several towns which had been induced to call for the establishment of a French dynasty. Deputations from Braga, Oporto, Barcellos, Viana, Villa do Conde, Feira, and Ovar, came in state and entreated him to give a king to Portugal. All these ceremonies had the aspect and the form of the Spanish *besamanos*. The army laughed and jeered at them without end, held language capable of shaking all military authority, and was but the more disposed to neglect its duties. In the midst of these idle occupations, marshal Soult learned that sir Arthur Wellesley had landed, on the 22nd of April, with a reinforcement of twelve thousand men; that thirty thousand English, followed by the whole Portuguese insurrection, were about to march on Oporto; and at last he owned that his only course was to abandon the capital of his projected kingdom. It would have been far better to have admitted this unpleasant necessity much sooner; but having done so at last, the marshal should have acted with the promptest decision, in order to leave nothing behind him; neither his *matériel*, nor his sick and wounded, whom it was impossible to leave at the mercy of a ferocious people. He had to choose for his line of retreat either that by Amarante to Zamora, or by Braga to Tuy. To retreat by Amarante would have the appearance of a *manœuvre*, which would spare the vanity of the general-in-chief, for he would seem to be making a move to the left of the English without entirely quitting Portugal, whereas to retire by Braga was simply to return to the spot whence he had come, and by the very same road. But the retreat by Amarante was difficult, and required much time; it was to be effected upon a road not one point of which was in our possession, in a long column, which the sick and wounded would make still longer, the head and middle of which would have to be protected against the insurgents, and the tail against the English. The road by Braga to Tuy was short; every point of it was in the hands of the French, and by concentrating the best troops in the rear guard to make head against the English, their mass would serve to cover all that was sent forward before them. This then, was the only sure, facile, and admissible line of retreat, though it was the least capable of veiling the fact of the forced abandonment of Portugal.

Be this as it may, whatever line was preferred, no time was to

be lost. It was imperative that a considerable force should be sent to Amarante, if that direction was adopted, to hinder the English from crossing the Douro on our left, and cutting off our retreat. It was above all, requisite that the sick, the wounded, and the heavy *matériel*, should be sent away. Marshal Soult, though made aware on the 8th of May of sir Arthur Wellesley's movements, did no more than concentrate his posts at Braga, Viana, and Guimaraens on Amarante, and order general Loison to make an excursion beyond the Tamega, in order to secure the passage of that small river. But in Oporto he made no preparation for departure, which was unfortunate, for it was evident that the longer the retreat was delayed the more difficult it would be. He had proposed at first to march on the 10th of May, after having occupied Oporto forty days ; then he delayed until the 11th, and finally chose to wait until the 12th. But that day was destined by Providence for one of the strangest events of this disastrous war.

Having sent, as we have said, an English brigade and a Portuguese division to Abrantes to observe the movements of the French on the Tagus, sir Arthur Wellesley resolved to march in person to the Douro, and present himself before Oporto, being thoroughly informed of what was passing there, and of the incredible disorder into which everything had fallen. General Beresford, who specially commanded the Portuguese, was ordered by him from Coïmbra to Lamego by Viseu. The English general's intention was to intercept the Braganza road, and at the same time to withdraw attention from Oporto, which was to be his main object. At the same time he sent forward his two principal columns : the one to the left by the coast road from Aveiro to Ovar, the other to the right by the interior road from Agueda to Bemposta. The left column having arrived at Aveiro had to cross long lagunes parallel to the coast, and which were navigable. Sir Arthur Wellesley embarked upon them a strong detachment, which on landing at Ovar would be placed in the rear of the French advanced guard, commanded by General Franceschi. Sir Arthur Wellesley ordered the right column to attack Franceschi in front, as soon as the troops landed at Ovar should be ready to fall upon his rear.

It was on the 10th of May this movement was effected. The brave general Franceschi, surprised and assailed in all directions, behaved with singular coolness, charged now the English infantry, now their cavalry under a fire of grape, killed as many men as he lost, and extricated himself from his awkward position with extreme good fortune. This surprise was the sad result of a state of things in which we let the English know everything, without ourselves knowing anything about them. On the 11th our

detachments, recalled to the faubourgs of Oporto on the left bank of the river, recrossed the river and brought over all the boats to the right side.

It seems that being warned on the 10th and 11th by the presence of the English army, marshal Soult ought to have had all his sick and wounded, not in the hospitals of Oporto, but on the road to Amarante, and should have assured himself positively of the possession of that town. But on the 11th none of the wounded had been removed, and the possession of Amarante was taken for granted, without certain proof. Marshal Soult again postponed till the 12th his departure from Oporto, from which he was loth to tear himself. The only precaution taken was to throw into the water the powder that could not be carried away, to separate from the heavy artillery, which could not be dragged with the army, the field artillery, which there were means of conveying, so as to have of the latter a moveable park of twenty-two pieces. The departure was to take place on the 12th. The bulk of the army was echeloned on the road leading to Amarante by Balthier, and the Mermet division was distributed in the interior of Oporto to cover the retreat.

But on the night of the 11th, sir Arthur Wellesley had conceived a project which would have been one of extravagant daring had he not been so well informed of the real state of things: this was to cross the Douro in presence of the French army, and seize Oporto before their eyes. On that night he sent two battalions to Avintas, two or three leagues above Oporto, with orders to cross the Douro unknown to the French, collect all the boats they could find, and float them down before day-break to Oporto. He himself took post with the bulk of his troops in the faubourgs of the left bank, completely concealed by the houses, and waiting the proper moment to execute his plan, the secret of which he had imparted only to the two lieutenant-generals who led the attacking columns.

On the 12th, very early in the morning, the two battalions sent under sir John Murray to Avintas, having collected a sufficient number of boats and sent them to Oporto, they were used before daybreak to land some battalions under lieutenant-general Paget, suddenly and with the utmost secrecy, at the upper extremity of Oporto. He hid his troops in a building belonging to the bishop, which commanded the right bank of the river. This point being well occupied, the rest of Hill's brigade was carried over, detachment by detachment, and it was already broad day ere anything was known at the French head-quarters of what was going on, and they refused to believe the warnings given them by several eye-witnesses. The general-in-chief, instead of going and ascertaining the truth with his own eyes, trusted at first to the negative report of his lieutenants, whom he afterwards

accused of having deceived him, and who were culpable, no doubt; but less so than himself, for in such cases the responsibility increases with the rank. This incredulity having allowed the English to throw some thousands of their men on the right bank of the Douro, they had time to establish themselves in the town of Oporto, and soon they even took no pains to conceal themselves. But general Foy, having at last gone in person to the spot, and convinced himself of the danger, ran to the barracks, put the troops under arms, and directed the 17th light infantry against the building occupied by the English. The latter, unfortunately, being once in possession, were not easily to be dislodged, and musketry was used against them without effect. General Mermet, who formed the rear guard with his division, brought his troops to bear upon the point seized by the English, with the intention of driving them into the river. But in moving to the upper part of Oporto he left the centre uncovered; and lieutenant-general Sherbrooke, taking advantage of the unguarded state of that part of the town, rapidly landed his brigade there, so that in an instant Oporto was filled with English. The brave general Delaborde, at the head of the 4th light infantry and the 15th of the line, charged and drove them to the edge of the river, but could never wrest from them the buildings which served them as a support. He was wounded, as was also general Foy, without succeeding in avenging the honour of the army for this unparalleled surprise.

In the existing state of things, resigned as we were to quit Oporto, it was almost useless to contest, at the cost of an immense effusion of blood, a town which we should have had to reconquer, street by street, from troops who were not to be driven, like the Portuguese, from the possessions they had seized. It is true that there remained a thousand sick and wounded in Oporto, a sacred deposit it behoved us to save. But, to effect their removal, it would have been necessary to possess the town for several days longer, and this was quite impossible. It was this consideration that decided the retreat of the French, after a strenuous struggle on the part of general Delaborde, and a loss of some hundreds, subsequently estimated at an exaggerated figure by marshal Soult and sir Arthur Wellesley. The most vexatious thing was to leave our sick and wounded in the power of the enemy, and with them the honour of the army, for such a surprise was without a precedent in the annals of war. Fortunately we were succeeded in Oporto by the general of a civilised nation, and our sick, who would have been in danger of being murdered had they remained in the power of the insurgents, were exposed only to the risk of being neglected.*

* The duke of Wellington behaved generously on this occasion, He applied to the French army for its own surgeons to attend their invalid countrymen, and granted those surgeons safe conducts to come and return.

The French then retreated on the evening of the 12th to Balthar, greatly incensed against each other, the generals accusing the commander-in-chief of having suffered everything to fall into a state of neglect and disorder, which had rendered the surprise of Oporto possible, the commander-in-chief accusing his lieutenants of having left him in ignorance of the fact that the English had begun to cross the Douro. Argenton, the culpable author of the communications with the English, whom the marshal had put in arrest in order to bring him to trial, was brought away with the army. The marshal wished to commit him to general Delaborde's custody, but things were come to such a pass that the general refused to take charge of him, saying that there was no other intention than to favour the escape of that intriguer, in order to cast a veil over what had happened, and that for his own part, as he desired light, he had no notion of being responsible for such an evasion. Argenton, who was full of dexterity, did in fact succeed in escaping, and fled to the English, without its being possible, reasonably, to accuse any one of conniving at his escape, though there was no end of such accusations in the army.*

Having arrived at Balthar in the evening, marshal Soult had tidings of another accident, still worse than that which had befallen in the morning at Oporto. General Loison, not having sufficient troops to force his passage across the Tamega, and fearing he should be cut off from Oporto by the great number of enemies that presented themselves, had evacuated Amarante, and thus surrendered the road to Braganza to the English. This was disastrous, for, in order to come upon the direct road from Oporto to Tuy by Braga, which it would have been far better to have adopted from the first, it was necessary to go back very near to Oporto; and it was natural to expect that the English army would be found barring our way. In that case, how were we to break through them, and reach the road to Braga? There were many reasons for regarding this as hopeless in the existing state of the army, and marshal Soult hardly knew what to do. But, with a little more presence of mind, he might have made the somewhat obvious reflection that, notwithstanding the surprise of the morning, it was not to be supposed that the English general had already transported his army from one bank of the Douro to the other. Such operations are but slowly effected when the means have not been prepared a long time in advance. Even if he had done so, it was not probable that he had already concentrated all his troops in the rear of the French, so as to bar their way from the Amarante to the Braga road. At the most, there could only be an advanced guard at the intersection of those two roads, and then there would be a probability that

* He was retaken some months afterwards, tried, and shot.

we might force a passage. It is true that in such situations one is more apt to surmise the worst than the best, and that, after having relied too much on fortune, one ends by trusting to it too little. In the present instance, marshal Soult would have succeeded better had he been more confident; for it was not until the morning of the 13th that sir Arthur Wellesley sent a mere advanced guard to occupy Valongo, the first point beyond Oporto, and it was only on the 14th that he appeared there himself at the head of his army. But as marshal Soult could not foresee this circumstance, he adopted a desperate course.

He had before him a chain of steep hills, beyond which lay the road to Braga, and what was more to the purpose, the road from Braga to Chaves, into which he might strike directly without descending to Braga, and so reach Chaves before general Beresford's troops. Not having ordered preparations beforehand at Tuy for crossing the Minho, he was obliged, as on the former occasion, to go up to Chaves, in order to cross the river in the mountains towards Orense.

But to cross the mountain chain, called the Sierra da Santa Cathalina, the army had to march along goat tracks, where the horsemen had to dismount, and the artillery men to abandon their cannons. The marshal had, therefore, to resign himself to the loss of all his artillery, the most humiliating of all sacrifices for an army, next to laying down its arms, for there is none more pernicious. But this resolution once adopted, marshal Soult had the merit of executing it without loss of time. He had his artillery and his ammunition chests immediately collected to be blown up. Care had been previously taken to load the soldiers' backs with as many cartridges as they could carry; and even a portion of the army treasure was offered to their cupidity, but this was useless, for most of them had their bags filled already. The greater part of the contents of the army chest was abandoned to the explosion that destroyed the artillery.

Having accomplished this painful sacrifice, the French marched to the escarped flanks of the Sierra da Santa Cathalina, towards which a *tête de colonne* had preceded them, and the whole day of the 13th was employed in crossing it. The soldiers suffered much on the march, for they were very heavily laden, and had to climb very difficult paths. At last they arrived in the evening at Guimaraens, where they found the corps of general Loison, which had fallen back on that town on quitting Amarante, and also the several detachments under general Lorge, which had evacuated the coast. The whole army was thus reunited, and capable of passing anywhere in consequence of the sacrifice of its artillery.

This was an advantage too dearly purchased not to be made good use of. Expecting to evade the pursuit of general Beres-

ford, who after occupying Amarante might push forward directly to Chaves and again intercept our line of communication, the march was continued without halting to Salamanca, and Ruyvaens. For the greater safety the marshal even avoided passing by Chaves, where he was sure of encountering the Portuguese who had forced the garrison left in that town, and he proceeded towards Monte Alegre, whence a shorter road led to Orense.

But it soon became known that in order to give general Beresford time to overtake the French, the insurgents were breaking down the bridges and shutting up the passes. In particular, it was known that the bridge called Puente Novo had been broken down by the peasants, and that they were in ambush near it to defend the passage. This obstruction was to be overcome at all hazards, or else we should have been taken in flank by general Beresford in twenty-four hours, and in the rear by sir Arthur Wellesley in forty-eight. Major Dulong, of the 31st light infantry, undertook the task. With 100 picked men he marched in the dark to the bridge, which he found cut down and guarded by the peasants. Fortunately the latter had left two planks for their own use, and, moreover, to shelter themselves from the weather, which was frightful, had shut themselves up in a hut, where they thought of nothing but warming themselves. Taking advantage of their negligence, Major Dulong passed over the planks with his brave men, attacked the hut, killed all the Portuguese in it, and having got rid of them, made haste to restore the bridge with the timber he found at hand. At daybreak on the 16th the army found the bridge repaired, and defiled over it, being thus saved from the consequence of the faults of its leaders by the bravery of an officer and by a favour of chance. It soon met with another obstacle at the Misarella bridge near Villa da Pontè. In the heart of a narrow gorge where two men could hardly march abreast, and from the heights overhanging which numbers of peasantry fired upon our soldiers, there was a bridge guarded by a breastwork of timber, and which the Portuguese had begun to destroy. At the same time was heard in the distance the firing which was begun to be exchanged between our rearguard and the advanced guard of general Beresford. There was no need of so many circumstances to excite the temerity of our soldiers. They dashed boldly into the gorge, carried the breastwork, killed the Portuguese who defended it, and crossed the bridge. But in the rearguard there was some disorder, and some remaining baggage which was carried on the backs of mules was lost. This loss was very lightly borne, and our men joyfully reached the road to Orense, where they arrived on the 19th of May, spent with fatigue, shoeless, and almost without clothes, having marched, often without food, under the spring rains, which in that region

are horrible. The greatest subject of sorrow, besides the loss of the *matériel*, was to have left in Oporto many sick, who, indeed, would be protected by English honour, and to have left besides, on the route, many wounded and crippled men, whom Portuguese honour did not protect at all, for the insurgents killed them as they followed us. Whatever may have been said afterwards, the capitulation of Cintra after the battle of Vimeiro, bravely fought though lost, did less damage to the renown and the effective strength of the army than the surprise of Oporto, the destruction of our artillery at Penafiel, and the precipitate march through the gorges of the province of Traz os Montes. The moral condition of our troops corresponded to their physical condition. The soldiers, though their bags were full, were dissatisfied with their leaders and with themselves, and while persisting in their indiscipline, they were severe, as they always are, in their judgment of those who had suffered them to fall into that state. Their jeers at the vanished royalty of Oporto deepened the sadness of the spectacle.

No sooner was Soult arrived at Orense than he had to repair to Lugo to rescue that town, which the absence of marshal Ney exposed to the enterprises of the Gallician insurgents. Ney, as we have said, feeling it necessary to rid the Asturias of La Romana, had resolved to make with general Kellermann a joint expedition into that province, the one moving by Lugo on Oviedo, the other by Leon. The first was consequently to march along the coast, the second was to traverse the mountains separating Old Castille from the Asturias. They had kept word with each other like gallant men. Ney starting from Lugo with 10 thousand fighting men on the 13th of May, the day after the surprise of Oporto, had reached the sources of the Navia, and leaving the Spaniards posted along the shore, had outflanked them by making his way over tremendous mountains which had separated them from Oviedo, entered that town in the midst of their dispersed bands, and had been unable to save it from a sort of sack, the result of a street fight between the Spaniards and the French. The marquis de la Romana, after having brought down all sorts of calamities on that unfortunate region, had taken refuge with some officers on board the English vessels, to go and recommence elsewhere his wretched system of war. Considerable stores of wealth had been found at Gijon. General Kellermann on his side had set out from Leon, crossed the mountains of the Asturias, and descending on Oviedo, had formed a junction there with the troops under marshal Ney.

It was during these combined operations that the Gallician insurgents, availing themselves of marshal Ney's absence, had assailed Lugo and St. Jago de Compostello. Marshal Soult marched thither and dispersed them, and was joined by marshal

Ney, who, after delivering the Asturias, had returned in all haste to relieve the threatened towns. When the two corps met, the details of the Oporto expedition were related by the one to the other, and were severely criticised by that of marshal Ney. His old soldiers, poor, orderly, and disciplined, ridiculed the younger, richer, and very indocile soldiers of marshal Soult, who had no victories to allege in excuse for their behaviour. The latter exculpated themselves by throwing the blame on their leaders, whom they accused of causing all the misfortunes of the army. It was evident that peace might be disturbed if the two corps remained long together. Marshal Ney, however, impetuous, but full of good faith, behaved to his colleague with the courtesy of a generous companion-in-arms. He opened his magazines to furnish marshal Soult's troops with part of what they had lost, and did what he could to replace the artillery they had been obliged to abandon.

Satisfied with each other, the two marshals conferred together as to the conduct they should pursue for the best interests of the Emperor's arms, as the phrase ran in those days, and with reason for Napoleon's greatness was much more considered than that of France, which was much compromised by these remote wars. After campaigning for several months in Galicia and the Asturias, marshal Ney had about 12 thousand men present under arms, and marshal Soult about 17 thousand, though their respective nominal forces were twice as great. Their strength would soon be increased by the return of men discharged from the hospitals; and with such a force, frankly employed, without any feeling of rivalry, they might complete the subjection of Galicia and the Asturias, exterminate the insurgents, and if the English persisted in remaining on the banks of the Minho, or even dared to cross it, they might rout them too, and drive them back to the sea. If, on the contrary, as was probable, sir Arthur Wellesley returned from the north of Portugal to the south, to make head against the French on the Tagus, one of the two marshals, or both of them, might quit Galicia, skirt along the confines of Portugal by Old Castille, move from Lugo to Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo, fall in conjunction with marshal Victor on the British army, and cure it for ever of any desire to reappear in the Peninsula.

This was certainly what Napoleon would have ordered had he been on the spot (his instructions testify it), and this was what the people at head-quarters in Madrid would have prescribed, if they had possessed the art of making themselves obeyed. For the present the two marshals could spontaneously execute the first part of this plan by clearing the coast of Galicia in a few days of the insurgents who had established themselves there, and cutting off those communications with the English fleet which

furnished the chief aliment of the war. General Noruña had created a formidable establishment at Vigo with about 12 thousand men and the crews of some English vessels. The marquis de la Romana, who had been carried from the Asturias to Galicia, with his officers and some select troops, has established himself at Orense since marshal Soult's movement on Lugo, and was making himself formidable there. It was indispensable, if the two marshals were not to remain together, to expel the insurgent chiefs from their positions, after which they might proceed wherever they should think it more useful or more conformable to their instructions. Those given to marshal Soult allowed him great latitude, for they amounted only to this, that he was to conquer Portugal, and then go to the support of marshal Victor in Andalucia. Now, instead of being at Lisbon or Badajoz, he was at Lugo, the point from which he had started. This case had not been foreseen or provided for by Napoleon, and therefore he was wholly free to act for the best. But he had a visible inclination to move into Old Castille towards Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo, along the eastern frontier of Portugal; whether it was that in thus skirting along the country he was to have conquered he felt himself a little less remote from his aim, or that remaining confined in Galicia to accomplish a task which was properly that of marshal Ney, was not very flattering to his ambition, or that the very acrimonious and sometimes scandalous language, elicited by the contact between the two corps, was disagreeable to him. He therefore intimated to marshal Ney his intention of proceeding to Zamora, to affect as he said, in Castille, a movement corresponding to that which the English seemed to be meditating towards the south of Portugal, by passing from the Minho to the Douro, and thence to the Tagus. There was some reason in this, though nothing was yet positively known of the supposed movement of the English towards the south of Portugal, and what was most immediately requisite was to beat the enemy who were at hand, for otherwise they would secure for themselves an exceedingly strong position on the coast of Galicia. At the rate the English were marching they could not be on the Tagus before a month or two, as the event afterwards proved. There would be time enough in that interval to destroy their establishment in Galicia, and then to proceed all together to the Tagus by Zamora and Alcantara. There would also be time to rest for a few days, and refit.

In order, however, to respond to the wishes of his comrade, marshal Soult agreed with him, by a written stipulation, that they should make an expedition into Galicia, and destroy the two musters of insurgents; after which Soult was to separate from Ney, and proceed to Old Castille by Puebla de Sanabria and

Zamora. They agreed that Soult, who was at Lugo, should descend by the valley of the Minho to Montforte de Lemos, Orense, and Ribadavia, until he had overtaken and destroyed the marquis de la Romana; that marshal Ney, protected on his flank by this movement, should compel the enemy to evacuate St. Jago de Compostello, and should then go down to the coast and attack the formidable works erected at Vigo by the English and the Spaniards. Marshal Soult having, by the destruction of the marquis de la Romana, rendered practicable the very difficult operation which they had to attempt upon Vigo, might then go up by the valley of Ores to Puebla de Sanabria and Zamora. After having signed these arrangements at Lugo, on the 29th of May, the two marshals separated, to begin, as soon as possible, the operations they had resolved on.

Marshal Soult quitted Lugo on the 2nd of June, after having made all his preparations for a march to Zamora, and advanced to Montforte, whence the marquis de la Romana fled to Orense. Having arrived on the 5th at Montforte, Soult halted, and instead of continuing to descend the valley of the Minho to Orense, as he had agreed with Ney, he directed his reconnaissances to the upper course of the Sil, one of the confluent of the Minho, towards Puebla de Sanabria and Zamora. That was not the way to Orense. However, he stopped at Montforte in a sort of immobility.

Ney, on his part, marched from the environs of Coruña, with 18 battalions, to St. Jago de Compostello, which the insurgents evacuated at his approach. On the 7th of June he repaired to Pontevedra, on the seaboard. To arrive at Vigo he had to pass along a series of small gulfs, covered with English gun-boats, and to defile under their fire. The intrepid marshal was not a man to stop for this; but on arriving near Vigo he encountered a position which nature and art had rendered formidable. He had to cross a small river without bridge, and within cannon-shot of the sea, and then to scale entrenchments mounting 60 guns of large calibre, and behind which were several thousand English seamen, with 12 thousand Spaniards. Such a position might have been carried by the impetuosity of the marshal and his soldiers, but his loss would be great. Besides, he ran the risk of failure; and, moreover, it was necessary to be assured that, during the daring attempt, he should not be subjected to a sudden attack on his flank or his rear by la Romana, who, though not to be feared in an ordinary situation, might do much mischief when the marshal was engaged in carrying the English redoubts. Knowing, therefore, that Soult was at Montforte, and la Romana at Orense, Ney awaited a movement of the former against the latter before beginning his perilous enterprise. In this position he continued until the 10th, expecting Soult to fulfil his engagement, rightly

desiring that la Romana's force should be dispersed before he attacked Vigo.

But at last he received from general Fournier, whom he had left at Lugo for certain details, a despatch which filled him with distrust of his colleague, and circumspection as to the enemy—two feelings not familiar to his confident and daring nature. General Fournier had seen in the hands of general Rouyer, who had remained at Lugo in charge of the sick and wounded of the army of Portugal, very secret orders from marshal Soult, enjoining him, as soon as the invalids were in a condition to march, to send them straightway to Zamora, and to keep those orders concealed from everybody, above all from marshal Ney. On being made aware of this order, which would have been quite natural if it had been avowed, since Zamora was Soult's definite destination, Ney thought he was betrayed. Seeing, moreover, that instead of descending upon Orense, to drive out la Romana, Soult remained at Montforte, he felt assured that his colleague wilfully broke his word to him. Before coming to an open rupture with him, he wrote him a letter on the 10th, informing him of his very perilous situation, telling him he still counted on the execution of the plan agreed on; but adding, that if, contrary to all probability, that plan was abandoned, he begged to have notice of the fact, because a longer stay in face of Vigo, with the road from Orense open on his flank, would be infinitely dangerous.

Marshal Ney waited some days for a reply to this letter, but received none. Struck by this silence, seeing the position of the English at Vigo becoming every day stronger, fearing, if he weakened himself in taking it, that the insurgents would all fall on him together, and that his return to Coruña would become difficult, he retreated to St. Jago de Compostello, scarcely able to contain his anger. There he learned that marshal Soult, far from descending the Minho, had on the contrary gone up its confluent, and proceeded by Puebla de Sanabria to Zamora. The fact was that Soult, impatient to quit Galicia for Old Castille, after having remained until the 11th at Montforte, had set out to cross the mountains that separate those two provinces. La Romana having attempted to oppose his march he repulsed him, and thought that in so doing he had fulfilled his engagements, which was not at all the case, for by beating the Spanish general on the upper confluent of the Minho, he only drove him toward the lower part of the river, towards Orense, the very place where it had been agreed that he should not be allowed to remain. Believing he had discharged his obligation to his colleague, he went on to Zamora without replying to Ney's letter. The latter considering this silence, the march to Zamora, and the injunction of secrecy laid on general Rouyer, as proofs of bad faith towards

himself, gave way to the most violent anger. He was in a most difficult position, for no sooner had marshal Soult re-entered Castille than la Romana returned to Orense, and as he might join Noruña, it became very dangerous for marshal Ney to remain before Vigo. His communications with Leon and Old Castille having been frequently interrupted whilst he was occupied on the coast, Ney might expect that the case would be much worse, now that the insurgents excited by the approach of the English, and the retreat of marshal Soult, would overrun the whole country, and probably go up from Orense to Lugo in great strength, and occupy that decisive position which completely bars the way from Coruña to Benavente. If, when there were only some scattered insurgents, it had required Maurice Mathieu's whole division, co-operating with general Kellermann, to reopen the communications with Leon and Old Castille, what would happen when Noruña and la Romana together were established in strength at Lugo? Another danger might arise, one that might lead to another Baylen. The English on arriving at the Minho had two courses open to them: they might recommence sir John Moore's campaign and enter Old Castille, or they might return to the south of Portugal to the Tagus. If they entered Castille, marshal Ney, with 10 or 12 thousand French against 20 thousand English and 40 or 50 thousand Spaniards, was lost. Now the idea of capitulating like general Dupont, or of saving himself by the sacrifice of his artillery, like marshal Soult, was equally insupportable to him, and he resolved to evacuate Gallicia. This was a very serious step, and would have momentous consequences; but there were good reasons for it, and moreover it accorded with instructions frequently repeated to him; for Joseph and Napoleon had written to him, blaming him for his haste in descending to the coast when his rear was not sufficiently secure, and telling him that before he devoted himself exclusively to the subjection of the seaboard, he ought to make sure of his communications with Old Castille. When marshal Soult was in Portugal, it was a comrade's duty to guard Orense and Tay; but now that Soult had evacuated Portugal there was no longer any reason for remaining in Gallicia, exposed to all sorts of danger, especially to that of being surrounded by the English and the Spaniards together.

Ney's only regret on evacuating Gallicia was on account of Coruña and Ferrol. But the Spaniards were too jealous of their maritime establishments to give them up to the English, and moreover, for the more security, he left a French garrison well provisioned in the Forts of Ferrol. Then sending his whole *matériel* on before him, not leaving behind one sick or wounded man, he returned slowly to Lugo, cutting off to the last man all the insurgent posts that ventured to approach him. At Lugo he

picked up marshal Soult's invalids, and took them with his own to Astorga, where he arrived in the beginning of July, without having lost one man or one cannon. Then he applied himself to reorganising and refitting his corps. At the moment he reached Astorga, marshal Soult was entering Zamora.

Marshal Ney's soldiers participated in the indignation of their commander to such a degree, that the aide-de-camps of the minister of war who were sent to the spot, reported that there would be danger in leaving the two corps near each other. The most insulting language was current in Astorga about marshal Soult and his army, who were accused of all the misfortunes of the campaign; for on departing, said they, he had passed on to Orense without destroying la Romana, whom he had thus thrown on the rear of marshal Ney; and when he came back, whilst a hand was lent him to destroy la Romana if he would, he retired clandestinely into Castille, leaving marshal Ney in Gallicia exposed to every danger. Ney wrote both to king Joseph and to marshal Soult letters most damnatory to the latter. "Had I chosen," he said, "to make up my mind to quit Gallicia without my artillery, I might have remained there longer at the risk of being shut in there; but I did not choose to expose myself to quit it in that fashion, and I effected my retreat, carrying off my sick and wounded, and even those of marshal Soult who had been left to my care." As for that marshal, he declared, that whatever might, be the Emperor's orders, he was resolved never again to serve with him.

These painful details are indispensable to a right conception of the manner in which the war in Spain was conducted, and to show how Napoleon, by extending his operations beyond the limits to which his own superintendence would reach, surrendered them to the hazard of events and of men's passions, and exposed to useless destruction heroic soldiers, who would ere long be missed for the defence of our unfortunate country. Whilst marshal Ney was at Astorga, expressing the anger he felt with all the vehemence of his nature—an example that was but too well followed by his soldiers—marshal Soult, at a short distance thence, at Zamora, appeared devoured with grief, deeply cast down, and constantly immersed in thought. It was thus at least that the officers commissioned to report to the minister of war depicted the state of mind of the two marshals.

King Joseph, who always learned news late, and did not know of the evacuation of Portugal and of Gallicia, and the quarrel between the two marshals until a month after the event, was deeply grieved, for he could easily foresee the consequences of that threefold misfortune. He at once gave up all thoughts of pushing marshal Victor forward into Andalucia, and detained him on the Tagus between Almaraz and Alcantara, to act against Gregorio de la

Cuesta, if the latter attempted to recross the Tagus, or against the English, should they be inclined to go up from Lisbon to Estremadura. The brilliant dreams of the month of April, inspired by the victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real, had vanished; the most that could be hoped for now was a victorious resistance to the assaults of the enemy. The news of the battle of Essling, which arrived just then, was not of a nature to enliven the sombre state of feeling at Madrid. However, as the three corps of marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult, could muster more than 50 thousand men, after they rested from their fatigues, they were enough, if well led, to drive all the English in the Peninsula into the sea. But to this end it was necessary that they should be well led, above all by a single hand, and, under existing circumstances, this was not to be expected.

Such was the state of things when there arrived most unexpectedly from Schönbrunn a despatch issued by Napoleon himself, which afforded another illustration of the consequences of directing military operations from such a distance. Whilst the last intelligence in Spain comprised the evacuation of Portugal and Galicia, at Schönbrunn Napoleon knew nothing subsequent to Soult's entry into Portugal, and Ney's descent to the coast of Galicia. Napoleon, a better judge than Joseph, had, like him, disapproved of what was passing, and the best remedy he knew was to combine the three corps of marshals Soult, Ney, and Mortier under one command. Accordingly, he wrote the following despatch to the minister of war: "You will send a staff officer to Spain with orders that the corps of the duke d'Elchingen, the duke de Treviso, and the duke de Dalmatie shall form but one army under the command of the duke de Dalmatie. These three corps are to manœuvre only together, march against the English, pursue them without remission, beat them, and sweep them into the sea. Putting aside every consideration, I give the command to the duke de Dalmatie as senior to the others. These three corps ought to amount to from 55 to 60 thousand men, and if their junction takes place promptly the English will be destroyed and the affairs of Spain terminated. But they must combine and not march in small parcels; this is a general principle for every country, but especially for a country in which communications cannot be had. I cannot nominate the place of junction, because I do not know the events that have happened. Send this order to the king, to the duke of Dalmatie, and to the two other marshals by four different ways." When this despatch arrived in Spain at the end of June, it caused extreme surprise; not because the junction of the three corps under one commander was disapproved of, but because it seemed impossible that marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult should serve together, and, above all, that the two former should serve under the latter. Had Napo-

leon been on the spot, he would certainly have made a different arrangement. He would—as Joseph suggested to him with much good sense—have left Soult to guard the north of Spain, and sent Mortier and Ney to the Tagus to reinforce marshal Victor, who was about to require considerable aid against the combined forces of Spain and England. And if marshal Ney, whose high standing and impetuous character unfitted him for serving under any other leader than the Emperor himself, could not have been employed under marshal Victor, he would have placed him in La Mancha, to act against the Spanish army of the centre, and he would have put general Sebastiani and marshal Mortier under marshal Victor, to fight the English. Marshal Mortier's modesty allowed of his being employed anywhere, no matter in what post, provided there were services he could render. The three corps of Mortier, Sebastiani, and Victor would, beyond a doubt, have been enough to beat the English. But Napoleon was far off, and Joseph durst not give orders for fear of not being obeyed. Thanks, however, to a certain military good sense with which he was endowed, and to the advice of his chief of the staff, marshal Jourdan, he conceived the happy idea of relieving Ney from the false position in which he was placed, and calling him to Madrid to take command of general Sebastiani's corps, which was operating in the province of La Mancha. Ney, however, chose to remain at Benavente, for he could not bring himself to quit his soldiers, whom he loved, and who loved him; and such was his deportment there towards Soult, that it was much to be doubted whether he would render obedience to that marshal when he came to be under his orders.

Ney, however, knew his duty too well to refuse to obey Soult until such time as Napoleon should be better informed; and some satisfactory results might still be expected from the combination of the three corps. But whereas their separation had damaged the first part of the campaign of 1809, their junction, effected at a fatal moment, was destined to spoil the second part, so that torrents of blood should have flowed uselessly in Spain from February to August. Sad proof of this will be found in the sequel.

The following was the situation of the belligerent forces in consequence of the late events. The evacuation of Galicia by Soult and Ney, had left the whole north of Spain to the insurgents, excepting the Asturias, where the brave general Bonnet, with a few thousand men, was making head against the mountaineers of that province. All Galicia, the Portuguese provinces of Traz-os-montes, Entre Douro e Minho, the verge of Old Castille, as far as Ciudad Rodrigo, and part of Estremadura, from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, were in the hands of the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the English, without counting the south of the Peninsula, which belonged to them exclusively. The

Spaniards were making great efforts to arm the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The detachment of Portuguese sent against Abrantes by sir Arthur Wellesley had marched to Alcantara, been repulsed thence by marshal Victor, and re-entered it again, the marshal not having chosen to leave a garrison there, for fear of weakening himself. Victor having fallen back on the Tagus on receiving intelligence of Soult's discomfiture and the arrival of a strong English army in Portugal, the Spanish general Gregorio de la Cuesta had moved back from the Guadiana to the Tagus, to the pass of Mirabete, opposite Almaraz. In La Mancha, general Venegas, who had succeeded Cartojal in the command of the army of the centre, had advanced against Sebastiani's corps, and seemed disposed to attack it. King Joseph had then quitted Madrid with his guard and a portion of the Dessoles division to attack Venegas; but the latter immediately retreated to the Sierra Morena, after which Joseph returned to the capital, leaving Sebastiani's corps between Consuegra and Madridejos, and Victor's corps on the Tagus, from Toledo to Talavera. These troops had not been engaged since the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, they had done nothing in April, May, and June, but perform some marches from the Guadiana to the Tagus, and they were well rested, well fed, and in superb condition. As for the provinces of Aragon and Catalonia, which we have not had occasion to mention since the siege of Saragossa and the battles of Cardedeu and Molins del Rey, general Suchet was fighting in the former against the insurgents of the Ebro, whom the siege of Saragossa had not discouraged; and in the latter, general St. Cyr had begun the sieges he had orders to effect, and was obliged to fight fresh battles every day to cover them.

Such was the spectacle which the war in Spain then exhibited. Everything was to depend on what the English would do. Would sir Arthur Wellesley march into Old Castille, as general Moore had done, to threaten the line of communication of the French, and oblige them to evacuate the south of the Peninsula, in order to succour the north? Or would he, after having cleared Portugal and driven marshal Soult beyond the Minho, move to the Tagus, to stop the enterprises which were to be apprehended on marshal Victor's part since the battle of Medellin? Such was the question which could hardly be solved in Madrid, the English general's instructions not being known, though marshal Victor at Talavera, and marshal Jourdan at Madrid, rightly surmised, from certain indications, that sir Arthur Wellesley would return to the Tagus. They supposed, with good reason, that he would not march into Gallicia, and thereby inordinately elongate his line of operation, and open the road to Lisbon by Alcantara to the French, but prefer marching on the Tagus, and

advancing thence, with all the forces of Spain, against Madrid. Under such considerations, Joseph did not think proper to accumulate forces in Old Castille, which were useless in that province; and acting on his own royal authority, until Soult should be in a condition to take the general command of the three corps, he moved Mortier from Valladolid to Villacastra, on the summit of the Guadarrama, so that he might be upon the Tagus in one or two marches, either at Toledo or at Talavera.

These measures adopted at head-quarters were happily adjusted to the intentions of the English general. His instructions, dictated under the impression made by sir John Moore's disasters, imported that he was not to venture into Spain. He was to attach himself exclusively to the defence of Portugal, and limit to that defence the aid promised to the Spaniards. He was to abstain as much as possible from crossing the Portuguese frontier, and to take such a step only in case of urgent necessity, or upon the surest prospect of success. So rigid were his instructions in this respect that he had been obliged to procure a modification of them, in order to be less crippled in his movements. For this reason he had halted on the banks of the Minho, and, learning that the French were assuming a very menacing aspect about Alcantara, he had moved by forced marches from the Minho to the Douro, and from the Douro to the Tagus, setting off against the earnest remonstrances of la Romana, who wanted him at Orense, those of Gregorio de la Cuesta, who summoned him to Merida. By the middle of June he was at Abrantes, preparing to reascend the valley of the Tagus, when he should have revictualled and recruited his army, which had great need of this, after its recent campaign on the Douro. He complained loudly of wanting money, *matériel*, and clothes; for, notwithstanding its wealth and its immense means of transport, the English government did sometimes make its soldiers wait for necessaries. Sir Arthur complained especially of his army, which he accused in very strong terms of being no more able to support good fortune than bad, and of shamefully pillaging the country it had come to defend. It pillaged, he said, not for want of subsistence, but to make money by selling to the inhabitants the cattle of which it had robbed them.* He remained

* I quote the duke of Wellington's own words in their original language. This is the only way to tell the truth without offending a noble nation, which has often accused us of having devastated Spain, and which will permit us to remark that we were not the only ravagers of that country:

"To the Right Honourable J. Villiers.

"Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

"MY DEAR VILLIERS,—I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of the

at Abrantes awaiting two regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and Crawford's whole brigade from Gibraltar. With these reinforcements, which would make his force amount to from 26 to 28 thousand men present under arms, he intended to go up the Tagus to Alcantara, where he expected to arrive in the be-

truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly, which has given me the greatest concern. . . .

"They have plundered the people of bullocks, among other property; for what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them to the people again. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention this practice to the minister of the Regency, and beg them to issue a proclamation, forbidding the people, in the most positive terms, to purchase anything from the soldiers of the British army.

"We are terribly distressed for money. I am convinced that 300,000*l.* would not pay our debts, and two months' pay is due to the army. I suspect the ministers in England are very indifferent to our operations in this country.

"Believe me, &c.,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

"To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

"Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

"MY DEAR LORD,—The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success any more than sir John Moore's army could bear failure. I am endeavouring to tame them; but if I should not succeed, I must make an official complaint of them, and send one or two corps home in disgrace. They plunder in all directions. . . .

"Believe me, &c.,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

"To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

"Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

"MY DEAR LORD,—I cannot with propriety omit to draw your attention again to the state of discipline of the army, which is a subject of serious concern to me, and well deserves the consideration of his Majesty's ministers.

"It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight of their officers—I may almost say never out of sight of the commanding officers of their regiments—and the general officers of the army, that outrages are not committed; and notwithstanding the pains which I take, of which there will be ample evidence in my orderly books, not a post or a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march, having been sick, or having straggled from their regiments, or who have been left in hospitals.

"We have a provost-marshal, and no less than four assistants. I never allow a man to march with the baggage; I never leave an hospital without a number of officers and non-commanding officers proportionable to the number of soldiers; and never allow a detachment to march unless under the command of an officer; and yet there is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet for one moment suffered the slightest want or the smallest privation. . . .

"Believe me, &c.,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

ginning of June, and form a junction with Gregorio de la Cuesta, whilst general Beresford, who was engaged in organising the Portuguese army, would guard the north of Portugal with the new levies and the English detachment under his orders.

The concentration of the French forces in the middle of the valley of the Tagus, on the suspicion of the approach of the English in that direction, was, therefore, a very wise resolution of those at head-quarters in Madrid. Unfortunately, the combination of the three corps under marshal Soult was about to become a fatal obstacle to that measure; and whilst there had been reason to regret that they had not been combined three months before, the time was at hand when it would be bitterly regretted that they were combined at the present moment. Though the supreme command had been bestowed on marshal Soult before the events at Oporto were known, and although he had still to fear the effect which the information sent to Schönbrunn might produce on the mind of Napoleon, he was yet very well pleased at having his rivals under his orders; and elated with pride at the part assigned to him, he devised a vast plan, ill adapted to existing circumstances, which he communicated to king Joseph, begging him to give orders for its immediate execution. As this plan was not carried into effect, it would not deserve mention here, had it not been the cause of subsequently hindering the junction of the French forces on the field of battle on which the issue of the campaign was decided. The plan was briefly this:

Marshal Soult supposed that the English, fatigued by their expedition to the Douro and the Minho, would halt and remain inactive until the completion of the harvest should enable the Spaniards and Portuguese to join them, so that they might resume military operations in September. There was, therefore, time enough, as he thought, to prepare for that event; and as he was more specially commissioned, by the union of the three *corps d'armée* of the north under his command, to expel the English from the Peninsula, he intended to operate by the line from Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida on Coïmbra, which was, in his opinion, the true route for penetrating into Portugal. To this end it was requisite forthwith to begin the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, then that of Almeida, and to employ in operations against those two places the interval of leisure on which he had reason to count. He undertook to make himself master of them with the 50 or 60 thousand men who were about to be under his orders, and, after they had fallen, he proposed to enter Portugal. But in order to be able to operate surely, three new concentrations of forces, he said, were necessary—one formed with the troops of Aragon and Catalonia (where we know that generals Suchet and St. Cyr maintained their ground with difficulty), in order to furnish him with a corps of observation in the north;

another formed with a part of the troops assembled in the valley of the Tagus (where they were quite indispensable), to cover his flank towards Alcantara; the third, formed with the reserve at Madrid (where there remained but a very weak garrison when Joseph quitted the capital), to serve him as rear-guard when he should have advanced into the heart of Portugal. Soult, moreover, required a park of siege artillery and a considerable sum of money to prepare his *matériel*. So then, in order to take a place which might, some time or other, be of use in the operations against Portugal, and to make head against the English in September, in a province where there was no certainty of meeting them, we were forthwith to abandon to them the Tagus, on which they were marching, and leave Madrid, Aragon, and Catalonia without troops. King Joseph and marshal Jourdan, regarding such a plan as inadmissible, replied that not a man could be withdrawn, either from Aragon or Catalonia, without immediately losing those provinces; that the forces remaining in Madrid were barely sufficient to reinforce the corps of general Sebastiani and marshal Victor from time to time; that the presence of those two corps on the Tagus sufficiently protected marshal Soult's flank towards Alcantara; that, moreover, the English, instead of postponing their operations until September, would march without delay to the Tagus, and there it was the marshal should think of acting, not on the line of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; that money there was none; the king was living on his plate, which had been melted down at the mint; and lastly, since the marshal wished to begin with the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, the *état major* would do its best to procure him a park of heavy artillery.

The most vexatious part of these projects was the order given to marshal Mortier to quit Villacastin for Salamanca. Joseph remonstrated against this order, rightly thinking that by a move to Salamanca Mortier would be drawn into the sphere of action of an army which, according to its leader's plan, was to remain useless for a long while; whereas, at Villacastin, he might render decisive services on the Tagus, whilst waiting until Soult's forces were ready to act. But Soult insisted, and Mortier was removed from the place where his presence might have been of immense advantage, as we shall soon see.

Contrary, in fact, to Soult's surmise, it was not in September that the English and Spaniards were to reappear on the theatre of war, but immediately, in the beginning of July, as soon as the resources of all kinds which they expected should have arrived. Sir Arthur Wellesley, as was to be anticipated, was at issue with the Spaniards as to the manner of operating on the Tagus. Gregorio de la Cuesta, always haunted by the fear of finding himself alone in presence of the French, insisted that

the English army should come and join him on the Guadiana, and thus make a very long *détour*, which would oblige it to descend as far as Badajoz in order to go up thence to Merida. Sir Arthur Wellesley, believing that marshal Victor was still between the Tagus and the Guadiana, wished to follow the better and much more natural plan of going up the valley of the Tagus, by Abrantes, Castello Branco, and Alcantara, so as to turn the marshal's position, by occupying that valley in his rear, and arrive, perhaps, at Madrid before him. For the success of this plan, it was enough that Gregorio de la Cuesta should detain marshal Victor on the Guadiana by some feint, and should not be afraid of exposing himself alone for some days to the encounter of the French. But the return of marshal Victor from the Guadiana to the Tagus cut short all these disputes. It was agreed that the English general, proceeding from Abrantes to Alcantara by the old route which Junot had taken, and the Spanish general, moving from the Guadiana to the Tagus, by Truxillo and Almaraz, should effect their junction on the banks of the Tagus, between Alcantara and Talavera, and should then take measures for turning their junction to the best account.

In consequence of this arrangement, sir Arthur Wellesley having received the troops he expected from Gibraltar, and the money and *matériel* of which he had urgent need, set out on the 27th of June from Abrantes, and advanced by Castello Branco, Rosmaniñal, and Zarza Major, into Estremadura. He was at Zarza Major on the 3rd of July, on the 6th at Coria, on the 8th at Plasencia. On arriving at the latter place he wished to concert measures with Gregorio de la Cuesta, and repaired to his headquarters at Puerto de Mirabete on the Tagus. He had orders to have as little communication as possible with the Spanish generals on account of their extremely braggart dispositions, and to communicate with the ministers of the Junta only through the English ambassador at Seville; in a word, to abstain, except in case of imperative necessity, from an intercourse which was always disagreeable and generally led to disunion. His interview with the proud and intractable Gregorio de la Cuesta afforded him proof of the wisdom of the instructions given him by his government. Don Gregorio being just then in favour with the fickle Spanish revolutionists, assumed the airs of a master, and behaved with singular arrogance to the insurrectional Junta, which everybody wished to see give place to the Cortes. He even declared his intention of anticipating the public wishes by dismissing the Junta and creating a government of his own fashion. His haughtiness towards his allies was proportional to these pretensions. Many a debate was necessary before a tolerably rational plan could be arranged with such a person. That which presented itself at the first glance, and on which it was im-

possible not to agree, was that the three generals, Wellesley, La Cuesta, and Venegas, should unite their forces between Almaraz and Talavera, or between Talavera and Toledo, and march together on Madrid. The forces of Venegas in La Mancha were estimated at 18 thousand men, those of Cuesta at 36 thousand men, those of sir Arthur Wellesley at 26 thousand; setting aside all exaggeration. It was an imposing force, and one which would have been overwhelming for the French if more than two-thirds of it had not consisted of Spanish troops. The junction being agreed on, the manner in which it was to be executed was next to be considered. In accordance with the judicious advice of sir Arthur Wellesley, it was agreed that towards the 20th or 22nd of July Venegas should make a strong demonstration against Madrid, by attempting to cross the Tagus in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez; that whilst the French were thus drawn to the upper course of the Tagus the English army should seize the opportunity to join the principal Spanish army, that of Gregorio de la Cuesta; and that the two armies should march up both banks of the Tagus and join Venegas in the environs of Toledo. Great difficulties arose on one point. The capture of the brave general Franceschi by the famous guerilla leader El Capuchino, who horribly maltreated his prisoner, had furnished the English general with certain proof of the arrival of marshal Soult at Zamora. But sir Arthur believed that Soult had occupation for a long time in repairing his damage, and was not aware of the general command conferred upon him. He thought, therefore, that by guarding the two passes from Old Castille into Estremadura, those namely of Perales and Baños, full security would be obtained against any danger from that quarter. He undertook to have the pass of Perales, which was the nearest of the two to Portugal, kept by detachments of Beresford's force; but that of Baños, which lay nearest to La Cuesta, ought, he thought, to be kept by Spanish troops. He had an excellent motive for acting thus, namely to avoid dispersing the English troops, which could alone be depended upon when the day of battle came, and to employ in accessory services the Spaniards whose numbers mattered little in a decisive engagement, where they were rather an incumbrance than otherwise. After much contention it was settled that general Wilson should be sent with a few thousand Spaniards, a few thousand Portuguese, and a thousand English, along the mountains which separate Estremadura from Castille, to cover the flank of the combined armies. Next there was a dispute respecting the victuals and transports, which the Spaniards had promised to furnish to the English for payment, and which they did not supply even when the money was tendered. Things had reached such a pass that sir Arthur Wellesley, seeing the Spaniards well provided and his own soldiers condemned to

all sorts of privations, threatened to withdraw if his wants were not more regularly supplied. To this the Spaniards replied that the English never had enough, they could do nothing but grumble, and where they complained of starvation, they, the Spaniards, would consider themselves living in plenty. The contradiction was easily accounted for by the difference in the habits and way of living of the two nations.

Having concluded these arrangements in the best way he could, sir Arthur Wellesley returned to Plasencia on the 13th of July. After allowing time for some detachments, which were still behind, to arrive, he marched to the Tietar, which he crossed without difficulty on the 18th of July. Advancing to Oropesa, he joined Gregorio de la Cuesta by the Almaraz and Arzobispo bridges, and drove back the rear-guards of Victor's corps on Talavera, which he entered on the 22nd. Sir Arthur was for attacking the French at once, knowing that they were not concentrated, and expecting that with the combined army, which was more than 60 thousand strong (26 thousand English and 36 thousand Spaniards), he should beat the 22 thousand French under marshal Victor. But Gregorio de la Cuesta declared that he was not ready, and Victor's corps was allowed to retire unmolested behind the Alberche, a small stream which descends from the mountains and falls into the Tagus a little beyond Talavera.

It was at this moment that the French at last had accurate intelligence of the march of the coalesced generals, and the junction of the English and Spanish armies. They had been aware for a fortnight of sir Arthur Wellesley's movement towards Abrantes and Alcantara, but they were still in doubt as to his ulterior direction, his intended junction with the Spaniards, and his plan for the campaign. That plan was now evident, and on the 20th and 21st of July marshal Victor made it known at Madrid. Not knowing whether or not he should be supported, he had recrossed the Alberche, and was resolved to retreat further still to the Guadarrama, another small confluent of the Tagus, which issues from the hills of the same name.

By the advice of marshal Jourdan, king Joseph immediately decided on moving forward all his forces to meet the combined army. He certainly could not have done better. He had at his disposal the 4th corps, general Sebastiani's, which still mustered 17 or 18 thousand excellent soldiers, after detaching 3 thousand to guard Toledo. He had that of marshal Victor, which, after all deductions, numbered 22 thousand quite as good. He could take from Madrid a brigade of the Dessoles division, his guard, and a small body of light cavalry, forming a reserve of 5 thousand men and fourteen pieces of cannon—altogether 45 thousand first-rate troops. In the hands of an able general such a force

would have been more than sufficient to beat the combined army, which amounted to from 66 to 68 thousand men, including general Wilson's detachment in the mountains, but of which only 26 thousand were real soldiers. Nor would there even have been any doubt as to the result, whoever was the general commanding our troops, if marshal Mortier had remained at Villacastro, so as to be able to reach Toledo in two days' marches. A reinforcement of 18 or 20 thousand veteran soldiers would have given the French army such a superiority as the Anglo-Spanish army could not have withstood. This precious advantage had unfortunately been sacrificed to the idea of fusing together the three corps of the north; an idea conceived by Napoleon at the distance of six hundred leagues from the theatre of war, and three months previously to the events which were to be accomplished. Nevertheless, it was still possible to repair the disadvantages of this unseasonable junction, by ordering marshal Soult to march from Salamanca to Avila, in order to descend between Madrid and Talavera; and if it was not possible to combine his three corps, immediately to push forward that one of the three which was ready first, leaving the others to follow in succession. If only that of marshal Mortier arrived—and it had long been ready—it would have sufficed to secure king Joseph a decided superiority. Joseph and marshal Jourdan did conceive this idea, but being of opinion that to bring marshal Soult's forces to Madrid would occasion a considerable loss of time, and that by making him debouche directly from Salamanca on Plasencia, he might on the 30th or 31st of July come upon the rear of the English, they preferred giving him this latter order rather than have him debouche by Avila, between Talavera and Madrid. This course lay under the disadvantage of presenting our forces to the enemy in two masses; the one descending the valley of the Tagus from Toledo to Talavera, the other ascending it from Almaraz to Talavera, and of affording sir Arthur Wellesley, who would be placed between them, an opportunity of beating them one after the other, as general Bonaparte had so often done round Verona. But sir Arthur Wellesley, though an excellent commander, was not general Bonaparte, and his soldiers did not march as did the French soldiers. He had but 26 thousand Englishmen under him, and with these could not beat in succession Joseph's 45 thousand, and Soult's 50 thousand. If the latter, receiving on the 24th the order despatched on the 22nd, marched on the 26th, which was possible, he might be at Plasencia, on the 30th, and the English army, attacked in front and rear, must have been defeated. If Soult could not bring up Ney's corps from its position near Benavente, his own corps, which should then be about 20 thousand strong, with Mortier's 18 thousand, would be enough to

give the *coup de grâce* to sir Arthur Wellesley, who had but 26 thousand men, who by that time would probably have been already beaten, or at least separated from the Spaniards, and forced to retreat. King Joseph sent general Foy to marshal Soult with the instructions we have mentioned, and with most pressing entreaties to put himself *en route* forthwith. On his return from Soult's camp, general Foy repeatedly averred that the marshal could be where he was wanted at the appointed time. Joseph then ordered general Sebastiani to march by Toledo to Talavera to the aid of marshal Victor; and he himself set out for the same rallying point, on the night of the 22nd, with his reserve of 5 thousand men. He left general Belliard in Madrid with Dessoles' second brigade, and a number of invalids and convalescents, who could all, in case of emergency, throw themselves into the Retiro, and defend themselves there for several weeks. A regiment of dragoons was to sweep the banks of the Tagus above and below Aranjuez, to give notice of the first appearance of Venegas. The 3 thousand-men detached from Soult's corps were to guard Toledo, so that from the sources of the Tagus to Talavera the necessary measures were taken on the left of the French to check the march of Venegas, whilst a stand was made against Gregorio de la Cuesta and sir Arthur Wellesley. These arrangements, which marked the advice of an experienced soldier (marshal Jourdan), and did honour to the judgment of king Joseph, who had adopted them, promised, if well executed, to bring about the total destruction of the English, who, upon the least favourable supposition, would be assailed by 45 thousand men in front and 38 thousand in their rear. What could 66 thousand men, but one-third of whom were real soldiers, do against such a mass of forces?

Joseph marched out of Madrid to Illescas on the night of the 22nd of July, and arrived on the 25th at Vargas, a little behind the small stream of the Guadarrama, on which marshal Victor had fallen back in order to effect his junction with general Sebastiani. That same day the three corps (Victor's 22,542, Sebastiani's 17,690, Joseph's 5,077) were in conjunction at Vargas, a little beyond Toledo. Had they relied less on the prompt arrival of marshal Soult, it would have been more prudent not to advance too far, but keep within reach of Madrid, to cover it from any attempt on the part of Venegas, and at the same time, to choose a good defensive position, so as to lead the English into that kind of warfare they least understood—offensive war. This course would have given Soult time to prepare and to appear on the theatre of war. But trusting too easily to his speedy arrival at Plasencia, and not taking sufficiently into account the unexpected delays which often baffle the best calculations in war, the French leaders did not hesitate to urge the Anglo-French armies

away from Madrid by marching straight against them, and pushing them upon Oropesa and Plasencia, where their destruction was expected. It was resolved, therefore, to advance on the following day, and vigorously resume the offensive. The news from marshal Soult was excellent. Undeceived at last as to the time when the English were to enter into action, and abandoning his first plans, he wrote word on the 24th that Mortier's corps and his own could quit Salamanca on the 26th, so that even leaving Ney's corps behind, there would be a sufficient force in the rear of the English on the 30th or 31st.

Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who on the 23rd was not ready to attack marshal Victor, whose force was then isolated, became full of spirit on seeing the French retreat, crossed the Alberche after them, hotly pursued them, and wrote to his ally, Wellesley, that there was no overtaking those despicable French, so fast did they run. Having marched on the 24th and 25th to Alcabon and Cebolla, he found them on the 26th at Torrijos, resolved to let him have his wish and come up with them. He had been warned by sir Arthur Wellesley, that if he marched in that way he would get himself beaten. The event showed the good sense of the English general.

Merlin's light cavalry, belonging to general Sebastiani's corps, marched with Latour-Maubourg's dragoons in the advanced guard. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who so much regretted the headlong flight of the French, stopped short on seeing them prepared to resist, and hastily retreated to seek support from the English. Between Torrijos and Alcabon he had to pass a defile, and to cover himself during the passage, he presented 4 thousand infantry and 2 thousand cavalry under general Zayas in order of battle. General Latour-Maubourg, who commanded the advanced guard, after having debouched in a field of olives, deployed his squadrons in a line parallel to the enemy. The Spaniards kept their ground at first when they saw only cavalry before them; but as soon as they perceived the head of the column of infantry, they began to fall back in all haste, and threw themselves into Alcabon. General Beaumont then dashed after them with the 2nd hussars and a squadron of the 5th chasseurs. General Zayas tried to oppose him with Villaviciosa's dragoons; but our hussars and chasseurs charged them in every direction, hemmed them in, and put them to the sword. Very few of them escaped. Our cavalry then charged the advanced guard, which fled in disorder with the main body. If the 1st corps (marshal Victor's) had then been in a condition to act, the whole Spanish army would have been routed. But the troops were fatigued with the heat, the ground was very broken, and marshal Victor did not choose to risk a fresh action, though strongly pressed to do so by Joseph's staff.

The French halted for the night at Santa Olalla. On the following day, the 27th, they set out at two in the morning to take advantage of the cool hours, and marched towards the Alberche in order to arrive the same day at Talavera, with the intention of driving the Anglo-Spanish army on Plasencia. The 1st corps, preceded by Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, still formed the head of the column. On approaching the Alberche they saw on the left the Spaniards passing that confluent of the Tagus in disorder in their retreat to Talavera, and on the right a column of English, who had come to Cazalegas to aid don Gregorio de la Cuesta. From the summit of a plateau which commands the course of the Alberche, they perceived on the other bank a vast wood of oaks and olives, and further on a series of prominent hills, very strongly occupied, connected on one side with a high chain of mountains, on the other with Talavera and the Tagus, which flows through that town. The greatest part of the English army was in position on the series of hills, having before them a large quantity of artillery, fascines, and solid redoubts. The dust that rose above the forest of oaks and olives showed that the Spanish troops we had beaten the day before were retreating through it, and we might hope to come up with them before they had reached the intrenched position of the English. Marshal Victor, who had great confidence in his old soldiers, and who thought he might take much upon himself in consideration of his high rank, hastily forded the Alberche with his three divisions. He advanced with the Ruffin division on his right, Villatte's in the centre, Lapisse's on the left, and flanked by Latour-Maubourg, and he sent word to king Joseph to support him with Sebastiani's corps and the reserve. Being well acquainted with the ground, which he had often gone over, he flattered himself, that if circumstances proved favourable, and he was well seconded, he should be able to carry the position by a mere *coup de main*.

The troops crossed the Alberche in close column, with the water up to their middles, and dashed into the forest. Lapisse's division on Marshal Victor's left became engaged near Casa de las Gallinas with Mackenzie's brigade, which formed the English rear-guard. The 16th light infantry pressed close upon the English, and attacked them wherever the ground permitted it. On coming to a glade that allowed of the deployment of the troops, general Chaudron Rousseau ordered a charge with the bayonet. The brave soldiers of the 16th, eager to prove that they no more feared a solid and regular army than the unwarlike troops of the Spaniards, rushed upon the two English regiments opposed to them (the 31st and the 87th), broke them, and caused them a considerable loss. The English retreated hurriedly upon their main body, which was in position, as we have said, near Talavera, between the Tagus and the mountains. Marshal

Victor wished to follow them, but he had to wait for the Villatte division, which had not quite crossed the Alberche, and the cavalry and artillery, which were still on the other side; especially it was necessary that Sebastiani's corps, which was still in the rear, should have come up. If, instead of a king personally brave, but without experience, and obliged to consult an old marshal, the army had been led by a real general, who personally inspected the ground at the head of his advanced guard, and formed his resolutions in good time, we should have hastened to cross the Alberche *en masse*; and by taking advantage of the check dealt to the English, and the confusion in which the Spaniards were retreating, we might perhaps have carried the enemy's position. But every one took his own course, or waited for the word of command, which did not come until the occasion was gone by.

It must be owned that it was rather late to crown the day by so decisive an act, for marshal Victor himself did not arrive in front of the English position until towards the close of the day. On emerging from the forest beyond the Alberche, our troops advanced along a sort of plateau, whence they distinctly perceived the position of the English. It was, as we have said, a series of hills, the highest of which was seen on our right, covered with English troops and artillery; and the others on our left, gradually declining towards Talavera, were likewise covered with troops and artillery, belonging to the Spanish army. In the centre of this position was a large redoubt, bristling with cannon, and jointly defended by the troops of both nations. Further on our left clumps of oaks and olive-trees, felled timber and enclosures extended to Talavera and the Tagus, and served to support the courage of the Spaniards, which never showed in much lustre, as we have often had occasion to remark, except when it was sustained by the nature of the ground. There might have been in position 25 or 26 thousand English, 30 and some odd thousand Spaniards, besides Wilson's division, which was distinguished on the mountains on our right, making haste to rejoin the main body: there were then 65 or 66 thousand enemies, whom we had to fight with 45 thousand; but the excellence of the latter made amends for their inferiority in number.

Besides that the position of the English and the Spaniards was strong, it accorded with their principal military quality, which consisted in making good use of a defensive post. To reach them it was necessary to cross a rather deep ravine which separated them from the plateau, on which we had debouched on issuing from the forest, and then to ascend a series of steep hills under their fire. It was possible, however, to turn these hills on our right, in consequence of a feature of the ground

which we might have used with advantage. The hill which formed the extreme point of the position of the English was divided by a wide valley from the lofty chain of mountains which borders the valley of the Tagus. By descending into the ravine above mentioned, marching straight towards the enemy, and ascending again to the right, we might have entered the valley and turned the hill in question, on which Hill's division was encamped. A considerable portion of the French forces should have been brought round in this way unperceived by the English, and then by a vigorous attack in front and rear their position would very probably have been carried.

Marshal Victor, who had remarked a great confusion in the retreat of the enemy, imagined that by a brisk attack at the close of the day, he should carry the hill on our right, after which the position would no longer be tenable for the English, and he would have the sole honour of gaining the battle. Extreme zeal and brilliant valour dictated this resolution; but it was one that would not have been taken under a general-in-chief who commanded with authority and vigour. A great battle would not have been begun unknown to him, by a wing, at so advanced an hour of the day, without his having appointed the time and the manner of entering into action, and, above all, without his having decided whether or not a battle was to be fought at all.

Carried away by his courage, and not knowing what troops he had to do with, marshal Victor launched the Ruffin division against the hill between nine and ten at night. This division, one of the best in the grand army, consisted of three accomplished regiments, the 9th light, and the 24th and 96th of the line. It was led by two officers of great merit—divisional-general Ruffin and brigade-general Barrois. Marshal Victor ordered the 9th to attack the hill in front, the 24th to turn it by the valley, and the 96th to advance to the left, to the direct support of the 9th. The marshal kept the Villatte and Lapisse divisions in reserve to hold the enemy in check on the left. The artillery on the plateau might have fired over the ravine upon the English, but it was not used for fear of firing upon our own men in the dark.

Our troops advanced bravely. The 9th, which led the way, descended from the plateau into the ravine, and marched straight towards the hill. The English having perceived the movement, opened a murderous fire, though aimed in the dark, upon our men, but did not succeed in checking them. The latter climbed the slopes of the position, drove in the enemy's first line with the bayonet, and still under fire made their way to the summit. Some companies of the 9th reached the top of the hill, and had even beaten back some of the English, when general Hill, seeing that these bold assailants were not supported either on the right or the left, directed a part of his troops against their flank. The 9th attacked

in front and on its left, was compelled to retreat, leaving many of its men dead or wounded on the summit of the plateau. The cause of this discomfiture was the delay of the 96th, which, encountering unexpected obstacles in the ravine, had spent more time in crossing it than had been calculated, and the delay also of the 24th, which had lost its way in the valley on the right. These two regiments arriving on the scene of action, found the 9th retreating, but not routed, and maintaining an unshakeable steadiness under the fire of the English. It had lost 300 men in that abortive attempt. Its colonel, Meunier, had received three musket shots. Marshal Victor did not think proper to continue this nocturnal engagement, but bethought him of allowing some rest to troops which, having left Santa Olalla at two o'clock in the morning, were fighting at Talavera at ten o'clock at night. Our men bivouacked where they were on the plateau facing the English. On the left, the cavalry connected marshal Victor's troops with those of general Sebastiani and of the reserve, which had at last crossed the Alberche, and deployed opposite the enemy's centre. Milhaud's dragoons, on the extreme left, watched the high-road to Talavera. On that side the Spaniards, whom our cavalry had thrown into extraordinary confusion, were taking up their position as they could. In their bewilderment, they believed themselves attacked when they heard the musketry of Ruffin's division, and they began to fire without knowing against whom or wherefore. So the next day they alleged that they had had to repulse a violent night attack. What was less pardonable, the English stationed in the same quarter repeated this falsehood.

On the next day, the 28th, a memorable day in our Spanish wars, eager to repair the very accidental discomfiture of the preceding night, marshal Victor was ready to begin the action at daybreak, confident of succeeding this time, if the attack on the hill was made with suitable *ensemble*. Seeing, as he rode over the ground, the English army posted on the series of hills, the chief of which he had assailed, and the Spanish army behind walls, felled timber, and woods, he was confirmed in his opinion that the hill opposite our right was the key to the position, and if it was taken, the combined army would be driven back on Talavera, and probably into the Tagus. He therefore determined to attack it at once with all his might, and sent word to king Joseph immediately to direct Sebastiani's troops and the reserve against the enemy's centre, that the English might not fall upon him *en masse* whilst he was occupied against the extremity of their line.

To give the Ruffin division an opportunity of revenging its defeat of the preceding night, he ordered it to attack the hill with its three regiments together. He placed the Villatte division

in reserve in the rear, and ordered the Lapisse division and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons to make a feint to the left of attacking the enemy's centre. But something more than a feint was requisite if they were to be hindered from falling in a mass on Ruffin's division.

At daybreak that brave division put itself in motion with only one change in its order of march. The 9th, which had already been decimated in its first attempt, was to make its attack on the right by the valley; the 24th, which had not fought, was to attack in the centre and in front; the 96th on the left, as on the preceding night. The three regiments descended into the ravine, and traversed it under the fire of Hill's whole division with a steadiness that excited the admiration of the English army. They mounted the first slopes and arrived on a ground that formed as it were the first stage of the hill, sustaining with incomparable coolness the enemy's grape and bullets. But sir Arthur Wellesley, placed in the midst of his army, discerned, with the glance of a real general, that the Lapisse division on the left of Ruffin's was not near enough to act, and that the rest of the French army was still less so. With the utmost celerity he then directed a part of his centre, composed of general Sherbrooke's troops, against Ruffin's division. The latter, taken in flank, whilst it sustained a tremendous fire in front, just as the 9th had been in the night, was compelled to give way. It retreated slowly, leaving the English without the courage to pursue it; but it paid for its daring attack and its fine retreat by an enormous loss. About 500 men of each regiment, making a total of 1500 men for the division, strewed the terraces of that fatal hill, against which two successive attacks made with rare heroism had been unsuccessful.

Marshal Victor, who had not spared himself, was forced to own that against such troops a position was not to be carried by a *coup de main*. Still confident, however, of victory, he postponed the decisive attack until such time as the whole French army should be able to act together. It was ten o'clock in the morning. Joseph, who had galloped up to the first corps to take upon him his functions as commander-in-chief, held a council of war with marshal Jourdan, marshal Victor, and general Sebastiani. The first question to be discussed was whether or not they should give battle. Opinions were divided on this essential question. Marshal Jourdan threw the weight of his great experience into the negative scale. He supported his opinions with excellent reasons. According to him the opportunity had been lost for carrying the enemy's position, which he had just reconnoitred, and of which he now knew the strong and the weak points. The proper course would have been, whilst the English were as yet ignorant of the real point of attack, to move a con-

siderable part of the French army into the valley, keeping the rest of the line to mask that movement, then suddenly to make a vigorous and well-combined attack on the principal hill before the enemy should have had time to bring up sufficient forces for its defence; and when the hill was carried, to drive back the Anglo-Spanish army on Talavera and the Tagus, where it might have been beaten with great havoc. But it was no longer time to operate thus, because sir Arthur Wellesley was made aware by two successive attempts of the real point of attack, because it was daylight, and so the least movement would be perceived, and the English general would not fail to move up to his left as many troops as we moved to our right. Moreover, in executing this change of front, we should have no other way of retreat in case of failure than the impracticable roads leading to Avila, and the retreat, if it became necessary, could only be effected by sacrificing the artillery and the heavy baggage of the army. In this state of things, the attack in front being a doubtful proceeding, and the attack in flank too late, and moreover perilous for the retreat, it was advisable to temporise, fall back behind the Alberche, take up a defensive position, and wait until marshal Soult with his three corps should have debouched on the rear of the Anglo-Spanish army.

Marshal Victor, eager to indemnify himself for his two fruitless attempts, and confident in the energy of his troops, maintained that it was for want of support towards the centre that his attack had not succeeded; and if Sebastiani's corps and the reserve were directed against the English centre, he undertook with his own corps alone to take the hill which was the key to the position. Again and again he declared that he ought to give up the trade of war, if, with troops like his, he did not take the enemy's position. Perplexed between marshal Jourdan's cool prudence and marshal Victor's impetuosity, Joseph knew not which course to take, when a despatch arrived from marshal Soult, announcing, that notwithstanding his promise, he could not be in the rear of the English before the 3rd of August. Yet marshal Mortier's corps was at Salamanca on the 26th; marshal Soult's corps was on the same day half at Salamanca, half at Toro, and there seems no reason why he should not have been on the 29th or 30th at Plasencia with 38 or 40 thousand men. Be this as it may, it was now the 28th, and Soult was not to be expected before six days. Now, would it be possible during those six days to make head against sir Arthur Wellesley and don Gregorio de la Cuesta on one side, and Venegas on the other, the latter already menacing Toledo and Aranjuez? These considerations, and marshal Victor's eagerness to fight prevailed, and it was resolved that the attack should be made forthwith. It was further agreed that this time it should be made simultaneously by our whole line from

right to left, so that the enemy, being obliged to defend himself at all points, should not be able to carry reinforcements to any. Marshal Victor was to proceed otherwise than has he had done at night and in the morning. Instead of ascending the hill directly, he was to make the Ruffin division file off into the valley which divided the enemy's position from the mountains, pass along that valley where Wilson's force was beginning to show itself, and not climb the hill until it had completely turned it. During this time the Villate division was to have one of its two brigades at the foot of the hill to threaten it and keep the English there, the other in the valley to support Ruffin's division against a mass of cavalry which was seen in the distance. The Lapisse division, forming Victor's left, was with Sebastiani's corps to make a vigorous attack on the centre, so as to draw thither the enemy's greatest forces. When that attack on the centre had produced its effect and Ruffin had gained sufficient ground in the valley on the left of the English, general Villate was to assail the hill in front with his two brigades. It was reasonable to expect that the attack thus made would be successful. Latour Maubourg's dragoons and Merlin's light cavalry were to follow the Ruffin division in the valley, where, as we have said, there was a good deal of English and Spanish cavalry. Milhaud's dragoons were to act on the extreme left, and occupy the Spaniards in the direction of Talavera. Joseph's reserve was posted in the rear of the centre to afford aid wherever needed. Lastly, marshal Victor's artillery, ranged on the plateau opposite the English position, was to fire upon it across the ravine.

The small extend of the field of battle allowed of these orders being rapidly conveyed, yet it was not until two in the afternoon they began to be executed, in consequence of the many movements of troops to be effected. Ruffin's division entering the valley by a lateral opening, marched up it in close column along the flank of the English, whilst Villate's two brigades took up a position in the ravine which divided us from the enemy, one of them facing the valley, the other the hill, ready to join Ruffin's division, or to return and assail in front the position so obstinately disputed since the preceding evening. During this time the artillery, under colonel d'Aboville, threw its fire upon the English across the ravine. Lastly, the Lapisse division made ready to charge the enemy's centre, and Sebastiani's corps was marching upon the redoubt at the point of junction of the two combined armies. But whilst these movements were taking place in good order, an accident occurred to disturb them. Leval's German division, which had recently been transferred from marshal Victor's corps to general Sebastiani's, had been placed on the left of the latter, to flank it with Milhaud's dragoons in case the Spaniards should debouche from Talavera. Being ordered to *

keep abreast with general Sebastiani, and not clearly discerning his post through the oaks and olives that covered the ground, it found itself suddenly under the fire of the central redoubt, and assailed on the right by the English, on the left by the Spanish cavalry. The Germans formed square, received the cavalry with a fire at point-blank distance, defeated it, and marched forward. In their offensive movement they turned an English regiment that attacked them in flank, surrounded it, and were about to make prisoners of it, when general de Porbeck, who commanded the Baden troops, was shot dead. This accident having left the Badense without a leader, the English had time to retrieve themselves and escape. Joseph's staff seeing the premature action, wished to stop the Germans, lest being engaged too soon they should be missed at a later moment when their services were required on general Sebastiani's flank, and so orders were sent to general Leval to fall back. It would have been better to follow up the attack with vigour, and to use the reserve in case of a sudden appearance of the Spaniards on Sebastiani's flank, than to retreat in face of the enemy. Be this as it may, the Leval division fell back, but its artillery horses having been killed by the fire of the redoubt, eight pieces which it could not drag back through the wood, were left behind, and fell into the enemy's hands.

After having repaired this accident as well as they could, generals Sebastiani and Lapisse both advanced. With the 16th light and the 45th of the line both deployed, followed by the 8th and 54th of the line in close columns, Lapisse assailed the heights which flanked the principal hill and connected it with the plain of Talavera. In spite of the fire of the English he gained ground. Sebastiani, with his fine French division of four regiments, advanced on Lapisse's left. The English fell furiously upon him. His right brigade, commanded by general Rey, and composed of the 28th and 32nd, repulsed them. The left brigade, commanded by general Belair, was assailed by the Spaniards and the English together, but stood its ground, not less firmly than general Rey's. The 75th and 58th stopped the charges of the Spanish cavalry, whilst Leval's Germans again advanced in several squares. Here, too, as well as in the direction of Lapisse's division, we were slowly gaining ground. Whilst these events were taking place on the left and the centre, to the right, in face of the famous hill, the artillery continuing to fire across the ravine, produced a murderous effect on Hill's division; general Villatte was still in the ravine, awaiting the signal to attack, and Ruffin's division was advancing in the valley against the English left. At that moment Albuquerque's Portuguese cavalry, joined with the English cavalry, attempted to bar the way against Ruffin's division, and galloped down

upon it. The division, seeing the charge approach, drew aside to let it pass, and the Anglo-Portuguese horse, dashing on at full speed, received the fire both of Ruffin and Villatte. A part wheeled round, but the English 13th dragoons were unable to pull up. General Strolz's brigade of light horse, skilfully manœuvring, waited till they had passed, then charged them in flank and rear, whilst the Polish lancers and the Westphalian light-horse assailed them in front. The unfortunate regiment, surrounded on all sides, was cut down or taken to a man.

Such was the state of things towards our right, when, in the centre, general Lapisse, who led his division in person, and had already climbed the heights occupied by the enemy, was killed by a shot. His death caused some confusion in the division, which, being immediately charged by Sherbrooke's troops, was driven back. Informed of this occurrence, marshal Victor galloped up to rally the troops, and bring them back into line; but the enemy, following up his success, fell *en masse* on the Lapisse division. At the same moment, general Sebastiani's corps, uncovered by the retrograde movement of the Lapisse division, was briskly attacked on its right. The 28th and 32nd behaved with their usual bravery, stood firm under general Rey, and yielded no more ground than was necessary to put them in line again with the troops which had retreated.

This was the moment to act with redoubled energy, to bring up the reserve to the aid of the Lapisse and Sebastiani divisions, and to set on Villatte's two brigades against the bill which Ruffin had succeeded in turning. Everything, in fact, gave reason to hope for victory. The English, cut up by the grape from our batteries on the plateau, seemed to be wavering; their artillery was dismounted, and their fire nearly extinct. Their usual tenacity must have given way to a vigorous simultaneous movement at that moment. But Joseph, who, while he yielded to marshal Victor's ardour, had also been much impressed by marshal Jourdan's reasoning, now seeing the day far advanced, and the victory still doubtful, thought proper to suspend the action, with the intention of renewing it next day. Certainly there was no reason for discouragement, for the battle was on the point of being won. Nevertheless, he countermanded the attack. It was about five o'clock, and at that hour of the day, in the month of June, he had still several hours' daylight before him. Marshal Victor immediately galloped up to him, urged the certainty of success if Ruffin, who had advanced to the necessary extent in the valley, attacked the rear of the English whilst Villatte assailed them in front; pointed out that the English were visibly wavering, and set forth all the reasons that existed for persevering and pressing upon sir Arthur Wellesley with a steadfastness equal to his own. Moved by the marshal's argu-

ments, Joseph was about to adopt his advice, when several officers came up with information that some Spanish detachments, going up the banks of the Tagus, seemed to be approaching the Alberche; and other officers, coming in all haste from Toledo, brought the alarming news of the appearance of Venegas before Aranjuez and Madrid. Joseph's irresolute nature could not withstand the effect of these reports; he was afraid of being turned; and being confirmed in his apprehensions by marshal Jourdan, who disapproved of the battle, he sent orders to marshal Victor to retreat, and to acquaint general Sebastiani with the exact moment when he would begin his backward movement, in order that the latter might affect his at the same time.

Not daring to disobey this time, marshal Victor sent word to general Sebastiani that he would begin to retreat at midnight; but he reiterated his entreaties to Joseph to be allowed to continue the battle the next day. Joseph passed part of the night in sore perplexity, surrounded by officers,—some of whom said that we were outflanked,—others, on the contrary, that the English appeared to be motionless in their position, and not in a condition to make a step in advance. Whilst thus distracted between the fear of being turned if he persevered in fighting, and that of being accused to the Emperor of weakness if he ordered a retreat, he suddenly learned that the army was quitting its position, and was thus relieved from the state of irresolution by the events themselves, which he no longer controlled. The fact was, that general Sebastiani, having received the intimation which marshal Victor had sent him in obedience to orders, had concluded he was to fall back, and had done so accordingly. Thereupon Victor, who would fain have retained his position in order to begin again next day, seeing general Sebastiani retreat, followed his example, and at daybreak, on the 29th, the whole army was in motion to recross the Alberche. Thus did chance put an end to the battle which chance had begun. Our army recrossed the Alberche without being pursued, carrying off all its wounded, its baggage, and its artillery, except the eight pieces left by the Leval division in a grove of olives. The English, glad enough to be rid of us, had not the least desire to pursue us. They had had several generals killed or wounded, and 7 or 8 thousand men put *hors de combat*,—5 thousand of whom were from their own ranks, the rest from those of the Spaniards. It was our artillery especially that had committed this havoc among them. Our losses were scarcely less; we had a thousand killed, and about 6 thousand wounded. General Lapisse, an officer greatly to be regretted, had been killed. Several other generals and colonels had been killed or wounded. This battle, which was left undecided, would have been won if marshal Victor had not attacked too soon, and at a single point, both on the eve and in the morning; if when

the action had become general, time had been given to the right to second the left ; if our forces had not been withdrawn too soon ; if the action had not been ended, as it had been begun, by chance ; and lastly, if everything had not been given up to confusion, for want of concert and decision of purpose. The battle of Talavera is one of the most important in the history of the war in Spain, and one of the most instructive ; for it presents a complete picture of what took place in that country, where heroic soldiers lost the fruits of their heroism for want of good leading. Assuredly, king Joseph and marshal Jourdan, if they had acted solely upon the dictates, the one of his natural good sense, the other of his experience, would have done much better than it was possible for them to do when placed between inferior subordinates, on the one hand, and the too remote authority of Napoleon, on the other,—between a disobedience which disconcerted all their plans, and a will which, at such a distance, paralysed without guiding them. Talavera presented a complete epitome of this sad state of things.

Joseph, whose return towards Madrid was, above all, prompted by his fear of the dangers that threatened that capital, fell back upon Santa Olalla ; by no means, it must be allowed, with the precipitation of a beaten general, for he was not so, but, on the contrary, with the slowness of a formidable enemy who retreats deliberately with a view to ulterior objects. The spirits of his brave soldiers were as undaunted as ever, and they desired nothing better than to be again confronted with the English. But the attitude of the latter showed that there would be no pursuit ; and besides, it was expected that they would soon be in a very bad plight in consequence of Soult's arrival on their rear. Nevertheless, Joseph left Victor on the Alberche to watch them, and act as circumstances should require on Soult's arrival. Then, in order to intercept Venegas and cover Madrid, he marched to Toledo and Aranjuez with Sebastian's corps and the reserve, which were more than sufficient, notwithstanding their losses, to match the army of La Mancha, which general Sebastiani alone had already beaten.

Though sir Arthur Wellesley was reinforced on the day after the battle of Talavera by the Crawford brigade, amounting to 3 or 4 thousand men, he had been so very roughly handled that it was impossible for him to fight another battle. Most of his guns had been dismounted, and his ammunition had been exceedingly diminished. It was absolutely necessary, too, that his soldiers should have time to recover from the effect of the violent efforts they had made. There was no fear, therefore, that he would imitate a manœuvre of Napoleon's, which he has since been blamed for not having practised ; viz., that after his encounter with king Joseph he should go and fall upon marshal Soult, and

thus beat them one after the other. In every age, when certain modes of procedure have been successful, they are erected into standard types, to which all things must conform, and by which the acts of all the men of the time are to be judged. Napoleon subsequently blamed marshal Jourdan for having brought marshal Soult to Plasencia instead of to Madrid by Villacastin, and thus placed sir Arthur Wellesley between the two French armies, thereby affording the latter a fine opportunity; and sir Arthur Wellesley's critics have blamed him for letting that opportunity escape him. But in neither instance were these censures well grounded. To bring marshal Soult to Madrid by Villacastin, and from Madrid to Talavera, would have required eight or ten days more; and such a delay could not have been admitted without peril, so beset were the French by the three armies of sir Arthur Wellesley, don Gregorio de la Cuesta, and Venegas. Moreover, in debouching with 50 thousand men on Plasencia, marshal Soult was strong enough not to fear singly encountering the English army. The more natural course certainly would have been to send marshal Mortier's corps to Talavera by Avila, and afterwards let marshal Soult march by Plasencia and fall on the rear of the English after they had been beaten. But it was the orders from Schönbrunn that hindered this natural manner of acting by placing Mortier under Soult's orders. Marshal Jourdan, therefore, was not at all in fault. As for sir Arthur Wellesley, his soldiers did not march like those of general Bonaparte in Italy; and with the 18 thousand English remaining to him after the battle of Talavera, augmented perhaps to the number of 22 thousand by the arrival of Crawford's brigade, what could he have done against marshal Soult's 50 thousand? Evidently nothing, except to expose himself to be cut to pieces. There are no grounds, therefore, for accusing him on this occasion of having missed the opportunity of a great victory.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had barely had twenty-four hours to recover from the effects of this severe engagement when he was informed by the people of the country that provisions were being collected at both extremities of the pass of Baños, on the road from Castille to Estremadura. The reports spoke only of some 12 thousand men, which was not very alarming. Leaving don Gregorio de la Cuesta in his rear to watch marshal Victor, he immediately marched to Oropesa, on the road to Plasencia, to meet the French, who were advancing from that direction, and who he conjectured could only be marshal Soult's corps, already beaten in Portugal.

At last that marshal was arriving, but three or four days after the moment when his presence might have produced immense results. On the 26th he had marshal Mortier's corps under his

hand at Salamanca, and his own at one day's march in the rear. Had he marched on the 26th or 27th he might in three or four days have debouched on Plasencia, and have been upon the rear of the English on the 30th or 31st. Coming upon them with 38 thousand men, whilst they were exhausted by a great battle, he must have driven them in disorder upon the Tagus, and have made them pay dear for their half victory at Talavera. But not venturing to advance without all his forces, marshal Soult waited for marshal Ney, who promptly obeyed his call, but came from too great a distance to join him at the appointed time. He also wished to supply some parts of the artillery he wanted, and he was not able to arrive with his advanced guard until the 3rd of August at Plasencia, a fact which justifies our assertion that the combination of the three corps of marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult, did as much mischief at the end of the campaign as their separation had done at its commencement. But for this junction, as we have frequently remarked, marshal Mortier being free in his movements, and left at Villacastin at Joseph's disposal, would have accompanied him to Talavera and decided the battle. Had the British army been beaten that day, there is no knowing how it could have passed the Tagus, or got back to Alcantara, pursued by French soldiers, marching twice as fast as the English.

Be this as it may, sir Arthur Wellesley having learned at Oropesa that the intelligence forwarded to him from the pass of Baños was incomplete, for instead of 12 thousand, 40 or 50 thousand were arriving by that pass, he thought he could not do better than shelter himself behind the line of the Tagus—a step which, from the condition of a victor, which he boasted to be, would bring him into that of the vanquished, with all the consequences of the most complete defeat. He could not afford to lose a moment, placed as he was between Victor who might return upon him, and Mortier who was coming on in all haste in advance of Soult. He resolved to cross the Tagus by the Arzobispo bridge, which was the nearest to him, although that would oblige him to go down the left bank as far as Almaraz, by almost impracticable roads, in order to get upon the high road to Estremadura. Fortunately for him, marshal Victor, whom Joseph had left on the Alberche to watch the English, having taken alarm at Wilson's skirmishers on the mountains, and seeing them advance on his right towards Madrid, had fallen back in the direction of that capital. Had he been on the Alberche, the Anglo-Spanish army, assailed when passing the river, might have suffered enormously. Sir Arthur Wellesley then recrossed the Arzobispo bridge, leaving at Talavera 4 or 5 thousand wounded, whom he commended to the humanity of the French generals, and a great quantity of *matériel* which he could not carry away. The wounded were so many prisoners he surrendered to us, and

who procured us all the trophies of victory, as though we had gained the battle of Talavera. Sir Arthur took up a position opposite Almaraz, on the heights commanding the Tagus, where he waited until his artillery should have traversed the horrible roads on the left bank of that river from the Arzobispo bridge to that of Almaraz. La Cuesta's Spaniards were to defend the Arzobispo bridge, and oppose the march of the French.

Marshal Mortier, who headed the march, having debouched from the mountains, was opposite the Arzobispo bridge on the 6th and 7th of August, and was soon followed by marshal Soult with the main body. The army which arrived so late naturally desired to signalise its presence, and could not let the enemy escape without trying to do him some great damage. It was consequently resolved to carry the bridge. This was a demonstration of force much rather than an operation of serious consequence. It was executed by Mortier on the 8th of August. The Spaniards had barricaded the bridge, stationed infantry in two towers situated on the middle of it, erected strong batteries right and left on the opposite bank, and drawn up the bulk of their army on the hills in the rear. Thus covered, they believed themselves invincible. Marshal Mortier looked for a ford, and found one a few hundred fathoms higher up, by which cavalry and infantry could pass. Whilst the French artillery played upon the bridge and the batteries beyond it, general Caulaincourt's dragoons crossed the ford, protected by parties of voltigeurs, and followed by the 34th and 40th regiments. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta opposed them with his infantry, formed in several squares. These were successfully charged by the dragoons; but the latter were soon assailed by the whole Spanish cavalry, three or four times more numerous than themselves, and would have been in serious danger if they had not manœuvred with much ability and coolness, supported by the infantry which had followed them. Fortunately, whilst this sharp conflict was waging, the 40th, marching along the bridge in spite of the fire of the Spaniards, forced the barricades, and opened a passage for Mortier's infantry, which took the Spanish batteries in flank and carried them. From that moment the Spaniards could hold out no longer, and fled, leaving us thirty pieces of cannon, a great number of horses, and 800 wounded as prisoners. This gallant exploit showed what were the corps of the old army and the officers who commanded them.

The question was now whether the French, having made themselves masters of the bridges over the Tagus, would pursue the now fugitive Anglo-Spanish army which called itself victorious a few days before. They had at their disposal the bridges of el Arzobispo and Talavera. But to reach the high road to Estremadura, the only one practicable for heavy artillery, it would

be necessary for them to go down to the bridge of Almaraz, the principal arch of which had been broken down, and which had been replaced for a while by a bridge of boats, now destroyed. The English had lost five days in conveying their artillery by the left bank as far as the high road to Estremadura, opposite Almaraz, though they had the arms of all the people of the country to help them. It would be necessary, then, to follow them almost without artillery, and to fight them in almost inexpugnable positions, or to erect a bridge at Almaraz, no materials for which were at hand. Hence it was scarcely advisable to pursue them, unless the whole country was to be occupied from the Tagus to the Guadiana, from Almaraz to Merida, or unless the march into Andalusia was to be immediately commenced. But the former of these operations was of little utility, the country between the Tagus and Guadiana having been ruined by the presence of the belligerent armies in it for many months. As for the latter, the season was manifestly too hot and provisions too scarce to undertake it just then. It was better to await the harvest, the termination of the hot season, and the arrival of Napoleon's instructions, which were becoming indispensable after the entire derangement of that year's plan of campaign. The army halted, therefore, at the Arzobispo bridge after the brilliant exploit which had put it in our hands. For the present the king's staff distributed marshal Soult's troops along the Tagus, and moved a portion of them back into Old Castille. The fifth corps (marshal Mortier's) was stationed at Oropesa to watch the Tagus from Almaraz to Toledo. The second (marshal Soult's) was established at Plasencia to watch the passes from Portugal. Lastly, marshal Ney, whom it was very desirable to keep aloof from marshal Soult, was moved back to Salamanca to destroy the bands of the duke del Parque which infested Old Castille. The intrepid marshal, setting out on the 12th, traversed the pass of Baños, fighting and dispersing Wilson's bands, and proved by the execution of this difficult march, in less than four days, that more speed might have been made to arrive in the rear of the English.

During this time sir Arthur Wellesley had arrived at Truxillo, whence he proposed to march to Badajos. Reduced to 20 thousand men, obliged to leave his sick and wounded to the French, at variance with the Spanish generals about provisions, about the operations to be executed, about everything, in short, he had not succeeded better than sir John Moore in his expedition into the interior of Spain. He returned, therefore, more than ever convinced that he should confine himself to the defence of Portugal, and only enter Spain in case of urgent emergency and with almost certain prospects of success. Nothing could be gloomier than his despatches to his government.

On parting from the Spanish generals, he strongly advised

them not to risk a battle, but to content themselves with defending the mountainous country of Estremadura, between the Tagus and the Guadiana, behind which barrier they might reorganise their forces, and even receive the co-operation of the British army, if they deserved that it should be continued to them. But they were incapable of appreciating and following such good advice.

The first among them who ought to have acted upon it was Venegas, who had moved upon Madrid, whilst sir Arthur Wellesley and de la Cuesta were combining at Talavera, and against whom Joseph and Sebastiani were marching at that moment by way of Toledo. After having detached some skirmishing parties across the Tagus, he had promptly fallen back behind it on learning the return of the French army, and had halted at Almonacid, opposite Toledo, in a strong position, where he believed himself able, with 30 thousand men, to brave the forces which Joseph could send against him. He would certainly have done better to follow sir Arthur Wellesley's advice; but he paid no heed to it, and resolved to await the French on the heights of Almonacid.

He had his left stationed on a lofty hill, his centre on a plateau, his right on the escarped heights of Almonacid, themselves commanded by a more escarped position, above which rose an old Moorish castle. General Sebastiani, marching in advance of king Joseph, arrived in front of Venegas by the Toledo bridge, on the evening of the 10th of August. His force amounted to not more than 15 thousand men since its losses at Talavera. The king was bringing him 5 thousand. On the morning of the 11th he made the Reval division assail Venegas' left. The Poles were the first to ascend the hill on which the Spaniards were posted. Venegas threw a part of his reserve upon them. But the Germans coming to the aid of the Poles, withstood the shock, and carried the left of the Spaniards, whilst the four French regiments of Sebastiani's division, the 28th, the 32nd, 58th, and 75th, attacked their centre and their right, followed by the Godinot brigade, which belonged to the Dessoles division. Every point was carried, and the Spaniards were forced to fall back on the castle of Almonacid. That position might have been turned, but Sebastiani and Dessoles' old regiments did not want to have difficulties smoothed down for them. Up they went, under the fire of an almost inaccessible position, and completed the rout of all the remaining enemies. The Spaniards had 3000 or 4000 men killed or wounded, a nearly equal number taken prisoners, and lost sixteen pieces of cannon. The French lost more men than usual, in consequence of the nature of the positions attacked. They had more than 300 killed, and about 3000 wounded.

The English army being in retreat on Badajoz, la Cuesta's army obliged to follow it, and that of Venegas quite dispersed, Joseph had nothing to do but to return to Madrid, which he re-entered, after having sent marshal Victor into La Mancha, and left general Sebastiani at Aranjuez. He appeared there triumphant in the eyes of the Spaniards, for Gregorio de la Cuesta, Venegas, and sir Arthur Wellesley (the latter with more reserve, as became his great merit), had announced their approaching entry into Madrid and the deliverance of Spain. Far from being able to fulfil these pompous promises, they were all retreating upon the Guadiana, the English disheartened, the Spaniards not disheartened but dispersed. Joseph could therefore present himself in his capital under all the appearances of victory. It was only for good judges, for those who knew the means accumulated in Spain, and the hopes conceived for this campaign that it was possible, by comparing the results expected with those obtained, to appreciate the operations of this year. With 300 thousand old soldiers, the best France ever possessed, giving 200 thousand present under fire, king Joseph's military counsellors had promised themselves to be in July at Lisbon, Seville, Cadiz, and Valencia: and yet they were not at Lisbon, not even at Oporto, but at Astorga; not at Cadiz, not at Seville, but at Madrid; not at Valencia, but at Saragossa! The obstinacy of the Spaniards, their patriotic and savage fury, their presumption which saved them from discouragement, the efficacious co-operation of the English, the disunion of our generals, the remoteness of Napoleon, and his instructions, which given from too great a distance, hindered the plain good sense of Joseph and Jourdan from seizing the opportunities which fortune offered them, were the general causes of the profound differences between what had been expected and what had been accomplished. Passing from general causes to particular, we must add that, if instead of despatching marshal Soult with his own corps only into Portugal, he had been sent along with marshal Mortier; if marshal Soult, when he consented to attempt that expedition with insufficient means, had not left la Romana in his rear without destroying him; if, on arriving at Oporto, he had not wasted his time there, had not suffered himself to be surprised, or had made a better retreat; if, on his return to Galicia, he had better seconded marshal Ney; if, having obtained a combination of troops, desirable in March, to be regretted in June, he had not detained them uselessly at Salamanca; if Joseph, then having it in his power to bring up Mortier's corps, had presented himself at Talavera with irresistible forces; if, not having those forces, he had temporised and waited for marshal Soult, or, not waiting for him, had made the attack at Talavera with more *ensemble* and steadiness; and if,

even though none of these things had been realised, marshal Soult had marched with more speed to Plasencia, the English would have been victoriously repulsed from Spain, and severely punished for their intervention in the Peninsula. One or two of these errors the less, and the fortune of the war had been changed!

When Napoleon, who was at Schönbrunn, engaged in negotiating and in preparing his armies of Germany in case of a resumption of hostilities, was informed of the events in the Peninsula, he was deeply affected by them, for, in order to negotiate advantageously and not be obliged to fight again, it was necessary for him that everything should go on well in all quarters, and that Austria should not find any encouragement in the events which were occurring elsewhere. Not acknowledging to himself his own share in the faults committed, and, great as he was, retaining so much human weakness as to wish to see only the faults of others without admitting his own, he severely blamed everybody. He keenly regretted having so soon settled the question between marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult, by uniting the three corps under the command of the latter; he blamed marshal Soult for having marched into Portugal without having destroyed *la Romana*, for not having taken any definite course at Oporto, for not having reopened his communications with Zamora, and for having made a wretched retreat. He conceived strange suspicions as to what had taken place in Oporto, and for a while his anger was so great that he thought of having the marshal brought to trial. But he had already on his hands the prosecution of general Dupont, which was becoming a serious difficulty; he had been obliged to reprimand the prince of Ponte Corvo, and too many acts of severity at one time had the double inconvenience of making him appear harsh to companions-in-arms, whom he daily called upon to shed their blood in his behalf, and of revealing the necessity for such harshness. How many cankers in his state would be revealed if he publicly gave vent to his displeasure! Some of his lieutenants breaking down at last before the immensity of the dangers; others trying their hands at insubordination; others again becoming ambitious in their turn, and dreaming of such fortunes as those of his brothers! Napoleon, however, came to no final determination: he sent for the principal officers who had figured in Oporto, and ordered that evidence should be collected with the greatest strictness against captain Argenton and his accomplices, if any he had. He authorised marshal Ney to return to France, to relieve him from the false position in which he had been placed; and he kept silence towards marshal Soult, leaving him for several months in the greatest perplexity. Nor did he spare Joseph; still less the

chief of his staff, Jourdan, towards whom he was habitually unjust. He bitterly blamed them both for having made Soult debouche by Plasencia and not by Avila, a reproach which was not deserved, as we have elsewhere shown. He blamed them, with more reason, for having given battle without waiting for the arrival of marshal Soult, then for not having given battle with *ensemble*, and not having persisted more energetically in the attack on the enemy's positions; in a word, when they had, with Victor, Sebastiani, Soult, Mortier, and Ney, nearly 100 thousand men, for having gone into action with 45 thousand against 66 thousand! all reprehensible faults, of which the arrangements ordered at Schönbrunn, without knowledge of the facts, were partly the cause. His criticisms after all, though characterised by that precision and that superior penetration, which belonged only to him, repaired nothing, and had only the poor advantage of easing his own dissatisfaction, whilst they deeply distressed his brother. He expressed, in particular, great anger at having been left ignorant of the loss of the artillery of the Leval division, and said, with reason, that as soon as he could go and pass some time in Spain, he would soon bring matters there to a conclusion. He gave orders to wait for the end of the hot season to resume operations, and, above all, to wait until the negotiations at Altenburg were closed, because he proposed, when peace was signed, to send back to the Peninsula the forces he was at that moment drawing to Austria. Now, whilst he wrote to Joseph that Talavera was a battle lost, he said at Altenburg that it was a battle won (both which assertions were false), and he made those about him relate in detail the pitiable state in which the English army was retiring into Portugal, for events now interested him only in so far as they might influence the negotiations pending with Austria.

But he was not at the end of the difficulties the English had in store for him,—whether to help Austria, which they had again left in jeopardy, or to gratify their maritime ambition. They had never ceased, since the opening of the campaign, to promise the court of Austria some great expedition against the coasts of the continent, meaning thereby the northern coasts; for an expedition to Spain, however highly serviceable to the maritime policy of Great Britain, was at that moment almost a matter of indifference to Austria. An English army, more or less in Spain, could not make one French regiment enter or quit the Peninsula. It was otherwise with a descent upon the coasts of France, Holland, or Germany. A descent on the coasts of France or Holland would draw off thither the reinforcements destined for Austria; on the coasts of Germany it might occasion a national explosion. Hence, Austria had never ceased, since

the opening of the negotiations, to press the English for a fulfilment of their promise. Moreover, as the work to be done was to destroy ports, burn dockyards, and commit all kinds of maritime ravages, their zeal might be relied upon; and if there was delay, it was only to be imputed to the nature of things, or to the incapacity of their government, which, rancorous and powerful as it was, was not conducted with the genius which then presided over the operations of the French government. They had lost Nelson and Pitt: they had still, indeed, sir Arthur Wellesley, superior to both; but he was restricted to a narrow stage, and the existing administration was far from able.

The English scheme, in addition to their efforts to rid Spain of the French, consisted in destroying Napoleon's immense maritime preparations along the whole coast of the empire. We have already seen that Napoleon, though unable to keep the sea against the British navy, had not renounced the intention of fighting England on her own element, but had devised grand measures to that end. Wherever he had sway or influence, he had prepared countless naval constructions, and crews proportioned to them, as far as that was possible, intending, as soon as his armies should be disengaged, to form camps within reach of his vessels, in order to despatch on a sudden, now from one point, now from another, great expeditions for the East and West Indies, Egypt, and perhaps Ireland. At Venice, Spezzia, Toulon, Rochefort, Lorient, Brest, Cherbourg, Boulogne (where the idle flotilla was beginning to rot), and Antwerp, above all—Napoleon's favourite creation—armaments of all kinds existed, and were regarded with extraordinary anxiety by the English (thereby justifying the views of Napoleon), and with an ardent desire to ward off from themselves dangers which were the more alarming, because their scope was unknown.

Two points had engrossed their whole attention during the year whose history we are relating: these were Rochefort and Antwerp. At the former, had been effected by Napoleon's orders a combination of squadrons, which moored in the roads of the île d'Aix. At Antwerp, was prepared an immense establishment, which, by its position opposite the Thames, kept the Londoners in a state of actual insomnia. The aid which the English, with a keen eye to their own interests, intended to afford Austria, was to destroy Rochefort and Antwerp, whatever efforts it might cost them. Seeing the greater facility of acting against Rochefort, where there was only a fleet to be burned, they had been early in a condition for this exploit. The longer, vaster, and more costly preparations against Antwerp were, as yet, but an unexecuted threat, whilst the belligerents were contending at Wagram and Talavera.

The expedition against Rochefort was ready for sea in April.

At that time there were in that port two fine naval divisions, under vice-admiral Allemand. They were stationed there in pursuance of a very ingenious plan of Napoleon's, but a very perilous one, like all those he was obliged to have recourse to at sea. By his orders, rear-admiral Willaumez was to have quitted Brest with a fleet of six ships and several frigates, picked up on his way the divisions at Lorient and at Rochefort, sailed for the West Indies with supplies of victuals, ammunition, and men, returned thence to Europe, passing through the straits of Gibraltar, and cast anchor at Toulon, where a grand naval force was gradually preparing, either to join Sicily to Naples, provision Barcelona, or menace Egypt, which Napoleon had not renounced the hope of some day recovering. Willaumez sailed in February, missed the Lorient division, being afraid to stop there too long, and, not finding the Rochefort division ready for sea, had been obliged to stop in that port, thereby raising to the number of eleven ships and four frigates the naval force there. The brave vice-admiral Allemand, who had so successfully passed the straits of Gibraltar to meet Ganteaume in 1808, and had accomplished the expedition to Corfu with him, had been appointed to the command of the Rochefort squadron. His instructions were to take the sea at the first opportunity. His fleet was a fine one, though far from being well manned,—as always happens when a fleet has to be formed in roads. The English had conceived the design of destroying the Rochefort fleet by the most terrible means imaginable, though they should exceed in barbarous cruelty all that war allows.

They had no thought of going up the Charente and presenting themselves abreast of Rochefort. It was elsewhere they intended to make an attempt of that kind, for it required an army, and they had not two at their disposal. But at Rochefort they proposed to destroy the fleet in its moorings. Admiral Gambier was therefore sent with thirteen ships, a great number of frigates, corvets, brigs, and gun-boats, to the île d'Aix, and boldly moored in Basques roads, those important waters not yet being sufficiently defended at that period. Fort Boyard was not yet in existence. The English had resolved to convert a great number of vessels into fire-ships, and to sacrifice them, regardless of the cost, for the chance of burning the French squadron. The lawfulness of employing this measure in war is questionable, because it is atrocious, like the bombardment of fortified towns without absolute necessity. Usually, when recourse is had to it, old vessels are used, which are loaded with combustibles, sometimes with explosive machines. After being thus converted into floating volcanoes, they are brought before a fleet, and the moment being chosen when the wind and current are favourable, they are set on fire and sent adrift, the crews only leaving them at the last

moment, when the flames compel them to take to their boats. A single fire-ship is often enough to cause immense destruction. This practice is particularly dangerous when the fleet attacked consists of many vessels lying close to each other, and when the fire-ships are sure of doing mischief wherever they fall. The danger of course increases with the number of the fire-ships. The English determined to have thirty, such a number as never before had been seen together, and as could only be furnished by an immensely powerful marine, which had abundance of old hulls to throw away. To devote thirty vessels to the destruction of perhaps three or four, was to act with a fury which takes no account of the mischief it sustains, provided it inflicts some on the enemy. So far did the English indulge the passion to destroy, as to place among these fire-ships frigates, and even ships of the line, so that the impulsive force might be the greater against the obstacles which the French might oppose to them. The English remained twenty days at anchor, preparing this unexampled flotilla, and loading it with its terrible freight.

Seeing them moored so long in the Basques roads, vice-admiral Allemand could not doubt the existence of an incendiary design against the port and the fleet. He placed his eleven ships and four frigates in two lines, very close to each other, backed on the right by the guns on the île d'Aix, and on the left by those on the river bank. They lay in a direction, not opposed, but parallel to the current, so that the floating bodies launched against them should not come athwart them, but pass before them. He also protected them with a double range of booms, the one at 400, the other at 800 fathoms distance, formed of floating beams strongly bound together, and fixed by means of heavy anchors dropped at certain intervals. As the critical moment approached, he formed the ships' boats into several divisions, armed them with cannons, and manned them with intrepid seamen, who were to lay hold on the fire-ships with hooks, and turn them aside. The boats mounted guard every night alongside the booms. He had all the useless sails taken down and stowed away with all other inflammable matters in the holds, and had everything removed that could increase the danger of the fire-ships, by forming projections upon which they might be caught, and so become fixed to the vessels they encountered. There were many things he wanted which the port of Rochefort could not supply him with, because there is almost always a lack of them after a long and unsuccessful war; but with such materials as he had, he did everything in his power to guard against the catastrophe, which he believed to be formidable, but which he was far from imagining so terrible as it actually proved to be.

On the night of the 11th of April, the wind blowing freshly

from the N.N.E. upon our line, and at an hour when the tide ran in the same direction, the English appeared in several divisions of large and small vessels, with the manifest intention of surrounding our squadron. A division of frigates and corvettes then advanced towards the boom, escorting the fire-ships. Vice-admiral Allemand, judging from all known precedents, expected to see some four, five, or six fire-ships, and had ordered the boats to be constantly at their stations along the booms, when suddenly was beheld a blazing line of thirty fire-ships, borne along by wind and tide against the French squadron. Never had such a spectacle been witnessed. Three of these horrible machines blew up near the booms, and broke them. The others, darting forth fireworks of all kinds like volcanoes, swept away the remains of the booms before them, and were floated along round our ships. The attempts to hook them were fruitless; they were too bulky to be held against wind and tide by boats, and dragged these along with them whenever the crews were rash enough to grapple them. Beholding these thirty blazing machines, there were few hearts but quailed, not at the danger to which seamen are inured, but at the thought of seeing all our vessels destroyed without a fight. In the horrible confusion, amidst frightful explosions and hideous glares, that showed the danger without serving to throw light on the defence, it was impossible to give or receive orders. Every captain had to act for himself, think only of his own ship, and how he could save it. The first impulse with them all was to get rid of the fire-ships that had fastened on their hulls. The admiral's ship *l'Océan* alone had three of them. The surest means of escaping was to cut their cables, and run where they could. Another was to fire upon the fire-ships and sink them; and in doing this, they fired upon each other as well in the confusion into which they had fallen, after losing their positions in line. By singular good fortune, however, our ships escaped without excessive damage to various parts of the coast; such of them as had taken fire succeeded in extinguishing the flames. The fire-ships ran ashore here and there on the neighbouring islands, and at daybreak we had the satisfaction of seeing all the thirty blown up, or burning to the water's edge, without having consumed any of our ships. So far English rage had only been destructive to English wealth.

But the scene was not ended. Our ships, as we have said, had cut their cables, and run aground at the *embouchure* of the Charente, from fort Fouras to the île d'Enett. Unluckily, four of them, caught by the ebb tide, had stuck fast on the points of a chain of rocks called les Palles, which forms one of the two sides of the mouth of the Charente. These ships were *le Calcutta*, *le Tonnerre*, *l'Aiglon*, and *le Varsovie*. Almost all the captains had thrown their powder into the sea, for fear of blowing

up if they took fire. Others had lost their boats and boats' crews in the confusion. They were therefore scarcely in a condition to defend themselves. Exasperated by the ill success of their atrocious scheme, the English resolved to indemnify themselves by taking or destroying the four ships on les Palles. *Le Calcutta*, attacked by several ships and frigates, cannonaded in all directions, and hardly able to use her guns, was defended for some hours, and then abandoned by captain Lafon, who, having but 230 men, believed that as it was impossible to save his ship, it was his duty to save his crew. The unfortunate man knew not to what severities he was exposing himself! *Le Calcutta* blew up some minutes after it was abandoned. *L'Aquilon* and *le Varsovie*, unable to defend themselves, were obliged to strike their colours, and were burned by the English. Two fresh explosions told the squadron what was the fate of these ships. *Le Tonnerre* having sprung a leak, made its way with difficulty to near île Madame. Captain Clément Laroncière threw overboard his guns, ballast, and everything he could to lighten her, but without avail. After enormous efforts, continued under the fire of the English, foreseeing that he must sink at high water, he landed his men on a point of rock, whence they might reach île Madame when the tide was out. Being the last to quit the ship, he set fire to it with his own hand, and so it went down under French colours.

Thus, out of eleven ships, four perished, not from encountering the fire-ships, but from the wish to avoid them. The brave admiral Allemand was in despair, though he had saved seven, without counting the frigates, which, with only one exception, were all preserved. His despair became converted into so great an irascibility, that it was impossible to leave him the command of Rochefort. The minister Deérès sent him to Toulon with his crews, who went by land, to man the vessels in the Mediterranean. New works were requisite at Rochefort before another fleet could be formed there. Admiral Gambier returned to the shores of England with the dubious glory of an atrocious expedition, which had cost England much more than France. Its most solid advantage for the former, was the deep dread impressed on all our fleets moored in roads, and a sort of hallucination that possessed most of our commanders of squadrons, who were continually haunted with visions of fire-ships, and made the strangest contrivances to guard against them. The minister Deérès, in spite of his rare discernment, was not himself quite free from this perturbation, and proposed to the Emperor to send back to Flushing the fine fleet constructed in the dockyards of Antwerp, and then moored at the mouths of the Scheldt. But admiral Missiessy, a cool, clear-headed, determined man, refused to do this, alleging that at Flushing it would be exposed to perish by

the bombs, or the fever of Walcheren, in dishonourable inactivity. He pledged himself to manœuvre in the Scheldt, so as not to lose either his honour or his fleet, and obtained a freedom of action, of which he soon made glorious use. The only measure commanded by the Emperor was the trial of the unfortunate captains who had lost their ships in the Rochefort roads.

The Rochefort expedition was not the one the English had most at heart. They ought, no doubt, to have been very well satisfied with destroying one of our principal fleets at its moorings; but they longed, above all things, to free themselves from the inordinate uneasiness caused them by Antwerp. They were always possessed with the idea that in process of time there might issue from that port, not the ten ships then moored at Flushing, but twenty or thirty, which Napoleon had the means of building there, and a flotilla far more dangerous than that of Boulogne, for in one tide it might convey an army from the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Thames. That grand expedition, which they had promised Austria they would send out before the end of the hostilities, and which, since the armistice of Znaim they promised to send out before the negotiations were ended, they were at that moment completing, not for the purpose of raising up Germany in revolt, but for the purpose of destroying the naval establishments in the Netherlands.

They had two reasons for selecting Antwerp as the point to attack: the importance of that port, and the hope of finding it without any preparation for defence. Spies had reported to them that there were but seven or eight thousand men on both banks of the Scheldt to Bergen-op-Zoom. With a little boldness they might even go further, commit immense destruction, and shed woful light on the policy which carried all our forces to Lisbon, Madrid, and Vienna, and left none to guard our own coasts. Their eagerness for an expedition to the banks of the Scheldt was therefore extreme, and they were resolved to devote to it 40,000 men at least, and from 1200 to 1500 sail. Nothing so considerable would have been seen in any age if they were able to carry out their intentions to their full extent. But the time employed in preparing such an armament was of course proportioned to its vastness. Proposed in March, resolved on in April, just when Napoleon was setting out for Austria, it had not sailed on the day of the battle of Wagram, nor arrived on that of the battle of Talavera. Sir John Moore's army, which had been proved in service, was to be employed in the expedition; but it had need to be largely recruited to reach the total of 40 thousand men; and as, moreover, there was a great siege apparatus to be shipped, the means of transport required amounted to the enormous sum of 100 thousand tons. Of these the royal navy could furnish 25 thousand, the remaining 75 thousand were

to be procured, either from the government arsenals, or from the merchant service. But many vessels had already been sent to the coast of Spain on sir Arthur Wellesley's account, and it was not advisable to deprive him of that indispensable means of retreat, a reverse of fortune being always to be provided against in the Peninsula. The whole 75 thousand tons were then to be procured from other than government sources, and so passionately was the British cabinet bent on this object, that for a moment it thought of pressing all the neutrals in the Thames into its service, and paying them afterwards. But this project was abandoned on account of the disturbance it would have caused to trade, and instead of it, the government offered enormously high rates for freight. The *matériel* was prepared, the army was recruited with volunteers from the militia, and so the time wore away from May to June, from June to July. It was not until the end of the latter month that all was ready. No time was to be lost, for if nothing was done before the treaty of peace had been extorted from Austria, the French armies would have returned from the banks of the Danube, and then any expedition of the kind would be a folly, not to mention that England would again have left her surest allies in the lurch.

By the 24th or 25th of July the expedition was ready for sea, consisting of 38 thousand infantry, 3 thousand artillerymen, 2500 cavalry (in all about 44 thousand men), 9 thousand horses, 150 twenty-four pounders and large mortars, the whole embarked on board 40 ships of the line, 30 frigates, 84 corvettes, brigs, and bombards, 400 or 500 transports, and countless gun-boats. Nothing like it had ever been seen. It was to sail from Portsmouth, Harwich, Chatham, Dover, and the Downs. Having command of the sea, the English could choose any points of departure that suited their own convenience. Sir John Strachan commanded the fleet, the earl of Chatham the army. Their orders were to take Flushing if they could, to destroy the Scheldt fleet at the same time, then to burn the dockyards of Antwerp, and close the channels of the Scheldt, by sinking large masses in them, which should render them unfit for navigation. The end and the means were commensurate in their vastness.

Dutch emigrants and English officers who had made the campaigns of Flanders in 1792 and 1793, had long been consulted as to the best course to be pursued. Two principal plans had been proposed: to land at Ostend, and march to Antwerp by Bruges and the Sas of Ghent, or to sail up the Scheldt. To march five-and-twenty or thirty leagues through the French territory, in presence of a nation so warlike as ours, appeared too perilous; and yet it was the only plan that offered some chance of success, for the invaders would barely have found on their way 3 or 4 thousand men dispersed all over Flanders. By beginning their march

before succours could be sent (a process requiring from fifteen to twenty days at least), they would have arrived at Antwerp without firing a shot, burned the dockyards and the fleet, and have re-embarked in their transports at Antwerp when the French troops were beginning to show themselves. But the idea of traversing such an extent of the territory of the empire was a bugbear that caused the plan to be abandoned. The next to be considered, and it was one that gave rise to much debate, was the plan of sailing up the Scheldt to Batz and Santvliet, the point where the estuary of the Scheldt changes into a river.

Ten leagues below Antwerp the Scheldt divides into two branches. One of these, called from its direction, the Western Scheldt, continues to flow due west, and falls into the sea between the guns of Flushing and Breskens; the other turns northward at Santvliet, passes between the fort of Batz and the fortified town of Bergen-op-Zoom, empties itself to the north-west, and is called the Eastern Scheldt, only because it flows less directly to the west than the other branch. Both of them are wider and shallower than the river above its bifurcation; they flow over a series of shoals which present many obstacles to navigation, and wash a province called Zeeland. This is the lowest province of Holland, the greater part of it being below the level of the sea, from the irruption of which it is only preserved by lofty dykes. In summer it presents to the eye only verdant meadows, beautiful willows, and tall poplars; but hideous death lurks beneath this smiling aspect, for pestilential miasmata are exhaled from the mud, which the tide leaves uncovered twice a day. Among all known fevers, there is none more deadly than that which bears the inauspicious name of Walcheren.

Of the two branches of the Scheldt, the western alone is navigable for ships of the line. It was the one chosen by Napoleon for the passage of his fleet from Antwerp to the sea, and was protected by the fortifications of Flushing in the island of Walcheren, and by those of Breskens in the island of Cadzand.

Supposing that Antwerp was to be reached by water, whether was the eastern or the western Scheldt to be preferred? Here, again, the bolder plan was the better, for when a surprise is to be effected, the quickest route affords the greatest likelihood, not only of success, but also of safety. The best course would have been boldly to enter the west Scheldt in defiance of the fires of Flushing and Breskens, at the risk of often running aground, for the buoys that marked the channel would of course have been removed, to have then advanced, with small vessels going before to take soundings, destroyed the French fleet if met with, landed the army at Santvliet, and marched straight to Antwerp. This would have cost more time and trouble than the land route, but the invaders would certainly have arrived in ten days, and in that

space of time Antwerp would not have received the succours necessary for its defence, as we shall presently see. This time, again, the decision was in favour of the more timorous way of executing a daring expedition, and, as commonly happens, a plan was adopted which, containing something from each of the plans proposed, ran the chance of combining the defects of them all.

It was settled that a naval division, under rear-admiral Ottway, should land 12 thousand men on the island of Walcheren, with whom the second in command, sir Eyre Coote, should take Flushing; that a second division under commodore Owen should put a few thousand men on shore on the island of Cadzand, with whom the marquis of Huntley should take the fort of Breskens and the batteries on that island; that the enemy's fire being thus extinguished right and left by the capture of the two islands, which form the entrance to the Western Scheldt, the bulk of the expedition should sail up it under the orders of rear-admiral Keates, lieutenant-generals Hope, Rosslyn, Grosvenor, and the two commanders-in-chief, Strachan and Chatham. They were to land near Santvliet with 25 thousand men, and then march to Antwerp.

Such was the plan ultimately decided upon at the departure of the expedition, the greater part of which was under sail on the 25th of July at Portsmouth, Harwich, Dover, and the Downs. The rest was to follow as it could. On the 29th, the low lands of the Scheldt were in sight. But the troops could not be disembarked at once in consequence of the state of the wind, which made it dangerous to attempt landing in boats. The two divisions which were to proceed respectively to the island of Walcheren, north, and to the island of Cadzand, south of the embouchure of the Western Scheldt, stationed themselves off those islands, and kept the sea as well as they could in rather rough weather. The main body, which was to go up the Scheldt under rear-admiral Keates and sir John Hope, waited also under sail for more favourable weather.

But as the wind did not change, and as unexpected intelligence arrived that the French fleet, instead of having gone up to Antwerp, was still at Flushing, the plan agreed on at the departure of the expedition was changed. In the first place, to avoid the bad weather, it was resolved to pass round the island of Walcheren northwards, to the entrance of the Eastern Scheldt, to get into the inner branch of the Weere Gat by the Roompot channel, and there land the troops under shelter from the surf that threatened to destroy the boats on the outer side. Considering also the news that had been received of the fleet, it was thought dangerous to attack it amidst the batteries that protected it, in channels well known to it; and it appeared better to turn it by the isle of Wal-

cheren, instead of coming upon it in front. A large portion of the expedition was therefore to proceed as far as possible up the Eastern Scheldt, whilst the other attacked the islands of Walcheren and Cadzand; the troops were to be landed on the islands of North and South Beveland, and were to be led by land to the forts of Batz and Santvliet to the junction of the two Scheldts, which would afford means of intercepting the French fleet and hindering its return to Antwerp. It would then be soon captured; and even if the expedition should not be able to reach Antwerp, it would have done very well indeed when it had taken the islands of Walcheren and Cadzand, the fortress of Flushing and the French fleet. Orders were immediately given in conformity with this plan, which was the third. The last division under Rosslyn and Grosvenor, was to be disposed of according to circumstances when it arrived. Admiral Gardner was placed at the entrance of the Western Scheldt to oppose the French fleet, should it choose to offer battle, succour Flushing, or act against the division detached to Cadzand.

Accordingly, whilst admiral Gardner kept the sea with his ships of the line, and commodore Owen was preparing with his frigates and light craft to land the marquis of Huntley's troops on the island of Cadzand, rear-admiral Ottway's strong division, which was to put 12 thousand men ashore at Walcheren, went up the north side of the island on the 29th and 30th, and, entering the Eastern Scheldt, moored at the opening of the Weere Gat. Once out of the open sea, and within the inner channels of Zeeland, the weather was no longer an impediment. Immediate preparations were made for landing. The English had such a quantity of boats, that the simultaneous landing of a great number of troops was for them the easiest of operations.

A more favourable moment could not have been chosen for insulting the French territory with impunity. No preparation for defence had been made, either in the island of Walcheren, or in the adjacent region; not that there had been no warning, but that the intelligence received was not treated with the attention it deserved. It was certainly impossible that so vast a muster of forces should have taken place on the English coasts without something of it having been known on those of France, in spite of the interruptions of communications. In fact, some French prisoners who had made their escape, and some well-paid spies, had warned the coast authorities, who, in their turn, had informed the ministers of marine and of war. But the minister of marine, too full of the recollection of Rochefort, had thought only of an expedition of fire-ships to burn the Scheldt fleet, and had wanted, as we have said, to shut that fleet up in Flushing, which admiral Missiessy had refused to do, for reasons which were justified by the event. As for the minister of war, having nothing to send

to Antwerp against an army of 40 thousand men, and not venturing to take upon himself to divert from the Danube to the Scheldt the torrent of men and *matériel* which continued, even since the armistice, to flow towards Austria, he did nothing, and chose rather to believe with the minister of marine, that the threatened expedition would prove an affair of fire-ships, which were to be guarded against by obstructing the several channels of the Scheldt. There was nothing then within reach of Antwerp but the camp at Boulogne, some companies of national guards employed under the senator Rampon in watching the coasts, and some provisional demi-brigades; but all dispersed, without organisation, without artillery, cavalry, &c. In the island of Walcheren especially, no preparation had been made for sustaining a siege. The island had been for several years divided between France and Holland. The French occupied the fortified town of Flushing on account of its port, and its command of the Western Scheldt, and the Dutch retained the territory of the island with its capital, Middleburg, and the small forts commanding the Eastern Scheldt. General Monnet, a brave man who had distinguished himself in the wars of the revolution, reposed from his past campaigns as commandant of Flushing. He had for the defence of the island neither flying artillery, nor cavalry, nor any one constituent of a corps adapted for keeping the field; his sole means of defence was a handful of odds and ends of troops, made up of an Irish battalion, a colonial battalion, two battalions of Prussian deserters, and some hundreds of French, making together about 3 thousand men. The Dutch commandant had some hundreds of veterans in Middleburg, and the forts on the shores. The fortifications of Flushing consisted merely of a bastioned wall surrounded by a ditch, which was everywhere fordable. It had no strong batteries, except on the side next the sea. Nothing then was easier than to take the island of Walcheren and the town of Flushing, when the invaders came upon them with 45 thousand men, and 5 or 600 sail.

As soon as the English were seen obstinately stationing themselves at the mouths of the Scheldt, it was easy to guess the object of their expedition. General Monnet, not wishing to absent himself from Flushing, immediately sent general Osten with 12 or 1500 men, that is to say, with half the garrison, to the northern shore of the island, to oppose the landing as well as he could; and with the remainder he himself set about preparing to defend Flushing. Some field artillery was procured for general Osten, by taking from the fortifications two 3-pounders and two 6-pounders, and harnessing to them untrained horses of the country, mounted by peasants. General Osten, who was very brave, advanced with his small force, and stationed it from

right to left, from the fort of Den Haak to Domburg, along the dykes, to fire on the English as soon as they should touch the shore.

The latter landed, to the number of some thousands, protected by the guns of more than sixty vessels. General Osten's soldiers, without discipline or national spirit, did not stand a moment against the fire from the ships, although they were covered by the dykes, but retreated in disorder, in spite of the heroic efforts of their officers to rally them. General Osten's four pieces, if well served, might have stopped the advance of the English, or at least retarded it. But the untrained horses reared and plunged, the peasants cut the traces, and fled. Two of the four guns were thus left on the ground. After ineffectual efforts to maintain his position, general Osten led his troops back to Serooskerke, in the interior of the island, and sent word of what had happened to general Monnet.

Whilst general Osten was deprived by the bad spirit of his soldiers of the honour of disputing the dykes with the English, Bruce, a Dutch general, surrendered to them the forts of Den Haak and Terweere, and the town of Middleburg, not having the least desire to be killed for the sake of the French—in which respect he shared the feelings of all his countrymen. He might, moreover, allege, in his own justification, that he had not sufficient means to resist the enemy.

On the 31st of July the English spread 15 thousand men over the island of Walcheren, and surrounded it with several hundred sail, for they placed themselves, with the greater part of their naval forces, in the Weere Gat and Sloe branches, which part the island of Walcheren from those of North and South Beveland. They marched to Middleburg, and thence to Flushing. General Osten made the best retreat he could, disputing the ground foot by foot, when the courage of his troops corresponded to his own; and though he did not obtain from his soldiers all he could have wished, he honourably covered his retreat with the loss of 2 or 300 men, and the destruction of a greater number of the enemy.

General Monnet received him on the glacis of Flushing, and they effected their junction under the guns of the place, and resolved to defend its approaches before they shut themselves up within its narrow limits. General Monnet occupied several posts on the exterior, and particularly one to the right towards Rameskens, in order to be able to break the dykes and inundate the whole island, when all other means of resistance had failed. He hastened to organise his garrison somewhat better, to supply his want of artillerymen from the ranks of the infantry, to form the population into legions of firemen, to counteract the effects of a bombardment, and to write to the island of Cadzand for French

troops, whilst the Western Scheldt was still open. The distance thence was but three or four cannon shots, the passage was easy and still possible, if the necessary forces were to be found in Cadzand.

That island was commanded by general Rousseau, an active and gallant officer belonging to the department of the Scheldt, which was included in the twenty-fourth military division. The moment he was aware of the presence of the English, he had sent notice to general Chambarlhac, who commanded the twenty-fourth military division, and had called in the troops stationed in the vicinity. He began by distributing among the coast batteries the few hundred men he could immediately dispose of, and getting ready some pieces of field artillery. Two fourth battalions, one of the 65th, the other of the 48th, having then been sent to him, he put himself at their head along the shore, ready to fall upon the first troops of the enemy that should land.

These prompt and determined measures were perfectly visible from sea, for the land was a low plain, as level as the sea itself, and they might give reason to suppose that there was a considerable body of troops in the rear. Commodore Owen and the marquis of Huntley, who commanded the forces acting against Cadzand, perceiving general Rousseau's troops from the Viengen channel, where they were struggling against the bad weather, did not dare to land. They saw 12 or 1500 men, whom they took for 3 or 4 thousand; and having only boats enough to land 700 men at a time, they were afraid they should be thrown into the sea if they attempted to touch the shore. Had admiral Strachan and lord Chatham carried to the island of Cadzand all the forces, and all the means of disembarkation uselessly employed in the Eastern Scheldt, they would infallibly have got possession of the island, with all the batteries on the left of the Scheldt, and have arrived at la Tête de Flandre, a suburb of Antwerp, before any succours. Fortunately, it was not so. Commodore Owen and the marquis of Huntley, intimidated by general Rousseau's attitude, sent to rear-admiral Gardner, who commanded the ships in the great Deurloo channel, for the boats he could spare, in order to land more men at a time; but he wanted them for his own operations, besides which, the stormy weather prevented their arrival, and the attack on the island of Cadzand, which ought to have succeeded, was not made on the 29th, nor on the 30th, nor on the 31st. The leaders of the expedition, content with having had it in their power to land at Walcheren, finding themselves quite safe from the bad weather within the Eastern Scheldt, and always full of the idea of taking the islands of North and South Beveland, which divide the two Scheldts, and the possession of which would allow of their turning the fleet, recalled Owen and Huntley. The whole expedition, in-

cluding the last portion, which had just arrived under lieutenant-generals Grosvenor and Rosslyn, thus filled the Weere Gat and Sloe arms. All the troops that had not landed on Walcheren were then put on shore in North and South Beveland, to march to the fort of Batz, the point of junction of the two Scheldts, and thus turn the French fleet, whilst the rest of the army was besieging Flushing.

Fortunately at that moment there were two energetic men on the spot—general Rousseau and admiral Missiessy. The former, seeing the departure of the naval division that threatened the island of Cadzand, ceased to have much fear for the left bank of the Scheldt, and, without hesitation, sent away the two battalions of the 65th and 48th by water, from Breskens to Flushing. They had to cross the Western Scheldt, which was some hundred fathoms wide at that part, and he sent over all the detachments that came to him, one after the other, thinking more of his neighbour, whose danger he perceived, than of himself.

Admiral Missiessy, who had asked not to be shut up in Flushing, where he would have perished by the enemy's shells and the fever, crowned the wisdom of his counsels by the firmness and ability of his conduct. His steadiness in remaining before Flushing, without shutting himself up in the port, had already sufficed to give the English expedition a different course,—the most dangerous for it, the most advantageous for us, as we shall soon see: that, namely, into the Eastern Scheldt. He had now to keep himself from being taken at the junction of the two Scheldts, towards Batz and Santvliet. So, like a man of sense and determination, who knew what he had to do, he weighed anchor on the 31st, and took advantage of the favourable wind to run up the Scheldt. By the evening of that day he had passed the fort of Batz, and entered the Upper Scheldt, above where the river divides. At that place two of the vessels ran aground on a soft mud bank, but were soon got off. Next day he was again under sail, and, at high water, all his ships passed between the forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek) which close the passage of the river by their formidable cross-fires. All these forts (Batz and Santvliet, Lillo and Liefkenshoek) were as neglected as they might have been in a time of profound peace amongst a heedless nation. Admiral Missiessy, who saw in them the means of his own safety, occupied himself about their defence. He placed a frigate athwart the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, which joins the Western Scheldt with the Eastern, and is commanded by the forts of Batz and Santvliet. He landed 100 Dutch gunners in Batz, and put French garrisons into Lillo and Liefkenshoek, taking care to supply them with the necessary stores. He then had several booms constructed, as a defence against fire-ships, and, instead of shutting himself in Antwerp,

he remained free to move about the river, and bring the thousand guns of his fleet to bear upon the defence of the surrounding points. He had under him a flotilla formerly detached from that of Boulogne, and stationed in the Scheldt.

It was well for him he had so opportunely made his retreat into the Upper Scheldt, for, two days later, the English would have turned him, by placing themselves between Batz and Santvliet, and thus have struck a grand first blow, by the capture or destruction of a whole new fleet. The troops of Hope's division, which had been put on shore on the islands of Beveland, had marched with all speed, and arrived on the 2nd of August before Batz, which was occupied by a Dutch garrison and by general Bruce, who had already surrendered the entrenched posts of the island of Walcheren. The fort mounted thirty guns, level with the water, and very dangerous for ships attacking it, but it had no great means of defending itself on the land side. With a garrison, however, and a brave commandant, it might have held out for some days. The one it had, but not the other. General Bruce was no more disposed at Batz than at Middleburg to resist to the uttermost, in a small fortress without casemates or blindage, exposed to an overwhelming force, and that for the sake of the French; so he evacuated the fort, into which the English entered without firing a shot. From that moment they were masters of the passage from the one to the other branch of the Scheldt, and had they forthwith brought up their whole army, as they had brought Hope's division, by the way of North and South Beveland, they might in a few days have arrived before Antwerp, which was, indeed, a closed fortress, but closed by old works, half destroyed, where there were at most 2 thousand men, without a cannon on the ramparts, and where there prevailed as much confusion among the authorities, surprised by the appearance of the enemy, as disaffection among the Flemish population. Fortunately, the two leaders of the expedition (sir John Strachan and lord Chatham) thought it necessary, in the first place, to finish the siege of Flushing, which would give them the means of introducing the whole of the fleet into the Western Scheldt, and arriving by sea at Batz and Santvliet, whence the land forces could march to Antwerp. This decision of theirs gave the French government some days to organise the first means of defence.

The telegraph had announced on the 31st of July, at Paris, the landing of the English in the island of Walcheren, and on the 1st of August the whole government was informed of the serious nature of the danger. In Napoleon's absence the government consisted of the ministers under the presidency of the arch-chancellor Cambacérès. Three only of the ministers could take part in the proceedings on this occasion: the ministers of war

and marine, Clarke and Decrès, because the safety of the territory and the fleet were their special concern, and Fouché, the minister of police, because he was the only one who had preserved a sort of political importance since the retirement of M. de Talleyrand. He had seen his existence threatened at the time of the latter's disgrace, and had become, in consequence, more busy than ever, whether to regain favour if he succeeded in signalising his zeal in a moment of difficulty, or in order to become a principal personage if the affairs of the empire fell into perplexity, as many people began either to fear or to hope. Signs of the decline of Napoleon's power were in fact beheld by many in the Spanish war, which seemed as though it would never end; in the Austrian war, the issue of which had for a while seemed doubtful; in the gradual spread of uneasiness among the populations of the empire; and in the dissatisfaction excited by the affairs of the Church, the sequel of which we shall soon set forth. For a restless person, therefore, not very trustworthy, and wishing to be at the head of all changes of fortune, the present was an opportunity to bestir himself.

Though he flattered the Emperor greatly, M. Fouché was the secret ally of all the disaffected, groaning *sotto voce* with them over their grievances, or over the maladies of the empire, the glory of which he extolled in public. Thus admiral Decrès, a minister of great talent, but so unlucky in his administration, was dissatisfied because the Emperor, unjustly visiting upon him the defeats of the navy, and offended at his caustic and bold language, had not been forward to make him a duke. M. Fouché had forthwith become the confidant and friend of M. Decrès. Marshal Bernadotte having been sent away from the army on account of his order of the day to the Saxons, had carried his pride and his resentment to Paris. M. Fouché hastened to press his hand, consoled with him on the ingratitude he had met with, and in public assumed the part of a Mentor, who strove to moderate the prince-marshal's anger, and hinder him from committing fresh faults. The Walcheren expedition was an occasion for bringing these latent dispositions into prominence; and if anything indeed could already disclose the failing strength of the throne, it was that under such a master as Napoleon any one should aspire to a political rôle of any kind whatever.

No sooner had the news of the landing arrived than M. Decrès hastened to the minister and the arch-chancellor and called for extreme measures. He displayed extreme ardour in his proceedings, because ever since the Rochefort business he had known no rest. He wanted that all the workmen that could be procured should be marched from Paris, that the national guards should be levied *en masse*, that a marshal of France, Bernadotte for example, should be placed at their head, and that the enemy should

be awed by a great display of force, apparent, if not real. M. Decrès spoke with the sincerity of a minister alarmed for the safety of his department. M. Fouché, who, by a singular concurrence of circumstances, occupied provisionally the place of M. Cretet, minister of the interior, who was on his death-bed, found in the functions which had casually devolved upon him a very sufficient reason for busying himself a great deal about the Walcheren expedition. To call out the national guards, almost in his own name and on his own account, to write proclamations, put a great number of men in motion, and appoint a military leader of his own choice, all this suited his twofold purpose of appearing at Schönbrunn very zealous, and at Paris very influential. He fully approved of M. Decrès' ideas, which he strongly supported in a council held on the morning of the 1st of August. Possessed by the dangers that threatened Antwerp, the minister of marine vehemently urged the convocation of 100 thousand national guards and the nomination of marshal Bernadotte to command them. These propositions, which might have appeared excessive under the most urgent circumstances, startled Clarke, the minister of war, whose character was not more trustworthy than Fouché's, but who had much sense and shrewdness, and very much doubted Napoleon's approval either of the national guards or of the prince of Ponte Corvo. He laid his doubts before the council, and then enumerated the means he had at his disposal without having recourse to the national guards, means which consisted in the provisional demi-brigades instituted by Napoleon, the gendarmerie, the national guards *d'élite*, under the senator Rampon, and the troops of the camp at Boulogne. The whole might form some 30 thousand men, under the senator Sainte Suzanne, an ex-officer of the army of the Rhine, whom Napoleon had appointed to the command of the coasts from Picardy to Holland, in case of an English expedition. Sainte Suzanne, though ill, had declared himself ready to take his command. Lastly, there was the king of Holland, who was marching with some men to Antwerp, and who as constable had already been invested by Napoleon in 1806 with the command of the coasts. Here was enough to supersede the necessity for levies *en masse*, and a leader in disgrace, like the prince of Ponte Corvo.

The arch-chancellor, who on the one hand distrusted Fouché's zeal, and on the other feared lest enough should not be done under the circumstances, did not declare himself very openly, but calmed the vehemence of M. Decrès, and seemed to incline to the opinion of the minister of war. Thereupon M. Fouché, abating the warmth of his advocacy of his new friend's views, contented himself with whispering in the ear of M. Decrès, that he was of his opinion, and that after all he would do upon his own responsibility what

the council would not resolve. The council adjourned without adopting the propositions of MM. Decrès and Fouché, the measures devised by M. Clarke being considered sufficient for the moment, until orders should have arrived from the Emperor, to whom despatches had been sent by extraordinary couriers.

The minister of war immediately issued orders in conformity with the ideas he had promulgated in the council. There were in Paris two demi-brigades composed of fourth battalions, the 3rd and 4th; he sent them off with all speed. There was in the north a battalion of the Vistula, some squadrons of Polish lancers, and several batteries of artillery, destined for the Danube; there were the 6th, 7th, and 8th demi-brigades stationed between Boulogne and Brussels, and four battalions of various regiments cantoned at Louvain; all these he sent to Cadzand and Antwerp. General Rampon had, as on other occasions, been appointed to command about 6 thousand national guards *d'élite*, the organisation of whom had already began. The minister Clarke ordered them to Antwerp. He directed marshal Moncey to collect all the mounted gendarmerie of the departments of the north, amounting to about 2 thousand; and he desired that, as soon as Boulogne was considered out of danger, all the troops that could be spared should be sent thence to Antwerp. The three demi-brigades of the north, the two of Paris, the four battalions of Louvain, and the battalion of the Vistula, made up about 10 thousand foot, and the national guards *d'élite* 5 thousand. With the gendarmerie, the artillery, and the dépôts from the vicinity, a force of 20 thousand men might be reckoned upon, to which was to be added the camp at Boulogne and a division of Dutchmen advancing under king Louis. This was a total of 30 thousand men, sufficient to protect Antwerp from a *coup de main*. The only difficulty was to bring them up in time, for the chief danger of the moment lay in the promptitude with which the English should conduct their operations. At least fifteen days were requisite to enable these forces to assemble at Antwerp with the horses, the officers, and the necessary *matériel*, and in fifteen days the English might easily have taken Flushing and laid siege to Antwerp. Quantity of forces was therefore of less moment than celerity, seeing that behind the walls and inundations of Antwerp the number and valour of the troops would be of secondary importance. General Clarke gave the necessary orders that all these movements should be executed as quickly as possible. He sent to Antwerp an officer of engineers of the highest merit, M. Decaux, subsequently minister, and he wrote to the king of Holland, hinting, that if he desired the command it rested only with himself to assume it in the capacity of constable.

Meanwhile M. Fouché, on his part, began the grand movement which had not found favour with the council, and wrote to all the

departments on the northern frontier, requiring them in the Emperor's name to levy the national guards. The letter addressed to the prefects, and intended for publication, appealed to the honour and patriotism of the population, told them Napoleon relied on them when he quitted his own frontiers for Austria, and that doubtless they would not suffer a handful of English to insult the territory of the empire. This letter, which was a sort of proclamation, savoured of the declamatory style of 1792, and was evidently intended to rouse public feeling. Administrative circulars, subjoined to the minister's letter, indicated the means by which the men were to be called out, clothed, and mustered. The zeal of the prefects was challenged to act with the utmost celerity.

Whilst these showy measures were being announced, the quieter and more effectual measures of the minister of war were receiving their execution, but unfortunately not so fast as they ought. Extreme confusion prevailed in Antwerp where there were barely a few hundred soldiers and some workmen to man the ramparts. The king of Holland, with laudable zeal, repaired thither in all haste, at the head of 5 thousand Dutchmen, the only troops at his disposal, whom he had stationed between Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp. Having turned thrifty to please the Dutch, he had on foot only these 5 thousand men, besides four regiments in Germany and one or two battalions in Spain. He had allowed his army and his fleet to dwindle away, in order to conform to the spirit of his new subjects; and in leading all the forces he had to the succour of Antwerp, he exposed Holland to the attempts of the English. That country, formerly friendly to France and hostile to England, had completely changed in that respect since the French alliance had closed the seas against its commerce. It hailed the arrival of the English almost as liberators. All Belgium shared the same feeling for the same reason, and still more from motives of religion. Any success of the English might easily have called forth a popular insurrection in that country. The clergy, whose influence there was so great, had been eager against the French rule since the rupture with the Pope, and all its members, except the archbishop of Malines, who owed his appointment to Napoleon, directed all their efforts in favour of the English.

On arriving at Bergen-op-Zoom king Louis stationed his troops between Santvliet and Antwerp, so as to be able to succour the latter. Upon the mere hint in Clarke's letter, he assumed the general command, and, giving way to his very lively imagination, he proposed measures which would have prematurely thrown the country into confusion, and done much hurt to the establishment of Antwerp. He wanted to have the whole country flooded from Antwerp to the lower Scheldt, to have hulls of vessels sunk in the channels, and that, in short, in order to keep off the English,

the country should do itself as much mischief as the invaders themselves could have inflicted upon it. The commandant Decaux, a very sensible man and a skilful engineer, succeeded in cooling down the king of Holland's effervescing spirits, put the forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek in a better state, spread the inundation round them so as to render them inaccessible, postponed it round Antwerp, arranged with admiral Missiessy for the establishment of several booms on the Scheldt, repaired the walls of Antwerp, and brought the measures for defence into some degree of order. Some thousand men of the 3rd, 4th, and 6th demi-brigades having already arrived, and being followed by the customs men, the gendarmerie, and the national guards, there were, about the 10th or 12th of August in Antwerp 8 or 10 thousand men, ill organised, but sufficient to garrison the place. Fortunately too, the English persisted in the siege of Flushing. General Monnet had received about 2 thousand men before the closing of the Western Scheldt; and if it was not to be expected that he should hold out to the end, still he would secure time for organising the defence of Antwerp. General Rousseau on his part, having received the 8th demi-brigade and some national guards *d'élite*, continued to occupy the left bank of the Scheldt, in the island of Cadzand. The progress of the enemy was thus delayed, and that was enough to cause their failure. The fleet had escaped the English; Antwerp was hourly becoming more difficult of access for them; Flushing alone was in danger of falling into their hands; and in any case it might be hoped that it would be their sole trophy.

When Napoleon learned, by extraordinary courier, the news of the Walcheren expedition, he was not surprised at it, for he had expected some descent upon the coasts, and for that reason had left in France the two provisional demi-brigades of Paris, the three of the north, and a certain number of artillery companies, of which he was not in absolute need. If the news did not surprise, still less did it trouble him, for from the first moment he judged the import of the expedition, and was convinced that except some expense entailed on himself, all the evils of it would fall upon the English, who would perish uselessly by the fever, without taking Antwerp or the fleet, unless the latter was ill-managed. Had he, however, more impartially considered his own position, he would have seen that this expedition did his government a very serious kind of mischief—that of strikingly revealing the dangers of a policy which, having 300 thousand men in Spain, 100 thousand in Italy, and 300 thousand in Germany, had not a soldier to guard Antwerp, Lille and Paris.

At first, strange to say, he was not of the opinion of those who had thought themselves of his, namely general Clarke and arch-chancellor Cambacérès. Both had supposed he would not

approve either of the mustering of the national guards, or of the nomination of marshal Bernadotte. They had guessed wrong. Though Napoleon did not like to have recourse to reasoning populations who put conditions upon their services, and though he surmised how much rancour the prince of Ponte Corvo cherished against him, still he could waive all such considerations when his interest required it. In the first place, he was not exactly informed as to the importance of the Walcheren expedition, and though with his transcendent sagacity he foresaw its ultimate result, he was yet not free from all uneasiness when he heard of 40 thousand or 50 thousand English soldiers—soldiers whose valour Spain had showed him. He did not think that such a force was to be despised, and by no means wished that the French should remain indifferent to its appearance. He could then have wished that at the first signal the nation had risen up in eager indignation to fall upon the audacious foe that dared to violate the soil of the empire. This would have been to unite the enthusiasm of 1792 with the profound order of 1809; but things so contrary are not to be allied at will. Nevertheless, as it gathers years, authority becomes singularly self-complacent, however great it may be intellectually. This is a weakness of time. Though he began to weary the nation, though the evidence of his ambition gave his wars a meaning unfavourable to him, Napoleon thought that everything was due to him; that at the first danger occasioned by his fault, every Frenchman ought to start to his feet; and he had, moreover, contracted the false notion of a man of genius, that a government, when it will, may make a nation do whatever it pleases. He was, therefore, dissatisfied that on the first appearance of the English on the soil of the empire, his ministers had not appealed to France, roused her enthusiasm, and demanded her devoted efforts. He believed they ought to have done this, that they could have done it, and he blamed their coldness. He thought it especially desirable (and in this he showed no weakness, but the highest good sense) to disgust the English with similar expeditions, by setting the mass of the people upon them. He regarded it as a great advantage for the moment, to prove to Austria, with which he was in negotiation, that France was ready to unite with him; and, if the reader would know his last motive, frankly expressed in his letters, he desired, as matter for recruiting was beginning to fail him, to procure fresh, by deriving from a strong commotion from 60 thousand to 80 thousand young national guards, whom, once raised, he would retain in arms, and convert into the best of conscripts, for they would all be from twenty to thirty years old. He therefore bitterly blamed general Clarke and arch-chancellor Cambacérès for their excessive prudence, and MM. Fouché and Decrès for not having persisted in the opinions they had put forth,

still more than MM. Clarke and Cambacérès for not having acquiesced in them. He wrote to both parties that he could not understand their hesitations; that at the first signal they ought to have raised 60 thousand national guards, convoked the senate, employed it to speak to France, and proved that behind the armies engaged at a distance there remained the nation itself, ready to support them, and supply their place at every point. If these ideas be compared with those which have been attributed to him in all contemporary narratives, it will be seen how rarely history is well informed.

Far from being displeased with Fouché for having agitated the nation, Napoleon blamed him for not having sufficiently stirred it up. As for the choice of the commander-in-chief, he here showed how much his judgment was superior to his passions when a great interest required it. He entertained a deep aversion for the vanity, the ambition, and the whole character of marshal Bernadotte, and he perfectly divined what treachery, present and future, was latent in his heart; and yet, deeming him of all men within reach of the British expedition, the only one capable of taking the command, he deeply regretted that he had not been nominated general-in-chief of the troops assembled in the north. He therefore reproached his ministers for not having chosen him, and ordered them to confer the command upon him if there was yet time. He no less strongly condemned them for conferring the command on king Louis. He was beginning to conceive an extreme impatience at seeing his brother govern Holland in a narrow interest, tolerating smuggling, favouring clandestine relations with England, feebly seconding and often abandoning the cause of the continental blockade, and abounding in a system of economy pleasing to the Dutch, but destructive to their army and their marine. Exaggerating even his brother's sins regarding the imperial policy, he went so far as to entertain distrust of him, and he reproached his ministers for not having seen that on this occasion king Louis would prefer the interests of Holland to those of France, and, to preserve Amsterdam, would let Flushing be taken and Antwerp burned. Nothing was more unjust than such a supposition, for king Louis was at that moment hastening to the defence of the French territory, and was uncovering Amsterdam to cover Antwerp. But, irritated by a correspondence with his brother, which was daily becoming more acrimonious, Napoleon blamed the confidence that had been placed in him, and in his letters he sarcastically asked his ministers, "Is it because he bears the title of constable that you have chosen Louis? But Murat bears that of grand-admiral: what would you say if I gave him a fleet to command?"

These points settled, the convocation of the national guard being adopted, and Bernadotte being designated for the chief

command, he gave admirably prudent, able, and provident instructions as to the conduct to be pursued. Make no attempt, he said, in his letters to his ministers, to come to action with the English. *A man is not a soldier.** Your national guards, your conscripts of the provisional demi-brigades, led pell-mell to Antwerp, almost without officers, with an artillery scarcely formed, opposed to Moore's soldiers, who have had to do with the troops of the grand army, would get themselves beaten, and would supply the English expedition with an object which they will soon lack, if they have not taken the fleet as I hope, and if they do not take Antwerp, as I am sure they will not. The English must be opposed only with the fever, which will soon have devoured them all; and with soldiers shut in behind entrenchments and inundations, to be organised and instructed. In a month the English will depart covered with confusion, decimated by the fever, and I shall have gained from this expedition an army of 80 thousand men, which will render me many services if the war with Austria is to continue.

In accordance with these views, Napoleon ordered general Monnet to defend Flushing to the last extremity, so as to keep the English as long as possible in the fever district, and give Antwerp time to complete its defences. He formally enjoined him not to lose a minute in breaking the dykes, and laying the whole island of Walcheren under water. He then gave orders to have the fleet taken up to Antwerp, or even higher, if that had not yet been done; to let in the water only where inundations were necessary; by no means to sink hulls of vessels in the channels, for he did not wish to have the Scheldt destroyed by way of defending it; to muster at Antwerp, under marshal Bernadotte, the provisional demi-brigades, general Rampon's national guards *d'élite*, the disposable dépôt battalions, marshal Moncey's gendarmerie, and king Louis's Dutchmen, the whole forming possibly an army of 25 thousand men, to be stationed round Antwerp behind the dykes and inundations, so as to render the place inaccessible, without, however, giving battle, but leaving the fever alone to work for him upon the English; to form after that first army a second, composed exclusively of national guards, distributed into five legions, commanded by as many veteran officers of the senate, and to be spread from the Tête de Flandre (a suburb of Antwerp) to the island of Cadzand, to guard the left bank of the Scheldt, in case the English should attempt a descent upon it; to organise that new army as well as possible, and summon to it, not retired officers, old servants of the republic, but officers from the infantry dépôts, particularly the majors, who were almost all excellent; to get together the *matériel* and *personnel* of eighty

* Napoleon's own words. What follows is a faithful abridgment of a hundred admirable letters on the Walcheren expedition.

pieces of artillery, the means for which he afforded by leaving in France ten companies of artillery out of those he had demanded; lastly, to place that second army under the command of marshal Bessières, who was cured of the wound he had received at Wagram, on whose devoted zeal he relied, and whom he was not sorry to place by the side of prince Bernadotte to second and watch the latter. To these two armies Napoleon (knowing that one never obtains more than half what one orders and pays for) desired to add a third on the Meuse, which was to come from the Rhine, and be composed of some demi-brigades at first destined for the Danube. He had already received from the hospitals, the dépôts of Italy, and the demi-brigades which had come by Strasburg and down the Danube, a considerable mass of soldiers, who had been incorporated with the army of Germany, and raised its effective amount to a most satisfactory point. He could, therefore, dispense with part of the resources he had called for, and consequently he gave orders to stop at Strasburg every corps that was organised—such for example as the demi-brigades—and send them down by the Rhine to the Meuse; to continue to send to Vienna mere detachments, suitable for recruiting the battalions; to commence at Maestricht, under marshal Kellermann, a muster of 10 thousand men, complete in all arms, in order to flank marshal Bernadotte at Antwerp. Estimating Bernadotte's corps at 30 thousand men, that of Bessières at 40 thousand, and that of Kellermann at 10 thousand, Napoleon hoped to have in Flanders an army of 80 thousand men, including 50 thousand at least passably organised, who, moreover, would become trained in a little while, and of whom, perhaps, at some future time he himself would suddenly come and take the command, if there was any good snare to be laid for the English. Detaining the latter in a labyrinth of islands, marshes, and arms of the sea, he did not despair of seconding the effects of the fever by some sudden piece of strategy, which would make them pay dear for their immense expedition; so that instead of being distressed by an attempt, which in reality as we have said revealed one of the bad sides of his policy, he was delighted at it, because he discerned the probability of a signal retaliation, and the creation of an army the more added to those he already possessed.

When these instructions arrived in Paris they filled Fouché with pride, and Clarke and Cambacérès with embarrassment. But each went to work to fulfil Napoleon's intentions to the best of his ability. Fouché had already rung a veritable tocsin for the levy of the national guards. He had in the first instance addressed a call to ten departments: he had recourse to twenty after the letters from Schönbrunn, and prepared even to address a still greater number. L'Escant, la Lys, la Meuse Inférieure, Jem-

mapes, les Ardennes, la Marne, l'Aisne, le Nord, le Pas de Calais, la Somme, la Seine Inférieure, l'Oise, Seine et Oise, la Seine, Seine et Marne, l'Aube, l'Yonne, le Loiret, Eure et Loire, and l'Eure, were put under contribution to furnish contingents of national guards. The prefects called together the mayors, and organised a sort of conscription, which was to be voluntary in appearance, but forced in reality, and from which escape was to be effected by paying so much a day to the unemployed workmen, or the vagabonds whom the authorities did not know what to do with. There were, in fact, very few zealous citizens who offered to serve in person, for this muster of national guards was looked upon as a new form of conscription. People did not believe much in the danger of the British expedition, and such as it was, they imputed it to the policy which left our own frontiers uncovered to invade those of others. In the Belgian departments, which were ill-disposed, and in those of the centre and the south, where distance caused the danger to be more coolly regarded, the inhabitants did not lend themselves freely to the new levies. But in the old departments near the northern frontiers and the coast, where the hatred of the English has always been very strong, people came forward with some alacrity. These latter departments had already furnished general Rampon with picked companies, consisting of old soldiers; they again supplied men for the new corps, of which Napoleon had ordered the formation. M. Fouché, acting in a revolutionary manner, did not hesitate to charge the budget of the minister of the interior with considerable expenses for clothing the national guards. Partly from zeal, partly from ostentation, he displayed an activity which was soon to end by exciting suspicion, for it exceeded the bounds of what was natural and useful. In Paris especially he displayed an ardour that appeared strange. In that great capital, accustomed to pass so rapidly from enthusiasm to sarcasm, there had been a change of feeling towards Napoleon since the war in Spain. To have the English so close upon one at home, whilst one was at Madrid and Vienna; to keep the pope prisoner in Rome, when he had been so caressed at Nôtre Dame; all this displayed an inconsistency which no one took the trouble to disguise. Paris, according to the bulletins of the police, was not like itself for a year past, and—sad result of the abuse of war!—Napoleon had so wearied out patriotism, that the mendacious bulletins of the archduke Charles, denying the success of the French army, were secretly circulated; not that the Parisians were already so culpable as not desire that success, but because without doubting Napoleon's genius they began to doubt his fortune, and thus he had revived the dangerous propensity to be critical. For these reasons Fouché had with difficulty succeeded in moving the young who loved horses and uniforms, and organising some battalions of

national guards in Paris. He had been obliged to talk of a guard of honour, which should escort the Emperor's person without going very far abroad; and to fill up its vacant ranks, he had even been obliged to pay men without work. He had then indulged in the pleasure of reviewing them—a dangerous pleasure, which was afterwards to cost him dear. As for the minister of war, M. Clarke, his occupations were more serious. On receipt of letters from Napoleon, he had summoned the prince of Ponte Corvo, and sent him to Antwerp. The disposable demi-brigades were on their way to the Scheldt; the gendarmerie, collected by marshal Moncey, had furnished two thousand horses; the artillery withdrawn from the roads to Alsace were on those to Flanders, and, though with much confusion, the means of defence were beginning to accumulate on the previously unguarded points of Antwerp, la Tête de Flandre, le Sas de Gand, Breskens, and the island of Cadzand.

Fortunately the English had profited little by the time elapsed. They had finished by collecting all their land and sea forces in the Eastern Scheldt. Their fleet was spread over the various channels that divide Walcheren from North and South Beveland; their troops were stationed in the island of Walcheren, round Flushing, and in South Beveland, round the fort of Batz. They did not think they could march safely until they had opened to their fleet the passage of the Western Scheldt, by the capture of Flushing, which would allow them to bring up their whole army by sea before Batz and Santvliet. In consequence of this determination, they had spent the first days of August in making works of approach before Flushing, and had employed their best troops upon them. General Monnet, who, as we have seen, had received two thousand men from various regiments, particularly two French battalions—the one from the 48th, the other from the 65th—had used them to dispute the ground more vigorously than had been done in the beginning. The new troops sent to him, though young, were full of honour, and did their duty better than the medley of foreigners of whom the Flushing garrison had at first consisted.

After having lost 12 or 1500 men, he was by the 10th of August entirely pent up within the town, and communicated only by his right with the post of Rameskens, where he had endeavoured to break down the dykes, in compliance with Napoleon's urgent orders. But whether it was that the tide was too low, or the ground not formed to receive the inundation, but little water had entered the island, and the English lodged on the causeways, had been able to remain before Flushing, where they were at work to establish batteries to reduce the town. This was the critical moment for the besieged; for general Monnet had no casemates to shelter his troops. He had in the

town a population (like all maritime populations) ill-disposed towards the French; he had in the garrison one-third French, unused to war, but trustworthy, and two-thirds foreigners, down-right bandits, who took advantage of the disorder of a siege to plunder and exasperate the inhabitants. The condition was, therefore, one of the very worst for resisting the frightful extremities which were in preparation.

In conformity with the true principles of siege operations, the English had resolved to employ all their artillery simultaneously, and not otherwise. On the one hand, they laboured at the erection of their incendiary batteries; on the other, to introduce into the Deurloo channel a portion of the Gardner division, which consisted of ships of the line and frigates, so as to cannonade the town by land and sea. Already even they had succeeded in turning it on the inner side, by passing through the Weere Gat into the Sloe.

On the 11th of August, after some difficulty, for want of pilots, and in consequence of the removal of the buoys, the frigates began to pass along the Deurloo channel before Flushing, discharging upon its walls a cannonade, which was vigorously returned. They effected their junction with the smaller craft, which had come down by the Sloe to before Rameskens. On the 12th the ships followed the frigates into the channel, and the English general having summoned Flushing to surrender, began to cannonade it simultaneously by land and sea. Never had so many guns sent forth their thunders in so small a space. The land batteries numbered more than sixty pieces of large calibre—24-pounders and mortars. The guns of the naval division were from a thousand to 1100, and poured out incessant broadsides of shot and shells. After twenty-four hours of this horrible cannonade, the town was found to be on fire; all the houses were shot through, all the roofs demolished. The inhabitants howled in despair. The batteries on the side next the sea replied with vigour and caused the British squadron some serious damage. But the latter was numerous enough to bring fresh vessels into line, in the place of those that were injured; and, in consequence of the freedom of its movements, it was able to throw its fire athwart our batteries. The contest could not long be continued, without ending in all our gunners being put *hors de combat*. By the 14th most of them were killed or wounded. Endeavours were made to fill their places with soldiers of the line, but the latter, having no experience, were very bad substitutes; and, besides, the cannons were almost all dismounted. On the 14th, the English general finding the guns of the town almost silenced, granted it a respite while he summoned it again to surrender. Not receiving an immediate reply, he reopened his fire. This fresh cannonade put Flushing in such a state that

it was no longer possible to resist. No return was made to the besiegers' fire, for our batteries were every one destroyed. The troops, with the exception of the French minority, refused to serve, and employed themselves only in pillaging. The despairing inhabitants insisted on surrendering, for several breaches in the walls exposed them to the horrors of storming. Under these circumstances, general Monnet consented to capitulate, and signed articles of surrender on the 16th of August. Though capitulations are never to be excused, it must be owned that in this case a longer defence was impossible, and would have retarded the surrender only one day, whilst it exposed the garrison and the inhabitants to all the consequences of a storming. After all, general Monnet, by detaining the enemy seventeen days before Flushing, and general Rousseau, by preventing their landing on Cadzand, had ruined the English expedition.

Flushing taken, an immediate advance ought to have been made upon Antwerp; but here the operation was becoming more delicate and more perilous, since the invaders had to march over French territory, through vast inundations, to lay siege to a considerable fortress already filled with reinforcements, which had been sent to it from all parts. The simplest course—if there had been as much resolution at that time as when the expedition started—would have been to have landed all the troops with their *matériel* on the islands of North and South Beveland, to have crossed those islands on foot, as the Hope division had previously done, and gone straightway to Santvliet, without losing time in bringing all the way up the two Scheldts such an enormous quantity of ships, frigates, and transports. A keen dispute arose on this subject between the naval and the military commander, as always happens in expeditions of this kind in which such dissimilar forces co-operate. The admiral, who was for landing the troops at once, and marching them to Batz, urged the difficulty of working through the two Scheldts under the fire of the batteries still remaining to the Dutch and the French, and through channels, the soundings of which were unknown, a multitude of ships of war and transports, amounting, with the gun-boats, to 12 or 1500, and towing these against the stream, which would require an indefinite number of days, whilst, if the troops were landed where they were, they would reach Batz in forty-eight hours. The commander of the land forces, on the contrary, wished to have all his *matériel* deposited at Batz or at Santvliet, alleging the impossibility of traversing with such incumbrances ground intersected by so many arms of the sea, canals, and dykes, to reach the upper extremity of the two Scheldts. He urged above all the necessity of having means to cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, and from the island of South Beveland to the mainland, on which Antwerp stands. It is probable that the general, on

whom rested the responsibility of the land operations, was not displeased to protract an expedition which frightened him, now that he had to march over the soil of the empire.

After a keen altercation, the earl of Chatham, with whom it rested to decide how he would employ his army, having insisted that his troops and his *matériel* should be conveyed by water to Batz and Santvliet, the admiral had only to submit, and undertake the introduction of that immense armament into the two Scheldts. This he tried to do, introducing the smaller craft into the eastern branch, and the larger, such as frigates and ships, into the western. But the fleet had to wait every day for the tide, and, when the wind was not favourable, the vessels had to haul upon their cables or be towed from the shore. From the 16th of August all the seamen in the fleet were employed in this severe labour.

During this time the prince of Ponte Corvo had repaired to Antwerp, which he entered on the 15th, bringing thither very opportunely the authority of his rank. King Louis who amidst the confusion of dismayed civilians and scarcely organised troops, knew not which way to turn for advice, gladly resigned the command to the prince marshal, and retired to Bergen-op-Zoom, and thence to Amsterdam, to take care of his own dominions. He left, however, his 5 thousand Dutchmen between Santvliet and Bergen-op-Zoom at the disposal of marshal Bernadotte, who had power to combine them with his own forces.

The marshal found on his arrival three demi-brigades already mustered, several fourth battalions taken from the 24th military division, a Polish battalion, 3 or 4 thousand national guards *d'élite*, about 2 thousand mounted gendarmes, a thousand horse from the dépôts, and several companies of artillery, making altogether 20 and odd thousand men present under arms, 12 or 15 thousand of whom were capable of appearing in line, with nearly 24 pieces of cannon, badly horsed. This medley of troops would have made a bad figure before the English army, especially if it was commanded like its countrymen in Spain; but behind the inundations of the Scheldt and the walls of Antwerp, under the command of a marshal practised in war and inspiring confidence, it was enough to frustrate the impending attack. It is true that the confusion in Antwerp was great, and that the moment would still have been favourable enough for a daring enemy, who, after taking Flushing, should have marched on Antwerp, which he might have reached on the 17th, when the marshal, but just arrived, knowing neither the place nor his army, had not yet been able to grasp the command. Success would have been easy on the 1st of August, if the English had not waited to take Flushing; but on the 16th, after Flushing had fallen, it became difficult, there being already in Antwerp a considerable though ill-organised

muster of men, supplies, and a commander; and day by day the difficulty was about to rise into impossibility, for besides that the forces in the town were to be incessantly augmented, they were about to be organised, which was still better than being augmented.

Marshal Bernadotte, in concert with two able men, admiral Missiessy and the engineer commandant Decaux, completed the measures devised in anticipation of the march of the English upon Antwerp. The forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek were put completely in a state of defence and surrounded by vast inundations. Behind these forts two sets of booms protected the fleet. Within the booms a numerous flotilla, ranging along the banks of the Scheldt, was to sweep them with raking fires; and the ten ships of the fleet, free in their movements, and having nothing to fear from fireships, could second the defence of Antwerp with 8 or 900 large guns. Antwerp itself was covered with entrenchments, palissades, and cannons; it was filled with troops, and its defenders were ready to encompass it with inundations. Marshal Bernadotte reviewed the troops, organised them, prepared them to look the enemy in the face, inspired them with an incipient confidence in themselves, and completed the mounting of their artillery; whilst in the rear, from the Tête de Flandre to Bruges, national guards were mustering in large numbers to form the army of marshal Bessières. The brave general Rousseau, with one of the demi-brigades sent him, guarded all the approaches to the island of Cadzand and the left bank of the Scheldt.

After having spent seventeen days in taking Flushing, the English employed ten more in working their 12 or 1500 sail up the two branches of the Scheldt. On the 25th, they had between Batz and Santvliet 2 or 300 frigates, corvettes, brigs, and gunboats, and were in a condition to cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, which forms the junction of the Western with the Eastern Scheldt. They could do so either in their countless boats, or by fording it at low tide with the water up to their shoulders. But beyond it they had to brave the territory of the empire, an experienced general, and an army magnified by the exaggerations of the French and the fears of the English, and reputed to be 40 thousand strong. This was not all: the epidemic which had spared the corps engaged before Flushing, because activity generally protects armies from fever, had not only attacked the troops landed in South Beveland, but also the division which, after having completed the siege of Flushing, was resting in Walcheren. The effects of their want of occupation, and the bad marsh water they drank, had been the more violent from the numbers assembled. From the 16th of August, the date of the surrender of Flushing, to the 26th, when the naval forces arrived off Batz, 12 or 15 thousand men had been

attacked by the fever, and in many of them it had assumed a malignant character. They were dying by thousands, and there was scarcely a place to lay them; for there were few buildings on the always half inundated islands of Zeeland, and Flushing had not a roof left standing. After having left some thousand men in Flushing, there remained, exclusive of the sick and wounded, but 24 or 25 thousand out of 44 thousand to march to Antwerp.

Lord Chatham seeing this state of things, and further intimidated by what was reported of Bernadotte's strength, held a council of war on the 26th of August, at Batz, to determine what was to be done. All the lieutenant-generals were present. It was evidently impossible to cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, either by fording it or on shipboard, and then march on Antwerp, without incurring a disaster. In fact, there would be found invincible difficulties on the way, if the French had the prudence not to give battle, but trust to the obstruction caused by the waters, which could not fail to stop the English army, whilst the fever would reduce their numbers from 24 thousand to 20 or perhaps 15. And if they failed before Antwerp, as everything foreboded, how should they effect their retreat before the French, who would immediately sally out from their entrenchments and pursue them. It would be the utmost if they could get back safe and sound across the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom.

These arguments were quite valid; for whereas on the 1st of August there was every chance of success, and on the 16th some still remained, on the 26th there was none whatever, and it would have been madness to pursue the object of the expedition further. Its leaders, then, had to content themselves with the conquest of Flushing; a conquest, it is true, that would not be retained, though costing enormous expenses, 15 or 20 thousand invalids, and the shame of seeing the greatest maritime experiment of the age made ridiculous. But there was no help for it. The decision of the council of war was immediately transmitted to England, whence a reply could arrive in forty-eight hours. The interval was spent in retrograding and embarking the sick for England.

On the 2nd of September the British cabinet approved of the decision of the council of war, and ratified the abandonment of an expedition which had cost so many efforts and promised such vast results. The English began again the difficult operation of hauling along the Scheldt 12 or 1500 vessels of all forms and sizes, and embarking their men, horses, and cannon. A great number of vessels sailed for the Downs. But the army could not be left where it was. Already there were 15 or 18 thousand soldiers on the sick-list. These were embarked as well as could be done, and vessels to convey them home were continually passing to and fro between the island of Walcheren and the Downs.

To avoid acknowledging the complete failure of the expedition by immediately evacuating Flushing, it was resolved to leave there a garrison of 12 thousand men, and the water drunk being the principal cause of the fever, 800 tons a day were to be sent from the Downs to Flushing. The transports, therefore, were constantly coming and going, bringing water and taking away the sick. Four thousand had already perished in Walcheren. Twelve thousand had been carried to England, where many died on their arrival, and as the garrison of Flushing diminished daily, it was resolved that only the number of troops strictly necessary for its defence should remain there. It was even intended to evacuate it altogether after blowing up the works, if the peace which was soon to be signed brought back the French armies from the Danube to the Scheldt.

When the French perceived the retrograde movement of the English (and they were not slow to perceive it), they were in a tumult of delight at their easy victory. The happy result was due exclusively to the firm attitude of general Rousseau, who had preserved the island of Cadzand, to general Monnet's resistance, which had made the English lose valuable time,—and to the coolness of admiral Messiesy, whose skilful manœuvring had saved the fleet. Nevertheless, marshal Bernadotte, always prompt to sound his own praises, addressed a new order of the day to his troops, applauding himself for the victory they had obtained over the English. This order of the day did not find more favour at Schönbrunn than that which he had addressed to the Saxons after the battle of Wagram.

It was now time to stop the levy of the national guards, who filled the country with agitation from Lille to Ghent, from Ghent to Antwerp, deserted for the most part on the march, or arrived in undisciplined tumult. This was the opinion of general Clarke, but Fouché, who had received the Emperor's approbation for the first levy, and found means of exalting his own consequence through the reviews in Paris and the general movement of the population, continued the levies and extended them to the whole coast of the empire, even to Toulon and Genoa, under the pretext that the English, being forced to quit Zeeland, might very possibly go and revenge themselves in Guyenne, Provence, or Piedmont, for their disaster in Flanders.

All these events were made known to Napoleon in the beginning of September. Great was his joy and his pride, for he attributed this success to his lucky star. Having seen that star near waning two or three times since the affairs of Spain began, he thought he now beheld it shining with fresh lustre. "It is," he said in his letters, "a piece of the good fortune attached to present circumstances, this same expedition, which reduces to nothing the greatest effort of England, and procures us an army

of 80 thousand men, which we could not have procured otherwise." He gave orders to continue organising the army of the north, to muster five legions of national guards under five senators, selecting for them only young and vigorous men, disposed to serve; and to complete the horsing of the artillery, in order that it might drive the English out of Flushing if they attempted to remain there, or return to Germany if hostilities with Austria were resumed. Lastly, being again displeased with marshal Bernadotte for his propensity to vaunt after the simplest operations, and seeing him with distrust at the head of an army composed of old republican officers and national guards, he had him thanked by the minister Clarke for his services, and ordered marshal Bessières to take the command of the army of the north.

Such had been this year the efforts of the English to dispute the Peninsula with Napoleon, and destroy his vast maritime armaments on the coasts. In Spain, with a few soldiers and a good general, they had stood their ground against admirable troops feebly commanded; and in Flanders, with excellent troops lacking a general, they had failed ignominiously before the recruits that filled Antwerp. But on the one theatre and the other Napoleon's fortune still prevailed. Sir Arthur Wellesley, pursued by the mass of the French armies, retreated into Andalusia, dissatisfied with his Spanish allies, and scarcely having any more hopes of that war. Lord Chatham returned to England, covered with confusion. Napoleon might then extort from forsaken Austria a brilliant peace, and save his own greatness and ours if he profited by the lessons of fortune, which once again seemed to have used him roughly for a moment to warn rather than destroy him.



BOOK XXXVII.

THE DIVORCE.

COURSE of the Negotiations at Altenburg—Napoleon would have desired the Separation of the Three Crowns of the House of Austria, or their Transference to the Head of the Duke of Wurzburg—Not wishing yet to make a Campaign for the Purpose of effecting that Object, he contents himself with new Acquisitions of Territory in Italy, Bavaria, and Poland—Reluctance of Austria to make the Sacrifice required of Her—Intentional Delays of M. de Metternich and General Nugent, the Austrian Plenipotentiaries—M. de Bubna carries a Letter from the Emperor Francis to Napoleon—The Negotiations removed from Altenburg to Vienna—Last Discussions and Signing of the Treaty of Peace on the 14th of October, 1809—Napoleon's *ruse* to insure the Ratification of the Treaty—His Orders for the Evacuation of Austria, and for sending into Spain all the Forces set free by the Peace—Attempt to Assassinate him in the Court-yard of the Palace of Schönbrunn—His return to France—Affairs of the Church during the Political and Military events of the Year 1809—Intolerable Situation of the Pope in Rome in Presence of the French Troops—To put an End to it Napoleon issues the Decree of the 17th of May, uniting the States of the Church to the French Empire—Bull of Excommunication issued in Reply to that Decree—Arrest and Removal of the Pope to Savona—State of Feeling in France consequent upon the Political, Military, and Religious Events of the Year—Deep Change in Public Opinion—Arrival of Napoleon at Fontainebleau—His Abode there, and new Habits—Assemblage in Paris of Princes, Relations, or Allies—Napoleon's Return to Paris—The Resolution to be Divorced matured in his Mind during the late Events—He confides that Resolution to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès and to Champagny, Minister for Foreign Affairs—Napoleon sends for Prince Eugene to Paris, that he may prepare his Mother for the Divorce, and solicits the Hand of the Archduchess Anne, Sister of the Emperor Alexander—Arrival in Paris of Prince Eugene—Grief and Resignation of Josephine—Forms adopted for the Divorce, and Consummation of that Act on the 15th of December—Josephine retires to Malmaison and Napoleon to Trianon—Reception given at St. Petersburg to Napoleon's Demand—The Emperor Alexander consents to give his Sister, but wishes to attach to the Marriage a Treaty against the eventual Re-establishment of Poland—Intentional Delays of Russia, and Impatience of Napoleon—Secret Communications making known the Desire of Austria to bestow an Archduchess on Napoleon—

Council of the Grand Dignitaries of the Empire, in which the Choice of a new Consort is discussed—Tired of the Procrastinations of Russia, Napoleon breaks with that Power, and abruptly determines to marry an Archduchess of Austria—On the same day he signs, by Prince Schwarzenberg's Mediation, his Contract of Marriage with Marie Louise, copied from Marie Antoinette's Marriage Contract—Prince Berthier sent to Vienna officially to demand the Hand of the Archduchess Marie Louise—He is eagerly welcomed by the Court of Austria—Marriage celebrated at Vienna on the 11th of March—Marriage celebrated at Paris on the 2nd of April—Temporary Change for the Better in Public Opinion and last Illusions of France as to the Duration of the Imperial Reign.

BOOK XXXVII.

THE DIVORCE.

WHAT Napoleon most regarded in the Walcheren expedition was its influence over the negotiations at Altenburg. He had employed the time elapsed since the armistice of Znaïm in putting his army in Germany into the most flourishing condition, so as to be able to prostrate the Austrians if the conditions of the peace they proposed were not agreeable to him. His army, encamped at Krems, Znaïm, Brünn, Vienna, Presburg, Œdenburg, and Grätz, well fed, well rested, largely recruited by the arrival and dissolution of the demi-brigades, remounted in cavalry horses, and provided with a numerous and splendid artillery, was superior to what it had been at any period of the campaign. Napoleon had formed under general Junot, with the garrisons left in Prussia, some demi-brigades under general Revaud, the reserves assembled in Augsburg, the provisional regiments of dragoons, and some Wurtembergers and Bavarians, an army of 30 thousand foot and 5 thousand horse, to keep guard over Swabia, Franconia, and Saxony, and hinder the forays of the duke of Brunswick Œls and of general Kienmayer. Marshal Lefebvre with the Bavarians was battling in the Tyrol. Lastly, there was the new army of Antwerp, the numbers and efficiency of which he no doubt greatly exaggerated, but which was, nevertheless, a force the more added to all those he already possessed. He was, therefore, in a condition to treat advantageously with a power which, though likewise making great efforts to reorganise its troops, was not in a condition to raise itself up again. Yet, notwithstanding the immense resources at his command, Napoleon sincerely desired peace, and for excellent reasons.

At the opening of the war, flattering himself that he should crush Austria at a blow, and too much forgetting the greatness of the means she had prepared, Napoleon had been surprised by the resistance he had encountered ; and though his confidence in himself had never been shaken, he had come to believe some-

what less in the facility of overthrowing the house of Habsburg. As he had now no thoughts of destroying it, war was for him without an object ; for having taken the Venetian states and the Tyrol from that power in 1805, there remained nothing which he could detach from it for himself. To wrest from the empire of Austria two or three more millions of inhabitants, in order to enlarge the duchy of Warsaw towards Gallicia, Saxony towards Bohemia, Bavaria towards Upper Austria, and Italy towards Carniola, was not worth a new campaign, however brilliant it might be. What would have completely fulfilled his wishes would have been to separate the three crowns of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, put them upon three several Austrian or German heads, and thus bring down for ever the old house of Austria ; or else to make his irreconcilable enemy, the emperor Francis, abdicate in favour of his brother the duke of Wurzburg, who had been successively sovereign of Tuscany, Salzburg, and Wurzburg, a good-natured and enlightened prince, formerly the friend of the General of the army of Italy, and still the friend of the Emperor of the French. In that case Napoleon would not have exacted any sacrifice of territory whatever, so much would his pride have been satisfied by dethroning an emperor who had broken word with him ; so much would it have conduced to the security of his policy to see the throne of Austria occupied by a prince on whose attachment he counted. But to separate the three crowns would be to destroy the house of Austria, and to do that required two or three more great victories, which Napoleon was very likely to gain, but which would probably make Europe desperate, alarm Russia, and disgust her with our alliance, and cause a general rising of the nations. As for a change of sovereigns, it was not easy to bring the emperor Francis to abdicate, though he was said to be weary of the throne. Besides, it was not seemly to make such a proposal. The suggestion ought to come from the Austrians themselves, in the hope of escaping territorial sacrifices. Thus the second plan was not much more feasible than the first. To weaken Austria in Gallicia for the benefit of the grand duchy of Warsaw, in Bohemia for the benefit of Saxony, in Upper Austria for the benefit of Bavaria, and in Carinthia and Carniola in order to procure a large continuity of territory from Italy to Dalmatia, and a land route towards the Turkish empire, was therefore the only practicable project. Napoleon resolved then to demand as much as possible in these several respects, and even to demand more than he was bent on obtaining, in order that he might exact payment in money for so much of his claims as he should abate at the end of the negotiation. Should he find the court of Vienna too fractious, and still too much possessed with the notion of its own

strength, he would then resume his first destructive intentions, whatever all Europe might think of it, Russia included.

Towards the latter power Napoleon intended to continue to behave amicably and as an ally, but still giving it to understand that he had perceived the coolness of its zeal during the last war, and that he no longer relied on it for difficult cases. Feeling certain that it was not disposed to recommence war with France, and believing that it would not expose itself to that contingency for the sake of ameliorating the lot of Austria, he did not wish to brave it beyond what was necessary to weaken Austria sufficiently, and for ever deprive England of her alliance. Nevertheless, as he was always ready for extreme resolutions, he was determined, if the negotiations with Austria failed, to dare everything against everybody, in order, as soon as possible, to close that long career of hostilities which the gigantic extent of his ambition had brought upon him. In consequence, after having maintained a long and even disdainful silence towards Alexander, he wrote to acquaint him with his victories, announce to him the opening of negotiations with Austria, and invite him to send to Altenburg a plenipotentiary furnished with his instructions as to the conditions of peace. Without naming any of those conditions, he asked that the person sent should be one who was friendly to that alliance which had already procured Finland for Russia, and which promised it Moldavia and Wallachia. Whether Alexander acceded to the proposal or not, whether or not he sent a negotiator to Altenburg, Napoleon's purposes would be equally served. A Russian negotiator might complicate the negotiation; but as he should be forced to side with the French, he would once more engage his court against Austria should hostilities be resumed.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements when the conferences for peace began. It was his intention, as we have said, to demand much more than he would be content to take, that he might exact payment of the difference in war contributions, which was fair enough, the expenses of the campaign having been enormous.

M. de Champagny set out in consequence for the little town of Altenburg, situated between Raab and Comorn, some leagues from the castle of Dotis, to which the emperor Francis had retired after the battle of Wagram. M. de Champagny had orders to place the negotiation on the basis of *uti possidetis*—that is to say, the surrender to France of those territories which our armies occupied, subject to such exchanges as might suit the convenience of Austria. Thus we held Vienna and Brünn, points which it was evident we could not retain; but, under the system of *uti possidetis*, Austria would cede in Bohemia, Galicia, and Illyria, as much territory and population as were restored to

her at the centre of the monarchy. Whilst she was offered this facility in distributing her losses, a demand was made on her for nearly nine millions of inhabitants; that is to say, more than a third of her dominions, which was equivalent to destroying her. But this was only a first demand, thrown out by way of beginning business.

The negotiations opened at the moment when it was beginning to be known in Austria that the Walcheren expedition would not be very successful; and they naturally languished until it was positively known that the expedition would have no other result than to make England lose some thousand men and much money, and to procure Napoleon an army the more. The emperor Francis, forced, in spite of himself, to treat for terms, appointed M. de Metternich to negotiate with M. de Champagny. M. de Metternich was to supersede, as prime minister, M. de Stadion, who had made himself the representative of the war policy, not so much of his own impulse as that of his brother, a hot-headed priest, and who, after the battle of Wagram, had felt the necessity of resigning, and making way for the partisans of peace. M. de Metternich, however, had consented to become M. de Stadion's successor only when the two powers should have formally made their election between peace and war, by the conclusion of a definitive treaty. Until then, M. de Stadion was to remain with the army at Olmutz, and direct affairs *ad interim*. The emperor had come to Dotis in Hungary, and M. de Metternich, whose triumphal entry into the cabinet would be the result of peace, had undertaken the task of negotiating at Altenburg. With him was joined M. de Nugent, chief of the staff of the Austrian army, for all military details, and for the discussion of points concerning the demarcation of frontiers. Whilst the negotiations were pending, the Austrians strove (like Napoleon on his side) to excite the zeal of the provinces still belonging to the monarchy, to recruit the army, and reconstruct its *matériel*.

The first conferences took place at the end of August, more than a month after the battle of Znaïm and the signing of the armistice: so much time had it taken to bring the plenipotentiaries together, and give them their instructions. This prolongation of the armistice, which was to have lasted only a month, was readily consented to, for nobody was in a hurry, neither Napoleon, because he was living at the expense of Austria, and had his reinforcements to receive; nor Austria, because, although she defrayed the cost of our stay, she wanted to repair her forces, and to know the result of the Walcheren expedition.

From the first, M. de Champagny was good-tempered and calm, as usual, but proud of the sovereign he represented; M.

de Nugent was gloomy, captious, and displayed the soreness of wounded military pride; M. de Metternich was cool, subtle, and formal, prolixly argumentative, and careful, as became his part, to repair the faults of his petulant colleague. After a while, the awkwardness of the first days began to wear off. M. de Nugent became less bitter, M. de Metternich less formal, and M. de Champagny remained unchanged and peremptory, not from his natural disposition, but in obedience to his instructions. M. de Metternich saw there were two ways of concluding a peace: the one, large, generous, fruitful in good results, consisted in restoring to Austria all the prisoners just taken from her, and leaving her such as she had been before hostilities began. Touched by such generosity, she would become for France a much surer ally than Russia, because she was less changeable; and an ally at least as powerful, as might have been perceived in the last battles. Such a result would be better than a new dislocation of her territory, for the advantage of ungrateful, impotent, insatiable allies like Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Saxony, that strove to promote war for the purpose of enriching themselves, and were not worth what they cost. This, he said, was one way in which peace might be conceived; and then there was another—narrow, difficult, insecure, cruel to the power from which fresh sacrifices were to be extorted, unprofitable to the power that was to obtain them; one, after which, both parties would be rather more dissatisfied with each other, and resigned to peace only so long as they could not recommence war. This way of treating consisted in computations of territory; it was a market job. If that was what the French preferred—as he much feared it was—they must speak first, and declare what they wanted; for, after all, it was not for Austria to despoil herself.

M. de Champagny replied that the first system of peace had been tried after Austerlitz, but to no good purpose; that at that period Napoleon, victorious over the Austrian and Russian armies, had received the emperor of Austria at his bivouac, and upon a pledge that war should be made on him no more, had restored the whole Austrian monarchy, with the exception of some slight dismemberments; that after having preserved an empire which he might have destroyed, he had a right to count upon a durable peace; and yet, no sooner was he engaged with the English in Spain, than all promises had been forgotten, and war had been resumed without any regard to plighted word; that after such experience it was no longer possible to be generous, and those must suffer for the war who had so readily and unscrupulously recommenced it.

M. de Metternich alleged, in his rejoinder, the thousand grievances for which it was so easy to find matter in Napoleon's am-

bition. He alleged, and with reason, the destruction of the house of Spain, the alarm caused in all courts by that audacious measure,—an alarm which was anything but allayed by the establishment of a close intimacy with Russia, which gave reason to apprehend the most formidable designs against the security of all states; and, lastly, the refusal to admit Austria, if not into that intimacy, at least into a knowledge of what Russia and France were preparing for the world. After the long enumeration of all these grievances, which occupied more than one official conference, and more than one private interview, it was necessary to come to a specific intimation of what was required, the Austrians persisting in it that the French, who demanded sacrifices, ought to speak first. Though conscious of the enormity of what he was about to put forth, M. de Champagny, in obedience to his master's orders, claimed to stand on the basis of *uti possidetis*, according to which each party was to keep what it had, saving the exchange of certain portions of territory for others. M. de Metternich replied, that if such a proposal was meant in earnest, both parties must prepare to fight, and fight with fury, for what was demanded was nine millions of inhabitants, a third, at least, of the monarchy; it was, in fact, its destruction; and that being the case, there must be an end to all negotiation.

After this first opening, both parties were silent for some days. A precaution taken by Napoleon threw a fresh chill upon the negotiation. Lest with reference to Galicia, and the aggrandisement of the duchy of Warsaw, language should be imputed to him which he would not utter, and he should have attributed to him, in order to involve him in a quarrel with Russia, a design of re-establishing Poland, he required that minutes should be taken of the conferences. The precaution was not without utility, but it tended to make the negotiations interminable. "We are no longer negotiators, we are mere machines," observed M. de Metternich. "Peace is impossible, he repeated incessantly, and thereupon, with an air of sadness and despondency, he avowed to M. de Champagny that he considered the negotiation as illusory, for it resembled all those which France had entered upon with England; and, in reality, he believed the Emperor Napoleon was resolved to continue the war. M. de Champagny, who knew the contrary, declared it was not so, that Napoleon desired peace, with the advantages he had a right to expect from the results of the war. "But then," retorted M. de Metternich, "wherefore a principle of negotiation that cannot be accepted? Wherefore these interminable formalities, which destroy all confidence?"

Things could not be left at this dead lock, and Napoleon, satisfied with the result already visible for him of the Walcheren expedition, and wishing to derive from it not the means of continuing the war, but that of concluding an advantageous peace,

ordered M. de Champagny to make a first step towards a compromise. If Austria, for instance, manifested a disposition to consent to sacrifices, such as those to which she had consented at Presburg, and which had consisted in the surrender of about three millions of subjects, he should respond to this concession with another, and take a middle term between nine millions and three, that is to say, four or five, and then it would be for both parties to try and come to a mutual understanding as to details.

This overture, made confidentially to M. de Metternich, confirmed his previous surmise, that Napoleon was willing to abate his first exorbitant demands; but whilst so much was still claimed, he would not explain himself in the name of his court. The essential declaration that it was ready to make fresh sacrifices of territory, he was reluctant to utter, for hitherto it had always stood upon this principle, that it would give money but not territory. M. de Metternich, however, consulted his court, which was at Dotis, some leagues from Altenburg. Meanwhile the two Austrian diplomatists required a formal statement as to what Napoleon proposed to keep, and what he was willing to give back. They required that those general principles of negotiation should be laid aside, such as *uti possidetis*, and what were called *the sacrifices* of Presburg, which signified nothing, or signified things inadmissible.

Napoleon, who desired peace, determined then to take another step, and drew up with his own hand a very brief note, in which he began to speak clearly, and demanded, on the Danube, Upper Austria as far as the line of the Ens, to join it to Bavaria, leaving it for a future day to declare what sacrifice he should think fit to require in Italy. This demand involved a loss of 800 thousand inhabitants, of the important town of Lintz, and of the line of the Traun and the Ens, together with the advance of the Bavarian frontier to within a few leagues of Vienna. The Austrian diplomatists received this note without any remark, taking it *ad referendum*, that is to say, to be communicated to their court. M. de Metternich contented himself with saying in conversation, to M. de Champagny, "It seems your master does not wish that the emperor Francis should return to Vienna, since he places the Bavarians at the gates of that capital." It is certain that, if Napoleon's demand had been conceded, there would only have remained the position of St. Polten to cover Vienna, and that the emperor Francis would have had to transfer his capital to Presburg or Comorn.

After a pause of two days, the Austrian diplomatists replied, on the 27th of August, that so long as they did not know what was demanded in Italy, it would be impossible for them to explain themselves, and they begged the French negotiator would be good enough to state the desires of his government in full.

Napoleon thereupon drew up another note, which was read at Altenburg by M. de Champagny. He intended, he said, on the Italian side, to reserve to himself Carinthia, Carniola, and the right bank of the Save from Carniola to the frontiers of Bosnia. Thus Napoleon reserved to himself—first, the slopes of the Carnic Alps, the upper valley of the Drave, Villach, and Klagenfurth; secondly, the slopes of the Julian Alps, the upper valley of the Save, Laybach, Trieste, and Fiume, which would give him a large and rich province connecting Italy with Dalmatia, and lead him by an uninterrupted contiguity of territory to the frontiers of the Turkish empire. This new sacrifice would uncover Vienna on the Italian side, as the former one would have uncovered it on the side of Upper Austria; since it would put into our hands the positions of Tarvis, Villach, and Klagenfurth, and nothing would remain for the defence of that capital but the positions of Leoben and Neustadt, that is to say, the prolongation of the Noric Alps. In point of population, the loss would amount to between 14 and 1500 thousand inhabitants.

This second note was, like the former, received in gloomy silence by the Austrian diplomatists and again accepted *ad referendum*. M. de Metternich, who saw M. de Champagny every evening, merely said to him that he was dismembering the Austrian empire bit by bit, uncovering the capital on all sides, and taking away its defences both on the German and the Italian routes; that evidently his master did not wish for peace; but he was mistaken if he thought the Austrian power destroyed; the provinces still left to the empire displayed extraordinary zeal, and the war, if continued, would be a war of despair. To this M. de Champagny replied, that the sacrifices actually demanded, with the addition of those intended to be claimed in Bohemia and Galicia, did not amount to the half of what would accrue to France on the principle of *uti possidetis*. As for war, Napoleon did not fear it; he had employed the two months of the armistice in doubling his forces; without withdrawing a single man from his armies in Spain, he had 300 thousand on the Danube, besides 100 thousand on the Scheldt, owing to the happy issue of the Walcheren expedition, and with one month more of war the house of Austria would be destroyed. These declarations drew from M. de Metternich expressions of grief, which showed that his opinion was not very different from that of the French negotiator.

On the 1st of September came a fresh intimation from the Austrian plenipotentiaries that they desired to know the whole extent of the French claims. Was the surrender of Upper Austria, Carinthia, Carniola, and part of Croatia, all that was required? Was nothing wanted elsewhere? They must know this before they could explain themselves.

Napoleon, who directed the whole negotiation from Schön-

brunn, alternating his diplomatic labours with excursions on horseback to the cantonments of his troops, replied on the 4th of September by another note under his own hand. In it he said that the city of Dresden, the capital of his ally the king of Saxony, being within a day's march of the frontier of Bohemia, the danger of which situation had been revealed by the last campaign, he claimed three circles of Bohemia, in order to make the Austrian frontier so much the more distant. This was a fresh sacrifice of 400 thousand inhabitants, and one which, while covering Dresden, of course uncovered Prague. Lastly, to make known the totality of his demands, Napoleon intimated in a general way that in Poland the negotiators would have to arrange separately a sort of *uti possidetis*, which, without express mention of details, implied the surrender of half Galicia, that is to say, of 2 million 400 thousand inhabitants out of the 4 million 800 thousand constituting the population of the two Galicias. Napoleon would not enter into any details on this subject, for fear of being compromised with Russia by any mention of the re-establishment of Poland. The sacrifices demanded in the various provinces of the monarchy amounted then to a total of 5 millions instead of the 9 millions implied by the principle of *uti possidetis*. In Germany, in exchange for Upper Austria, some Bohemian circles, Carinthia, and Carniola, Napoleon was willing to give back Styria, Lower Austria, and Moravia, superb provinces, which contained Vienna, Znâim Brünn, and Grätz, and formed the centre of the monarchy. But however speciously reasoned, however soft in its tone was the note of the 4th of September, and however careful it was to set forth the difference between the claims it embodied and those which had been propounded in the first instance, it was not less painful to those to whom it was addressed. The Austrian legation again kept silence, only M. de Metternich in private interviews continued to deplore the system of peace adopted by Napoleon, which he called the close-handed peace, the cruel peace, the hard-bargaining peace, in lieu of the generous peace, which would have procured a long repose and a definitive pacification.

Meanwhile the French having fully explained themselves, the Austrians were now bound to do so in their turn, or break off the negotiations. The case was too plain to admit of any misconception. Napoleon's forces were augmented daily; the only consequence of the Walcheren expedition had been to authorise the levy of additional troops (the German diplomatists wrote to that effect to their court); and Russia had just declared herself, by sending M. de Czernicheff with a letter for the emperor Napoleon and another for the emperor Francis. The czar declared that he did not choose to have a plenipotentiary at Altenburg, because he left the conduct of the negotiation to France alone;

a course which left Russia free to accept or reject its result, but which also left Austria without support. He advised the emperor Francis to make the promptest sacrifices, and the emperor Napoleon to be moderate in his demands; and the only formal request he made of the latter was not to create him a Poland under the name of Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Provided he abstained from that infraction on the alliance Napoleon might evidently do what he pleased. It even appeared from the language of the Russian letter that Napoleon's pretensions in Germany and Italy would be regarded with a more favourable eye than his pretensions in Gallicia. Under such circumstances the Austrians could not choose but come to terms. The emperor just then recalled M. de Stadion to give him final instructions, and with him he had summoned the principal personages of the Austrian army, such as prince John de Lichtenstein, M. de Bubna, and others, to give their opinions as to the resources remaining to the monarchy, and if necessary to go on a mission to Napoleon. They all agreed that peace must be made: that the prolongation of the war, though possible with the means in preparation, would be too hazardous; that nothing was to be expected either from the Walcheren expedition or from the intervention of Russia, and that consequently Austria must resign herself to sacrifices, but not so great as those claimed by Napoleon. Among these men, some of them M. de Metternich's rivals, like M. de Stadion, others inclined as military men to make light of diplomatists, to think them slow, formal, and tiresome, there was a disposition to think that it was the Austrian legation that mismanaged the negotiation, that it wasted valuable time, that it would end by disgusting or incensing Napoleon, and that a military man, who should go to him with a letter from the emperor Francis, speak frankly to him, and ask him to be content with moderate sacrifices, would probably succeed better than all the diplomatists with their cumbrous and tortuous proceedings. This suggestion was adopted, and it was resolved to send to Schönbrunn M. de Bubna, aide-de-camp to the emperor Francis, a soldier and a man of talent, who should address himself to certain qualities in Napoleon's character, his good-nature, and facile humour, qualities which were easily awakened when the right way was taken. Thus, on the one hand, to reply by protocol to protocol, the Austrian legation was to offer Salzburg and some sacrifices in Gallicia, vaguely indicated; on the other, M. de Bubna was to make a personal appeal to Napoleon, quiet him as to the smallness of the offer made him, and bring him to prefer territories in Gallicia to others in Germany or Italy, a thing which Austria much desired, for she had found Gallicia not well affected towards her, and she would fain have thus flung an apple of discord between France and Russia. Lastly, M. de

Bubna was to hint to Napoleon that he had been mistaken as to the character of M. de Stadion, and that with that minister peace would be more prompt, more sure, and more easily accepted in its hard conditions by the emperor Francis.

M. de Bubna set out on the 7th of September for Napoleon's head-quarters. The latter was abroad visiting his camps. He received M. de Bubna on his return amicably and graciously, as was his wont when recourse was had to his good feelings, and spoke with an extreme frankness which might even have been deemed imprudent had he not been in a position to render diplomatic dissimulation almost useless. M. de Bubna complained of the tediousness of the negotiations, and the exorbitant demands of France, throwing all the blame, however, on M. de Metternich, who, he said, conducted the conferences badly. Then he invoked the victor's generosity, and repeated the ordinary theme of the Austrians, that Napoleon had nothing to gain by aggrandising Saxony and Bavaria, and appropriating to himself one or two ports on the Adriatic, that it was better for him to increase the new Poland, come to an understanding with Austria, attach her to him, and forget his dislike of M. de Stadion, who was quite cured of his warlike notions. Excited by M. de Bubna, Napoleon threw off his reserve, and disclosed all his thoughts with a sincerity which was in reality the more adroit, as it had the appearance of an involuntary impulse.* "You are right," he said, "we must not tie ourselves to what our diplomatists are doing. They conform to their trade by losing time, and asking more than we both want. If you are determined to act frankly with me we may bring matters to a conclusion in forty-eight hours. It is very true that I have no great interest in procuring a million more inhabitants for Saxony or Bavaria. My true interest, would you know what it is? It is either to destroy the Austrian monarchy by separating the three crowns of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, or to attach Austria to me by a close alliance. To separate the three crowns we should have to fight again; and though we ought, perhaps, to end matters in that way, I give you my word that I have no wish to do so. The second plan would suit me. But how is a close alliance to be expected of your emperor? He has good qualities, no doubt; but he is weak, swayed by those about him, and he will be led by M. de Stadion, who will himself be led by his brother, whose animosity and violence are notorious. There would be one sure way of bringing about a sincere, complete alliance, and one for which I would pay a very handsome price, as you shall see; this would be to make the emperor Francis abdicate, and transfer the crown to his brother, the grand duke of Wurzburg. The latter is a

* There are in the imperial archives accounts of this interview, made both by Napoleon himself and by M. de Bubna.

wise, enlightened prince, who likes me, and whom I like; who has no prejudices against France, and who will not be led either by the Stadions or by the English. For him do you know what I would do? I would withdraw forthwith, without demanding either a province or an *écu*, notwithstanding all the war has cost me, and perhaps I would do better still; perhaps I would give back the Tyrol, which is so hard to keep in the hands of Bavaria. But handsome as these conditions would be, can I institute a negotiation of this nature, and insist on the dethronement of one prince and the elevation of another? I cannot." As Napoleon accomplished these words with his searching and enquiring look, M. de Bubna hastened to reply, though with the hesitation of a faithful subject, that the emperor Francis was so devoted to his house that if he supposed such a thing he would abdicate on the instant, for he would rather ensure the integrity of the empire for his successors than the crown on his own head. "Well," said Napoleon, with marked incredulity, "if that be so, I authorise you to say that I will give up the whole empire on the instant, with something more, if your master, who often declares himself disgusted with the throne, will cede it to his brother. The regards mutually due between sovereigns forbid me to propose anything on this subject, but you may hold me as pledged should the supposition I make be realised. Nevertheless I do not believe this sacrifice will be made. In that case, not wishing to separate the three crowns at the cost of prolonged hostilities, and not being able to secure to myself the close alliance of Austria by the transfer of the crown to the archduke of Wurzburg, I am forced to consider what is the interest which France may preserve in this negotiation, and to maintain it. Territories in Galicia interest me little, in Bohemia, not more, in Austria rather more, for they would serve to remove your frontiers further from ours. But in Italy, France has a great and real interest, namely, to open for herself a broad route towards Turkey by the coasts of the Adriatic. Influence over the Mediterranean depends on influence over the Porte. I shall not have that influence otherwise than by becoming the neighbour of the Turkish empire. By hindering me from crushing the English as often as I have been on the point of doing so, and obliging me to withdraw my resources from the ocean to the continent, your master has constrained me to seek the land instead of the sea route, in order to extend my influence to Constantinople. I am not thinking, then, of my allies, but of myself, my own empire, when I demand from you territories in Illyria. Let us, however, meet each other half way. I will consent to fresh sacrifices in favour of your master. I had not yet formally renounced the *uti possidetis*; I do so now, and will say no more about it. I claimed three circles in Bohemia; there shall be no

more question of them. I insisted on Upper Austria to the Ens; I give up the Ens and even the Traun; I restore Lintz. We will find a line which, while giving you back Lintz, shall not place you under the walls of Passau, as you are at present. In Italy, I will forego a part of Carinthia; I will retain Villach, and give you up Klagenfurth. But I will keep Carniola and the right bank of the Save as far as Bosnia. I demanded of you 2,600,000 subjects in Germany; I will not require of you more than 1,600,000. There remains Galicia: there I must round off the grand duchy, and do something for my ally, the emperor of Russia, and I think that you, us well as ourselves, may be facile on that side, since we do not set much store by those territories. If you will come back in two days," said Napoleon in conclusion, "we shall settle all in a few hours, whilst our diplomatists, if we leave them alone at Altenburg, will never have done, and will set us on again to cut each other's throats." After this long and amicable interview, in which Napoleon treated M. de Bubna so familiarly as to pull him by the moustaches, he made the latter a superb present, and sent him away fascinated and grateful, and prepared to advocate at Dotis the cause of peace, of immediate peace, at the cost of greater sacrifices than had at first been decided upon.

He had to pass through Altenburg on his way to Dotis. Being by profession of the party of the military men, and not of the diplomatists, he related at Altenburg the part of the interview which concerned the two legations, and the jocularities Napoleon had indulged in at the expense of them both. This annoyed the Austrian legation, and increased the belief at Dotis that it was expedient to dispense with diplomatists, and continue to employ the intervention of military men.

M. de Bubna took pains to reassure the emperor Francis as to Napoleon's intentions, and his wish to evacuate Austria, and Vienna in particular, as soon as peace should have been signed. He spoke to him of what concerned a change of reign, only with the reserve which befitted such a proposal, and as an offer to which no great importance was to be attached. As for the new conditions obtained from Napoleon, it was not easy for him to make them acceptable, for the Altenburg legation took pains to depict them as disastrous; and, besides, the emperor Francis being kept by those about him in continual illusions, could not conceive that, in order to have peace, it was necessary to abandon his finest provinces, and particularly the ports on the Adriatic, where alone the Austrian territory was in contact with the sea. He had habituated himself to the idea that, with Salzburg and the portion of Galicia most recently detached from Poland, he might pay the cost of the war; or, at most, that he might have to add some money thereto. So habituated was he to the notion

that this would be the utmost extent of the sacrifices he should have to submit to, that he could not be very well content with the offers brought him by M. de Bubna. A decision, however, was necessary, one way or the other; and it was resolved that M. de Bubna should return to Napoleon with another letter from the emperor of Austria, thanking him for his pacific intentions, but telling him that the concessions he had made were almost nugatory, and asking others of him, in order to render peace possible.

It was on the 15th of September M. de Bubna returned to Dotis; he reappeared at Schönbrunn on the 21st, with the new letter from the emperor Francis. On receiving it, Napoleon could not restrain a burst of impatience. He inveighed against those who represented the state of things to the emperor Francis in a manner so completely untrue, and said that none of them knew even the geography of Austria. "I had not yet," he said, "renounced the basis of *uti possidetis*, and I renounced it at the desire of your emperor. I had demanded 400 thousand souls of the population of Bohemia, and I have ceased to demand them! I wanted 800 thousand souls in Upper Austria, and I content myself with 400 thousand! I had demanded 1,400,000 souls in Carinthia and Carniola, and I gave up Klagenfurth, which is again a sacrifice of 200 thousand souls! I restore, then, a population of a million of subjects to your master, and he says I have conceded nothing! I have retained only what is necessary for me to keep off the enemy from Passau and the Inn; what is necessary for me to establish a contiguity of territory between Italy and Dalmatia; and yet he is told that I have not abated any of my claims! And it is thus they represent everything to the emperor Francis; thus they enlighten him as to my intentions! By deceiving him in this way they have led him to war, and finally they will lead him to his ruin." Napoleon kept M. de Bubna with him to a very late hour; and under the influence of the feelings that possessed him, he dictated a very bitter letter to the emperor of Austria. When he grew more calm, however, he abstained from delivering it to M. de Bubna, remarking, that it was not becoming of one sovereign to tell another in writing "*You do not know what you say.*" He sent for M. de Bubna, repeated before him all he had said on the preceding night, again declared that his last propositions were his ultimatum; that, short of their acceptance, there was war; that the season was advancing, he wished to make an autumn campaign, and must, therefore, have a prompt answer, otherwise he would break off the armistice; that his first impulse had been to write a letter which would not have been agreeable to the emperor, but he decided not to send it, that he might not offend that monarch; but he charged M. de Bubna to report at

Dotis all he had heard, and return as soon as possible with a definitive reply.

But what he would not write directly to the emperor he caused to be said to the negotiators at Altenburg, to whom he addressed, through M. de Champagny, a most vehement note, wherein he vented all those feelings the expression of which he had thought proper to spare the emperor himself.

This controversy had entirely changed him; and though he did not consider the few leagues of territory and the few thousands of subjects in dispute as worth a new war, the idea of all the ill will he perceived in the court of Austria took strong possession of his mind, and his inclination to destroy that power began to revive by degrees. In fact, he gave formal orders for resuming hostilities. His army had increased every day since the opening of the negotiations. His infantry was completed, rested, and as fine as ever. All his cavalry was remounted; he had 500 pieces of flying artillery, and 300 well appointed pieces on the walls of the Austrian fortresses he occupied. He had reinforced Junot's corps in Saxony, and intended to join it to the forces of Massena and Lefebvre in Bohemia, which would make up a mass of 80 thousand men in that province. He proposed with the corps of Davout and Oudinot, largely recruited, with the guard at that time 20 thousand strong, and with the army of Italy, about 150 thousand men in all, to debouche by Presburg, where he had executed great works, enter Hungary, and there deal the house of Austria the finishing blows. He had employed the materials in the isle of Lobau in constructing four portable bridges for the purpose of crossing all the rivers which the Austrians should attempt to put between him and them. He had put Passau, Lintz, Mölk, Krems, Vienna, Brünn, Raab, Grätz, and Klagenfurth in a complete state of defence, and he had thus a formidable basis in the very heart of the monarchy. Although the English had no longer a garrison on Walcheren, he had ordered that the organisation of the army of Flanders should be completed, by uniting into divisions the demi-brigades collected there, completing the horsing of the artillery, and reducing the national guards to the men disposed to serve. Lastly, he had taken a decree for levying upon the old conscriptions (a recent resource he had opened for himself), a last contribution of 36 thousand men, who were to be draughted into the fourth battalions sent to France. These 36 thousand conscripts, aged from 21 to 25 years, would furnish him with a good reserve if the war continued, or, if peace was signed, would contribute to recruit the army of Spain. He therefore ordered the arch-chancellor Cambacérès immediately to present this decree to the senate, that it might be voted before the end of the negotiations.

At the head of this imposing force, he awaited the reply from Dotis, as well inclined for war as peace, in consequence of the bad disposition he thought he perceived in the court of Austria. In anticipation of renewed hostilities, he even went and visited in Hungary and Styria positions he had not yet seen, and which he wished to see for himself in case he should have operations to direct in those countries.

Upon M. de Bubna's reappearance at Dotis, it was felt to be necessary to decide either for war or for making the sacrifices demanded by Napoleon. The anger he had manifested, and which he had rather unjustly vented on the Altenburg legation, which after all wished for peace, though it had very much decried the concessions obtained by M. de Bubna, made it scarcely possible to leave the sequel of the negotiations in the hands of MM. de Metternich and Nugent. Prince John de Lichtenstein, a brave soldier, with no great head but plenty of heart, whom Napoleon liked for his frank and soldierly humour, was assigned as a colleague to M. de Bubna, and both were sent to Schönbrunn, through Altenburg, with power to consent to the principal bases laid down by Napoleon, but with injunctions to resist strongly as to the sacrifices demanded in Upper Austria, the war contributions which it was foreseen would be demanded, and all other details of the treaty, so as to render it as little disadvantageous as possible.

As this purely military legation completely neutralised the legation left in Altenburg, M. de Metternich did not choose to prolong his stay in a place where the plenipotentiaries were of no use but to mask the real negotiation going on at Vienna, and he retired to Dotis by no means pleased with the part which M. de Stadion or the emperor had made him play. He was soon to be indemnified for this by taking into his hands the direction of the affairs of Austria, to hold it for forty years. He foresaw, too, that the military negotiators would be very unskilful tacticians on the new field of battle they had entered upon, and would soon be beaten by Napoleon; he therefore warned them to be thoroughly on their guard, but his advice had rather the effect of alarming them at the task before them than of fortifying them against Napoleon. After all, it was much better for him that the officers who had the glory of figuring at Essling and Wagram (and victor or vanquished this was glory) should alone bear the responsibility of the severe sacrifices about to be incurred perforce. Hence, when M. de Lichtenstein, alarmed by his advice, seemed almost inclined to hang back, M. de Metternich strongly encouraged him to persist in his intention of going to Schönbrunn.

MM. de Lichtenstein and de Bubna arrived on the 27th of September, and were most graciously received. M. de Lichtenstein

had already obtained unsolicited and very flattering remarks of favour from Napoleon. Orders had been given to spare his property round Vienna, and not to billet a soldier in his châteaux. The two plenipotentiaries gave Napoleon to understand that they were authorised to accept his principal conditions, with the exception of certain details which they were instructed to object to. Seeing, then, that he was master of them, and that to make an end of the matter he had only to forego a few square miles, a few thousand inhabitants, and a few millions of francs, he was willing to spare himself needless expense, and he ordered the minister of war to suspend all the movements of troops to Austria, which had begun again, since the Walcheren expedition ceased to cause any uneasiness.

On the 30th, after a theatrical performance, he sat down in his cabinet with the negotiators, and settled with them the principal bases of the treaty. With regard to Italy both parties were agreed: we were to have the circle of Villach without that of Klagenfurth, which still opened to us the Noric Alps; and we were to have Laybach and the right bank of the Save to Bosnia. Towards Bavaria Napoleon had at first wanted the Ens, and then the Traun for a boundary, but to facilitate the negotiation, he again consented to forego some portions of territory and some thousands of subjects in that quarter. He consented to a line taken between Passau and Lintz, starting from the Danube near Efferding, consequently leaving a territory round Lintz, touching Schwanstadt, abandoning the territory of Gmünd at that point, and finally connecting itself by the Kammersee with the country of Salzburg, which was ceded to Bavaria. On the Bohemian side he contented himself with some detached portions of territory which Austria had in Saxony, close to Dresden, and not comprising a population of 50 thousand. In fine, instead of 1,600,000 subjects in Italy and Austria he had demanded previously, Napoleon did not insist on more than 1,400,000 or 1,500,000.

In Galicia the question was more difficult, because it was newer, Napoleon having postponed explaining himself as to that country on account of Russia. The province consisted of Old Galicia, which Austria had obtained upon the first partition of the Polish provinces, and which bordered the whole of north Hungary, and of New Galicia, obtained at the last partition, and stretching along both sides of the Vistula to the gates of Warsaw. New Galicia comprised on one side the countries between the Bug and the Vistula, on the other the countries between the Vistula and the Pilica. Napoleon had required to be ceded to him all New Galicia in order to enlarge the grand duchy of Warsaw, besides two circles round Cracow to form a territory for that ancient metropolis, and three circles on the eastern side, those of Solkiew, Lemberg, and Zloczow, to bestow on Russia as a gift which

might console her for the aggrandisement of the duchy of Warsaw. This would cut off 2,400,000 subjects from the 4,800,000 contained in the two Gallicias. Here, again, Napoleon gave up a population of 4 or 500 thousand souls in order to facilitate the negotiation. He now only insisted on New Galicia, from the Vistula to the Pilica on the left, from the Vistula to the Bug on the right, and the circle of Zamosc, with a smaller territory round Cracow, but one which should include the salt mines of Wieliczka. Lastly, he waived his claim to the circle of Lumberg, and contented himself with the circles of Solkiew and Zloczow for Russia, thereby reducing the total of his demands in Galicia to about 1,900,000 souls.

On these bases there was a tolerable agreement. But two points of great importance remained to be settled: the one was the reduction of the Austrian army; the other, the war contribution required by Napoleon to indemnify him for his expenses. Prussia was bound by secret treaty not to have more than 40 thousand men under arms, and to pay an enormous contribution. Napoleon intended, in like manner, to constrain Austria; not to reduce her effective to 40 thousand men, but greatly to diminish her army, and to pay a part of the costs of the war. These matters had only been mentioned orally, and not at all in writing; so much did they implicate the financial credit of Austria. Napoleon intended that for the future Austria should reduce her force to 150 thousand men, and that she should pay down 100 millions of francs, on account of the 200 millions of war contributions, of which he had as yet only received fifty. The two negotiators readily consented to reduce the Austrian army to the number of 150 thousand men; the finances of Austria did not permit her to keep more on foot; but they required a limit of time, without which such a constraint would have become an intolerable vassalage. To give this condition a less humiliating import, it was settled that Austria should be bound to this restriction of her effective only during the maritime war, in order to deprive England of any ally on the continent. Lastly, Napoleon, in consenting to evacuate the conquered countries forthwith, and to leave a part of the contributions undischarged, demanded 100 millions within a brief period. On this point the two Austrian negotiators had no latitude; and, after a long evening spent in discussing it, both parties separated, without having been able to come to an agreement. It was settled that on the following day M. de Bubna should go to Dotis, in order to smooth away the last difficulties.

Though it had been expected at first that the business would be concluded in three or four days, the time wore away until the 6th of October, in disputes over the map about certain contours of territory, some thousands of subjects to be taken or left

here and there, and above all the millions demanded by Napoleon. The contribution became matter of seemingly insurmountable difficulty. On the 6th of October Napoleon, beginning again to lose patience, left M. de Champagny a formal ultimatum, which allowed of no more tergiversations. The weather was still fine, and there were certain positions in Styria which he desired to revisit, from that instinct which prompted him to study with his own eyes places to which he might one day be called by war. On his return to Vienna, he expected to find the question of peace or war decided positively, and beyond all doubt, one way or the other. This time, however, he wished rather to intimidate than to break off; for the differences between Austria and him were certainly not such as he would have recommenced war for, though he was much bent on obtaining the contribution, his finances having great need of immediate help.

The two negotiators referred for further instruction to Dotis; and, at the last moment, the emperor Francis's intimate advisers hesitated much before resigning themselves to such sacrifices. To lose in Italy the frontier of the Alps, in Austria that of the Inn—to surrender Galicia, for the aggrandisement of the grand duchy of Warsaw, that germ of a new Poland—to lose thus 3,500,000 subjects—to pay 100 millions of francs, in addition to 50 millions already paid, and to submit to the humiliation of a limit imposed on the effective of the Austrian army—was a cruel punishment for the last war. Was there no hope of another battle of Essling, or of some help from one of the powers of Europe? But the military men were all agreed as to the impossibility of resisting, and the most painful intelligence was arriving from all parts of Europe. Spain, in spite of the boastings of its generals, was beaten, at least, for the moment. England had lost in Walcheren half of her best army; and that expedition had become an apple of discord thrown amongst all parties of her people. Prussia was trembling, on account of the imprudence committed by major Schill. Russia alone was erect, and visibly dissatisfied at the rather brilliant figure made by the Poles in the war, and at the aggrandisement which their conduct would have earned for them. But being bound by the French alliance, as she could not once more, as at Tilsit, set the example of a complete reversal of policy effected in twenty-four hours—as she had gained Finland through that alliance, and hoped, from it, Moldavia and Wallachia—she would not quit Napoleon for Francis; and as a continuation of the war could not but place her in the most extreme embarrassment, since, on the resumption of hostilities, she would have either to break with the French or to march with them, she explained herself categorically at Dotis, and declared, that in case of a prolongation of the war she would act decidedly with Napoleon. She

expressed herself thus, in order the more certainly to put an end to the war between France and Austria; and she succeeded: for the emperor Francis, borne down by such a combination of circumstances, gave way at last, and authorised MM. de Lichtenstein and de Bubna to consent to the sacrifices demanded, excepting, however, the amount of the indemnity, as to which the negotiators had orders to press still for a reduction. At the most, they were authorised to assent to 50 millions, in lieu of the 100 demanded by Napoleon.

On the 10th of October they met M. de Champagny, and the three following days were spent in shaping and retouching the articles of the treaty. On the evening of the 13th Napoleon used all his ascendancy over MM. de Bubna and de Lichtenstein and brought them to assent to a war contribution of 85 millions, exclusive of what had been already received on account of the 200 millions imposed after the battle of Wagram. Prince John, the greatest personage of the court of Austria, took upon him to exceed his instructions, in order to save his country from the disaster of a new campaign. His heroic bravery likewise authorised him to incline openly to peace. In order to prompt his decision, Napoleon told him that this treaty was subject to the ratification of his sovereign, who might reject it if the conditions did not suit him. At last, on the morning of the 14th of October, M. de Lichtenstein signed, with M. de Champagny, the treaty of peace known as the treaty of Vienna, the fourth since 1792, and destined, to our misfortune, not to last longer than the others. All the allies of France were included in the peace. Austria ceded all we have already stated: in Italy, the circle of Villach, Carniola, and the right bank of the Save, to the Turkish frontier; in Bavaria, the Innviertel, with a line from Efferding to the country of Salsburg; in Poland, New Galicia, with the circle of Zamosc for the grand duchy, and the circles of Solkiew and Zloczow for Russia. The secret articles contained an engagement not to raise the Austrian army above 150 thousand men until the maritime peace, and to pay 85 million francs, in discharge of what the Austrian provinces owed; 30 millions of which were to be paid down on the day of the evacuation of Vienna. Only six days were allowed for the ratification.

This double treaty having been signed, Napoleon, in great delight, dismissed MM. de Bubna and Lichtenstein with marks of high favour, and immediately had the act announced by cannon. It was a clever ruse, for the people of Vienna, who wished the war ended, being thus put in possession of the peace they so ardently desired, it would no longer be possible to deprive them of it by a refusal to ratify. Napoleon intended to follow it up with another ruse, still more subtle and hard to

parry, which was to set out himself for Paris, leaving Berthier to manage the details incident to the evacuation of the conquered countries. He immediately issued, with his usual activity, the orders rendered necessary by the peace he had signed. He ordered marshal Marmont to go and establish himself at Laybach, in Carniola, prince Eugene to go back to Friuli with the army of Italy, marshal Massena to move from Znaïm to Krems, marshal Oudinot to quit Vienna for St. Polten, and marshal Davout to quit Brünn for Vienna. The latter was to form the rear-guard of the army with his magnificent corps, the cuirassiers and the artillery, whilst the imperial guard was to head the advance. A part of the artillery horses was to be sent to graze in Carniola, another was to accompany marshal Davout into the provinces of northern Germany, another was to go to Spain. It was settled that the evacuation should begin on the day of ratification, and should be continued *pari passu* with the liquidation of the war contribution.

Full of the idea of bringing matters forthwith to an end in Spain by sending thither a considerable mass of forces, without, however, withdrawing anything from the organised corps which had executed the campaign in Austria, Napoleon turned towards the Pyrenees all the forces that were on their march to the Danube. General Junot's corps, with the addition of the troops in Swabia and the garrisons in Prussia, might amount to about 30 thousand foot, and with the provisional dragoons, the marching regiments of hussars and chasseurs, and the artillery, to about 40 thousand men of all arms. The army of the north, when marshal Bessières should have retaken Walcheren, would comprise 15 thousand soldiers of the line, without reckoning the national guards. The dépôts of the centre, Bretagne and the Pyrenees, contained 30 thousand fully trained conscripts. Eight new regiments of the guards (four of conscripts, four of tirailleurs), represented nearly 10 thousand young soldiers eager to distinguish themselves. Lastly, the Rouyer division composed of the contingents of the German petty princes, which Napoleon proposed to send into Spain, would give 5 thousand. All these corps together made not less than 100 thousand men, at whose head, after having despatched his affairs in Paris, Napoleon proposed to enter Spain towards the close of winter. So intent was he on bringing his continual wars to a close, that he gave orders for immediately directing to Spain the forces we have enumerated, so that on his arrival at Paris, the movement which would take a long time to execute should have already begun. He urged marshal Bessières to make haste and retake Walcheren with the 15 or 20 thousand troops of the line and the 30 thousand national guards under his command. There had been levied 65 thousand of these national guards, which had caused extreme confusion in

the northern provinces, and occasioned considerable expense. Under pretext of guarding the coasts of the Mediterranean, M. Fouché went so far as to put all the departments of the south in motion. At the same time several retired officers of the revolution had been called out, some of whom had been dismissed from service for incapacity, others for bad spirit. M. Fouché had not been sorry thus to flatter a certain number of them, and the minister Clarke, for want of better, had not been able to dispense with their services. Napoleon, who was prompt to conceive suspicion, strongly blamed M. Fouché for thus throwing France into commotion for a danger very remote for the present moment, and from the provinces he disturbed by his unseasonable appeals. He said it was all very well to levy 30 or 40 thousand men in the provinces of the north near the point where the English made their descent, and immediately after that event, but to call for as many as 200 thousand men in Provence and in Piedmont, three months after the date of the expedition, *was madness*. He even hinted that he saw in it something else than want of prudence and good sense. He ordered the discharge of the national guard of Paris, composed of young men who had the presumption to suppose that they were not to serve in the ordinary way, but were to guard the emperor's person; and he desired they should be told that to enjoy that honour it was necessary to be able to show four quarters of nobility, that is to say, four wounds received in four great battles, and that he did not want men who disliked danger but were fond of fine uniforms. He desired that most of the officers who had been called out from retirement should be sent home again, and that fit persons should be sought for amongst the majors of regiments, who were all officers of merit. Lastly, having expressed in severe terms his displeasure at the agitation so rashly produced, he gave instructions that before his return everything should return to its ordinary footing, and that a reflux of the disposable forces should take place from all parts towards Spain.

Having thus arranged everything in twenty-four hours, he made ready for departure without awaiting the reply from Dotis, in order that he might render a refusal to ratify impossible, for it was not likely they would dare to run after him and tell him they refused the peace. An incident which occurred shortly before his departure caused a great sensation among those about him. On the morning of the 12th he was holding one of his grand reviews at Schönbrunn, in which figured the finest troops in Europe, and which were flocked to with as much curiosity at Vienna, Berlin, Warsaw, and Madrid, as at Paris. There was an immense crowd of spectators from the capital, all eager to see their victor, whom they admired though they detested him. Besides peace was announced as certain, and a sort of joy was

beginning to succeed the just grief of the Austrian nation. Napoleon was quietly watching his troops defile past him with a smile on his lips, when a young man, dressed in a frock-coat, somewhat like a military undress, presented himself and said he had a petition to deliver to the Emperor of the French. He was repulsed, but returned again and again with an obstinacy which was observed by prince Berthier and the aide-de-camp Rapp, and struck them so much as to induce them to give him in charge to the gendarmes. The officer of that body having felt something hard under the young man's coat when he laid hold of him, searched him and found a very sharp knife, manifestly secreted for a criminal purpose. With the quiet determination of a fanatic the young man declared that in placing himself thus armed in the way of the emperor Napoleon his intention had been to stab him. The affair was made known to Napoleon who sent for the prisoner after the review and interrogated him in presence of Corvisart, whom he had sent for to Schönbrunn, because he was fond of conversing with that celebrated physician, and wished to consult him as to his health, though it was in general good.

The prisoner, who had a mild and rather handsome countenance, and whose bright eye bespoke a mind preternaturally exalted, was the son of a Protestant clergyman of Erfurth, and was named Staaps. He had run away with some money from his parents, giving them vaguely to understand that he cherished some grand design. He was going, he said, to deliver Europe from the conqueror who tormented her, and to emancipate his country. It was a divine mission he declared he had received, and for which he was resolved to sacrifice his life. He had no accomplice, but had brooded in solitary intoxication of mind over his criminal folly. Napoleon having questioned him mildly as to what had brought him to Schönbrunn, he confessed he had come to strike him a mortal blow. When Napoleon asked him why, he replied that it was to free the world from his inauspicious genius, and particularly Germany, which he was trampling under foot. "But this time at least," remarked Napoleon, "to be just, you ought to have struck at the emperor of Austria not at me, for he it was who declared war on me." Staaps proved by his replies that he was not aware of this, and that yielding to the universal feeling he attributed to the emperor of the French alone all the woes of Europe. Looking on the young man with good-natured pity, Napoleon had him examined by his physician Corvisart, who declared that he was not ill, for he had a quiet pulse and all the signs of health. Napoleon then asked Staaps if he would renounce his criminal design in case he should pardon him? "Yes," he replied, "if you will give peace to my country; no, if you will not." However, on being taken to

prison, the assassin appeared astonished at the mildness and benevolent loftiness of him he had intended to smite, and had to summon all his fierce patriotism to his aid to avoid feeling regret. He prepared himself for death by praying and writing to his parents.

Napoleon appeared little moved by this incident, and affected to say that it was difficult to assassinate a man like him. Besides the difficulty of gaining access to him, he counted on the prestige of his glory, and on his fortune, to which he had so often trusted his life with heroic carelessness. One reflection, however, haunted his mind, namely, that it was no longer the French revolution, but himself—himself alone—that was becoming the object of universal hatred, as the sole author of the woes of the age, as the cause of the incessant and terrible agitation of the world. Why did he not draw from the lips of that fanatic a deep and lasting lesson instead of a passing impression—partly of pity for his intended murderer, partly of sadness for himself! A violent feeling was manifestly growing up against him, for the police took note of many an expression indicative of murderous thoughts; they even received the depositions of a soldier to whom proposals had been made, in the island of Lobau, that he should kill the Emperor.

Napoleon began to feel his moral isolation, and promised himself that he would think of it; but he ordered that no noise should be made about this occurrence, and he had even thought for a while of pardoning the culprit. Reflecting, however, that it was necessary to strike terror into the young German fanatics, he delivered Staaps over to a military commission, and set out on the night of the 15th of October, leaving orders to make known to him at Passau, by means of signals, what was the determination come to at Dotis. A series of flag-staffs was erected along the Danube from Vienna to Strasburg. A white flag was to be the signal that peace had been ratified; its rejection was to be indicated by a red flag; and in that case he would return forthwith, and resume hostilities. If, on the other hand, peace was ratified, the evacuation was to take place without delay. As the troops withdrew, they were to blow up the fortifications of Vienna, Brunn, Raab, Grätz, and Klagenfurth; a rude way of bidding adieu to the Austrians, but one conformable to the rights of war.

Whilst Napoleon was rapidly travelling up the valley of the Danube, through the columns of his guard, which were already on the march to Strasburg, and which hailed him with their acclamations, the court of Dotis had received, with a sort of despair, the treaty concluded at Vienna. Vainly did MM. de Lichtenstein and de Bubna plead how impossible they had found it to obtain better terms, and the certainty they had acquired

that hostilities would be immediately resumed if they did not give way. They were assailed with harsh and violent reproaches. The diplomatists, so often laughed at by the military men for their slowness, revenged themselves by accusing the latter of having been duped. M. de Lichtenstein, in spite of the glory with which he had covered himself in the last campaign, and M. de Bubna, in spite of the favour he enjoyed, were in a manner disgraced and were sent back to the army. The treaty, however, which was so much abused, was accepted, in order not to have war with Napoleon, and not to snatch from the good people of Austria a peace of which Napoleon had put them in possession by an anticipated publication. A new negotiator, M. de Urbna, grand chamberlain to the emperor, was appointed to be the bearer of the ratifications, and to ask for some changes in the amount and times of payment of the war contribution. His remonstrances, listened to with politeness, but referred to the emperor, were followed by the immediate exchange of the ratifications, which took place on the morning of the 20th of October. Thereupon prince Berthier, who waited only for that signal to commence the evacuation, ordered marshal Oudinot to put himself in motion, and follow the imperial guard along the road to Strasburg; marshal Davout to move from Brünn to Vienna; marshal Massena to move from Znaïm to Krems; marshal Marmont, who was encamped at Krems, to take the St. Polten and Lillienfeld route to Laybach; and prince Eugene to take that to Italy by Cedenburg and Leoben. At the same time he gave orders for springing the mines made under the ramparts of the capital; and whilst the Viennese were watching the departure of our troops, with looks no longer indicative of anger, repeated explosions told them of the destruction of their walls. They were keenly affected, and, perhaps, they might have been spared that last affliction; for as a measure of precaution the act was one of very doubtful utility.

Napoleon had gone first to Passau to give orders for the works, by means of which he intended to make that town a great fortress of the Confederation. The signals having informed him that nothing new had occurred, he proceeded to Munich, where he waited in the family of prince Eugene for the despatches which were to determine his return to Paris or to Vienna. A courier having at last brought him news of the ratifications, he bade adieu to his allies, who had once more been aggrandised by his protection, and set out for France, where an accumulation of weighty affairs demanded his attention.

The most serious and distressing in the list was the affair of Rome, the sad vicissitudes of which it is time we should make known. The reader doubtless remembers that when Napoleon resolved to break with the house of Spain and with the pope, in pursuance of his desire to destroy the old order of things in

Europe, he seized the Legations, attached them to the kingdom of Italy under the title of Departments, and caused Rome to be occupied by general Miollis. To justify that occupation, he alleged the necessity of connecting his armies of north and south Italy by the centre of the Peninsula, and also that of protecting himself against the hostile intrigues of which Rome was constantly the theatre. From that day the state of things became intolerable. The pope having quitted the Vatican for the Quirinal, shut himself up in the latter as in a fortress, and gave occasion there to scenes as deplorable for the oppressing as for the oppressed power. General Miollis, condemned to a most uncongenial office (for that intrepid soldier was a man of highly cultivated mind), strove in vain to mitigate the harshness of his duty. Pius VII., indignant in the highest degree as a pontiff at the violence exercised against the Church, and mortified as a prince by the ingratitude of Napoleon, whom he had gone to Paris to crown, could no longer restrain the feelings that wrought within him, and which, without diminishing the affectionate and religious interest he deserved, made him lose some portion of his dignity. When general Miollis proposed to visit him on New Year's day, at the head of his staff, he refused to see him. The cardinals on their part declined, on the plea of illness, the invitations sent them by the general, and the latter affected to send and inquire after their health. The pope no longer having the Roman exchequer at his command, and being resolved to solicit nothing, pledged the beautiful tiara which Napoleon had presented to him on his coronation. The relations subsisting between powers so dissimilarly great were already difficult enough without this ignoble complication. It was impossible but that such offensive proceedings should soon lead to acts of violence. As it had been ascertained that the pope was addressing protests to foreign courts his couriers were arrested, a fact which sufficiently proves the truth formerly so well understood by the First Consul, that to be independent the pope ought to be sovereign of the territory in which he resided. Pius VII. then gave it out that he was a prisoner, and would not correspond with any one, least of all with the French government.

The Roman troops, adroitly flattered by general Miollis, who had persuaded them that by becoming incorporated with the French troops they would cease to bear the old nickname of *soldiers of the pope*, had consented to this incorporation. The pope wishing to punish them by denationalising them, changed the uniform and the cockade of the Roman troops, and bestowed the new cockade only on the troops that remained faithful to him, that is to say, on the noble guard, and the Swiss guard that occupied his palace. Ere long the young men of family, who formed the noble guard, irritated at the treatment received by

their sovereign, braved the French with an arrogance which in their position was courageous and meritorious. The French general, in his turn giving way to a feeling of offended pride, broke open the doors of the Quirinal, and disarmed the noble guard in the pope's own palace. After such an outrage as this there was no act of violence which might not be expected. After the loss of cardinal Consalvi, Pius VII. had successively taken for secretaries of state cardinal Gabrielli and cardinal Pacca. The French attempted to arrest the latter in the Quirinal, but the pope displaying on this occasion all the majesty of his age and his supreme dignity, appeared in his pontifical vestments to protect his secretary, whom the French durst not seize in his presence. From that time he made him sleep in a chamber next his own and he lived in the midst of some faithful domestics, who kept watch by turns day and night at all the issues of the palace, the doors and windows of which were constantly barred.

Napoleon thus drawn into an obstinate conflict with the old European order of things, a conflict of which the deplorable catastrophe of Vincennes was the first act, the spoliation of Bayonne the second, the captivity of Pius the third, and not the least unhappy, forgot with regard to the pontiff all the respect due to his rank, his age, and his virtues, all the gratitude he owed him for his conduct, and the forbearance with which it became him to treat a power he had re-established, and which he could not overthrow without the most deplorable inconsistency. What occasion for ridicule did he afford, great as he was, to the few philosophers left in Paris, the associates of MM. Sieyès, Cabanis, and de Tracy, who had so much condemned the concordat! Rather, indeed, than come to such scenes as those witnessed in the Quirinal they were unquestionably right in desiring that the two powers, instead of entering into reciprocal relations, and signing treaties, should forget each other altogether, and live on the footing of total strangers!

But Napoleon, blinded by passion, forgetting that after having made himself at Vincennes the rival of the regicides, after having made himself at Bayonne the equal of those who declared war against Europe to establish in it the universal republic, he made himself in the Quirinal the equal at least of those who had dethroned Pius VI. to create the Roman republic, forgetting that he had heaped contempt on all those parties, and that he had obtained the crown by affecting not to resemble them,—Napoleon soon put the climax to his monstrous proceedings by resolving to dethrone Pius VII., and take from him the sceptre, leaving him the tiara. That those who devised the civil constitution of the clergy, and created the Roman republic, should act thus, was quite natural, and admitted of the most honourable justification, since they acted upon their convictions. But the author of the

concordat to act thus ! It was on his part a proof of self-forgetfulness, most painful to the admirers of his rare genius, alarming to those who thought of the future of France, impossible ever to be explained except by drawing from it the lesson so often repeated in history, that the greatest man is but a child when passion seizes hold of him.

“ *There must be an end to this comedy,*” said Napoleon in one of his letters, and indeed it could not be endured any longer. To kill the pontiff, of which Napoleon’s noble heart was assuredly incapable, would have been better than to leave him to fret and degrade himself in the Quirinal. Napoleon resolved, therefore, to suppress the temporal power of the pope, and he waited to pronounce that sentence until he no longer needed to put himself under any restraint as regarded Austria. On the 17th of May, after the battles of Ratisbon and Ebersberg, and the entry into Vienna, he decreed at Schönbrunn the suppression of the pope’s temporal power, and declared the states of the holy see united to the empire. He nominated, for the administration of those states *consulta* composed of Roman princes and citizens, proclaimed the abolition of entails, of the inquisition, of convents, and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, and applied to the Roman state all the principles of 1789. He left Pius VII. the palaces in Rome, a civil list of 2 millions of francs, and all the pontifical paraphernalia, saying that the popes had no need of temporal power to exercise their spiritual mission,—that that mission had even suffered from their two-fold character of pontiffs and sovereigns, that he would change nothing in the Church, its dogmas or its rites, he would leave it wealthy and respected, only as Charlemagne’s successor he withdrew the endowment of a temporal kingdom, which that emperor had bestowed on the holy see. All this was said in language imperious, lofty, specious, but very strange in the mouth of the sometime First Consul !

The decree was published at Rome on the 11th of June by sound of trumpet amidst a population divided in sentiment; the lower classes and clergy, indignant at the violence done to their pontiff; the middle classes, though much disposed to do without the ecclesiastical government, looking very suspiciously on what came from the man who had put down the French revolution. The pope waited only for this last act to have recourse to the only arms that remained in his hands, those of excommunication. Many a time he had thought of employing them; but the fear of showing how blunted were weapons formerly so potent, or if they proved of some efficiency against a sovereign of new origin, the fear of driving him to the worst extremities had made the counsellors of the holy see hesitate as to that course. They agreed, however, that it should be adopted if the suppression of the temporal power was decreed; in anticipation of which event

the bulls were all drawn up beforehand, transcribed by the pope's own hand, and signed. They pronounced sentence of excommunication not against Napoleon by name, but against all the authors and accomplices of the acts of violence and spoliation done against the holy see and the patrimony of St. Peter. No sooner had the publication of the 17th of May taken place, than some bold and faithful hands posted up in St. Peter's, and in most of the churches of Rome, the bull of excommunication that dared to strike Napoleon on his throne, and which, not having in its support the force of the religious sentiment which had long been on its decline, yet found one in the just feelings of mankind, which revolted against the acts of violence and ingratitude committed by the warrior upon the pontiff who had crowned him.

The French police took down those audacious placards, but the bull, being passed from hand to hand, could not fail soon to reach the extremities of Europe. These two acts, one of which corresponded to the other, would naturally exasperate to the last degree the two powers personified in the French general and the Roman pontiff, and it was impossible they should continue to confront each other without coming to physical violence. Napoleon corresponded for the affairs of Rome with general Miollis, and with his brother-in-law Murat, who, as king of Naples, was commander-in-chief of the army of occupation. Foreseeing what might happen, he wrote to the latter on the 17th and 19th of June that if the decree of the 17th of May encountered any resistance, the pope was to be treated precisely as he would deal with the archbishop of Paris, and that, if necessary, cardinal Pacca and Pius VII. were to be arrested. These instructions, which he afterwards regretted having given, reached Rome through Murat at the moment when the greatest uneasiness prevailed there. There was an English fleet in sight of Civita Vecchia; but the importance of this fact was exaggerated, for it was only a demonstration of the British forces stationed in Sicily. The people of Rome were in great agitation. The abolition of the ecclesiastical government, and the substitution of a provisional civil authority, caused general confusion. Every moment it was said that the tocsin would ring, and at that summons the Trasteverini would fall upon the French, who were but 3 or 4 thousand, Murat having moved all his forces to the coast to watch the British fleet. It was expected that this would happen on St. Peter's day, the 29th of June, when, it was asserted Pius VII. would issue forth from the Quirinal in pontifical robes, himself pronounce the excommunication, release all the subjects of the empire from their oath of allegiance, and give the signal for a general insurrection in Italy.

There was then at the head of the French police in Rome an

officer of gendarmerie, colonel Radet, a very cunning, bold man, just the person to execute a *coup de main*. Being quartered in the Rospigliosi palace, near the Quirinal, he had filled the pope's palace with spies, and placed trusty hands near the belfry of the Quirinal to seize the bell that was to ring the tocsin. Though the rumours we have mentioned were not realised, they excited the imagination of the French authorities, and impressed them with the belief that there remained no safety in Rome so long as they tolerated the presence there of the pope and his minister, cardinal Pacca, who was reputed to be the chief agent of the extreme ecclesiastical party. To arrest cardinal Pacca without the pope, from whom he remained inseparable, was impossible and insufficient, and it seemed absolutely necessary to arrest both. The French authorities, however, were loth to perpetrate this act of violence, the worthy consequence of that of Bayonne, when the letters so imprudently written by Napoleon to Murat, and communicated by the latter to general Miollis, removed all scruples. Nevertheless, general Miollis still hesitated, but as colonel Radet insisted that Rome could no longer be governed unless they made a display of vigour, it was resolved to arrest the pope, with suitable precautions, and transport him to Tuscany, where a decision should be come to as to what was to be done with that sacred personage, so very embarrassing at Rome, but destined to be embarrassing everywhere, because everywhere he would be the living evidence of an odious and useless violence.

Preliminaries having been arranged, and the gendarmerie echeloned along the road from Rome to Florence, colonel Radet assailed the Quirinal on the 6th of July at 3 o'clock in the morning, the very time when our army was deploying to fight the battle of Wagram. The doors being fast, the garden walls were scaled with ladders, the palace was entered through the windows, and the intruders arrived at the apartments of the pope, who, on being informed of the assault, had hurriedly clad himself in his pontifical costume. Cardinal Pacca was beside him with some ecclesiastical and civil members of his household. The pontiff was indignant. His eyes, naturally quick but mild in their expression, shot fire. Seeing colonel Radet at the head of our soldiers, so odiously travestied into vanquishers of a defenceless old man, the pope asked him what brought him there by such an entrance. Colonel Radet stammered out an excuse, alleging the orders he was bound to obey, and said he was directed to take him out of Rome. Pius VII., feeling that all resistance would be useless, asked that he might be accompanied by cardinal Pacca and some of his household; this was granted on condition that he should set out forthwith, and that the persons he wished to have in his retinue should not join him

until after the lapse of some hours. The pontiff having resigned himself to these conditions, he was put into a carriage, colonel Radet mounted the front seat, and they passed through Rome and the first stages without being recognised. They travelled post, without stopping, as far as Radicofani. There, the pope being fatigued, and his retinue not having arrived, he refused to go any further; besides, he had rather a sharp attack of fever, and it was impossible not to grant him a little rest. After a delay of one day the journey was resumed; they drove through Sienna, through the midst of a kneeling but passive population, and arrived at 8 o'clock in the evening at the Carthusian monastery of Florence.

The grand duchess Eliza, Napoleon's eldest sister, who took intelligent pains to govern well her beautiful duchy of Tuscany, and had some difficulty in curbing her subjects, who, like others, were tending to disown the ascendancy of Napoleon, was dismayed at the thought of having such a prisoner to keep, and feared that the mere suspicion of her being an accomplice in such an act of violence would quite alienate the affections of her people. She resolved, therefore, not to have the pope in Florence. The promptness of the abduction having outstripped all the orders that might have been expected under such circumstances from Schönbrunn, everybody was free to shift the burden from his own shoulders to his neighbour's. The grand duchess, consequently, ordered that the pope should be taken to Alesandria, where he would be in a fortress under the charge of prince Borghese. He set out on the 9th for Genoa, under the escort of an Italian officer of gendarmerie, of gentle deportment, likely to be agreeable to Pius VII. The grand duchess gave her best carriage for the use of the august traveller, sent her own physician with him, and supplied all the comforts likely to render the journey less fatiguing. The noble old man, grieving at his removal from Italy, irritated by fatigue, and distressed at meeting new faces, passionately refused for a moment to acquiesce in what was required of him, but was forced, nevertheless, to depart for Genoa. By and by he grew calmer, on seeing the deference with which he was treated, and especially on perceiving on their knees around him the people of the country, who were allowed to approach his carriage. There was no great risk in allowing them to do so; for, though hatred was beginning to supplant affection throughout the empire, fear still remained entire; and, while all condoled with the pope, no man would have dared to brave the imperial authority for his deliverance. On arriving, however, near Genoa, it became known that the people had turned out to salute the pope. He was, therefore, put on board a custom-house boat, at some distance from the

town, and taken by sea to San Pietro di Arena, whence he was transferred to Alessandria.

Prince Borghese, governor-general of Piedmont, alarmed in his turn at having such a prisoner to keep, and having no orders, sent the pope on to Grenoble, where he arrived on the 21st with cardinal Pacca, who, after a temporary separation, had joined him again at Alessandria.

At Grenoble the pope was lodged in the bishop's palace, treated with all respect, but kept prisoner.

When the Emperor learned at Schönbrunn the inconsiderate use that had been made of his letters, he blamed the arrest of the pope, and greatly regretted that such an act of violence had been committed. But being as unwilling to have him in France as prince Borghese had been to have him at Alessandria, and the grand duchess Eliza at Florence, and not being aware that the pope was already at Grenoble, he named Savona, on the gulf of Genoa, where there was a good citadel, and a tolerably large house, suitable for the reception of the pope. On receipt of this letter, the minister of police sent off Pius VII. from Grenoble to Savona, a movement which Napoleon likewise blamed when he was informed of it; fearing that these repeated removals from place to place would seem a series of indecent vexations practised upon an august old man, whom he still loved whilst oppressing him, and by whom he was loved in spite of that oppression. He ordered that M. de Salmatoris, one of his chamberlains, should be sent from Paris with a troop of domestics and a considerable quantity of furniture, so as to provide a becoming establishment for the pope. He ordered that he should be allowed to do what he pleased, perform all the ceremonies of religion, and receive the homages of the numerous populations that would flock to see him. At the same time he gave directions for the removal to Paris of the cardinals, the generals of the several religious orders, the members of the Roman chancery, the members of the courts of the Dataria and Penitenza, and, lastly, the pontifical archives; for he was meditating the design of placing the sovereign pontiff by the side of the head of the new empire of the west, and thus establishing at Paris the centre of all temporal and spiritual authority—a singular indication of the degree to which his powerful judgment had already become distorted.

Such were the events of all kinds which took place during the short Austrian campaign, and every reader may easily imagine the effect they must have produced on men's minds. That effect had been great and rapid. For a year past, since the beginning of the Spanish business, discontent had continued to grow and feed upon the conviction universally entertained that

all might have ended after Tilsit, and peace have prevailed on the continent at least, but for the imprudent act which had overthrown the Spanish Bourbons to put the Bonapartes in their place. Although the court of Vienna had been the first to assume the offensive, everybody referred the Austrian war to the Spanish as its certain and obvious cause. Those incessant wars were looked on with dismay, which perilled France, her greatness, her tranquillity, and her emperor himself; for even while they censured his insatiable ambition, his subjects clung to him as a saviour, and were as much displeased with him for hazarding his own person as for endangering France, as he did every day. Patriotism had almost sunk under the general feeling of weariness, and some of the disaffected, as we have before stated, secretly hawked about translations of the mendacious bulletins issued by archduke Charles. The doubtful battle of Essling gave still more force to these feelings, which rose almost to a rancorous pitch when major Schill took the field, and bands of insurgent Germans appeared in Saxony and Franconia. Wagram extinguished these discontents, but Walcheren revived them; and though the discomfiture of the English again effaced the alarm caused by their landing, one might have remarked the reluctance of the national guards to march and their indiscipline, which was so great that general Lamarque was obliged to have some of them shot. The old officers, who had been called from retirement to active service, had not the less continued to play the part of malcontents in Paris, and had held most objectionable language. Round MM. Fouché, Bernadotte, and Talleyrand had gathered many enemies of the empire, who showed more than usual boldness. The old royalists had begun to bestir themselves in the faubourg St. Germain, and the memory of the Bourbons seemed to be somewhat revived amongst them. They flocked to St. Sulpice to the sermons of a preacher, already celebrated, M. de Frayssinous, with an eagerness which was not owing entirely to religious motives. In those sermons were developed, greatly to their satisfaction, doctrines strongly at variance with those of the decree of the 17th of May, which had suppressed the pope's temporal sovereignty. Their suppression by the police gave occasion to current remarks still more objectionable than the sermons themselves. The clergy were in consternation at the news that, after many scandalous scenes, things had been carried in Rome to the climax of a forcible abduction of the pope. Prayers were offered up for him in the churches; the concordat was laughed at in the *salons*, in which there still lingered some traces of the old philosophical spirit, and everywhere occasion was found for vituperating and depreciating Napoleon as a politician, though the great captain still commanded universal admiration. Reports of his assassination were

even propagated several times, as though the same feelings which prompted some to meditate that crime prompted others to pre-sage it. In short, it was evident that a revolution was already taking place in public opinion, and that the impulse which was arousing Europe against Napoleon was beginning to detach France from him. The late war, however, miraculously brought to a close in four months, the glorious peace by which it was followed, and the continent once more pacified, brought back hope, and with it content admiration, and the desire to see the imperial reign tranquillised, consolidated, and mitigated and perpetuated in an heir; and although, with all her known frivolity, Josephine was loved as an amiable sovereign, who represented goodness and grace by the side of might, the French desired, with regret for her, another marriage, which should give heirs to the empire. Nor did they confine themselves to wishes on this subject; the fact was indiscreetly announced as already resolved on, by persons who declared their pity for the victim of this sacrifice, and were ready, perhaps, to blame the Emperor for consummating it, and to see, according as his choice should fall, in a new union a new act of ambition.

Such was the state of public feeling which Napoleon thoroughly apprehended, but which he did not like to have represented to him in its true colours, preferring to surmise disagreeable things for himself rather than hear them from the lips of others. During the war in Austria, prince Cambacérès had remained silent, that he might not have to utter them; but Napoleon himself called upon his discreet archchancellor to speak out, and the latter told all, with extreme delicacy, but with honest sincerity. Anxious to speak with him above all men, and in the fullest detail, on these important matters, Napoleon ordered him to be at Fontainebleau on the 26th of October, the day he himself expected to arrive there.

On the 26th, Napoleon did reach Fontainebleau, before his household, the empress, his ministers, and everybody. The punctual archchancellor was on the spot at dawn. Napoleon received him with confidence and friendliness, but with a hauteur not usual with him. The more he felt public opinion lapse from him the more loftily he bore himself towards it, even with regard to those who represented it with so much good feeling for him. He complained to the archchancellor of the weakness with which those in Paris had borne the trials of the recent short campaign, the alarms they had so readily conceived on account of a few insignificant efforts made by major Schill and some other German insurgents, and the commotion into which they had been thrown by the expedition to the Scheldt, which was, he said, an effect of his fortunate star; he expressed some scorn for the want of firmness displayed under these various circumstances, and complained espe-

cially that there had been so much hesitation about calling out the national guards when they might have been of use, and so much indiscretion in calling them out when they could only serve to disturb the country. He manifested more than usual distrust with regard to the old republicans and royalists, and appeared even to extend that feeling to his own kindred. He affected to consider the affairs of the clergy as of minor importance, and talked of settling them now that he was returned, in concert with prince Cambacérès. He spoke with great contempt of death, and of the dangers he had run, affecting to believe, and believing really, that for an instrument of Providence like himself there were no balls or poignards to be feared. He then came to the essential matter which most engaged his thoughts—the dissolution of his marriage with the empress Josephine. He loved that old companion of his life, though he was not scrupulously faithful to her, and it wrung his heart to part from her; but as his popularity declined, he liked to suppose that it was not his faults, but the want of a future, which menaced his glorious throne with premature decay. To consolidate what he felt trembling under his feet was his engrossing thought, as if when a new wife had been chosen, obtained, placed in the Tuileries, and had become the mother of a male heir, the faults which had set all the world against him would have been disarmed of their consequences. It was well, no doubt, to have an indisputable heir, but better, a hundred-fold better, would it have been to be prudent and wise! However this may be, Napoleon, who, notwithstanding his want of a son, had been unable after Tilsit, at the zenith of his glory and power, to sacrifice Josephine, now at last resolved to do so, because he felt the empire shaken, and was about to seek in a new marriage the solidity which he ought to have derived from an able and moderate course of conduct.

He spoke then on this grave subject with prince Cambacérès, declared that there was no prince of his family who could succeed him, cast a sad and searching glance upon the defects of that family, and showed that his brothers were incapable of reigning, intensely jealous of each other, and by no means disposed to obey his successor, unless direct descent constrained them to acknowledge in that successor the continuator of the empire. He manifested, however, a marked preference for prince Eugene, praised his services, his modesty, his boundless devotedness, but declared that adoption would not suffice to make him accepted after his own death as the heir to the empire; and he added that being certain of having children with another wife than Josephine, he had resolved to divorce her, but had not mentioned the matter to any one, least of all to her who was to be sacrificed, that such an avowal was most painful to him, that he expected the arrival of prince Eugene,

who was to prepare his mother, and until then he desired the matter to remain a profound secret. Prince Cambacérès learned with keen regret this momentous determination, for, like everybody else, he liked Josephine, and felt clearly that in repudiating her, Napoleon was about to break still more with the tenour of his own early days, days of sound ideas and moderate designs, days in which were comprised all the men of the Revolution, and from the traditions of which he could not separate himself without breaking with those men too. The same prudence which had made Cambacérès condemn the conversion of the consulate into the empire, prompted him to condemn an alliance with any old dynasty, for he was well aware that length of possession was the surest consolidation, and that length of possession depended solely on discreetness of conduct. He made some diffident suggestions founded on the favour Josephine enjoyed in France, the affection borne towards her by the people, and above all by the army, who were accustomed to behold in her the benevolent wife of their general; on the revolutionary souvenirs connected with her, and on the new step he would seem to make towards the *ancien régime* in putting away the widow Beauharnais to wed a daughter of the Habsburgs or the Romanoffs. To all these remarks, offered with such extreme reserve, Napoleon replied in the tone of an absolute master whose towering will had become as it were identified with destiny. He wanted an heir, and that heir obtained, the empire, he asserted, would be established for ever. The first consul's old counsellor, confounded by his master's hauteur, submitted in silence, and was indemnified by an extreme kindness for the inflexibility of the purposes he had endeavoured to bend.* It was settled that silence should be observed until the arrival of prince Eugene.

The unfortunate Josephine did not arrive until the afternoon at Fontainebleau, already alarmed at not having been the first to be received. Napoleon welcomed her with affection, but with the embarrassment caused by the weighty secret he durst not divulge. Without possessing talent, Josephine had exquisite tact, and the penetration which personal interest gives, and she felt as it were struck to death. Hearing on all sides the crowd of flatterers repeating how necessary it was to consolidate the empire, and seeing all things tend to what was called stability, the tears she had so often shed in anticipation of her sad lot

Cambacérès speaks of this conversation as follows: "We were alone for several hours, as the Emperor had desired, in order that he might have leisure to talk with me on several matters. . . . During the interview Napoleon appeared to me preoccupied with his own greatness; he had an air *as though he were stalking about amidst his glory*. There was a haughtiness in what he said that made me fear I should no longer prevail on him to use any of those delicate artifices that he himself had owned to be necessary towards ruling a free people, or one that wishes to appear such."

began to flow afresh. Her daughter, the queen of Holland, rendered unhappy by her husband's sombre jealousy, and separated from him, had come to comfort her mother, and finding her so woe-begone, had at last come almost to wish, for her sake, that this dreadful secret, whatever it was, should be divulged. Fontainebleau was thronged with courtiers, who, the more they had been alarmed by the events in Spain, the more they affected to proclaim the invincibility of him they had thought so near being vanquished. To hear them talk, one would have supposed that nobody had feared, nobody had doubted, nobody had been uneasy. The English had been blunderers—the Austrians madly presumptuous. The Spaniards were sure to be put down. Of the pope, and the useless and odious violence he had suffered, not a word. Napoleon did not choose the affair to be talked of, so no one said anything about it, that it might be, as he commanded, a thing of no consequence—an affair of priests, not worth the serious attention of the nineteenth century. And then every conversation on public affairs ended with a whispered remark on the misfortune of seeing the throne occupied by a very engaging but barren female sovereign. No one could presume to fathom the thoughts of the omnipotent Emperor, but it was not possible he should not think of completing the edifice he had raised by giving an heir to the empire. All the thrones of Europe would be eager to offer the mother of that future master of the West, and when the child was born the empire would be eternal. In short, whilst Paris was beginning to talk and object, though still admiring, at Fontainebleau, people were silent, unless it was to say in servile, low, insipid language, what they had descried in the imperious looks of Napoleon.

His whole family had asked leave to come and expiate, some their failings or their partial disobedience, others certain sayings and doings of which they had been the involuntary cause. Jerome, king of Westphalia, had mismanaged the few military movements he had been required to execute; he had expended too much on his pleasure and not enough on his army. Louis, king of Holland, not to indulge his own taste for luxury, but to gratify the parsimonious spirit of the Dutch, had not maintained troops enough, and he had favoured, or at least not put down, the contraband trade with England. Murat, removed from the army to reign in Naples, where he strove to flatter all classes of his subjects, had, probably without knowing it, given occasion for remarks which were transmitted by the police to Schönbrunn. People said, that in anticipation of a catastrophe on the Danube, fatal to Napoleon's life or fortunes, MM. Fouché and Talleyrand had turned their eyes on Murat, and arranged to have relays ready on the road from Italy, which were to bring him from Naples to Paris. After all, it was not so much to his own ambi-

tion as his wife's that these reports had reference. Napoleon received Jerome indulgently, though the sacrifice of business to pleasure was in his eyes the worst of all faults. But he could pardon a great deal in consideration of his brother's affection, and he allowed him to hope for an advantageous arrangement respecting Hanover. He was more severe with Louis, whom he esteemed, but whose sombre independence and extreme obsequiousness to the wishes of the Dutch were becoming an actual defection as regarded the policy of France. He gave the king of Holland reason to apprehend the most unfavourable resolutions relative to his territories. As for Murat, whom he had not seen for a long time, and whose name, present to the minds of all intriguers, offended him at times, he signified his displeasure not so much against him as his wife, whose restless mind presaged many a capital fault. Though friendly as ever towards his kinsfolk, he affected in a greater degree towards them the bearing of a master. As he advanced in life, he saw deeper in them, as in all around him, to the bottom of human affections; and in approaching, as he sometimes foreboded, the term of his greatness, he seemed to have conceived towards all the world some hidden bitterness, which the fortunate and prompt termination of the war in Austria had not been sufficient to remove, and which manifested itself by an expression of more absolute authority.

Napoleon's family were not the only comers. The kings, his allies, having all some interest to discuss or thanks to offer, had begged permission to visit him: these were the king of Saxony, the king and queen of Bavaria, and the king of Wurtemberg. The Emperor replied most courteously to their requests, and everything announced for the end of autumn the most brilliant assemblage of crowned heads in Paris. Meanwhile a series of magnificent fêtes took place at Fontainebleau. Theatrical performances, balls, and hunting parties followed one another without intermission. Hunting the stag seemed to be Napoleon's favourite pastime. He spent whole hours on horseback, and had the fact stated in the public journals, because, during the last campaign, rumour had questioned the stability of his health as well as his fortunes. The circumstance that he kept Corvisart, the physician, with him, as much to enjoy his conversation in his leisure moments at Schönbrunn, as to consult him about some obscure pains, the forerunners of the disease of which he died twelve years afterwards, had given occasion to much idle talk about his health. To refute such rumours, he galloped from morning till night, boasting of his strength, which was still great, and wishing that it should be believed. His personal appearance had undergone a great change at that time. His face, which had been dark and thin, had grown open and full without becoming less handsome. From being taciturn he had become an abundant talker, always

listened to with rapt attention by some, with cringing docility by others. Formerly abrupt and dry, he had become impetuous, voluble, sometimes stern, though always calm in danger and kind when he saw others suffer. In short, his mighty nature had completely bloomed, and it was now about to fade, like his fortunes, for nothing is stationary. Amidst the ladies who eagerly thronged his court, he had particularly distinguished one or two, and he took no pains to conceal his inclinations, in spite of the fits of jealousy of the empress Josephine, whose feelings in that respect he mortified, as if he wished to prepare her to renounce him, or himself to draw from domestic disagreements the courage to break from her which he had not. Such was his life on his return from the war in Austria; and its lustre was not less than after Tilsit, for it seemed that every one sought by boundless obsequiousness to make him forget the doubts for a moment entertained as to his prosperity.

Always attentive to business, however, in the midst of pleasures, he issued orders from Fontainebleau upon a great number of matters. He accelerated the organisation, mustering, and movement of the corps destined for Spain, which consisted as we have seen of that of general Junot, dispersed from Augsburg to Dresden, that of marshal Bessières employed on the recovery of Walcheren, the reserves prepared in the centre and west of the empire, the provisional dragoons, and the young regiments of the guard. The English having at last withdrawn entirely from the mouth of the Scheldt, after blowing up the docks and works at Flushing, Napoleon gave the troops of the line of that corps the route for Spain, and dissolved the national guards, except some battalions composed of the small number of men who had taken a liking for the service. He had caused the evacuation of Austria to be continued step by step as the payments were made, and directed marshal Oudinot's corps to Mayence, marshal Massena's to Flanders, and marshal Davout's to those parts of Germany which still remained to France, such as Salzburg, Bayreuth, and Hanover. He dissolved marshal Oudinot's corps, consisting of fourth battalions (excepting the old St. Hilaire division), and sent those battalions to their several regiments. He reinforced the fine divisions of Massena's corps, to which he entrusted the coasts of the continent from Brest to Hamburg. Marshal Davout's corps he reunited with the cavalry, and proposed to make it live in Hanover, either at the expense of that country, or at that of king Jerome, if he gave Hanover to him. He directed marshal Marmont's corps to the camp at Laybach, to be quartered on Carniola. Thus he sought the best contrivances not to diminish his forces, and at the same time to render them less costly, for the Austrian war had not brought him in what he expected (it had produced about 150 millions), and the Walcheren expedition had

cost him much money for the equipment of the national guards. Finance was then the object of Napoleon's most anxious care, and the cause of most of his determinations. Wishing to bring the affairs of the continent to a close, he treated with Bavaria for the pacification of the Tyrol, the partition of the territories of Salzburg, Bayreuth, &c.; with Westphalia for the cession of Hanover; with Saxony for the gift of Galicia. Of some he demanded dotations for his generals; of others, means to maintain his armies; of all, a definitive arrangement which should put an end to the extraordinary military occupations, and at last confer upon the continent an aspect of peace and stability. There was no difficulty in the way of any of these arrangements, for Napoleon was giving away territories, and might, therefore, name what conditions he pleased. The recipients could not fail in any case to be satisfied.

Napoleon had no serious difficulty except with his brother Louis. He was incensed to the last degree at the facilities afforded by the latter to the contraband trade, as a punishment for which he required from him the territory comprised between the Scheldt and the Rhine from Antwerp to Breda, hoping to guard himself better against smuggling when he should have that line, and threatening even to take all Holland if the abuses he complained of were continued. He organised the extraordinary domain, directed by M. Defermon and formed with the army treasury, and the properties of all kinds he had reserved in various countries, in order that the fortunes of his servants might rest on durable bases. Lastly, Napoleon gave his attention to the Church, and thought of a new establishment which would place its head in the position of the patriarchs of Constantinople with regard to the emperors of the East. He had caused the pope to be very well treated, and to be surrounded with all the state of a sovereign. Pius, who had recovered his usual serenity after a few days' anger, but persisted in his resistance, remarked that mere necessities were enough for him, and that pomp would be unbecoming in his new situation; sovereign he was no longer, and as a prisoner, it would be mockery to surround him with magnificence; a moderate entertainment, such as was afforded to prisoners who were respected, would be enough for himself and his servants.

These objections were not attended to, and the pope's establishment continued to be princely. As for the affairs of the Church, Pius refused to meddle with any of them so long as he was kept without a council of cardinals and a secretary of state of his own choosing. He was equally obdurate as to the institution of bishops, always a matter of great urgency. Previously, and even subsequently to the entry of general Miollis into Rome, Pius VII. had consented to institute the bishops nominated by

the imperial government, on condition of the omission of a formality merely implying deference for the Emperor. Thus he had granted the bull which institutes the bishop accepted by the Church, that which is addressed to the clergy, and that which is addressed to the faithful of the diocese; but he had refused that which is addressed to the temporal sovereign in whose dominions the new prelate is to exercise his functions. Napoleon proposed that things should remain on that footing for the future; but the pope had even refused that compromise since his captivity at Savona. Dispensations and all ordinary acts were granted in Rome by cardinal di Pietro, who had been left in the metropolis of the Church to fulfil the functions of the spiritual governor according to the usual custom in the absence of the pope. Napoleon made light of these difficulties, and flattered himself he should remove them when he had Pius VII. near him. His project was to bring him to Fontainebleau, soothe and win upon him, and then make him accept a magnificent establishment at St. Denis, where the sovereign pontificate should be surrounded with as much splendour as at Rome itself. Convinced that with might on one's side one may do everything, Napoleon imagined that after some resistance the pope would yield when he saw that nothing was to be got by holding out; that the cardinals and high dignitaries of the Church, brought after the pope to Paris, and sumptuously treated, would likewise end by preferring an opulent and respected position to persecution; and that the Romans, for whom he destined a court the most brilliant in the world next to his own (what that was we shall see by-and-by), would freely forego a pontificate which subjected them to the government of priests; that the Catholics of France would be flattered at having the pope among them; those of the rest of Europe, reduced to far other sacrifices, would resign themselves to his residence in France, and so there would be an end to those old Catholic habits, of all habits the most deeply rooted, inveterate, and unyielding among the European populations, just as to one of those frontiers which he changed at will by writing a new treaty article with the point of his sword on the day after a victory. He renewed the order for removing to Paris the cardinals sitting in Rome, of whatever nation they were, the generals of orders, Dominicans, Barnabites, Servites, Carmelites, Capuchins, Theatins, &c., and the members of the Dataria and the Penitenza. He further ordered that the precious archives of the Roman court should be sent to Paris in one hundred waggons. The minister of public worship was sent to St. Denis to inspect the buildings, and have them fitted for the reception of a vast establishment. However, as the consciences of the faithful did not accommodate themselves so readily as Napoleon had anticipated to these innovations, and as the clergy, not venturing to

resist openly, had recourse, as an indirect mode of exhaling its discontent, to extraordinary missions, which were flocked to by the royalists of the south and of Brétagne, he absolutely interdicted all missions both within and without the bounds of the empire. "For the service of religion at home," he said, "the ordinary clergy is sufficient. I presume enough upon its lights and its zeal to believe that it has no need of itinerant preachers to help out its deficiencies. As for foreign countries, I have no proselytising zeal. I am content with protecting religion in my own dominions. I have no ambition to propagate it in those of others." Cardinal Fesch having represented that such an interdiction would alarm the faithful more than all besides, Napoleon enjoined him to abstain from all reflections, and to set the first example of obedience, for a mere appearance of resistance would be more severely visited on him than on any one else.

Whilst Napoleon, mingling business with pleasure, the sage resolutions of a grand administration with the illusions of a blind policy, was reposing in the beautiful residence of Fontainebleau from the fatigues and perils of war, the arrival of the allied sovereigns in Paris called him thither to receive them. There were in the capital the king and queen of Bavaria, the king of Saxony, the king of Wurtemberg, and the kings and queens of Holland, Westphalia, and Naples. Napoleon made his entry into Paris on horseback on the 14th of November. He had not appeared there since his departure for the army on the 12th of April. The rejoicings for peace coinciding with an unexampled assembly of sovereigns, Paris enjoyed a brilliant autumn, which was much wanted after a spring and summer which had presented only loneliness and gloom.

But amidst these gaieties Napoleon was maturing the grand resolution which was to be so painful to his heart, so pleasing to his pride, and of so little service to his power,—we mean the divorce, and the marriage by which it was to be followed. the scenes of jealousy which had grown worse in proportion as the unfortunate Josephine began to suspect that something more serious than an infidelity was concealed from her, irritated Napoleon, without giving him the courage to come to a rupture. He tried to do so by becoming colder, more reserved, and sterner. But this state of things was insupportable for him, and he was impatient to put an end to it. He sent off a courier to Milan with orders to prince Eugene to come instantly to Paris, where he detained queen Hortense, in order that Josephine might have her children about her at the trying moment. He sent for the arch-chancellor Cambacérès and M. de Champagny, and communicated to them separately, and to them only, the resolution he had finally adopted, and to the fulfilment of which they were required severally to contribute. He conferred with Cambacérès

about the form of the divorce. He told him that Josephine suspected what was coming, but that he awaited the arrival of prince Eugene to avow all to her: until then he desired the most absolute secrecy, and he would finish the business immediately afterwards. He repeated his reasons for the divorce, and declared his intention to surround the act with forms the most affectionate and the most honourable for Josephine. He would have nothing that could resemble a repudiation; nothing but a mere dissolution of the conjugal tie, founded on mutual consent—a consent itself founded on the interests of the empire. It was arranged that after a family council, in which the two consorts should express their intentions to the arch-chancellor, a *senatus consulte* passed in due form should declare the civil contract dissolved, and should secure a magnificent provision for Josephine. She was to have a palace in Paris, a princely residence in the country, an income of three millions of francs, and the first rank among the princesses after the future empress regnant. He intended to keep her near him as his best and most affectionate friend.

In all these arrangements Napoleon forgot the spiritual tie, the dissolution of which was likewise necessary to the completion of the divorce. He did not seem to attach much importance to it, counting that the secret had been kept by cardinal Fesch and Josephine as to the religious consecration which had been given to their marriage on the eve of their coronation. But cardinal Fesch had talked of it to Cambacérès, and the latter submitted to Napoleon that the foreign courts with which he thought of connecting himself might attach an importance to the religious question which he himself did not attribute to it; consequently, that the spiritual tie ought to be dissolved as well as the civil. Napoleon was very angry with cardinal Fesch. He said that the ceremony performed without witnesses in the chapel of the Tuileries was of no value, that it had taken place solely to quiet the pope's conscience, and that to think of raising up such an obstacle against him at that moment, was a perfidy on the part of his uncle the cardinal. It was settled, however, that as soon as there was no more need of secrecy, the arch-chancellor should get together some bishops, and find out some means of dissolving the spiritual union without having recourse to the pope, from whom nothing was to be expected under existing circumstances.

The next question concerned the princess whom Napoleon would put in Josephine's vacated place on the throne of France, and on this point he made M. de Champagny his sole confidant. It was requisite that the new marriage should not only serve his policy as the founder of an empire by giving him an heir, but should also serve his foreign policy by consolidating his system of alliances. He might choose a consort either from among the lesser courts or the greater, as do the more powerful sovereigns.

In taking their consorts from the great courts, they strengthen themselves by the good-will of the great states, but not for a long while, as experience proves, since great states are necessarily jealous of each other, and family alliances are but truces to their jealousies. In allying themselves with the smaller courts they attach to themselves more firmly the only ones that can be faithful to them, if their interest is fully satisfied, since they have no reason to be jealous. If Napoleon would take his new bride from a secondary court, his choice might naturally and honourably fall on the daughter of the king of Saxony, the German sovereign who was most attached to him, who owed him most, and deserved the most esteem. The princess was of mature age, of a good constitution, and irreproachable character. Everything was easy and sure in that union, though it had no brilliancy.

Among the great courts, Napoleon could only choose between Russia and Austria. Nothing could be nobler, nothing nearer to what is called legitimacy, than an alliance with Austria; and that alliance was possible, for the representatives of the court of Vienna had insinuated in a hundred ways that that court would desire nothing better than to be united with Napoleon. But the ill-will between them was very recent! To embrace and marry so soon after the battles of Essling and Wagram—would not this shock the good sense of both people? Besides (and this was the main consideration), it would be a renunciation of the Russian alliance, which had been the foundation of the policy of the empire since Tilsit. Napoleon had, during the last six months, many causes for coolness towards Alexander, especially in the last war, in which he had been so ill-seconded by him; but he still regarded the Russian as his principal alliance, as that one which, even though it amounted to no more than neutrality, would yet enable him to keep the continent enthralled and England isolated. He wished, therefore, to preserve it, though he did not fail to tell the emperor Alexander wherein he had reason to be satisfied with him or otherwise. A marriage connexion with the court of Russia was naturally indicated by all that had gone before. At Erfurth, Napoleon had brought the emperor Alexander to talk to him about his possible union with a Russian princess, the grand-duchess Anne. The czar had appeared quite disposed, as far as he was concerned, to consent to the marriage, and seemed only to foresee difficulties on the part of his mother, an estimable princess, but proud, and filled with the prejudices of the European aristocracy. She had married the grand-duchess Catherine, a princess remarkable for beauty and mental endowments, and of an age quite fit for marriage, to a plain duke of Oldenburg, in order to avoid a demand which she foresaw and disliked. It was therefore to be feared that she would hardly be disposed to bestow her second daughter on Napoleon, after

having disposed thus of her eldest to avoid a marriage contrary to her own wishes. Alexander, nevertheless, had promised his good offices, and held out almost a certainty of success, without, however pledging himself, because he was resolved not to do violence to his mother's inclinations. Therefore, as we stated in its place, the two parties had separated in perfect mutual satisfaction. After this, it was impossible to think of any other union without breaking off the alliance, which Napoleon did not choose to do. He hoped, too, that such a marriage would restore to the Russian alliance all the warmth it had lost, and all the influence over Europe which he expected from it.

In consequence, he ordered M. de Champagny to write in cypher, with his own hand, a despatch to St. Petersburg, which M. de Caulaincourt was himself to decipher, and which was to be kept secret from everybody, even from M. de Romanzoff, and to be communicated only to the emperor Alexander in person. In that despatch, dated the 22nd of November, M. de Champagny said :

"Mention of a divorce had reached the ears of the emperor Alexander at Erfurth, who spoke of it to the Emperor, and told him his sister, the princess Anne, was at his disposal. His majesty desires that you enter upon the question frankly and simply with the emperor Alexander, and that you speak to him in these terms.

" 'Sire, I have reason to think that the Emperor, urged by all France, is disposed for a divorce. May I send him word that he may count on your sister? Will it please your majesty to think over the matter for two days, and give your answer frankly to me, not as the French ambassador, but as a person passionately devoted to both families. It is not a formal demand I present to you, but a disclosure of your intentions I solicit. I venture, sire, to take this step, because I am too much accustomed to say to your majesty what I think to fear that your majesty will ever compromise me.'

"You will not mention the matter to M. de Romanzoff on any pretext whatever; and when you shall have had this conversation with the emperor Alexander, and that which is to follow it two days afterwards, you will forget entirely the communication I make to you. It will remain for you to make known to me the qualities of the young princess, and particularly the period at which she may be in a condition to become a mother; in the present calculations, a difference of six months is an object. I have no need to recommend to your excellency the most inviolable secrecy; you know what you owe in this respect to the Emperor."

This despatch having been sent off, and everything being prepared for the dissolution of the marriage with the empress Josephine, and the formation of a new alliance with a Russian

princess, Napoleon was impatiently waiting the arrival of prince Eugene to disclose all to Josephine, when the terrible secret escaped, as it were, in spite of him. Every day the unfortunate Empress becoming more sad, more agitated, and more importunate in her complaints, Napoleon lost patience, and cut short her reproaches, telling her that after all he must think of other ties than those which united them, that the welfare of the empire demanded a great resolution on their part, that he counted on her courage and her devotedness to consent to a divorce, to which he himself had the greatest difficulty in making up his mind. No sooner had he uttered these terrible words, than Josephine burst into tears and fell fainting. Napoleon immediately called M. de Beausset, the chamberlain on service, bid him help him to raise the Empress, who was labouring under violent convulsions, and they both carried her in their arms to her apartments. Queen Hortense was sent for, and found the Emperor distressed and angry at the obstacles opposed to his designs. He told the young queen bluntly and almost sternly that his determination was fixed, and neither tears nor cries could change a resolution which was become inevitable, and necessary to the welfare of the empire. He put on a stern demeanour, as if to stop the tears before which he felt his courage ready to give way. Queen Hortense, whose pride suffered at that moment both on her own account and her mother's, hastened to assure the Emperor that as for tears and cries he should have none to complain of; the Empress would not fail to submit to his desires, and descend from the throne as she had ascended it in obedience to his will; whilst her children, content to renounce grandeurs which had not made them happy, would gladly go and devote their lives to comforting the best and fondest of mothers. The unfortunate wife of king Louis had many reasons to speak thus. But as Napoleon listened to her, the real emotion he felt at the bottom of his heart broke through the show of harshness he affected, and he began himself to weep, and to express to his adopted daughter all the grief he felt, all the violence he was obliged to do to his own nature to pursue the course he had adopted, and all the cogency of the motives that had determined him to act thus. He entreated her not to quit him, but stay by him with prince Eugene, to help him to console their mother, and render her calm, resigned, happy even whilst becoming a friend instead of a wife. Napoleon then recounted all he intended to do for her, so as to disguise as much as possible the change which her situation was to undergo. Palaces, châteaux, a magnificent income, the first rank at court after that of the empress regnant, all this, little as it was in lieu of a throne, was something, nevertheless, for a person of Josephine's light and frivolous mind. Queen Hortense, who tenderly loved her mother, tried what she could to console, or at least assuage her sorrow, and many were the

tears they wept together. Josephine, however, was calmer on the following days. She expected her son; until his arrival, so long as no formal act had intervened between her and her consort, she still hoped; and, indeed, Napoleon's kindness towards her, now that the terrible secret was revealed, was such as almost to confirm her fond illusions.

Meanwhile, Josephine's lamentations being heard by the servants of the palace, the tale soon spread through the Tuileries, and thence through Paris. The Bonaparte family, too, always jealous of the Beauharnais, could not conceal their joy, the involuntary ebullitions of which would alone have been enough to reveal all. Already an ungrateful court forgot the dethroned empress, and busied itself in curious conjectures about the future empress, whom it sought on all the thrones of Europe. Napoleon anxiously awaited the arrival of prince Eugene to put an end to this painful state of things.

That excellent prince arrived in Paris on the 9th of December. His sister threw herself into his arms, and acquainted him with their mother's sad lot. Until then he had been in a state of uncertainty, and, instead of foreseeing a misfortune, he had inclined to the opinion of his wife, the princess Augusta, who told him he was perhaps sent for to be declared heir to the empire. His successes in the last war had conduced to this short-lived illusion. But he was a prince of moderate desires, and, on learning the truth, he was grieved most on his wife's account, for it was evident that if Napoleon had a son to succeed him, he would not diminish the inheritance of that son by detaching from it the kingdom of Italy. He had, therefore, to renounce not only the throne of France, to which he had never aspired, but also that of Italy, which, from long possession, he had come to look on as his destined patrimony. He waited, however, on the Emperor, resigned to everything, and grieving for those who were near and dear to him much more than for himself. Napoleon, who loved him, pressed him in his arms, explained his motives, showed him the impossibility of leaving him, Beauharnais, to reign over the refractory Bonapartes, and unfolded to him the plans he had formed for preserving to the Beauharnais an existence in accordance with the few years of greatness they had enjoyed. He then led Josephine's two children to their mother. The interview was long and painful. "Our mother must go away," said Eugene, as the queen of Holland had said already; "and we must go with her, that we may all three expiate in retirement an ephemeral greatness which has troubled rather than embellished our existence." Napoleon, intensely affected, and shedding tears like them, told them that, on the contrary, they must stay with him, with their mother, in all the lustre of the position in which he wished to maintain them, in order to manifest that Josephine was neither repudiated

nor disgraced, but sacrificed to a necessity of state, and recompensed for her noble self-sacrifice by the grandeur of her children, and the tender friendship of him who had been her consort. After many exaggerations—for exaggerations assuage sorrow just as tears do—some degree of tranquillity succeeded these violent agitations, but they left on Napoleon's noble countenance deep traces, which greatly struck those who thought him capable of conceiving in his imperious soul only strong volitions, but no tender affection. The sacrifice having been made, it was now to be rendered irrevocable. The 15th of December was the day chosen for dissolving the civil contract according to the formalities arranged with the arch-chancellor Cambacérès.

On the evening of the 15th of December, the whole imperial family assembled in the Emperor's cabinet in the Tuileries. There were present the empress-mother, the king and queen of Holland, the king and queen of Naples, the king and queen of Westphalia, the princess Borghese, the chancellor Cambacérès, and count Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angely, the two latter as *officiers de l'état civil* for the imperial family. Napoleon, standing up, holding Josephine by the hand, who was in tears, and himself having tears in his eyes, read the following speech :

"My cousin prince arch-chancellor, I sent you a closed letter of this day's date, ordering you to present yourself in my cabinet, that I might make known to you the resolution which I and the Empress, my very dear spouse, have come to. I was very glad that the kings, queens, and princesses, my brothers and sisters, brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, my step-daughter and my step-son, become my adopted son, should be present at what I had to make known to you.

"The policy of my monarchy, the interest and the necessity of my peoples, which have constantly guided all my actions, require that I should leave after me to children, inheritors of my love for my peoples, this throne on which Providence has placed me. For many years, however, I have lost the hope of having children by my marriage with my well-beloved spouse the empress Josephine: this it is that induces me to sacrifice the dearest affections of my heart, to hearken only to the good of the state, and desire the dissolution of our marriage.

"Arrived at the age of forty, I may conceive the hope of living long enough to bring up, after my own mind and my own views, the children it shall please Providence to give me. God knows how much such a resolution has cost my heart; but there is no sacrifice too great for my courage, when it is demonstrated to me that it is for the good of France.

"I cannot conclude without saying, that far from having ever had reason to complain, I have, on the contrary, only encomiums to bestow on the attachment and tenderness of my well-beloved spouse. She has embellished fifteen years of my life; the

memory of this will always remain engraved on my heart. She has been crowned by my hand : it is my desire that she retain the rank and title of Empress, but, above all, that she never doubt my sentiments, and that she always hold me for her best and dearest friend."

Napoleon having ended, Josephine, holding a paper in her hands, tried to read. But her voice was choked with sobs, and she handed the paper to M. Regnaud, who read as follows:

"With the permission of my august and dear spouse, I must declare, that retaining no hope of having children who may satisfy the requirements of his policy and the interests of France, I have pleasure in giving him the greatest proof of attachment and devotedness that was ever given on earth. I owe all to his bounty; it was his hand that crowned me, and on this throne I have received only manifestations of affection and love from the French people.

"I think to evince my gratitude for all these sentiments, in consenting to the dissolution of a marriage which is now an obstacle to the good of France, which deprives it of the happiness of being one day governed by the descendants of a great man, so evidently raised up by Providence to efface the evils of a terrible revolution, and to re-establish the altar, the throne, and social order. But the dissolution of my marriage will make no change in the sentiments of my heart: in me, the Emperor will always have his best friend. I know how much this act, commanded by policy and by such great interests, has rent his heart; but we both of us glory in the sacrifice which we make to the good of the country."

After these words, the noblest ever uttered under such circumstances, for never, it must be owned, did vulgar passions less prevail in an act of this kind, the arch-chancellor drew up a minute of this twofold declaration, and Napoleon embracing Josephine, led her to her own apartments, where he left her almost fainting in the arms of her children. He repaired immediately to the council-hall, where, conformably with the constitution of the empire, a private council had met to draw up the *senatus consulte*, declaratory of the dissolution of the marriage between Napoleon and Josephine, which was to be taken to the senate on the following day.

That great body assembled by the Emperor's orders to receive the declaration of the two august spouses, and act thereupon. The sitting began with the reception of prince Eugene as senator. He had been nominated at the time of his departure for Italy, and had not yet taken his seat. He delivered some becoming and simple words, which had been prepared for him, on the occasion of the new *senatus consulte*.

"My mother, my sister, and myself," he said, "owe every-

thing to the Emperor. He has been truly a father to us; he will find in us, at all times, devoted children and obedient subjects.

"It is important to the happiness of France that the founder of this fourth dynasty should grow old surrounded by a direct lineage, which shall be a guarantee to us all, as the pledge of our country's glory.

"When my mother was crowned before the whole nation by the hands of her august spouse, she contracted the obligation to sacrifice all her affections to the interests of France. She has with courage, nobleness, and dignity, fulfilled this first of duties. Her soul has often been affected at witnessing the painful conflicts endured by the heart of a man accustomed to master fortune, and always to march with a firm step to the accomplishment of his great designs. The tears which this resolution has cost the Emperor, sufficiently proclaim my mother's glory. In the situation in which she is about to be placed, she will not be a stranger in her wishes and her feelings to the new prosperities that await us; and it will be with mingled pride and satisfaction she will behold all the happiness that her sacrifices shall have produced for her country and her Emperor."

The *senatus consulte* was passed in the same sitting. It pronounced the dissolution of the marriage contracted between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine, maintained the latter in her rank as crowned Empress, assigned her an income of two millions of francs, and rendered obligatory on Napoleon's successor's the appointments he should make in her favour on the civil list. These appointments were the gift of an annual pension of one million, payable by the civil list, independently of the two millions payable by the state treasury, and the absolute property of the châteaux of Navarre and Malmaison.

On the following day, December 17th, all the documents were inserted in the *Moniteur*, and the dissolution of the marriage was known by the public. Josephine was pitied, for she was liked for her goodness, and even for her defects, which were in conformity with the national character. But the sympathy she excited was soon absorbed in curiosity to know who was to be her successor. Opinion was divided between a Russian and an Austrian princess, but generally inclined to the former rather than to the latter. As for the unfortunate Josephine, she retired to Malmaison, where her children stayed with her, and tried, with but little success, to comfort her. Napoleon went to see her the day after her arrival, and continued to visit her on the subsequent days. He thought he ought to invest himself in a kind of mourning, and quitting the illustrious guests who had come to his court, he retired to Trainon, to hunt, attend to business, and wait the result of the negotiations he had begun. Fresh despatches were

sent to St. Petersburg on the 17th (the day the *senatus consulte* appeared in the *Moniteur*), pressing the court of Russia for an immediate reply, Yes or No. They stated that all the conditions would be accepted, even those relating to religion,—that the only point on which there could be any difficulty was the age and health of the princess, for before all things an heir was wanted. If, however, her age and state of health were such as gave promise of children, and if her family consented to the proposed union, the reply must arrive without any delay, and the desired alliance must be celebrated immediately, as France could not be kept longer in uncertainty.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès had been instructed to procure the dissolution of the spiritual tie, in order to remove the scruples of the Catholic courts, if a princess of that religion were to be chosen. With regard to the spiritual as well as the civil tie, the annulling of the marriage on the grounds of informality or of great public interest, was preferred to an ordinary divorce, as more honourable to Josephine, and more conformable to the prevailing religious ideas. It was also resolved to do without the pope's intervention. The arch-chancellor, who was very expert in these matters, and generally in all those which required knowledge, prudence, and a great fertility in expedients, assembled a commission of seven bishops, to whom he submitted the case in question. These were the bishop of Montefiascone (cardinal Maury), the bishop of Parma, the archbishop of Tours, and the bishops of Verciel, Evreux, Trèves, and Nantes. These learned men, after a searching investigation, concluded that, whereas, for the dissolution of a regular marriage, in consideration of a great interest of state, the only competent authority was the pope; the authority of the diocesan was sufficient to annul an irregular marriage like that in question. Now the occult ceremony which had been celebrated in the chapel of the Tuileries without witnesses,* and without sufficient consent of the contracting parties, could not, whatever cardinal Fesch might say, constitute a regular marriage. Its annulment on the ground of informality was therefore to be sued out before the diocesan court in the first instance, and before the metropolitan authority in the second.

In consequence of this opinion, canonical proceedings were instituted without noise at the instance of the arch-chancellor, representing the imperial family, to obtain the annulment of the religious marriage between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine. Cardinal Fesch, and MM. de Talleyrand, Berthier, and Duroc, were heard as witnesses, the first-named as

* It was on the erroneous authority of a contemporaneous manuscript memoir, that I stated in Vol. V. that MM. de Talleyrand and Berthier were present as witnesses at the religious ceremony of marriage secretly performed in the Tuileries on the eve of the coronation.

to the forms observed, the three others as to the nature of the consent given by the parties. Cardinal Fesch declared that he had delivered to him by the pope dispensations for the non-observance of certain forms in the accomplishment of his functions as grand almoner, which, in his opinion, justified the absence of witness and of *curé*. As to the title, he affirmed its existence, and thus rendered useless the precaution which had been taken to withdraw from Josephine's hands the certificate of marriage which had been delivered to her by cardinal Fesch, and which her children had with much difficulty obtained from her. MM. de Talleyrand, Berthier, and Duroc, affirmed that Napoleon had repeatedly told them he had consented only to a mere ceremony in order to reassure Josephine's conscience and the pope's, but that his formal intention at all times had been not to complete his union with the Empress, being, unhappily, certain he should soon be obliged to renounce her for the interests of his empire. These witnesses related certain details which left no doubt on the matter.

The conclusion come to by the ecclesiastical authority was, that there had not been sufficient consent; but, from respect for the parties, it would not dwell specially on that ground of nullity, but upon others quite as important, derived from the fact that there had been no witnesses, and no *proper priest*—that is to say, no parish clergyman (the only minister accredited by the Catholic religion to give authenticity to a marriage). It declared that the dispensation granted to cardinal Fesch in a general manner as grand almoner, could not have conferred on him the curial functions, and, consequently, the marriage was null, through defect of the most essential forms. The marriage was, therefore, broken before both the diocesan and the metropolitan jurisdiction, with suitable decency, and the full observance of the canon law.

Napoleon was then free, without having had recourse to what has dishonoured in history the reputations of princesses, without having had recourse to the form of divorce, which is scarcely conformable to our habits, and with all the delicacy due to the unfortunate spouse who had so long shared and embellished his life, as he himself said. He now awaited with impatience the reply from St. Petersburg.

The communication with which he had commissioned M. de Caulaincourt was delicate and difficult, and though the great favour he enjoyed with the emperor Alexander afforded him great facilities, yet the circumstances were not happily chosen for success. The last war had greatly deteriorated the alliance between the two courts. In the first place, although things had proceeded somewhat better this year in Finland, though a revolution we will speak of by-and-by had overturned the throne of Sweden, and

brought about peace and the cession of Finland to Russia, the events in the East were less favourable to Russian ambition; and since the emperor Alexander had been allowed entire freedom with regard to Turkey, he had scarcely made any progress on the Danube, so that Moldavia and Wallachia, though conceded by Napoleon, had not yet been won from the Turks. They were, therefore, not quite so well pleased at St. Petersburg with the French alliance, though they had only themselves to complain of, and not that alliance which had granted them everything. Secondly, Napoleon, being dissatisfied with the little aid he had received from his ally, had treated him with some negligence during the campaign, had not written to him until it was ended, and had with marked haughtiness, but without complaining of it, pointed out the inefficacy of the Russian aid. Alexander being obliged to confess either the insufficiency of his government, or his own want of good-will, and much preferring the former alternative, had suffered severely from mortified vanity. "What would they have had me do?" he often said. "My affairs in Finland and Turkey have not gone better than those of the Emperor Napoleon in Poland. Could I do for him what I have not done for myself?" And he alleged in excuse for the smallness of the services he had rendered Napoleon, the disturbances, the seasons, and the inferiority of the Russian administration as compared with the French. But what had most of all displeased him was the terms of the treaty of peace concluded with Austria, and the aggrandisement of nearly two millions of subjects granted to the grand duchy of Warsaw. To him, and still more to others in St. Petersburg, this had appeared a certain presage of the speedy re-establishment of Poland, and for a fortnight the court of Russia rang with invectives against France, so that M. de Caulaincourt durst hardly show himself. The gift to Russia of a lot of 400 thousand subjects had seemed but a lure intended to cover the re-establishment of Poland, which the opponents even said was completely realised by the junction of Galicia with the grand duchy of Warsaw. Alexander had never ceased complaining since the last treaty of Vienna, and asking for guarantees against the future evils which those about him predicted.

He had received from Napoleon a very reassuring letter, which he communicated to the chief personages of the court of Russia, but the declarations it contained being, as they said, mere words, he had been obliged to ask for something official. His wish was complied with, and M. de Caulaincourt, at his urgent request, was authorised in a general way to sign a convention relative to Poland. He let himself be drawn into signing one which subsequently proved a most embarrassing tie upon Napoleon. In that convention it was stated that the kingdom of Poland should never be re-established; that the names of Poland and Pole should

disappear in all acts, and be no more employed thenceforth; that the grand duchy should not be enlarged at any future time by the addition of any part of the old Polish provinces; that the Polish orders of knighthood should be abolished; and, lastly, that all these engagements should be binding on the king of Saxony, as grand duke of Warsaw, no less than upon Napoleon himself.* This strange convention, which put Napoleon in such a singular position with regard to the Poles, was wrung from M. de Caulaincourt by the importunities of the emperor Alexander, who seemed resolved on breaking the alliance if it was not ratified.

It was in this situation, shortly before the final arrangement of the above-mentioned convention, and whilst its conditions were still under discussion, that the demand supervened which M. de Caulaincourt was commissioned to make to the court of Russia. Having received the first despatch from Paris on the 8th or 9th of December, he could not immediately see the emperor Alexander, who was absent from St. Petersburg, but he had an audience of him on his return. The emperor Alexander, though rather surprised, did not deny the sort of engagement he had entered into at Erfurth, namely, to use his influence with his mother to obtain the hand of the archduchess Anne. He expressed his desire and even his strong hope of succeeding, but he required time, and to be free to set about the matter in his own way. Whether he was sincere in the great deference he affected for his mother, or that it was a way of providing himself with excuses if necessary, he said he would not speak in the name of the Emperor Napoleon, but in his own; that he would not represent the demand as actually made, but as possible—probable, even—and that he would try to obtain his mother's consent by alleging his own political interests rather than the wishes of the Emperor of the French. With a profusion of polite messages for Napoleon he postponed his answer, promising to give it as speedily as possible.

That the emperor Alexander, who loved his mother and was loved by her, though a certain jealousy on the score of authority subsisted between them, should make a mystery towards her of a matter so important to the imperial family, was not very likely. Probably he wished that, in case the family alliance with Napoleon should not be found suitable, the self-love of the two courts should be less implicated in the matter, his mother being supposed to have given a refusal to the emperor Alexander, and not to the Emperor Napoleon, who would not have figured in the negotiation. It is probable, above all, that he wished to retain a greater degree of freedom, so that he might put a higher price on his consent, and that price was the convention as to Poland.

* These very important facts have never been known. We relate them from M. de Caulaincourt's authentic correspondence with Napoleon.

M. de Caulaincourt wrote to Paris on the 28th of December that his overtures had been most favourably received; that he had every hope of success; but that there would be requisite a vast amount of finessing, and a little patience. Pressed by M. de Champagny's despatches, which followed each other without interruption, he availed himself of the latitude allowed him, and acquainted the court of Russia that all the conditions would be accepted, including even those relating to the difference of religion. He again saw the emperor, who appeared satisfied with the result of his first overtures, spoke of his mother's consent as almost certain, whilst that of his sister, the grand duchess Catherine, was already obtained, and would be soon followed by the general and official consent of the whole imperial family. Nevertheless, Alexander still demanded some days before he gave his final answer. It was evident he would consent at last, since he spoke of his mother and sister, the only persons about whom there was any difficulty, as acquiescent; it was evident that he would not venture to offer on his own account a refusal, which, by hurting the sensitive pride of Napoleon, would bring about a rupture of the alliance, a total change of policy, the loss of his dearest hopes with regard to the East, and an alarming alliance of France with Austria. The aristocratic objections that might be entertained to an alliance with a new dynasty, greatly attenuated, indeed, by the incomparable glory of Napoleon, were certainly not worth the sacrifice of the empire's best interests. There was no doubt, then, as to the ultimate consent; but the convention relative to Poland was the manifest motive which still made Alexander hang back. The terms of that convention had, after difficulties of all kinds, been at last agreed on, but, until it was ratified, he would not pledge himself to the marriage; he wanted first to have in hand the price he bargained for, namely, the convention which should relieve him from the danger of seeing a new kingdom of Poland erected upon his frontiers. At first he had asked for ten days, then he asked for ten days more, and promised that his answer should be forthcoming in the latter half of January. The first overture dated from the middle of December.

Napoleon, who had written on the 22nd of November, and counted on a reply by the end of December or the beginning of January (the couriers then took 12 or 14 days to go from Paris to St. Petersburg, was very impatient to know the issue, and already somewhat offended at the delays he encountered. He regarded himself as superior to all the sovereigns of his time, not only in genius (about this there was no question), but by reason of the position that genius had won for him. He thought that his hand ought to be accepted as soon as he consented to offer it, and these affectations of difficulty about an old princess, who in reality depended on Alexander, put him in no good humour.

What particularly disposed him to take amiss the real or pretended hesitation of Russia, was the eagerness manifested by the other courts with which he might ally himself.

The house of Saxony, of course, desired nothing better. The old king of Saxony seemed actuated rather by personal regard than by political motives in consenting to give him his daughter, a princess of somewhat advanced years, but whose constitution gave promise of a healthy progeny. Her father had, indeed, conceived a real attachment for Napoleon.

The demonstrations on the part of Austria were not less favourable. Prince Schwarzenberg, who had quitted the embassy to St. Petersburg for that to Paris, had just arrived in France, and felt it an annoyance to represent there a beaten court, and one which would be still more so if the alliance of France with Russia became closer. It was that alliance which had frustrated the last levy of bucklers on the part of Austria; the continuance of that alliance would keep it in a state of complete nullity if it did no worse. A marriage with France, though it should replace Austria in a very strong position, would at least put an end to the alliance between France and Russia, would secure the peace which was so much needed, and would dissipate the fears, whether well or ill founded, with which the event at Bayonne had inspired all the old dynasties. Hence all the Austrian negotiators, both civil and military, had thrown out hints on this respect which had not been accepted by Napoleon, who was then full of the idea of a Russian marriage, but which had dwelt in his memory. M. de Metternich, now prime minister in the place of M. de Stadion, having been familiar at Paris with the princess and princesses of recent origin, and entertaining against them none of the prejudices of the old courts, would naturally have desired to inaugurate his ministry with a marriage of such great political consequence, and prince Schwarzenberg, knowing the prime minister's dispositions, was as desirous as he of substituting Austria for Russia. But on arriving in Paris he had the mortification of seeing prince Kourakin caressed and flattered as the representative of the court with which the marriage was about to be contracted, and his own situation, which was unpleasant enough in consequence of the late war, made still more so in consequence of the approaching union. The Austrian ambassador's feelings became known through M. de Floret, the secretary of legation, who talked of them to M. de Semonville, and the latter, who busied himself as much as he could about everything, repeated to M. Maret what he had learned from M. de Floret. There was, besides, a Frenchman very intimate with M. de Schwarzenberg; this was M. de Laborde, son of the celebrated banker of the 18th century, established in Austria during the revolution, and recently returned to France. M. de Laborde was very well known to M. de Cham-

pagny, who employed him to ascertain the exact disposition of Austria in this matter. Prince Schwarzenberg imparted to M. de Laborde his uneasiness, and his dislike of the post he occupied at Paris, which was becoming most disagreeable, especially as the marriage with a Russian princess was to all appearance a settled thing. M. de Laborde reported all this to M. de Champagny, who authorised him to insinuate that Napoleon's choice was by no means irrevocably fixed, that what was said in public was stated very much at random, and that it was not impossible the Emperor's policy would soon bring him back towards an Austrian alliance. These words repeated, without official character, but with much address, as rumours gathered from good authority, gave great satisfaction to prince Schwarzenberg, who immediately wrote to Vienna to know what he was to do, should a demand in marriage be addressed to him.

During the negotiations with the court of St. Petersburg, and the secret communications with the court of Vienna, the belief in a Russian marriage was general in Paris, but the public desire was much divided between a Russian and an Austrian princess. Most of those about Napoleon formed their opinion in accordance with their own position, their past history, and their interests, some few in accordance with their disinterested forethought. All those who had any affinity with the *ancien régime*, like M. de Talleyrand, for instance, and who saw in an Austrian marriage another backward step, were for a daughter of the emperor Francis. M. de Talleyrand, moreover, had an invariable leaning for Austria against the powers of the north, and he had connexions with that court which had often been suspiciously regarded by Napoleon. M. Maret, whom M. de Talleyrand treated with extreme disdain, was this time in accord with him, and their language was the same. M. Maret had no other reason for this than that he had been the recipient, through MM. de Semonville and Floret, of the first confidential communications made on the part of Austria. In the imperial family the whole Beauharnais section inclined to Austria, and on a question which ought never to have elicited any opinion on their part, they hastened to have one, and to express it with strange vivacity. Their real motive was the desire of a lasting peace in Italy and Bavaria, which was a matter of great interest to prince Eugene and his father-in-law. Though the former was not destined to reign in Italy if Napoleon had a direct heir, he would have to govern that kingdom as viceroy during Napoleon's life, some twenty or thirty years, as he calculated, and he wished that there should be no danger of seeing the Austrians at Verona as in the late war. Josephine, who indemnified herself for her fall by her zeal in serving the interests of her children, made the most unseemly overtures on this subject to Madame de Metternich, who had not quitted Paris.

On the contrary, all who leaned to the revolution, all who disliked the *ancien régime*, all who feared a too complete return to the past, all likewise who had some military and political forethought, wished for a marriage with Russia. The Murat family, swayed by the queen of Naples, feared that an Austrian princess would introduce into the imperial court a pride of birth injurious to the princes and princesses of the Bonaparte family, who had not like Napoleon their personal glory to uplift them. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, who, from inclination and good sense, had remained attached to what was fundamental on the revolution of 1789, fearing always Napoleon's ambitious propensities and the weaknesses concealed beneath his greatness, shared the dislike of the Bonapartes for an Austrian marriage, which was a sort of alliance with the old *régime*. Moreover, his peculiar tact in apprehending the spirit of the country, made him forebode no advantage for Napoleon in resembling in any respect Louis XVI., and his political sagacity enabled him to foresee that of the two powers that one whose alliance was rejected would soon become an enemy. If it was Austria, there would be nothing new or very formidable in this; if it was Russia, the matter would be more serious, for though the way to Vienna had been found twice, that to St. Petersburg had not been found yet. But strange to say, it already needed some courage to counsel Napoleon in favour of the Russian marriage, so much did a secret instinct tell every one that a marriage with an Austrian archduchess was the one which would most flatter the self-love of an Emperor who was not legitimate (according to the language of those he wished to resemble), and who desired to become so otherwise than by glory.

While these contradictory opinions prevailed around Napoleon, he himself remained in a state of uncertainty, which induced him to summon a privy council in the Tuileries, that he might hear what everybody had to say, desiring almost, he who was usually so resolute, to find in the opinions of others reasons for determining his own.

The council was suddenly convoked on Sunday, the 21st of January, immediately after mass. There were present the grand dignitaries of the empire, the minister of foreign affairs, Maret, the secretary of state, who acted as secretary of the council, and the presidents of the senate and the legislature, MM. Garnier and de Fontanes. Napoleon, grave, impassable, seated in the imperial chair, had on his right the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, king Murat, and prince Berthier; on his left, the arch-treasurer Lebrun, prince Eugene, MM. de Talleyrand, Garnier, and de Fontanes; M. Maret, closing the circle, was seated at the end of the council-chamber, opposite the Emperor.

"I have assembled you," said Napoleon, "to have your advice

upon the greatest interest of state, upon the choice of the spouse who is to give heirs to the empire. Listen to the report of M. de Champagny, after which you will please to give me each of you your opinion." M. de Champagny presented an elaborate report on the three alliances between which the choice lay: the Russian, the Saxon, and the Austrian. He affirmed that the three were equally possible, the three courts being equally well disposed (an assertion somewhat exaggerated as regarded Russia, but near enough to the truth to be presented to the council). He then compared the personal advantages of the three princesses. The Saxon princess was a model of all virtues, somewhat advanced in age, but of a fine constitution. The Austrian princess was eighteen years old, of an excellent constitution, an education worthy of her rank, and gentle and engaging disposition. The Russian princess was rather young, about fifteen, endowed, it was said, with qualities desirable in a sovereign, but of a religion not that of France, a circumstance which would occasion some trouble, particularly that of having a Greek chapel in the Tuileries. As for political advantages, M. de Champagny spoke without ambiguity. He saw none, he pointed out none, except in the alliance with the court of Austria. On this subject he spoke like an ex-ambassador of France to Vienna.

After the report there was a long silence, no one venturing to speak first, but each waiting a call from Napoleon to open his lips. Napoleon then resolved to take the sense of the council, beginning on the left, the side where lay the less weighty opinions, though M. de Talleyrand sat there. The arch-treasurer, Lebrun, an old royalist, who had remained such at the imperial court, though very much devoted to the empire, roused himself from a sort of dosing state that was habitual to him, to express an opinion that was not wanting in sense. "I am for the Saxon princess," he said; "that princess does not implicate us in anybody's policy, does not embroil us with anybody, and comes, moreover, of a good stock." The arch-treasurer said no more. Prince Eugene, speaking next after prince Lebrun, stated in simple and modest terms the reasons alleged by the partisans of the Austrian policy, and these were repeated with more force, though with sententious brevity, by M. de Talleyrand, who next to the arch-chancellor was the most competent judge in such matters. He said that the time for securing the stability of the empire was come; that the policy which inclined to Austria had more than any other that advantage of stability; that alliances with the northern court had a character of ambitious and changeful policy; what was wanted was an alliance which would make it possible to contend against England, and the alliance of 1756 was there to show that it was only in an intimate union with Austria that the continental security had been found which

was necessary to a great display of naval force; and lastly, that the head of a new empire, wedded to an archduchess of Austria, would have no need to envy in any respect the honours of the Bourbons. The lordly diplomatist spoke in a tone and style such as the French *noblesse* might have used had they to deliver an opinion on the marriage of Napoleon. The senator Garnier gave his voice for that middle term, which compromised no interest, the Saxon alliance. M. de Fontanes inveighed with literary warmth, and even with a sort of royalist bitterness, against northern alliances. He spoke as they used to speak at Versailles, when Frederick the Great and Catharine the Great were seated on the thrones of the North.

Contrary to usage, M. Maret, a mere secretary, whose business was to hear and record the opinions of others, was allowed to give his own, which, however, was not regarded as of much importance by the council. He voted for the Austrian princess. On passing to his right, Napoleon encountered different sentiments. He heard, indeed, M. de Champagny repeat what he had said in his report, and prince Berthier, who liked Austria, declare in its favour, so that there was a strong majority for the archduchess. But Murat and Cambacérès remained to be consulted. Murat was extremely animated, and expressed in that council of the *grands* of the empire all the old revolutionary sentiments that remained in the army. He maintained that this marriage with an Austrian princess could only awaken inauspicious recollections of Marie Antoinette and Louis XVI., recollections which were far from being effaced, far from being agreeable to the nation; that the imperial family owed everything to the glory and power of its head; that it needed not to borrow anything from foreign alliances, and its approximation to the *ancien régime* would alienate many hearts that were attached to the empire without winning the hearts of the French *noblesse*. He inveighed against the partisans of the family alliance with Austria, affirming that such a scheme could not have been devised by the devoted friends of the Emperor. As he spoke, it seemed as though the Bonapartes stood behind him inciting him against the Beauharnais, and M. Fouché against M. de Talleyrand. After the fire of the king of Naples came the cool prudence of the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, expressing itself in simple, clear, moderate, but positive language. He said, the first thing to be considered was the procuring of heirs for the empire, and it behoved to know was the Russian princess capable of bearing them; if she was, the course was obvious. As for what regarded religion, the court of Russia would certainly allow itself to be prevailed upon to forego conditions that might give offence to France; and, as for policy, a doubt was inconceivable. Austria, deprived in this century of the Netherlands, Swabia,

Italy, Illyria, and lastly of the imperial crown, would be an enemy for ever irreconcilable; her natural inclinations, too, rendered her incompatible with a new monarchy, whilst Russia, on the contrary, had in that respect fewer prejudices than any other court (which was true then). She had in her territory and her remoteness reasons of all kinds for being the ally of France, and none for being her enemy. If rejected, she would not fail to become hostile; a war with her would be infinitely more hazardous than with Austria, and to neglect her would be to abandon a possible and facile alliance for a false and impossible alliance. He concluded then, in a most formal manner, in favour of the marriage with the Russian princess.

These two opinions, the last especially, proceeding from the gravest man of his time, strongly counterpoised those in favour of the Austrian alliance. But as it was only a consultation Napoleon had required, the matter was not put to the vote. He himself, remaining calm and impenetrable, nothing in his countenance allowing it to be guessed which way he inclined, thanked the members of the council for their excellent advice. "I will weigh your arguments," he said, "in my mind. I am convinced that, whatever difference there may be between your views, the opinion of each of you has been determined by an enlightened zeal for the interests of the state, and by a faithful attachment to my person."

The council was immediately dismissed, and, in spite of the reserve which Napoleon imposed on all those about him, without however always observing it himself, all the opinions uttered in the council were eagerly canvassed in the palace. The Murat family even believed for a while that the cause of the Russian alliance was won, and said so to prince Cambacérès with great signs of joy. But the decision of the question was to depend much more on events than on the personal opinion of Napoleon.

A courier from Russia was impatiently looked for. Then, on the 6th of February, came despatches from M. de Caulaincourt, calculated to prolong the uncertainty that had existed for six weeks. The last delay of ten days asked for by the emperor Alexander expired on the 17th of January, and on the 21st he had not replied. Evidently he wanted to gain time, and obtain the ratification of the treaty relative to Poland, before he pledged himself irrevocably. He had repeated to M. de Caulaincourt that the empress-mother did not refuse her consent, that the grand duchess Catherine likewise gave hers, and that things would go as Napoleon wished, but that he still required a little time before he gave his final answer. A more serious matter was the health of the young princess, which did not quite correspond to the impatient desire of an heir to the empire, and also the obstinacy of the empress-mother in insisting upon a chapel with

Greek priests in the Tuileries. M. de Caulaincourt further stated that he expected a formal answer in a short while, and he doubted not it would be favourable. Napoleon's impetuous character could not accommodate itself to such a state of uncertainty. Whether the delay arose from a repugnance to a union with him, or from a wish to gain time in order to wrest from him a treaty, both irksome at present and imprudent with regard to the future, in either case it was disgusting to him. It was, moreover, supremely disagreeable to him to remain longer the common subject of gossip, like one of those rich heirs whom everybody provides with a wife. He therefore gave way to one of those impulses which he could not control, and which ended by deciding his destiny; he resolved to break with Russia, and to take the dilatory behaviour of that court for a refusal, which disengaged him with regard to it. He had not been insensible, moreover, to the arguments advanced in favour of Austria and against Russia, to the inconvenience of having a wife who would, perhaps, make him wait two or three years for children, who would not be present at the ceremonies of the national religion, and who would have her own priests—a secondary consideration, but irksome among a nation like the French, which, without being devout, exhibits all the punctiliousness of the most lively devotion. He had conceived, too, a better opinion of the Austrian army since the last campaign, and considered it as serious a matter to have to do with it as with the Russian army. These reasons being backed by the most powerful of all, offended pride, he made up his mind at once with the incredible promptitude which formed the distinctive trait of his character. After having read M. de Caulaincourt's despatches, he sent for M. de Champagny and ordered him to write to St. Petersburg, and declare that very day to M. de Kourakin that the delay to reply to him released him not from an engagement (there had not been any at Erfurth), but from the preference he had thought due to the sister of a monarch, his ally and his friend; that to wait longer was impossible in the state of anxiety prevailing among the French; and that, moreover, the information conveyed to him regarding the health of the young princess did not correspond with the motive which had made him dissolve his old marriage to contract a new one. For these reasons he decided for the Austrian princess, whose family, far from hesitating, met him spontaneously with an alacrity to which he could not be insensible.

As to the convention relative to Poland, he explained himself still more energetically, and in a manner which showed more plainly how much the choice he had just made was influenced by the desire to escape from the importunate demands addressed him. "To enter," he said, "into an absolute and general engage-

ment that the kingdom of Poland shall never be re-established, were an imprudent and undignified act on my part. If the Poles, taking advantage of favourable circumstances, should rise up of themselves alone, and hold Russia in check, must I then employ my forces against them? If they found allies, must I employ all my forces to combat those allies? This would be asking of me a thing impossible, dishonouring, and, moreover, independent of my will. I can say that no co-operation, direct or indirect, shall be furnished by me towards an attempt at re-constituting Poland; but I cannot go further. As for the suppression of the words POLAND and POLE, it is a barbarism I could not commit. I can abstain from employing these words in diplomatic acts, but it is not in my power to expunge them from the language of nations. As for the suppression of the old Polish orders of knighthood, this can only be consented to upon the death of the existing knights, and by ceasing to confer new titles. Lastly, as to the future aggrandisements of the duchy of Warsaw, I cannot bind myself against them except in consideration of reciprocity, and on condition that Russia pledges herself never to add to her dominions any portion detached from the old Polish provinces. On these bases," said Napoleon, "I may consent to a convention, but I cannot admit any others." He had a new draft of the convention drawn up in accordance with these observations, and ordered M. de Champagny to despatch it forthwith. All this eventually could not fail sooner or later to prove the end of the alliance, and the origin of a fatal imbroglio.

Having broken with one of the powers between which he had wavered, Napoleon desired to enter into a contract that same day with the other. Secret communications had been constantly kept up with M. de Schwarzenberg through M. de Laborde. It was known that in reply to his inquiries his court had authorised him not only to accept any offer of marriage, but to do what he could, without compromising the dignity of the emperor Francis, towards determining Napoleon's choice in favour of an archduchess. He was asked that same evening, February the 6th, if he was ready to sign a contract of marriage. On his replying in the affirmative, the articles were drawn up, and an appointment was made with him for the next day in the Tuileries. Napoleon again summoned a council of the grand dignitaries in the Tuileries, laid the question definitively before them—but for form sake only, since his mind was made up—and made every arrangement to the end that on the following day his lot might be definitively united to that of the archduchess of Austria.

Next day his purpose was accomplished. His contract of marriage was, with the exception of some differences of language which he thought the time and his dignity demanded, an exact counterpart of that of Marie Antoinette, which he had caused to

be taken from the archives of the foreign office. Thus he would have no mention of a dowry, nor any security for its payment, and desired that everything should be marked with the stamp of his own greatness. Berthier, his friend, the interpreter of his will in war, was to go to Vienna to demand the hand of the princess, and was to display the utmost magnificence. As it is the monarchical custom that when a sovereign marries by proxy that proxy must be a prince of the blood, Napoleon made choice of his glorious adversary the archduke Charles to represent him in the marriage ceremony. Records were consulted as to what had taken place at the marriages of Louis XIV., Louis XV., the grand-dauphin father of Louis XVI., and Louis XVI. himself. The latter marriage was the model to which everything was to conform, although the cruel fate of that monarch and his unfortunate spouse was a melancholy omen. But the more melancholy it was, the more did it enhance by contrast the advantages of the present. Napoleon would have the glory not only of having raised up royalty from martyrdom to the loftiest grandeur, but of having restored even its system of alliances. The measure of his glory and his services was the difference between the scaffold which Marie Antoinette had ascended, and the dazzling throne to be mounted by Marie Louise. The oldest nobles of the old court were consulted, particularly M. de Dreux Brézé, formerly master of the ceremonies, as to how all things had been arranged at the marriage of Marie Antoinette, in order to reproduce them exactly, or with no other difference than increased magnificence. Mention was left, for form sake, of a mean jointure of some 100 thousand francs in favour of the future empress, should she become a widow, and Napoleon ordered that the amount stipulated for her should be four millions of francs. The richest jewels were prepared. So impatient was Napoleon, that he arranged so that when the news of the consent arrived by telegraph in Paris, Berthier could set out that very day, demand the princess in marriage on the day of his arrival, celebrate the marriage on the following day, and bring home the new consort to Paris forthwith, so that the marriage might be consummated by the middle of March. Prince Schwarzenberg consented to everything, and despatched his courier on leaving the Tuileries, after having taken upon him to sign for the archduchess Marie Louise a literal transcript of the marriage contract of Marie Antoinette.

The courier despatched from Paris on the 7th of February arrived on the 14th at Vienna, and caused the liveliest satisfaction there. The war party, defeated in the person of the Stadians, and confounded by the result of the last war, had given place to the peace party headed by M. de Metternich. The idea of seeking tranquillity, security, and restored influence for the future, in an alliance with France, which would lead to the

dissolution of the alliance of France with Russia, was eagerly welcomed in Vienna. M. de Metternich found the emperor Francis perfectly well disposed to the marriage, both as a sovereign and a father. As a sovereign he saw in it a happy arrangement for his policy, for the crown of the Habsburgs was guaranteed, and the union of Russia with France destroyed. As a father, he saw secured to his daughter the finest fortune imaginable, and could even hope for her happiness, for Napoleon had the repute of being facile and good natured in domestic life, independently of all there was in him to excite the imagination of a young princess. M. de Metternich, who had lived in Paris among the imperial family, could perfectly reassure the emperor Francis in that respect. The latter, however, loving his daughter much, and not wishing in any degree to constrain her, ordered M. de Metternich to go and speak himself to her on the subject, which he did. The young princess was eighteen, of a good figure, excellent health, and a fair German complexion. She had been carefully educated, had some talent, and a placid temper; in short, the qualities desirable in a mother. She was surprised and pleased, far from being dismayed at going into that France where but lately the revolutionary monster devoured kings, and where a conqueror, now mastering the revolutionary monster, made kings tremble in his turn. She accepted with becoming reserve, but with much delight, the brilliant lot offered her. She consented to become the consort of Napoleon, and mother to the heir of the greatest empire in the world.

All haste was now made at Vienna to satisfy Napoleon's impatience. The contract of marriage, signed in Paris by prince Schwarzenberg on the 7th of February, was accepted on condition of certain additions, containing sundry stipulations usual in the house of Habsburg. Napoleon's idea was adopted of copying in all points the forms observed upon the marriage of Marie Antoinette, only with greatly increased magnificence. But with every wish to satisfy him it was impossible to proceed as rapidly as he desired without omitting many imposing ceremonies, which it would have been contrary to his design to neglect. The archduke Charles was accepted as Napoleon's proxy to wed the princess, and Berthier as his ambassador extraordinary to demand her in marriage. The ceremony was appointed for the beginning of March.

The news of the reception given to his proposals delighted Napoleon and his court. Gaiety prevailed universally. The clouds raised by the late war dispersed as if by magic. Hope and enthusiasm returned. The old malcontent nobility of the faubourg St. Germain were infected with the common feeling, and many of them came over to the new *régime*, thinking it no shame to serve under him whom the greatest reigning family in

the world consented to adopt as a son-in-law. Such was the increase of these convertites, that their numbers gave rise to a danger of an opposite kind, that of obfuscating the recent grandeurs born of the revolution and the empire. Napoleon displayed consummate tact in forming the household of the empress, by choosing for her first lady of honour the duchess of Montebello, widow of marshal Lannes, killed at Essling by an Austrian cannon-ball! Everybody approved of this act of gratitude, and the person chosen, by her conduct and by her distinction, not hereditary but personal, deserved the high position assigned to her. Magnificent presents were ordered, and Berthier hastened his departure so as to arrive in Vienna in the beginning of March. The queen of Naples also quitted Paris with a brilliant court for Braunau, there to receive the new empress on the frontiers of the Confederation of the Rhine.

Berthier arrived on the 4th of March, 1810, and made his public entry into Vienna on the following day, amidst an immense concourse of nobles and people. The whole court went to meet him with the equipages of the crown, which were to convey him to the palace. The people of Vienna, in an excess of delight, wanted to take the horses from his carriage and draw it themselves, and there was much difficulty in preventing that tumultuous manifestation.

The 6th and 7th were spent in festivities. On the 8th, according to the usages of the court of Austria, and to what had been practised at the marriage of Marie Antoinette, Berthier made a formal demand of the hand of the archduchess Marie Louise, which was accorded with the most pompous forms. The following days were devoted to fresh formalities and fresh rejoicings. On the 11th a marriage was solemnised amidst a vast concourse, with a splendour which surpassed all that had ever been seen, and with a joy that equalled all the popular gladness. The archduchess, wedded by the archduke Charles, was immediately treated as Empress of the French, and even took precedence of all her family, by an excess of courtesy on the part of the emperor Francis and the empress, his second wife.

The 13th was the day appointed for the departure of the Empress of the French. The people of Vienna followed her with acclamations and with affectionate feeling that were mingled with uneasiness at the last moment, for the thought of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette came upon them unbidden. The whole court accompanied Marie Louise.

The emperor Francis, who loved his daughter, wished to embrace her once more, and he set off secretly for Lintz to surprise her there, and bid her a last farewell.

She was at Braunau on the 16th of March. Everything had been prepared there as it had been for the marriage of 1770. Three

reception-rooms, connected together, the first reputed Austrian, the second neutral, the third French, had been erected to receive the young Empress. She was taken from the Austrian into the neutral room by her father's household, and there delivered to prince Berthier, the Emperor's representative, with her dowry, her jewels, and the contract of marriage; and lastly she was led into the French room, where Napoleon's sister, the queen of Naples, received and embraced her. From Braunau she was conveyed to Munich, from Munich to Strasburg, everywhere accompanied by the acclamations of the German and French populations through which passed that strange spectacle of the daughter of the Cæsars going to wed the fortunate soldier who had conquered the French revolution and Europe. To the fever of war had succeeded a fever of joy and hope.

On the 23rd of March the Empress Marie Louise entered Strasburg, hailed by the same popular enthusiasm. She passed through Luneville, Nancy, and Vitry. It was at Compiègne she was to see Napoleon for the first time, surrounded by his whole court; but to spare her the embarrassment of an official interview, Napoleon set out from Compiègne with Murat to meet her on the road. He took her in his arms, and seemed pleased with the kind of beauty and capacity he thought he perceived in her at first sight. A woman of good constitution, good tempered, simple, becomingly educated, was all he desired. He appeared perfectly happy on entering with her into the château of Compiègne on the evening of the 27th of March.

They remained there until the 30th, when he set out with his new Empress for St. Cloud, where the civil marriage was to be celebrated. The ceremonies which had taken place in Vienna, in conformity with the usages of the old courts, sufficed to render the marriage complete and irrevocable. The repetition at Paris was only a formality due to the nation over which the new sovereign came to reign. It took place on the 1st of April, in presence of the whole imperial court, in the grand gallery of St. Cloud, through the ministry of the arch-chancellor Cambacérès. The repetition of the religious marriage was to take place for the people of Paris on the 2nd of April, in the Tuileries.

On that day Napoleon, preceded by his guard, surrounded by his marshals on horseback, and followed by his family and his court in a hundred magnificent carriages, made his entry into Paris by the triumphal arch de l'Etoile. That monument, the foundation of which had but recently been laid, was erected in a temporary way, almost as it appears at this day. Napoleon passed through the arch in the coronation carriage, the glass panels of which showed him seated by the side of the new Empress. He traversed the Champs Elysées through a double range of sumptuous decorations, and an immense assemblage of people.

He entered the palace of the Tuileries by the garden. The nuptial altar had been erected in the grand saloon, where are now assembled the finest works of art, and which is arrived at through the longest and richest gallery of pictures in the world, which connects the Tuileries with the Louvre. All the opulent population of Paris, splendidly dressed, sat on two rows of benches along that gallery. Napoleon, leading the Empress by the hand, and followed by his family, walked along it to the grand hall, where, in a chapel dazzling with gold and light, he received the nuptial benediction. Enthusiastic cries hailed the close of the ceremony. That day there was a nuptial banquet in the great theatre of the Tuileries. The following days were employed in elegant and magnificent fêtes. All classes took part in the joy which effaced the sombre impressions made by the late war. On seeing Napoleon again all-powerful and happy, people forgot for a while that he had nearly ceased to be so. Seeing him so well married, they believed him definitively established. They put aside the momentary forebodings that crossed their minds as importunate and baseless dreams. They began again to believe in the infinite and everlasting greatness of the empire, as though they had never doubted it. In fact, the victory of Wagram, though not equalling those of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland in the grandeur of its trophies—while it was yet on a par with them as to the genius displayed—the victory of Wagram, completed by the marriage with Marie Louise, replaced Napoleon at his highest degree of power, and if prudence gradually repaired the grand fault of the war in Spain, the last illusions sprung from that marriage might be realised. But that this should be so, something must have been changed which is less changeable than destiny—the character of a man must have been changed, and that man was Napoleon.

END OF VOL. XI.

HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
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&c. &c. &c.

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CONTENTS

OF

THE TWELFTH VOLUME.

BOOK XXXVIII.

CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE.

	PAGE.
SITUATION of the Empire after the Marriage which united the fortunes of France and Austria—Napoleon desires to take advantage of the Peace to calm the spirit of Europe, and to put an end to the War with Spain and England—He hastens to distribute amongst his Allies the territories which he still possesses between the Rhine and the Vistula, with a view to the evacuation of Germany—Distribution of the French Armies in Illyria, Westphalia, Holland, Normandy, and Brittany, with a view to the enforcement of the Continental Blockade, the War in Spain, and Economy—Financial difficulties—Napoleon wishes to make Spain bear part of the expense which she causes—Napoleon's plan of forcing the English to make peace by making them suffer a great reverse in the Peninsula, and by means of the Continental Blockade—State of the Maritime Question and difficult position of the Americans between England and France—American Law of Embargo, and arrest of all the sailors of the United States found in the ports of the Empire—Napoleon's measures for closing the coasts of the continent against England—His embarrassments with respect to Holland, the Hanse towns, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia—Resistance of Holland—Whilst freeing himself from these various toils, Napoleon busies himself in putting an end to the religious disputes—The error of some cardinals on the occasion of his marriage, and the severities which are its consequences—Position of the clergy and the pope—Endeavour to form a provisional administration of the churches, and resistance of the clergy to this administration—Character and conduct of Cardinal Fesch, of Cardinal Maury, and of MM. Duvoisin and Emery—Establishment destined by Napoleon for the papacy in the bosom of the new Empire of the East—Dispatch of two cardinals to Savone to negotiate with Pius VII., and, in case of any excessive difficulty,	

project of a council—Progress of affairs with Holland—Napoleon desires that Holland should cease from all commercial intercourse with Britain, and afford him more efficaciously the assistance of its naval resources—King Louis opposes all the expedients by which this twofold object would be obtained—The king entertains for a moment the idea of revolting against his brother and throwing himself into the arms of England—Yielding to better counsels he renounces this idea and proceeds to Paris for the purpose of negotiating—Fruitless attempts to come to an agreement—Napoleon, hoping nothing from Holland, or his brother, is disposed to unite it to the Empire, and expresses himself frankly on the subject—Delayed in his purpose by the distress of his brother, he imagines a secret plan of negotiating with the British Cabinet, consisting in a proposition to respect the independence of Holland if England consents to treat for peace—M. Fouché takes a part in these various affairs, and points out M. de Labouchère as the most proper person to send on a mission to London—Voyage of M. de Labouchère to England—The English Cabinet is unwilling to excite public feeling by the opening of a negotiation which is not sincere, and dismisses M. de Labouchère with a formal declaration that every equivocal proposition will remain unanswered—The negotiation, half abandoned, is secretly revived by M. Fouché without the knowledge of Napoleon—King Louis submits to the will of his brother and signs a treaty, by virtue of which Holland cedes to France Southern Brabant, as far as the Wahal, agrees to permit our troops to occupy its coasts, and engages to assemble a fleet at the Texel by the First of July—Return of King Louis to Holland—Journey of Napoleon and the Empress to Flanders, Picardy, and Normandy—Great works at Antwerp—Napoleon discovers on his way that the negotiation with England has been revived by M. Fouché—Disgrace of this minister—Conduct of King Louis after his return to Holland—Instead of endeavouring to calm the Dutch, he excites them by the expression of the most exaggerated sentiments—His open opposition to the surrender of the American cargoes, the establishment of the French custom-houses, to the occupation of North Holland, and the formation of a fleet at Texel—Unfortunate occurrence of an insult offered to the French Embassy by the people of Amsterdam—Napoleon, irritated, orders Oudinot to enter Amsterdam with colours flying—King Louis after having made vain efforts to prevent the entry of the French troops into the capital, abdicates the crown in favour of his son, and places this young prince under the regency of Queen Hortense—Upon hearing of this event Napoleon decrees the annexation of Holland to the Empire, and converts this kingdom into seven French departments—His efforts to re-establish its finances and its marine—Vast development of the continental system in consequence of the annexation of this kingdom—New regulation devised for the sale of the colonial merchandize, and permission to effect its sale granted, on payment of a duty of 50 per cent.—Invitation to the states of the continent to adhere to this new system—All agree, with the exception of Russia—Immense seizures in Spain, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany—Terror felt by all the correspondents with England—Re-establishment of relations with America, on condition that it should break off its intercourse with England—General state of commerce at this period—Efficacy and danger of the measures conceived by Napoleon

BOOK XXXIX.

TORRES VEDRAS.

PAGE.

VICISSITUDES of the Spanish war during the latter part of the year 1809—Retreat of the English after the battle of Talavera, and their long inaction in Estremadura—The assembly of the Cortes at the commencement of 1810 determined on—Events in Catalonia and Aragon—Skilful manœuvres of General St. Cyr in Catalonia for covering the siege of Girona—Protracted and heroic defence of this place by the Spaniards—General St. Cyr disgraced and replaced by Marshal Augereau—Conduct of General Suchet in Aragon since the taking of Saragossa—Battles of Alcanitz, Maria, and Belchite—Definitive occupation of Aragon, and its good administration by General Suchet—Troublesome growth of bands of guerillas throughout the whole of Spain, and especially in the North—Unwilling to confine themselves to this species of warfare, the Spaniards desire to commence grand operations, in spite of the advice of the English, and march upon Madrid—The battle of Ocana, and dispersion of the last Spanish army—Consternation and disorder at Seville—Project of the Junta of retiring to Cadiz—Commencement of the year 1810—The French plans for this campaign—Employment of the numerous reinforcements sent by Napoleon—Situation of Joseph at Madrid—His Court—His systems, political and military, opposed to those of Napoleon—Joseph desires to take advantage of the victory of Ocana to invade Andalusia, expecting to find great resources in that province—Notwithstanding his determination to unite all his forces against the English, Napoleon consents to the Andalusian expedition, intending to send his troops from Andalusia to Portugal—March of Joseph upon the sierra Morena—Entry into Baylen, Cordova, Seville, Grenada, and Malaga—The error of not advancing immediately upon Cadiz enables the Junta and the Spanish troops to retire—Commencement of the siege of Cadiz—The 1st Corps appointed to the prosecution of this siege; the 5th sent to Estremadura, the 4th to Grenada—Unfortunate dispersion of the French troops—During the Andalusian expedition Napoleon converts the provinces of the Ebro into military governments, with the view of ultimately uniting them to the empire—King Joseph falls into a state of despair, and sends two of his ministers to Paris to protest against the proposed annexation—After long delay the operations of the campaign of 1810 are at length commenced—Whilst General Suchet besieged the fortifications of Aragon, and Marshal Masséna besieged Cadiz and Badajoz, Marshal Masséna to take Ciudad Rodrigo, and Alméida, and to march immediately upon Lisbon at the head of 80 thousand men—Siege of Lerida—Marshal Masséna having been appointed against his own wish to the command of the army of Portugal arrives at Salamanca in May 1810—Disordered state in which he finds the troops intended to carry on the campaign in Portugal—Bad disposition of his lieutenants—The army reduced at the commencement of the campaign from its proper strength of eighty thousand men, to fifty thousand—Efforts of Marshal Masséna to supply deficiencies—Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Alméida in July 1810—After the taking of the two fortresses, Marshal Masséna prepares to invade Portugal by the valley of

Mondego—Finds great difficulty in procuring means of transport for provisions and ammunition—Passage of the frontier on the 15th of September—The political and military views with regard to the Peninsular, of Sir Arthur Wellesley, now Lord Wellington—Choice of an impregnable position in front of Lisbon, as a means of resisting all the forces Napoleon could send into Spain—Lord Wellington prepares to retreat, first destroying all the resources of the country in front of the advancing French—Retreat of the English army upon Coimbra—Marshal Masséna pursues the English in the valley of Mondego—Difficulties attending his march—The English pause upon the lines of sierra d'Alcoba—Battle of Busaco—The French unable to force the position of Busaco, proceed to turn it—Precipitate retreat of the English upon Lisbon—Energetic pursuit on the part of the French—The English enter upon the lines of Torrès Védras—Description of these famous lines—Marshal Masséna, after having carefully reconnoitred, despairs of forcing them—He determines to blockade them, until the arrival of reinforcements—In the meanwhile, takes up a firm footing upon the Tagus, and prepares a bridge which may enable him to manœuvre upon both sides of the river, and to provision his army at the expense of the rich province of Alentejo—Mission of General Foy to Paris, to inform Napoleon of the events of the Campaign, and to ask him for instructions and for succour—State of the English army in the lines of Torrès Védras—Lord Wellington's disputes with the Portuguese government, and misunderstanding between him and the British Cabinet—State of public feeling in England—Anxiety respecting the fate of the British army, and disposition towards peace—Assumption of the regency by the Prince of Wales—His disposition towards the various parties in the British Houses of parliament—The slightest incident capable of inclining the balance in favour of the opposition and bringing about peace—General Foy's journey across the Peninsula—His arrival in Paris and presentation to the Emperor 111

BOOK XL.

FUENTES D'ONORO.

TENDENCY of Napoleon's ideas at the period of General Foy's arrival in Paris—His interviews with the latter—Necessity for the despatch of a reinforcement of sixty or eighty thousand men to Spain, and the impossibility of sending so many—Napoleon's last encroachments on the coast of the North Sea—Annexation to the Empire of the Hanse Towns, of a part of Hanover, and the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg—The Emperor Alexander's displeasure on hearing that his uncle had been deprived of the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg—Instead of conciliating the Emperor Alexander, Napoleon insists, with threats, on his compliance with his commercial regulations—The Czar resists, and whilst being undesirous of war, prepares for it by ordering the construction of some works on the Dwina and the Dnieper—Napoleon, informed of the course of affairs in St. Petersburg, hastens to make preparations for war whilst Russia, being fully occupied in the East, may be unable to reply to his armaments by imme-

diate hostilities—First idea of a great war in the North—Immense preparations made by Napoleon—Unwilling to diminish the forces under his own command by sending reinforcements to the Peninsula, he contents himself with ordering Generals Dorsenne and Drouet and Marshal Soult to proceed to the assistance of Masséna—Napoleon's illusions respecting the efficacy of this aid—General Foy returns to the army in Portugal—Protracted encampment of this army on the Tagus—Its industry and sobriety—Excellent temper of the troops, and despondency of the Generals—Firm attitude assumed by Masséna—General Drouet traverses the province of Beira and arrives at Leiria—Delight of the army at the appearance of General Drouet's corps—Abatement of this delight when it is discovered that this reinforcement amounts only to seven thousand men—The Generals assemble at Golega to consult respecting the execution of the orders sent from Paris, and resolve to remain on the Tagus, and to attempt to cross it for the purpose of obtaining the resources of Alentejo—General Eblé's admirable efforts to create means for crossing the river—Events in Spain during the period of the encampment on the Tagus—Results of the sieges conducted by General Suchet in Aragon and Catalonia—Tortosa invested at the close of 1810, and captured in January 1811—Preparations for the siege of Tarragona—Events in Andalusia—Dispersion of the army of Andalusia amidst the provinces of Grenada, Andalusia, and Estremadura—Embarrassments of the 4th corps compelled to contend at the same time with the insurgents of Murcia, and those of the mountains of Ronda—Efforts made by the 1st corps with a view to the commencement of the siege of Cadiz—Operations of the 5th corps in Estremadura—Marshal Soult demands a reinforcement of 25,000 men—The order to advance to the assistance of Masséna having arrived in the meanwhile, he positively refuses compliance with it—Instead of marching upon the Tagus he undertakes the siege of Badajoz—Battle of Gévora—Destruction of the Spanish army which endeavoured to raise the siege of Badajoz—Distress suffered by the army of Portugal during the siege of Badajoz—Masséna is at length compelled to retreat upon Mondego, in order to establish himself at Coimbra—The retreat commences on the 4th March, 1811—Successful march of the army, and pursuit of the English—Masséna desires to make a pause of two days at Pombal, for the purpose of giving his sick and wounded and the baggage time to escape—Unfortunate quarrel with General Drouet—Marshal Ney's fears for the safety of his corps, and his disputes with Masséna on this subject—His retreat upon Redinha—Marshal Ney precipitately evacuates Condeixa, whereby the whole army is compelled to fall back upon the road of Ponte-Murcelha, and to renounce the idea of establishing itself at Coimbra—Retreat upon the sierra of Murcelha—A false movement of General Reynier, compels the army to re-enter definitively Old Castille—Appearance of the army on its return to Spain—Masséna's obstinate determination to recommence offensive operations immediately, and to return to the Tagus by Alcantara—Marshal Ney's refusal of obedience—Masséna sends Ney to the rear of the army—Difficulties which prevent Masséna from executing his project of returning to the Tagus—His army in a frightful state of destitution—Empty promises of Marshal Bessières, the commander-in-chief of the

provinces of the North—Advantageous position of Lord Wellington after the retreat of the French, and triumph of the war party in the British Parliament—Lord Wellington leaves a portion of his army before Almeida and sends the remainder to raise the siege of Badajoz—The capture of Badajoz by Marshal Soult—Marshal Soult proceeds to Cadiz after the capture of Badajoz for the purpose of supporting Marshal Victor—Marshal Soult demands, in vain, aid of the army of Portugal—The English invest Badajoz—Plan formed by Masséna during this period—Although very ill-supported by the army of Andalusia, he conceives that it would be excellent policy to throw himself upon the English who blockade Almeida—He begins to put this project into execution on the 2nd of May, instead of on the 24th of April as originally proposed—In consequence of this delay Lord Wellington has time to return to Estremadura to put himself at the head of his army—The battle of Fuentès d'Onoro on the 3rd and 5th of May—Masséna's energy during this memorable battle—Daring escape of the garrison of Almeida—Masséna re-enters Old Castille—The battle of Albuera—Great loss suffered on each side, and continuance of the siege of Badajoz—Noble defence made by the garrison—Difficult position of the French in Spain—The circumstances which rendered fruitless their efforts during the campaigns of 1810 and 1811, and decided the fate of Spain and of Europe—Errors of Napoleon and his lieutenants —Masséna unjustly disgraced	177
---	-----

-BOOK XXXVIII.

CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE.

SITUATION of the Empire after the Marriage which united the fortunes of France and Austria—Napoleon desires to take advantage of the Peace to calm the spirit of Europe, and to put an end to the War with Spain and England—He hastens to distribute amongst his Allies the territories which he still possesses between the Rhine and the Vistula, with a view to the evacuation of Germany—Distribution of the French Armies in Illyria, Westphalia, Holland, Normandy, and Brittany, with a view to the enforcement of the Continental Blockade, the War in Spain, and Economy—Financial difficulties—Napoleon wishes to make Spain bear part of the expense which she causes—Napoleon's plan of forcing the English to make peace by making them suffer a great reverse in the Peninsular and by means of the Continental Blockade—State of the Maritime Question and difficult position of the Americans between England and France—American Law of Embargo, and arrest of all the sailors of the United States found in the ports of the Empire—Napoleon's measures for closing the coasts of the continent against England—His embarrassments with respect to Holland, the Hanse towns, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia—Resistance of Holland—Whilst freeing himself from these various toils, Napoleon busies himself in putting an end to the religious disputes—The error of some cardinals on the occasion of his marriage, and the severities which are its consequences—Position of the clergy and the pope—Endeavour to form a provisional administration of the churches, and resistance of the clergy to this administration—Character and conduct of Cardinal Fesch, of Cardinal Maury, and of M.M. Duvoisin and Emery—Establishment destined by Napoleon for the papacy in the bosom of the New Empire of the East—Dispatch of two cardinals to Savone to negotiate with Pius VII., and, in case of any excessive difficulty, project of a council—Progress of affairs with Holland—Napoleon desires that Holland should cease from all commercial intercourse with Britain and afford him more efficaciously the assistance of its naval resources—King Louis opposes all the expedients by which this two-fold object would be obtained—The king entertains for a moment the idea of revolting against his brother and throwing himself into the arms of England—Yielding to better counsels he renounces this idea and proceeds to Paris for the purpose of negotiating—Fruitless attempts to come to an agreement—Napoleon, hoping nothing from Holland, or his brother, is disposed to unite it to the Empire, and expresses himself frankly on the subject—Delayed in his purpose by the distress of his brother, he imagines a secret plan of nego-

tiating with the British Cabinet, consisting in a proposition to respect the independence of Holland if England consents to treat for peace—M. Fouché takes a part in these various affairs and points out M. de Labouchère as the most proper person to send on a mission to London—Voyage of M. de Labouchère to England—The English Cabinet is unwilling to excite public feeling by the opening of a Negotiation which is not sincere, and dismisses M. de Labouchère with a formal declaration that every equivocal proposition will remain unanswered—The Negotiation, half abandoned, is secretly revived by M. Fouché without the knowledge of Napoleon—King Louis submits to the will of his brother and signs a treaty, by virtue of which Holland cedes to France Southern Brabant, as far as the Wahal, agrees to permit our troops to occupy its coasts, and engages to assemble a fleet at the Texel by the first of July—Return of King Louis to Holland—Journey of Napoleon and the Empress to Flanders, Picardy and Normandy—Great works at Antwerp—Napoleon discovers on his way that the negotiation with England has been revived by M. Fouché—Disgrace of this minister—Conduct of King Louis after his return to Holland—Instead of endeavouring to calm the Dutch, he excites them by the expression of the most exaggerated sentiments—His open opposition to the surrender of the American cargoes, the establishment of the French custom-houses, to the occupation of North Holland, and the formation of a fleet at Texel—Unfortunate occurrence of an insult offered to the French Embassy by the people of Amsterdam—Napoleon, irritated, orders Oudinot to enter Amsterdam with colours flying—King Louis after having made vain efforts to prevent the entry of the French troops into the capital, abdicates the crown in favour of his son, and places this young prince under the regency of Queen Hortense—Upon hearing of this event Napoleon decrees the annexation of Holland to the Empire, and converts this kingdom into seven French departments—His efforts to reestablish its finances and its marine—Vast development of the continental system in consequence of the annexation of this kingdom—New regulation devised for the sale of the colonial merchandize, and permission to effect its sale granted, on payment of a duty of 50 per cent.—Invitation to the states of the continent to adhere to this new system—All agree, with the exception of Russia—Immense seizures in Spain, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany—Terror felt by all the correspondents with England—Re-establishment of relations with America, on condition that it should break off its intercourse with England—General state of commerce at this period—Efficacy and danger of the measures conceived by Napoleon.

HISTORY
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BOOK XXXVIII.

CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE.

NAPOLEON, vanquisher at Wagram, of Austria, and the last efforts of Germany, enriched by new territorial spoils in Galicia, Bavaria, and Illyria, lavishing on his Polish, German, and Italian allies, the provinces torn from his enemies, having extended yet farther towards the East his empire, already so vast in the North, the West, and the South, and husband of an archduchess, seemed to have arrived at that summit of human glory from which his enemies hoped and his friends feared he must now fall. The world, which judges by that which is external, was yet for a time dazzled and had good reason to be so, for with the exception of Russia, where Napoleon was still regarded with much respect, and of Spain, where a vast popular insurrection disputed with him the extremities of the peninsular, the whole continent displayed towards him a profound

submission, and the humility of peoples as well as of kings appeared to be without bounds—England alone, protected by the ocean, continued to escape from this wide spread subjection.

Struck by this spectacle, the royalist and religious party, of all parties the slowest to see clearly and to submit, perceived that its strength was well nigh gone. It began to attach itself to the Imperial dynasty, and many of its members accepted places at court; spreading, either because they believed them or because they sought some excuse for their weakness, the most extraordinary reports. According to these, Napoleon, allied to Marie Antoinette since his marriage with Marie Louise, was about to set aside the proceedings of the past, to reinstate gloriously the memory of Louis XVI, to drive the regicides from the government, perhaps even from the country, and to surround himself with the old court. To these reports a new one was added even more singular; which was, that Moreau, who was very popular amidst the friends of the Bourbons, was about to be recalled from exile and raised to the dignity of Marshal, with the title of the Duke of Hohenlinden. As for the republicans, it would have been difficult to gather any of their expressions of opinion, for they seemed no longer to exist.

A few of them only just survived; hiding both their errors and excesses in darkness and oblivion. But in their place arose a certain disposition both to enquire and to blame, which presaged a state of public feeling very different from that which then prevailed. As yet, however, this germ of an independent spirit was scarcely perceptible, and the prestige which had so long enveloped Napoleon, appeared to be completely re-established.

But there were not wanting reflective minds, which could discern some dangerous elements beneath this outward splendour. Napoleon, by espousing an Austrian Princess, had banished all appearance of probability from his project of overturning the old Dynasties, and in some degree assuaged the bitter hatred with which the Austrians regarded him; but he had not recompensed them for the losses which he had compelled them to endure during fifteen years; he had not consoled Prussia for her reverses, nor made Germany forget her humiliations. He had wounded Prussia incurably in the proceedings with respect to his marriage, and by his loyal but haughty refusal of the convention with respect to Poland; and his Austrian marriage had provided it with a most fertile source of suspicions. Italy remained cruelly lacerated by his seizures of territory; the war in Spain was a constantly

bleeding wound, and the hatred of England a source of hostilities to which there appeared no limit. To meet these various difficulties, it was necessary to maintain in the North, the East and the South, innumerable troops, the support of which was thrown by the peace entirely on France, and to supply which, every French household was filled with grief and desolation. To crown all, although there was not, as yet, any direct schism between them, Napoleon was engaged in the most complicated disputes with the Pope. This state of affairs, which was visible to his enemies, who rejoiced in it, unperceived by his friends, who were unwilling to see it, and comprehended in all its bearings by those wise spirits alone, who are always so rare, and so rarely attended to, was by no means wholly concealed from the discernment of Napoleon; and presented no insurmountable difficulties, if only a moderation which was foreign to his proud and passionate character, and a determination to complete the designs on hand before entering on new ones, had aided him in his struggle with the circumstances by which he was surrounded.

If, for example, he had devoted his utmost attention towards deriving from his recent marriage, the advantages which it offered; gradually instilling a feeling of confidence into Austria, inspiring it with hope, and restoring to it, as the price of a sincere alliance, the Illyrian provinces, which were of no advantage to himself; if he had appeased Germany by a complete evacuation; if he had rather restricted the limits of the Empire, than extended them by continual additions; if, whilst he was endeavouring to render the continental blockade more vigorous, he had not made it a pretext for fresh invasions; if he had thrown into Spain an overwhelming army, and that mightiest of all his forces, himself; if he had refrained from every war until that had been concluded; if he had inflicted on England such a blow in the Peninsular, as would have forced her to sue for peace; if he had known how to manage those religious parties, which he had only flattered for his own ends, and to bring Pius VII. to an arrangement which he desired from the bottom of his heart; if, having secured the Empire from danger without, by a general peace, he had known how to grant some liberty to the spirit which was beginning to arouse itself from within,—he might have hindered a great catastrophe, or at least have prolonged the existence of the too vast edifice which he had raised; we say prolonged, for to have rendered it enduring, he must have courageously removed acquisitions which the very nature of things condemned, he must have renounced the prefectships at Rome, at Florence, and at Laybach, and have confined his dominions

to those limits between the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees, which Europe at that period would not have been inclined to dispute with us ; and how magnificent an empire would that have been, which would have comprised Gênoa, mount Cenis, the Simplon, Geneva, Huninguen, Mayence, Wesel, Antwerp, and Flushing.

It is said, that before it hurls men to destruction, Providence, even as an indulgent mother, warns them and invites them to reflection and amendment. At Eylau, at Baylen, at Essling, Providence had clearly indicated to Napoleon the bounds beyond which he should not attempt to pass, and in granting him the victory at Wagram, after the difficult Austrian campaign, in bestowing upon him a wife of the blood of the Cæsars to bear him an heir to his new empire, it seems to have been granting him time to retrace his steps, and to attain a position of safety. Napoleon's rare penetration perceived the true value of the moment, and was anxious to seize the good it offered ; since his return to Paris he had devoted himself to reassuring Europe, of appeasing Germany, of putting an end to the war in Spain, of disarming or of vanquishing England, of arranging the French finances, silencing religious disputes, and in short, of bestowing repose upon an exhausted world. Unhappily, he set to work to remove these difficulties in the same spirit as that in which he had aroused them ; instead of untying the knot, he strove to break it, and from this period his genius, always vast, was less happy in its movements, and less adroit.

One of his first acts after his marriage, was to address a circular to the diplomatic agents of the empire, from which they were to take their official tone ; " This circular," wrote Napoleon to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was charged with its compilation, " will not be printed, but it will serve as a text-book to my agents. You will say in it, that one of the principal means which the English make use of for the purpose of reviving the flame of continental war, is a supposition that I intend to overthrow the Dynasties. Circumstances having placed me in the position of having to choose a spouse, I have been anxious to deprive them of this terrible pretext, for exciting nations and sowing anew those seeds of discord which have already covered Europe with blood. Nothing has appeared to me more calculated to calm these disquietudes than a demand by me in marriage of an Arch-duchess of Austria. The brilliant and distinguished qualities of the Arch-duchess Marie-Louise, of which I have had particular information, have induced me to act in conformity with my policy. My demand having been made, and agreed to by the Emperor of Austria, the Prince of Neufchatel has &c. I

have been much rejoiced at this opportunity of reconciling two great nations, of giving a proof of my esteem for the Austrian nation, and the inhabitants of the city of Vienna. You will add that I desire that their language should be consistent with the ties of kindred which unite me to the House of Austria, without however uttering any expression which could effect my intimate alliance with the Emperor of Russia."

All the policy of Napoleon at this moment was directed to these ends. To enter into an alliance with Austria, to which bonds of kindred now attached him, without becoming alienated from Russia, which he had not ceased to make the groundwork of his system of alliance, was for some time his chief object. He hastened to effect the evacuation of the Austrian States, showed an accommodating disposition in respect to the payment of the war contributions, consented to a loan which Austria desired to open at Amsterdam, and even favoured it by an indirect intervention; and listened complacently to some vague discourse, with reference to the final settlement of the Illyrian provinces, the restitution of which would have been a handsome marriage gift for the court of Vienna. The most gracious reception was accorded to M. de Metternich, whom the Emperor Francis had sent to Paris to arrange the new relations between the two countries, which would be the result of the marriage.

M. de Metternich on entering the Austrian Cabinet, in which he remained for almost forty years, introduced a policy which differed much from that of his predecessors—that of a good understanding with France. In order to prepare the way for this he was anxious to visit Paris; firstly to guide the first steps of the young Empress in a court of which he knew all the intricacies, and secondly to obtain certain knowledge whether the conqueror was about to adopt pacific views in the midst of the sweets of a brilliant marriage, or only intended to make it the starting point for new and vaster enterprises. Some weeks devoted to this twofold object would not be time lost, and the Emperor Francis had consented that his future Minister, before entering on his duties, should undertake at Paris this important mission.

Napoleon received Metternich most graciously and made every effort to please him. He was above all things anxious that he should witness the happiness of the young Empress, and be able to calm the anxiety which the Emperor Francis felt with regard to the fortunes of his daughter. One day, indeed, M. de Metternich having demanded an interview with the Emperor at a time when he happened to be with the Empress, he was immediately conducted to the private apart-

ments of the Palace, and Napoleon himself led him to the chamber of Marie-Louise, saying, "come and see with your own eyes the wretchedness of your young Arch-Duchess and the state of continual terror in which she passes her days;" and then, after a few moments, he added, leaving the room, "I leave you with Madam, that you may receive her confidences, hearken to her complaints, and be able to report them to the Emperor Francis!" M. de Metternich, surprised and almost embarrassed by such freedom, remained with the Empress, who appeared perfectly happy in her new position, and said to him with more spirit than she was in the habit of showing, "I suppose you think at Vienna that I live in great awe of my redoubtable husband! Ah! well, you may tell my countrymen that he is more afraid of me than I of him." And indeed, when Marie-Louise happened to be guilty of some inadvertence, which was very excusable in the midst of persons and circumstances which were equally strange to her, Napoleon scarcely dared to speak to her on the subject, and gave her by the mouth of M. de Meneval or the Arch-Chancellor the advice which he hesitated to give in his own person.

The conversation of M. de Metternich with Marie-Louise had continued almost an hour, when some one tapped at the door and Napoleon entered, saying gaily—"Ah, well! Madam, you have told it all? you have laid bare your whole heart? And this marriage is much to be regretted, is it not, as regards the happiness of the woman whom it has made my wife? Write all that you have heard to the Emperor Francis without scruple and without reserve." He then carried off M. de Metternich to discuss with him those weighty matters which would naturally employ the interviews between Napoleon and a person who was destined soon to become the first Minister of the court of Vienna. Unfortunately, in the midst of all this ostentatious suavity, Napoleon, when serious affairs came to be discussed, when this or that power was the subject of his discourse, would give way to sallies of haughtiness, rancour, and ambition, which terrified him whom he was so anxious to conciliate. Thus this lion which at one moment slumbered beneath the hand which caressed it, would at the next arouse itself with roars, if any unexpected object had excited its terrible instincts.

The relations with Russia were still in an unsettled state, disturbed as they had been by Napoleon's abrupt withdrawal from the projected marriage, by the tone which he had adopted towards that country, immediately upon his alliance with Austria, and his rejection of the convention relating to Poland. With respect to the projected marriage, indeed,

Napoleon had instructed M. de Coulaingcourt to assert at St. Petersburg, that the hesitation of the Russian Court, and above all, the extreme youth of the Princess had forced him to accept the Austrian Archduchess, in whose person were united all those qualifications which were most calculated to effect, and had already effected, a sincere intimacy between the courts of Paris and Vienna, whilst there was nothing in this marriage which could cause any alteration in the political system of alliances which remained based, as it ever had been, on an intimate union between the two empires of the east and the west; that Napoleon earnestly desired that the Russians might be victorious over the Turks, and that the Emperor Alexander might secure possession of the left bank of the Danube, namely Moldavia and Wallachia, in conformity with the secret stipulations of Tilsit; that, with regard to Poland, he was at all times ready to sign an agreement not to favour any attempt to re-establish the ancient kingdom of Poland, but that he could not enter into any general, absolute, and too presumptuous engagement, that Poland should never be re-established as a kingdom.—“That,” to use his own words, “depends neither on the Emperor Alexander nor on me, whatever may be our greatness, but on God, who is more powerful than either. I can undertake not to provoke, yea, even not to assist the designs of Providence, but I cannot promise to fetter them!” Exquisite modesty! which once more came to his aid, and which was always of such great use to him, as a shield against the arguments of his adversaries! But the point of the sword gleamed out from amidst all this complaisance, as he added expressions of the deep regret with which he saw that Russia desired to pass beyond the line of the Danube, and further expressed an earnest hope, that in return for Finland, which was already, and for Moldavia and Wallachia, which were about to be annexed to her dominions, she would maintain the most rigorous hostility towards England. All which was said in a mingled tone of courtesy, friendship and haughtiness, which would not have wounded a power entirely friendly, but was ill-calculated to reassure an ally partially estranged. M. de Romanoff at St. Petersburg, and M. de Kourakin at Paris, listened to these explanations with an appearance of great satisfaction, for Alexander was unwilling to show any dissatisfaction he might feel, lest it should be attributed to the failure of that matrimonial treaty, to which he had only assented in the hope that it might secure to him the acquisition of the left bank of the Danube; and to fulfil this part of his duty to the utmost of his power, M. de Kourakin, although attacked with gout on the day of the

marriage ceremony, caused himself to be carried, covered with gold and precious stones, to the Chapel of the Louvre, that he might display, in the midst of his anguish, an expression of joy which was sufficiently laughable, and exhaust himself in praises of the beauty of the young Empress, so far as to embarrass M. de Metternich himself, who, not knowing how to reply to the Russian's repeated compliments, at length said: "Yes, she is fair, but not pretty."

Always active, Napoleon lost no time in arranging matters with a view to his wise intention of evacuating Germany. By the last treaty of peace he had preserved the two Tyrols, the German and the Italian, and acquired Salzburg and some districts upon the right of the Inn. Of his former conquests there remained to him the principality of Bayreuth in the high palatinate, Hainault and Fuld in Franconia, Erfurt and many other districts in Saxony, Maidenbourg in Westphalia, and Hanover in the north of Germany. These various territories he now resolved to distribute, and, after having extorted part of their value in the shape of money or gifts to his generals, to withdraw from them all the troops which were not necessary for the defence of the new kingdom of Westphalia.

Napoleon, as was natural, transferred to Bavaria all that he had acquired on the Inn and in Upper Austria; and resigned to it L'Inviertel, Salzburg, the German Tyrol, and a part of the Italian Tyrol, reserving to the kingdom of Italy that portion which was necessary to give it a good border line. He granted, moreover, to Bavaria the Principality of Ratisbon, and the Principality of Bayreuth. All which liberality went far to indemnify Bavaria for its exertions and expenses during the last war; and whilst these various arrangements sufficiently enlarged the territories of his allies, they rendered their boundaries more convenient. Ulm fell to the lot of Wurtemberg, whilst Ratisbon and Bayreuth were transferred to Bavaria.

As the price of these concessions of territory, Napoleon demanded that no recompense should be required for the support of his armies whilst in Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden. To Marshal Davoust, whose well known energy and probity were the best of guarantees, was entrusted the due execution of the evacuation.

Napoleon demanded also of Bavaria that the grants which had been made to soldiers of all grades in the ceded provinces, should be confirmed, or redeemed at a fixed rate; and further, that it should advance a sum of thirty million francs in repayment of the vast expenses to which he had

been put by this campaign. But even under these conditions Bavaria obtained advantages which fully balanced the sacrifices she was called upon to make. Napoleon recommended her to bestow upon the Tyrol, the possession of which was now fully confirmed to her, a satisfactory constitution, as he had, in ceding to Baden the various ports of the Palatinate, demanded fair treatment for the Catholics; for it was a remarkable trait in his character, that when the hero was not misled by his passions, the wisdom and humanity of the statesman were alike visible.

Our allies of the south of Germany having been satisfied and their territories evacuated, Napoleon bestowed all his attention upon its central and northern territories; and took into consideration the fortunes of the Prince Primate, late elector and archbishop of Mayence, who had become chancellor and president of the confederation of the Rhine, and whose endowment was partly in the principality of Ratisbon, which had been lately granted to Bavaria, and partly in the tolls of the Rhine navigation, which produced a very variable and uncertain revenue. Napoleon desired to show favour to this prince, who was devoted to his interests, and bestowed upon him the principalities of Fulda and Hainault, on condition that he should cede some portions of territory to the Duchies of Hainault and Hesse-Darmstadt, Ratisbon to Bavaria, and the Rhine dues to the Treasury Extraordinary.

By this arrangement a new advantage accrued to Napoleon, which had reference to the fortunes of Prince Eugene, who remained without princely endowment in consequence of the Austrian marriage. There was no longer any hope of an act of adoption in favour of the Viceroy, since there was every expectation that Napoleon would have children; and as it never entered into Napoleon's views to separate the kingdom of Italy from the Empire, the Prince Eugene, possessed for the term of his own life of the Viceroyalty of Italy, had no territory descendible to his heirs. Of a sweet and submissive temperament, this prince was very dear to Napoleon, who was the more anxious to treat him with no neglect, as he had already caused him deep pain by the repudiation of his mother the Empress Josephine; and moreover, the Princess Augusta of Bavaria, whom the Viceroy had espoused, a lady worthy of her rank and endowed with a remarkable strength of character, attacked him with earnest remonstrances, reminding him of the duty he had imposed upon himself by taking her from one of the most ancient thrones in Europe to make her the wife of a man who had neither princely birth nor patrimony: and

she urged that he ought not leave her, in the midst of this distribution of crowns, without some endowment for her children. These remonstrances of the princess, and the pining grief of the Prince Eugene, touched Napoleon, and he bestowed upon them the reversion of the new grant which he was creating in favour of the Prince Primate, under the title of the Principality of Frankfort; the feeble health of the Primate affording a fair expectation that he would not long withhold its enjoyment from the family of the Prince Eugene.

In his desire to hasten the distribution and evacuation of the German territories, Napoleon proceeded to arrange with King Jerome various territorial and financial disputes which were still pending, and were the source of much uneasiness to the two brothers. King Jerome had caused some dissatisfaction to Napoleon during the last war, not from want of energy when in action, but from a certain dilatoriness in the conduct of the campaign; besides this, his administration had expended more in the service of luxury than in objects of utility, his system of government was not such as pleased the Germans, and he had permitted those of the French donees who had received grants of territory in Westphalia to suffer such vexations as Napoleon, in his zeal for the welfare of his soldiers would never have allowed them to endure. Nevertheless as King Jerome alone all of his brothers possessed a truly military spirit, and was always submissive and devoted, he continued to treat him with indulgence, although sometimes showing towards him, as towards all his family occasionally, an extreme severity.

He resolved therefore to bestow upon him Magdeburg and also Hanover, which was a large and fair portion yet unappropriated. Nor did this arrangement present any great additional obstacle in the way of a peace with England, for she seemed to have adopted a feeling that Hanover was not English, and it was sometimes even said that she was rejoiced at its loss. In return for this gift King Jerome undertook to maintain during the whole continuance of the war an army of 18,500 French troops, to be quartered in Westphalia; to pay the extraordinary contributions to the war which were still due from Hanover, and to recognize all the grants made in that country to the French soldiers.

Under these conditions King Jerome was declared Sovereign of Hesse, Westphalia and Hanover, having Cassel for his capital, and Magdeburg for his citadel, and becoming second only to the King of Prussia in the order of German Sovereigns.

These arrangements having been made, there remained in

our possession only the town of Erfurt, together with some tracts of country destined for the King of Saxony, grand duke of Warsaw ; and the affairs of Germany were now settled in a manner calculated to endure just so long as the French empire.

In the preceding arrangements it will be observed that the support of a body of French troops was the price to be paid for the cession of Hanover ; a condition which was at variance with Napoleon's idea of propitiating Germany by the withdrawal of his armies. But two reasons induced him to defer the complete execution of this plan, the one being founded on the state of Prussia, and the other having reference to the execution of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, which constituted what is called the continental blockade. The conduct of Prussia had been at times most unhappy and inconsistent, for nothing is more inconsistent than the agitated movements of distress. Whilst protesting its submission to the hard conditions signed at Tilsit ; whilst affecting the greatest resignation, and manifesting an eager desire to repress the revolt of Schill, it sympathized most ardently with the patriotic struggles which it undertook to suppress, and for a moment indulged in the hope that it might be able to escape from the yoke which had fallen upon Germany. Nothing could be more natural and, let us add, more legitimate than this feeling, but unhappily for herself, Prussia had mingled these sentiments with actions of the gravest imprudence. She had recruited her regiments, bought horses, and collected certain bodies of troops under pretext of preparing the contingent promised to France ; a pretext which was little calculated to blind a vision so keen as that of Napoleon. Prussia had moreover, in further pursuance of this line of conduct, made great delay in the payment of the contributions due from her, having permitted almost at the commencement of the war of 1809, bills to the amount of 22 millions, which she had subscribed to the treasury extraordinary to be protested. At first Napoleon had appeared to allow this delay to pass unnoticed, but after the peace of Vienna he had demanded the fulfilment of the obligation in a tone too peremptory to be disregarded ; for although the Prussian court persisted in dwelling at Königsberg partly from chagrin and partly from policy, it was no less in the power of Napoleon, and it found itself compelled to pay something, if not the whole. —“ You have lost the opportunity,” said Napoleon, “ of rising, which was open to you by the exercise of simple good faith towards France. Had you been able to foresee that the last rising in Austria would lead only to defeat and fresh confiscations of territories, you would, without being compelled to augment the number of your troops, or

to increase your expenses, have closely allied yourself to me, have furnished me with the contingent of fifteen thousand men, which you promised, have honoured your signature, paid the twenty-two millions, and proved that you had frankly adopted the policy, which must always be yours, of a French alliance. I should then, most probably, have freed you from the remainder of your obligations, have exalted your position, enlarged your territories, and replaced you in the elevated position from which you have fallen. The adoption of this course would, it is very likely, have obtained for you Magdeburg, or even Hanover. But instead of aiding, you have threatened me, instead of spending money in the payment of your debt to me, you have expended it in arming against me; I am the victor, and it is time that you should expiate your errors, not by fresh losses of territory, but by the performance, at least, of your engagements; by the delay of which, you force me to leave garrisons on the Oder, and as a support to these garrisons to maintain troops on the Elbe. This continued military occupation of territory burdens me with heavy expenses and, which I much regret, forces me to make in the bosom of Germany a military demonstration which is an interruption to my political plans. You have deprived me of the revivifying repose for which I longed, and have done me as much moral as material injury. It is necessary that this state of things should come to an end, or I will take measures for paying myself; I will seize one of your provinces, Silesia perhaps, and give it to any one who will pay me what you owe!"

Such was the language which Napoleon held towards Prussia, accompanying it with detailed accounts, of which he demanded the settlement. Prussia, ever since the reduction of her debt, had remained a debtor of eighty-six millions, and Napoleon insisted that this debt should be satisfied by a payment of forty-eight millions, in monthly instalments, whilst the remaining thirty-eight millions were to be supplied by means of a Dutch loan. Terrified, Prussia promised full satisfaction of his demands, whilst she secretly determined to escape from the necessity of obeying them. Napoleon perceiving that if he abandoned the military posts which he held as pledges, his debt would never be paid, resolved to continue to occupy them with French and Polish troops; the latter having become, by training in our school, most excellent soldiers, and although nominally belonging to the King of Saxony, being in reality entirely devoted to the French cause. Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin, received Saxon Polish regiments, and as the French Artillery and Engineer corps of these places formed no more than a fifth-part of the effective

strength, the garrisons appeared to have lost their French character. To the troops in Stettin, which was of most importance, and was on the shore of the Baltic, Napoleon added a regiment of infantry, borrowed from the division of Marshal Davoust. Dantzic had become a sort of Hanseatic town, endowed with a fictitious independence and by treaty bound to receive, when a maritime war should render it needful, a French garrison. Under the specious and well grounded pretext, that the English would be eager to possess themselves of a town which was precious on account of its port, and its situation on the Vistula, he established there a garrison similar to those on the Oder, but of greater strength. And thus in a time of perfect peace, Napoleon took possession, with a force, which under the appearance of being Polish, was in reality French, of those important places, the possession of which gave him complete command of the Oder and the Vistula.

These military occupations were, there can be no doubt, irreconcilable with the peaceable spirit which Napoleon's policy had for the moment assumed, but they served to control Prussia, and would be a formidable base of operations against Russia if ever hostilities should be renewed with that power. Besides the Prussian debt, the threatening presence of the English in the Baltic, and the necessity of occupying the shore of this sea for the sake of watching the execution of the laws of blockade, offered sufficient explanation of the presence of the French troops to prevent their prolonged stay from destroying entirely the good effect produced by the evacuation of the rest of Germany. Besides these measures it was necessary to take others for the support of the garrisons on the Vistula and the Oder, to compel the Hanse towns to renounce commercial intercourse with Great Britain, and to coerce Holland, which paid no more attention to the continental blockade than as if it had been governed by a German or English Prince. Even when the governments attempted to keep good faith the communities under their charge were little affected by the existence of the blockade, and pursued a contraband trade which the most vigorous measures failed to prevent. The circumstance that the English trade was scarcely at all cramped with Holland, which had become a French monarchy, sufficiently proved the difficulty of maintaining efficiently the continental blockade, and Napoleon having just now both leisure and troops at his disposal, determined to conduct in person this kind of warfare, which was certainly the most effective he could possibly have directed against England.

Having carried the policy of evacuation to the furthest

extent, Napoleon distributed his troops with great ability, and with strict regard to the various objects of calming the apprehension of Germany, supporting the garrisons of the Vistula and the Oder, occupying the coasts of the Baltic, the north sea and Holland, of reassembling an army at the camp of Boulogne, of dispatching considerable reinforcements to Spain, and finally of putting in force that system of economy which the state of his finances rendered so necessary. He had sent to Laybach the army of Dalmatia, which had come from Zara to Vienna under the command of Marshal Marmont, and he decided that it should be supported by the Illyrian provinces. He had sent the army of Italy to the plains of Friuli, Venice, and Lombardy. He had from time to time turned back towards Spain all the reinforcements which had been marched upon the Danube, during the negotiations which were to put an end to the Austrian war. There remained the three corps of the Marshalls Davoust, Massena, and Oudinot, which constituted the strength of the grand army at Ratisbon, Essling and Wagram. Withdrawn successively from the Austrian base of operations in Bavaria and Swabia, they had subsisted during the treaty upon the provinces intended for the allies, the cost of their maintenance being defrayed to these monarchs in advance, in the shape of ceded territories. Napoleon finally adopted the following mode of distribution. The corps of Marshal Oudinot, which was composed of a division of old regiments under the brave general, St. Hilaire, and of two divisions of the fourth battalions, was broken up and distributed along the coasts of France. The regiments of St. Hilaire's division were divided between Cherbourg, St. Malo, and Brest, as a menace against England; and the two divisions of the fourth battalions, which belonged to the regiments engaged in the war with Spain, were quartered in the neighbourhood of Rochfort in Bordeaux, to be ready to throw themselves upon the Pyrenees, if the hundred thousand men already sent thither should prove insufficient. The corps of Marshal Massena, more distinguished for its valour than its numbers, passed from Swabia to Franconia, and descended the Rhine to occupy the camp at Boulogne, Brabant, and the frontiers of Holland; the chief division being established at Embden, to be in connection with the Hanse towns.

Napoleon determined that the corps of Marshal Davoust, which was altogether the finest and best disciplined, should supply the troops for the occupation of the North of Germany; and he had many reasons for this choice. By always fixing the residence of this corps in northern climates he

hoped to preserve to it its vigorous temperament, its warlike manners, and to almost entirely destroy its remembrance of its native soil. Its troops, moreover, as sober and steadfast as their chief, were exactly suited to a kind of service which exposed those who were charged with its execution to a dangerous corruption. And finally, if it should ever become necessary to give a decided blow to the Great Empire of the North, this corps would serve as the head of the weapon ; for, we must unhappily repeat, Napoleon cherished in the midst of projects for a sincere peace, those warlike ideas which were sooner or later to overthrow the most pacific resolutions.

The three divisions, Morand, Friant, and Gudin, although almost completely organized, yet underwent some modification. One of the regiments of the St. Hilaire division was annexed to them, together with General Bruyère's division of cuirassiers, the light cavalry division of General Jacquinot, and a vast park of siege artillery. The expenses of this superb corps were divided between the kingdom of Westphalia, the Hanse towns, and the places held in pledge. General Gudin was directed to watch Hanover, General Morand the Hanse towns, and General Friant Magdeburg and the Elbe. To Marshal Davoust fell the duty of occupying himself under the cold climate of the North with the instruction of the troops and the rigorous application of the laws of blockade.

The divisions of heavy cavalry which had habitually served under Marshal Davoust re-entered France, with the exception of the Bruyère division, which remained in the North. The cuirassiers of Spain, now the cuirassiers of Padua, were put upon a peace footing and quartered in Normandy, where fodder abounded. The carabiniers and the cuirassiers, formerly St. Germain, were spread over Lorraine and Alsatia. The men past service returned to their homes with rewards ; the young soldiers were sent back to their dépôts to receive further instructions. The cavalry regiments were reduced from the effective force of a thousand horses to that of about six hundred. The horses of the artillery, always a source of great expense, were partly sent to Illyria, where they were fed at the cost of a conquered province, partly to Alsatia and Lorraine, where Napoleon had sometimes thought of entrusting them to the peasants, partly to Spain where it was necessary to provide vast parks of artillery for the siege of the fortified places. Finally the useless staffs were dissolved ; that attached to Davoust's corps alone being retained upon a war footing.

Napoleon, willing to grant some repose to the population

of the Empire, and to permit it to taste the sweets of peace had resolved to levy no conscription in 1810. He calculated on a double saving, by the reduction of the standing army, and the relinquishment for the present year of the expenses of the equipment of recruits. He had proposed to send to Spain, independently of the guard which he wished to forward in all its completeness to the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of a hundred thousand men, to be followed by a reserve of thirty thousand, for the supply of which, the levies of the preceding and the current years were sufficient. We have seen that the provisional demi-brigades, formed of fourth and fifth battalions, at first led towards Swabia, Franconia, and Flanders, and subsequently turned towards Spain, had been definitely forwarded to the Pyrenees. Napoleon supplied them with all that the dépôts afforded, in order that they might arrive in the Peninsula as complete as possible. He took all the disposable strength to be found in the dépôts of the light cavalry to the twelve regiments of Chasseurs and Hussars, which were still in Spain. He had broken up during the Austrian campaign, the twenty-four regiments composing the Dragoon force, the third and fourth battalions, in order to conduct them to the Danube in temporary groups. When peace had been concluded, he sent them towards the Pyrenees, drafting into their ranks all the conscripts of the last levies, who were suitable for service in this arm; in this manner all the dragoons had been thrown into Spain.

By these various contrivances, in the employment of which he excelled, Napoleon had preserved the nucleus of a powerful army in the north, had surrounded the Hanse towns with a net-work of troops of observation, had lightened as far as possible the expenses of his armies and thrown upon the Peninsula all his disposable forces. Spain, he said, must pay the expenses of the war of which she is the theatre and the cause. Napoleon entertained an angry feeling with respect to this war, which made itself felt not only by the country, but by King Jerome himself; for the latter, living in a state of humiliating subjection, and discontented with the arrogance of the French generals towards himself and their excesses against the Spaniards, either affected to, or really did believe, that if left to his own course, he could do more by means of his own persuasions towards effecting the pacification of Europe, than Napoleon would ever do by his armies, and had drawn upon himself both blame and suspicion.

Napoleon irritated at the immense expenses which yet left our armies in want of every necessary, wrote to Joseph

the most severe and peremptory letters. "The whole revenue of France will not suffice for the expenses of the Spanish army, unless I put to them some limit. My empire is drained of men and money, and I am compelled to pause. The last Austrian war has cost me more than was estimated; the Walcheren expedition has drawn from my treasury the most considerable sums, and if I continue this extravagance, my treasury will be completely exhausted. It is necessary, therefore, that the war in Spain should support itself, and that the King should furnish the chief part of the expense of the artillery, the remounts for the cavalry, of the hospitals, and of the subsistence of the troops. All that I shall be able to afford, will be a supply of two millions a month for the pay. I can do no more. Spain is a wealthy country, and well able to bear the expenses of which she is the cause. The King is fond of cherishing at Madrid the favourites to whom he owes no gratitude; let him take care of the soldiers to whom he owes his crown. Should he not do this, I will deprive him of the administration of the Spanish provinces; I will govern them by the hands of my generals, and take care to collect from them, as from all the other countries in which my troops have been quartered, the necessary expenses. Let these intimations be attended to, for my determination is irrevocable, and it is irrevocable because it is founded on unavoidable necessity."

Napoleon had good reason to be uneasy with respect to the finances; for to preserve well organised, and well provided, the numerous armies by means of which he controlled Europe, from the Vistula to the Tagus, from Calais to the borders of the Save, he had to expend as much gold as men, and in carrying on an actual campaign, he was in as much danger of exhausting his treasury as of depopulating the country. He had for many years passed the proper limit of expenses by about fifty millions in time of peace, and about eighty or a hundred in time of war. The last Austrian campaign had cost even more than this last amount, and had been maintained out of the "Treasury of the Army," known by the title of the "Treasury Extraordinary;" and this, although very considerable, was now seriously diminished, for it was from this source that Napoleon rewarded his soldiers, furnished grand monuments for the capital, and aided distressed populations. This treasury was reduced, as has already been said, at the moment of the Austrian war, to 292 millions. This war had increased it by 170 millions, the sale of the Spanish wools had added to it ten millions, a cession of the treasure upon the mount Napoleon, ten millions more, and it had

thus reached the amount of 492 millions. Napoleon had borrowed of it, eighty-four millions for the Austrian war, twenty-eight for the Louvre and various public buildings, twelve for dotations, four for some extraordinary expenses of the crown, and it was left at 354 millions.

It must be added, that this sum did not wholly consist of actual treasure, for it was partly made up of charges on the vanquished states, and the chief of these consisted in the eighty-six millions owed by Prussia, the payment of which, Napoleon had some difficulty, as we have seen, in obtaining. And we must observe, that the eighty-four millions borrowed of this treasury, for the Austrian campaign, do not represent the whole expense of that war, which had amounted altogether to a total of 480 millions.

It was necessary then to husband this "Treasure Extraordinary." Napoleon knew very well, that with armies maintained in Illyria, Italy, Germany, Holland, and Spain, although a portion of them were supported by the occupied countries, the sum of 350 millions, granted to the two Ministers of War, would not suffice. He foresaw that an excess of forty or fifty millions would disturb the fictitious balance of the Revenue, and he had provided more than one resource by which to supply this amount. These resources consisted, first, of the possessions of the great Spanish families, prosecuted as guilty of high treason, and secondly, of the numerous seizures of the goods of the false neutrals who had thronged all the ports, both of the empire and its allies, which also amounted to several hundred millions. Napoleon hoped therefore, by observing a rigid economy, to be able to meet the expenses of those armies which the state of Europe, quiet but not resigned, and the Spanish war, successfully prosecuted, but not terminated, required.

We are now able to form some idea on the projects which Napoleon had conceived, for putting an end to his long conflict with Europe. The troops which were to evacuate Germany, were still to hold the north of the continent in check, and to guard the coasts against British commerce, whilst the young recruits which the Austrian war no longer required, were to be incorporated with the old Spanish army, which they would complete and invigorate. He proposed to join his own guard, which he had sent forward in the spring of 1810, after having given it some months of repose, to gather under his own command a hundred thousand men to drive the English into the sea, and by the infliction of a terrible disaster, to give an irresistible preponderance to the peace party in the English parliament.

Besides the infliction of a great blow on the English army,

Napoleon had resolved on another efficacious means of obtaining peace, and this was, the rigorous observance of the continental blockade, which had been maintained with rigor in the ports of old France alone, had been much relaxed in the ports of new France, and had been totally disregarded in the allied states, such as Hanover, Holland, the Hanse towns, and Denmark. His ardour for this kind of warfare was not less than that which he felt for that which is waged on the battle field. To inflict a great blow on England, it was not only necessary to drive from the continent her cotton fabrics, or metallurgical products, but also her colonial merchandize, such as sugar, coffee, unmanufactured cotton, dyes, woods, &c., which constituted the money with which the inhabitants of the West and East Indies paid for the manufactured products of Manchester and Birmingham. Indeed, not only did its own colonies pay in colonial merchandize, but also the French and Dutch colonies which it had become possessed of, and it was obliged to dispose of this in Europe, before it could obtain the price of its commercial and industrial operations. For the disposal of this merchandize, the English had put in practice some sufficiently ingenious contrivances. Thus, besides the great dépôt of London, where all the neutrals were obliged to touch, to take in a part of their cargo, they had established other dépôts at Acre, Malta, and Heligoland, where they accumulated enormous heaps of merchandize, and whither the contraband traders went to obtain the materials for their clandestine traffic. At Heligoland, for example, they had formed a singular establishment. Heligoland is an island situated in the North Sea, opposite the mouth of the Elbe, divided into a low part where it is easy to disembark from ships, and a high part with which the only communication is by a ladder of two hundred steps, which could be easily destroyed in a few moments. Six hundred English, provided with a numerous artillery, defended this high part and the magazines which were established there, containing merchandize of the value of three or four hundred millions. An English flotilla cruised constantly about the low part of the island to defend the approaches. It was from them that the contraband trades obtained the merchandize which they carried into the continent in spite of the laws of Napoleon. The farmers who cultivated the lands along the coasts were the receivers of these smuggled goods, which were taken from them during the night and spread abroad far and wide; and this kind of fraud was practised not only in the Hanse towns, but throughout the whole of Holland, notwithstanding its connections with France. The populations of these various countries aided the contrabandists to the utmost of

their power, joined with them in assailing the custom-house officers, in disarming them, and seducing them from their duty.

Independently of this contraband trade, almost open smuggling was carried on by pretended neutrals, who introduced the interdicted products in abundance into the ports of France or its allies.

To understand the part played by these false neutrals, we must recall to recollection the English and French decrees, so often cited in this history, and composing then the maritime legislation. The English had in 1806 declared all the ports of France, from Brest to the mouths of the Elbe, in a state of blockade, although they had not sufficient force to close them. Napoleon had immediately replied to this fictitious blockade by a general blockade of the British Isles, had prohibited all communication with them, and interdicted access to his ports, not only to all English ships, but to all that had touched at her shores or those of her colonies.

To this decree England had replied by those famous orders in council of 1807, which forbade any neutral ship from sailing on the seas, which had not touched at the port of London, at Malta, or certain other British ports, for the purpose of having its cargo examined, of paying enormous tolls, and taking out a license of navigation. It was to this extraordinary assumption of authority over the ocean that Napoleon had replied by his decree of Milan, which declared denationalized and fair prizes whatever ships should have submitted to the rules of this odious legislation.

Between these two tyrannies, therefore, the unhappy mariners of neutral nations found themselves; compelled on the one hand to visit London for the sake of obtaining the required license, and exposed on the other hand to capture by the French for having taken it. It is impossible to urge any excuse for either of these tyrannical enactments; unless it may be alleged in extenuation of the second of them that it was provoked by the first. The English pushed their demands to the extent that all the naval commerce of the Mediterranean was compelled to touch at Malta, and all that of other seas at London, to obtain the license, without which a vessel was liable to seizure. The Dutch, for example, who obtained the salt which they required for their salted provisions on the coast of France, were forced to pay in London for permission to import this important element of their chief branch of trade.

The Americans, indignant at this double violation of the rights of neutrals, which they chiefly attributed to the fault of the English, whom they considered to have given the first

provocation, had passed an act, called the law of Embargo, by which they had prohibited their vessels from navigating between France and England, and even from entering Europe. They had thus confined their commerce to their own coasts, and had formed a resolution to manufacture their own cotton, and declared liable to seizure every French or English ship which should touch on the American coasts.

The American owners of privateers, however, less proud than the American government, had to a large extent infringed these laws, which were more dictated by feelings of honour than those of interest. As therefore the Embargo only referred to those which had entered the ports, the greater number of these persons had kept their vessels afloat on the open sea, in the hope that the new regulations would only last for one or two years, and they went from port to port on account of the houses by which they had been chartered. Almost all proceeded to England where they took in cargoes of the colonial produce with which the warehouses of London overflowed, and sometimes on their own account, but more frequently on the account of English, Dutch, Hanseatic, Danish, or Russian merchants, taking out licences, had themselves conveyed by the British fleets, entered Cronstadt, Riga, Dantzic, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Amsterdam, even touched at Antwerp, Havre, and Bordeaux, presented themselves in all these ports as neutrals on the ground of being Americans, declared that they had had no communication with England, were readily believed in Russia, Prussia, at Hamburg, and in Holland, where there existed a great willingness to be deceived, and found little difficulty at Antwerp, Havre, and Bordeaux, in setting at defiance the vigilance of the officers of government, who were seldom able by the most minute search to establish the fact of communication with England or submission to its laws.

In the Mediterranean the Greeks, who then laid the foundation of their commercial prosperity under the Ottoman flag, went to Malta for sugar, coffee, and English cottons, which they transported to Trieste, Venice, Naples, Genoa, and Marseilles, giving themselves out to be neutrals on the ground of their being Ottoman, and there was as much difficulty in proving this fraud as in the case of the Americans.

France had a great interest in putting an end to this illegitimate commerce; for if England should be unable to dispose in Europe of the colonial produce which she received from her own colonies, or that which she received in payment for her manufactures from the colonies of other nations, her immense commerce must instantly come to an end. The enormous number of bills, founded on this colonial merchan-

dize, which were deposited in the Bank of England, would have been protested, to a greater or less extent, the credit of the bank would have received a blow, and its notes which, since the suppression of payments in silver, were the only, or at least the chief medium of exchange in England, would have been struck by an immediate discredit. And the exchange on England which was already very low, the pound sterling which was usually worth twenty-five francs being now worth no more than seventeen francs, would have fallen still lower, the bank note would have been at a discount of thirty per cent, the pound sterling would have been worth on the continent no more than fourteen or fifteen francs, and all affairs, both public and private, would have been thrown into confusion. And how, in that case, would it have been possible to procure those productions of which English luxury was unwilling to be deprived even in time of war? How, moreover, could a maintenance have been provided for the English armies in the Peninsular, which were unable to obtain either bread or wine except by payment? If we consider, also, that there were in England two political parties, whose strength, generally unequal, was nevertheless frequently balanced on certain questions, and that one of these was eager for war whilst the other was as desirous of peace, we shall be easily able to understand that to add to great military reverses a fresh commercial blow, would have been to have given the victory to the peace party, and to have arrived at that moment when, peace prevailing both by sea and land, Napoleon's work would have been at length accomplished.

However violent were the means which Napoleon found himself compelled to employ, we can scarcely fail to excuse them when we reflect on the importance of the ends he had in view. We must even be convinced that his chief mistake consisted in not having sufficiently persevered in carrying out these views. Perceiving immediately, that it was scarcely possible to discover whether the pretended neutrals had or had not submitted to the English regulations, he took an important step which at once cut short the difficulty. He was unwilling that either Ottoman or American vessels should be received into the French ports, and determined with respect to the former, that they should be only received provisionally, that their papers should be sent to Paris, inspected by the director of the Customs and by himself, and that they should only be exempted from confiscation on passing satisfactorily this rigorous examination. There was little inconvenience to be feared from treating with severity the Greek pretended Turks, for the Porte interested

himself but little in their favour, and was, moreover, held but in little esteem.

With respect to the Americans, the difficulty was greater. They not only visited France, but also Holland, Germany, Prussia, and Russia, countries in which a command to be obeyed, required to be supported by plausible reasons and great influence. The American belonged, moreover, to a powerful nation, which required judicious treatment, as there was some chance that by right management it might be induced to declare war against Great Britain. Napoleon prohibited the reception of Americans in the French, or quasi-French ports, and insisted that they should not be permitted to enter those of Prussia or Russia, alleging very justly, that those who attempted to do so, could not but be false Americans. Some of those who took the title had, indeed, assumed it without any just claim, and others were men who, having renounced their own country for a greater or less time, and adopted in its stead the British masts, had no longer any right to the support of their government. It was possible therefore, to contest their right to the protection of the American flag. In putting an end to their traffic, the commerce of Great Britain was demolished and reduced to the nocturnal smuggling which took place along the badly watched coasts.

Napoleon went even farther in respect to them, and not contented with closing against them the ports of the continent, ordered their seizure in the ports of France or its dependents, and energetically implored a similar treatment of them in Prussia, Denmark, and Russia; alleging in support of his demand, a reason, to which he pretended to give more weight than it really had with himself: namely, the seizure in America of the French vessels which, touching at the ports of the Union, had violated the laws of embargo. There were, indeed, three or four which, having had the boldness to venture on the Atlantic had violated, either consciously or not, this American law, and had been seized; there were these three or four, we say, against the hundreds of American vessels which, having entered the French ports, were seized and sequestered. "It is a real injury," said the American minister, who was charged with the duty of defending at Paris his countrymen; "it is a real injury to us for an imperceptible one suffered by France." "The extent of the injury is nothing," said Napoleon, "the honour of the flag is everything. You have laid your hands on French vessels, under the protection of my flag, and a single touch is sufficient to justify me in seizing the whole American marine, were it in my power." But this was merely an

ostensible reason, and Napoleon was not so incensed about the matter as he pretended to be.

He merely sought some specious pretext for seizing in Holland, France, and Italy, the numerous American vessels which carried on a fraudulent traffic for the English. He had, in truth, sequestered a considerable number and found in them what supplied his treasury almost as abundantly as the war contributions which he imposed upon the vanquished. But, nevertheless, perceiving the advantage he might derive from attaching the Americans to himself, he opened a negotiation with General Armstrong, who represented at Paris the government of the United States, and did not hesitate to admit that his decrees of Berlin, were in the nature of an outrage, but an outrage which an outrage had provoked. He maintained, that he had no other way of replying to the insolent pretensions of Britain to levying a toll upon the seas, and declared that he was ready to withdraw his decrees as far as the Americans were concerned, if they would undertake to resist British tyranny, and to oblige the British Cabinet to withdraw its famous orders in council, by the threat of a declaration of war. On this condition, he said, he was ready to restore to the Americans all the rights of neutrals.

This seizure of American vessels was not difficult in France, nor even in the Hanse towns at the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, where there were encampments of French troops; but it was difficult in Holland, where King Louis opposed the wishes of his brother, and in Denmark, which served as a *dépôt* for prohibited merchandize, and distributed it over the continent by the Holstein frontier; in the ports of Prussia, which felt no great anxiety to annoy its own people for the sake of securing a triumph to Napoleon over England, and in the parts of Prussia, which, having an extreme need of commerce with Britain for the disposal of its agricultural products, the sole wealth of its great noblemen, carried on under the American flag, a part of that traffic which she had promised at Tilsit and at Erfurt completely to resign.

That he met with resistance in Denmark, in Prussia, and in Russia, Napoleon admitted with scorn and anger; but when he found in Holland, a country vanquished by the arms of France, and bestowed as a kingdom upon one of his brothers, an ill-will more decided than in any other part of the European coast, he could not endure it with patience, and every instant threatened with some overwhelming blow, those rash ones who had dared to brave his wrath.

The simple announcement of this source of vexation to him will sufficiently inform us of the motive which led him,

in the recent distribution of his troops, to place a part of his ancient division Massena about the frontiers of Holland. Perceiving that he could not prevent the Dutch from engaging in contraband trade, he had issued a decree prohibiting all commercial intercourse with them. This was striking them a death blow, for being half separated from England by the war, and alienated from the continent by our laws, they were condemned to die of hunger. King Louis had then cast himself at his brother's feet, and promising to alter his line of conduct had obtained the withdrawal of the decree. But these promises had been broken immediately, and the Americans, despite our proclamations, admitted into all the Dutch ports. At this new act of disobedience, Napoleon, no longer able to restrain himself, had renewed the decree of separation and openly avowed his intention of reuniting Holland to France.

During some time, indeed, this idea had occupied his mind; for finding that even under his brother's government he was unable to obtain from Holland either efficient naval aid or genuine obedience to his commercial regulations, he prepared to reabsorb it in his empire. The sad and bitter language employed by King Louis was not calculated to make him change his project. His family, however, some remains of affection, and Europe, still restrained him. A person of whose merit he had taken much notice, and who was well acquainted with himself without being less attached to his country, Admiral Verhuel, took pains to prevent so shameful an affair, and entreated the two brothers to meet. Napoleon was averse to this from a fear that he might permit himself to be turned from his purpose when in his brother's presence; and King Louis dreaded no less that he might fall in Paris under a too powerful hand, and was, moreover, unwilling to meet the Queen Hortense, his wife, from whom he lived separated. However, at the instances of Admiral Verhuel, who took for each of the brothers the steps which neither was willing to take for himself, King Louis had quitted the Hague and come to Paris; and, as a first act of submission, had consented to the seizure of the American vessels which had entered the ports of Holland.

Napoleon had then employed himself in putting into execution the decrees in the other states of the north. To admit pretended neutrals in order to seize them, was a method which much pleased his unscrupulous spirit in the choice of means; he had had them seized by his own agents in the Hanse towns, and urged both Denmark and Prussia to allow them to enter their ports, that they might be able to seize them, reminding

them that they would only be seizing English vessels falsely pretending to be American. Denmark and Prussia timidly objected to this demand, that if there were many fraudulent traders there were also many honest ones, and that they took particular care, by a rigid examination of papers, to discover those which had touched at the English coasts. But Napoleon denied that it was possible to make any such distinction, for the least culpable had at any rate violated the American law, which prohibited American ships from visiting Europe. Some sufficiently bad reasons were murmured in answer to this; and a promise was given that his laws should be observed. There was little excuse for Denmark, for England had behaved towards her with implacable enmity, and France, on the other hand, with faithful friendship; the case in question regarded, moreover, the most sacred rights, for every state was interested in resisting the legislation which England desired to establish over maritime commerce. But Prussia, which was vanquished and oppressed, and had little interest in maritime questions, he readily excused for her unwillingness to forward the success of the political combinations of her vanquisher, and for a disinclination to contribute to it by enormous sacrifices. She did not positively refuse, however, to conform to Napoleon's wishes, but evaded explanations, and, in fact, admitted the American vessels without detaining them. Napoleon, who himself perused the correspondence of his consuls, and maintained the dispute in person, had proposed to Prussia an agreement worthy of the contrabandists against whom he waged war. Having heard that a numerous convoy of vessels sailing under the pretended American flag, was about to enter the ports of Old Prussia, "Let them enter," said Napoleon, "and then detain them; deliver up to me their cargoes, and I will receive them on account of the Prussian debt." And this strange agreement was on the point of succeeding.

Of all this northern coast there remained open to the Americans only Swedish Pomerania, which Napoleon intended to give up to Sweden, in consequence of a revolution which suddenly burst forth, but might have easily been expected under the government of a king whose continual extravagances compromised at times both the dignity and safety of his country.

We have seen how foolishly Gustavus IV. directed his forces in the war of Finland. Enraged against Denmark, instead of turning his attention towards Russia, with whom he might have long disputed the possession of Finland, he had carried the chief part of his forces towards Norway, for

the purpose of invading it, and towards the Sound, for the sake of threatening Copenhagen. The Swedes, exasperated at seeing themselves deprived of Finland by this unhappy disposition of their brave troops, revolted against their foolish king. The faithful servants of Gustavus, in vain entreated him to make the necessary sacrifices to the wishes of a nation justly enraged. He then fell into a kind of frenzy; cast his sword at an aide-de-camp, and had finally been disarmed, and confined as a madman. In this extremity, the States, in an extraordinary assembly, declared him incapable of reigning, and called to the throne his uncle, the Duke of Sudermanie, a wise and gentle prince, who, during the minority of the dethroned king, had already governed the kingdom with great prudence. To avoid the most imminent misfortunes, the new monarch immediately concluded peace with Russia and France.

Finland was the cost to Sweden of peace with Russia; but peace with France obtained for her, on the other hand, the restitution of Pomerania, and of the port of Stralsund, taken by the French in 1807, and occupied by them during the next three years. But Napoleon had made this restitution on condition that English vessels should be absolutely denied entrance into the Swedish ports, especially that of Stralsund, the most important of all, since it was situated on the German continent, and was in a position to neutralise the whole system of continental blockade. Unhappily it happened that after the loss of Finland, Sweden could feel no sacrifice more severely than that of the English commerce. At this epoch almost all the peoples of the Baltic, rich in agricultural products, and in things essential to maritime commerce, such as iron, wood, hemp, pitch and tar, were unable to do without both England and France, and certainly required commercial intercourse with either the one or the other. To be embroiled with France left them at liberty to trade with England, and rendered them, moreover, the medium of a profitable contraband commerce. But to be embroiled with England closed against them the British ports, without opening to them those of France, which were in a strict state of blockade, so that a misunderstanding with England was equivalent to a rupture with both these powers. The Swedes, after having promised to Napoleon to break with the English effectually closed against them the great depôt of Gothenbourg, so conveniently situated for contraband purposes. But they had immediately permitted them to transfer this depôt to the isles in the neighbourhood of Gothenbourg, and, following the example of all the humble dwellers on the shores of the Baltic, involved themselves in embarrass-

ments with France by means of forced promises perpetually violated.

Napoleon, who received very exact information from his consuls, was excessively displeased on learning that he was deceived in Sweden, as in the case of other nations, reiterated the motives which had induced him to declare war against Gustavus IV., and to conclude a peace with the Duke of Armaine, and announced his determination to re-occupy Swedish Pomerania, and to declare war once more against Sweden itself, whatever might be thought of it by the Northern cabinets, if his injunctions with respect to British commerce were not exactly observed.

Of all the Northern cabinets, one only, that of Russia, made a show of resistance. This cabinet, dissembling its displeasure at the proceedings of Napoleon, in respect to the marriage question, and at his refusal to ally himself with her in respect to the Polish question, and dissembling also the uneasiness with which it viewed the recent intimacy which had sprung up between France and Austria, had good reasons for doing so for a time; for she was anxious to put an end to the war with the Turks, and to ensure the acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia. But yet, although resolved to endure much, Alexander sustained the pride of a great nation, as well as that which filled his own heart.

Offended at the sovereignty which Napoleon pretended to exercise over all the coasts of the North, from Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg, as far as Riga and even to St. Petersburg, Alexander yet submitted to it patiently that he might keep the more clearly in view the objects of his Eastern policy; but a sentiment of self respect which was easy to be aroused, and agricultural and commercial interests which could not be so readily brought forward, made him desirous that Napoleon should behave with some moderation in respect to the ports in his own states. He urged, therefore, in reply to the French cabinet, the reason which had been adduced by all the other powers, and which availed nothing as long as the American law of Embargo was in force; namely, that all the American vessels were not sailing under false colours, that there were amongst them some which traded in good faith, that he admitted them alone into his ports, and that, being entirely deprived of all commerce with Great Britain, he was especially anxious to continue that with America. This argument was faulty, because the law of Embargo rendered every American vessel trading in Europe a contraband trader; and it was moreover a matter of notoriety that the English did not permit a single vessel to escape without paying the navigation toll, or being freighted with English merchandize.

Unhappily Napoleon, from his immediate desire of laying hold of every possible advantage, had, by granting licences of communication with Great Britain, put a very plausible argument into the mouths of those who nullified the continental blockade. These exceptions of his to his own system brought him into a position not a little embarrassing.

The English were in great need of corn towards the end of 1809, and were at all times in want of the dockyard materials procured from the north. They had, therefore, permitted all vessels, whether of a hostile country or not, to bring them corn, wood, hemp, pitch and tar, levying a toll upon them, which ultimately fell upon themselves, as it raised the price of these materials which were so necessary to them. In consequence of this interested toleration, there could be seen upon the quays of the Thames vessels from Belgium, Holland, the Hanse towns, Denmark, and Russia, all which countries were at war with England. Napoleon perceiving the absolute necessity to the English of the materials which they procured in so exceptional a manner, had formed the plan of deriving a profit by forcing them to purchase French products, and had accordingly granted free passage to vessels which, whilst they carried wood, hemp, and corn, made up their cargo with silks, woollens, wines, brandy, cheeses, &c. He permitted them to bring in return certain fixed articles, not the tissues of Manchester, or the hardwares of Birmingham, not coffees or sugars, but certain things which our manufactures wanted, such as indigo, cochineal, fish, oils, leather, &c. As, therefore, French vessels were to be seen in England, so were English vessels to be seen in France, trading under the protection of passports called licences. The French ships, in fact, being compelled to carry silks with their cargoes of corn, transferred them at the mouth of the Thames, to the contrabandists who undertook this clandestine introduction into the country. The English in their turn, presented themselves in our ports with the permitted articles only, having entrusted to the smugglers on our coasts, the cotton stuffs with which they had also been charged. This was a species of traffic which tainted commerce with corruption, habituating it to falsehood, and even to forgery, for there were in London persons who prosecuted the trade of manufacturing false ships papers. Very great inconveniences resulted, moreover, from this system, in exchange for very slight advantages, for in France, the trade under the protection of licences did not exceed twenty millions, exports and imports together, from 1809 to 1810. But the great misfortune of this species of commerce, was that it placed

France in a contradictory position with respect to her own decrees, which was perfectly unsustainable in the presence of those from whom she demanded the most rigorous observance of the laws of the continental blockade.

"You require," remonstrated Russia, "that I should forbid my subjects to have any communication with Great Britain, that I should prevent them from selling their cereal products, and the dockyard materials, for which they can only find purchasers in the British merchants, that I should refuse them permission to receive in exchange, the sugars, coffees, and woven fabrics, of which they are in the utmost need, whilst you, on your part, do not hesitate to carry over to England your silks, cloths, and wines, and to receive in return the sugars and coffees, which are so strictly excluded by your laws from the rest of the continent. Be not, then, so rigorous towards others, so indulgent to yourselves, especially since the others have scarcely any interest, and you have an immense one in the universal observance of this system!"

This argument had a force which Napoleon in vain attempted to ignore, and he replied to it with anger, being unable to meet it with good reasons, "All that is said of my system of licences is false," he said, in answer to Russia, "I do not introduce sugar and coffee into France; but the English having need of our corn, I turn their wants to our profit by obliging them to receive silks, cloths, and wines, and I receive in return articles indispensable to French manufacturing industry, especially 'guineas,' which are exported by smugglers, and the loss of which must materially help to deteriorate the English exchange."

There was a certain amount of truth in this answer, but such as it did contain only proved how insignificant was this trade which was carried on under the protection of licences, which produced little profit and much inconvenience, and furnished the numerous opponents of the continental blockade with the most embarrassing arguments.

In the meantime, Napoleon, persisting in his system, watching himself the coasts of France and the allied countries, reading every day the statements of the arrival and the departure of ships, demanding the admission of French custom-house officers and troops into Holland, charging Marshal Davoust with the duty of watching Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, making preparations for the re-occupation of Swedish Pomerania, forcing Prussia to close Colberg and Königsberg, urging Russia, without however pressing her too closely, to close Riga and St. Petersburg, was on the point of obtaining the most important results from his plans.

It was, no doubt, possible that there might still remain some half open outlets for the products of British industry, but these products being obliged to ascend to distant northern points by sea, that they might be conveyed overland to the south, would arrive at their destination so burdened with costs of conveyance, that the sale of them would be impossible. The continental blockade, thus enforced, could not fail, as we shall presently see, to reduce Great Britain to a state of insupportable distress, had it been maintained with perseverance, but also without provoking a war with the north.

Whilst Napoleon endeavoured to force the English to peace by means of a great reverse in the Peninsular, and by a ruinous system of attacks on commerce, he was not less active, in the mean time, in the conduct of the internal affairs of his empire. At length he grappled with the great religious question, which was not the least of those which drew forth the fiery impetuosity of his character.

The Pope, transported to Savona, was still a prisoner, and obstinately refused to perform the functions of the Apostolic chair. There was no schism, as in the last period of the Revolution, when the clergy, divided amongst themselves and causing divisions amongst the faithful, avenged themselves by the perplexity which they caused to the state, for the persecutions which it had caused them to suffer. The clergy of the present time were united, tranquil, submissive, kept to a uniform method of religious worship, were ignorant of, or feigned to be ignorant of the bull of excommunication hurled against Napoleon, and were tolerably unanimous in blaming the Pope for having recourse to this extreme measure, which must necessarily either expose the weakness of the Spiritual Arms, or cause a quarrel with government, which, despite all its faults, they regarded as still necessary to the security of all. Nevertheless, those who held those opinions, disapproved very strongly of the seizure of the Pope, deplored his imprisonment, and desired the end of a state of things which was afflicting to all good Catholics, and must sooner or later degenerate into schism. There was an unanimous wish that the Pope and the Emperor should come to an understanding, and that the former should obtain such an establishment as was suitable to the head of the Church, whilst their existed neither any expectation nor even desire that he should obtain the re-establishment of his temporal power, now regarded as utterly overthrown. A singular state of things! Under the control of an all powerful government, the church, forgetting at the moment how far the temporal power of the Papacy was necessary to the

independent action of their spiritual power,—the Church, once so exacting, was willing that the Pope should renounce his states, and content himself with a considerable establishment, which, however magnificent, could only be as that of the ancient patriarchs who resided with the Emperor at Constantinople.

Such was the advice of the great majority of the clergy. But there was a zealous minority which had resisted the concordat, which shared all the hatreds of the ancient royalists, pourtrayed in dark colours the sufferings of the Pope, and was active in promulgating the bull of excommunication. It maintained that to lay hands on the domain of St. Peter, was to attack the faith, that the Pope whilst imprisoned ought to refuse to perform any pontifical act, and that the clergy deprived of intercourse with their Head, should refuse to administer the Sacrament. In short, as formerly the parliaments, for the purpose of vanquishing the crown, pretended to stop the course of public justice, so now this portion of the priesthood was anxious, as a means of embarrassing Napoleon, to suspend the exercise of the religious offices.

On the very day even of his marriage, Napoleon met with an example of the annoyances which these malcontent priests leagued with the old Royalists, were able to cause him. He had, as we have already said, summoned to Paris the greater part of the dignitaries of the papal government, and had already assembled around him twenty-eight cardinals, who assisted almost every Sunday in the performance of mass in his chapel, although he was excommunicated. On the day of his marriage, thirteen out of the twenty-eight cardinals failed to attend the ceremony. The motive of this absence was not given, but it was intended to intimate to the people that without the Pope's concurrence, Napoleon was unable to obtain a divorce, and that as the first marriage was still binding on him, this second was irregular. But this motive rested on no real foundation, for the divorce which was refused by the church, could not have been pronounced by the Pope, and every species of ecclesiastical jurisdiction having been exhausted, the marriage with Josephine had been annulled by the ordinary jurisdiction. But although false, this motive, rather pointed at than alleged, tended to nothing less than to place the august Princess whom the Court of Austria had bestowed upon Napoleon, in the position of his concubine, and to render illegitimate the heir of the empire, whom France was expecting with so much impatience.

Napoleon, whose eye nothing escaped, had perceived

during the nuptial ceremony, that all the red robes, as he called them, were not present. "Count them," he said to a prelate of his chapel; and having become certain that thirteen of the twenty-eight were absent, he cried out half aloud, with a vehemence which he could not restrain: "The fools! they are always the same! ostensibly submissive! secretly factious! But they shall find to their cost what it is to jest with my power!" The ceremony was scarcely concluded, when he sent for the minister of police, and ordered him to arrest the thirteen cardinals, to strip them of their purple, (whence they were afterwards known by the name of the black cardinals) to scatter them amongst the various provinces, to place them under the surveillance of the police, and to sequester not only their ecclesiastical revenues, but also their private property.

In this most violent manner was met this most imprudent and blameable opposition. Amongst the thirteen cardinals was Cardinal Oppizoni, whom Napoleon, notwithstanding certain stains upon his private character, had made Archbishop of Bologna, Cardinal and Senator. The ungrateful prelate being threatened with the severest penalties if he did not give in his resignation of all his dignities immediately, resigned. Overwhelmed with terror, he resigned all that he was required with torrents of tears, and immediately quitted Paris to be partly an exile, partly a prisoner in the retreat which was assigned him.

The day following these deplorably violent proceedings, the secret instigators of the whole affair rejoiced in the accusation of adultery which it in some degree threw out against the marriage, the fruit of which was to inherit the empire, and in the outrageous exercise of power which it had excited, and flattered themselves that these events would furnish an infinite number of sources of annoyance to the detested government. That portion of the clergy which was not yet blinded by party spirit, were equally grieved at the cause of offence and at the chastisement which had followed it, and was exceedingly anxious to see the end of a state of things which was very likely to produce the most disastrous consequences. But it was difficult to incline the Emperor to moderation, the Pope to submission; and the solution of this difficulty offered the only means by which some agreement could be come to between these two spiritual and temporal chiefs.

The Pope at Savona, although closely watched, found means to communicate with the zealous Catholic party, and well comprehending the tactics of the moment refused to perform any political act. He would neither consent to

institute the new Bishops appointed by Napoleon, by which twenty-seven chairs were already vacant, nor continue to the existing Bishops the power of granting certain licences, especially marriage licences; and thus, as far as he was able, checked the exercise of religious worship in France; a state of things which would either turn to the injury of religious worship itself or to the injury of the government, according as the people took the part of the Pope or the Emperor. Pius VII. living in the episcopal palace of Savona, passing the days in saying mass and in giving his benediction to those who often came from afar to receive it, received politely, but sadly, the authorities, and replied, when urged to perform the most indispensable of the pontifical functions, that he was not free, and moreover lacked counsel, since the Cardinals were prisoners, or assembled around the Imperial throne, that in this state of isolation he was unable to perform any act that would avail anything, and that he was even unable to err, so completely was he deprived of the lights of the Church.

Napoleon, informed of all that the Pope did and said, was not behind him in finesse, and declared that he was willing to wait until the Pope became reasonable, and would continue to manage the affairs of the Church in a manner which was, certainly, only temporary, but which would amply suffice for some time to come. He then ordained silence respecting ecclesiastical affairs, and for the space of a twelvemonth abstained from any interference with them, and this not only from policy, but also because he was quite unable to attend to all the affairs which were constantly accumulating on his hands, even since the conclusion of the Austrian war. Nevertheless he was anxious to put an end to his quarrel with the Pope, and to extend to the Church that peace which he desired to bestow on Europe.

The Pope, who, in the midst of his most fervent prayers felt the weight of his chains, saw an innumerable number of important questions solving themselves, and beheld the progress of a long train of treaties, divorces, and marriages, began to be impatient, and at length almost flew into a passion. "They think of every thing," said he, "except God! Busy themselves about every kind of business except that of the Church. But even they have some temporal importance, and it will be discovered when once the course of prosperity is checked. They wish to push me to extremity! Ah! well! I will employ a new species of weapon, and have recourse to those means which God has placed in my hands for the salvation of his Church." * * * And without explaining himself further, the unfortunate

pontiff intimated in threatening terms that he would provoke a schism by a solemn appeal to consciences, and would place the Imperial government in the embarrassing position in which the revolutionary government had found itself, for where schism is, civil war is not far off. After the utterance of these threats he fell back into his dejected and gentle manner, engaged in long conversations with the prefect, and constantly asked how it was that this General Bonaparte, to whom he had shown so much affection, whose elevation he had so assiduously favoured, and for whose sake he had braved so much opposition in order to go to Paris to consecrate him, could repay his services by such gross ingratitude; oppressing and humbling that church which he had formerly so courageously re-established by the glorious act of the Concordat? And he displayed the most profound astonishment at such opposite modes of acting.—M. de Chabral offered him consolation, calmed his excitement and persuaded him to hope that everything would be soon arranged, without particularizing the conditions, but leaving him to guess that they would consist of the resignation of his temporal power. Of this the Pope took no notice, pretending that it was respecting his spiritual power alone that he felt any solicitude.

It was necessary, however, that some arrangement should be come to. Napoleon was well aware that the temporary arrangements for the government of the church were very insufficient, and obstinately opposed. Twenty-seven of the bishoprics of the empire had become vacant since the rupture with Rome; and it need not be said, the absence of the bishop or his representative not only throws the ecclesiastical business of the diocese into confusion, and leaves its clergy ungoverned, but also suspends certain civil processes, since amongst Catholics the progress of civil life is conducted under the consecration of religion. But a more serious case than the absence of a bishop, is that of the presence of one who is not recognised by the faithful. And this was, in fact, the danger threatened by the vacancy of these twenty-seven vacant dioceses, for Napoleon, who was not disposed to let his prerogatives lie idle, had lost no time in providing new incumbents. He had proposed to the Pope that he should confer canonical institution upon these nominated prelates, with the understanding that the pontiff might be at liberty to omit in the bulls of institution, the name of the sovereign whose acts he thus confirmed. Napoleon could indulge in this modesty, without endangering his authority, but he was unwilling, and with reason, that the Pope should employ, for these cases, the forms which he used when the twofold

right of nomination and institution, united in his own person; the form, namely, entitled *de propria motu*. It was this form which the Pope had used in the case of M. de Pradt, when he was transferred from the bishopric of Poitiers, to that of Malines. Napoleon rejected these bulls, which did not only omit, but negatived his authority, and desired that the twenty-seven prelates whom he had nominated, should, although not yet instituted, enter upon the government of their dioceses. He discovered an expedient which might enable them to do this in the ancient usages of the church, and had them endowed with the rank of *Vicars Capitular*.

When a bishopric became vacant by the death of the bishop, the chapter of the diocese used to elect, by the title of vicar capitular, a temporary administrator of the affairs of the diocese, who should fulfil the episcopal functions even to the installation of a new bishop, but who, nevertheless, was to limit himself to those acts, the performance of which was absolutely necessary, whilst he enjoyed none of the episcopal honours. In former times, the person who had received the nomination to a bishopric, was sometimes elected vicar capitular, and thus entered at once on the immediate possession of his see. Napoleon being unable to obtain the necessary bulls, was anxious that the objects of his nomination should be thus elected vicars capitular, but he had met in almost every quarter, with the most determined resistance. The chapters had generally elected their vicar capitular before the arrival of the Emperor's nomination. This previous election was put forward as a reason against proceeding to a second, or, in some bolder instances, it was objected that the method of proceeding was but an indirect means of usurping the papal functions, and it was denied that the rules of the church would permit the nominated bishops to take the character of vicars capitular. Good or true or not, this allegation suited the purpose of those who saw that in complying with the provincial administration of the ecclesiastical affairs, they were depriving the Pope of his most effectual means of checking Napoleon in the course he was now taking. But the means adopted were perilous, for it was no easy matter to oppose a man like Napoleon, and to disturb the exercise of religious worship was not very consistent with piety. In vain did some enlightened priests, recalling the fact that Henry VIII. had been able, for his own shameful reasons, to drag from the bosom of the Catholic Church one of the greatest nations of the globe, declare that Napoleon might bring greater evils on the faith than were ever caused to it by the English monarch; especially since there was more to be feared from an age that was

indifferent, than from an hostile one. But the instigators of the clerical opposition, blinded by their passions, and caring little for the danger of religion, made Paris itself the theatre of this perilous conflict. The circumstances which took place with respect to this important diocese, present the most striking picture of the state of the French Church at this period, and of the relations in which Napoleon stood towards it.

The Archbishopric of Paris had become vacant, and Napoleon had nominated to it the Cardinal Fesch, his uncle. Scarcely had the Cardinal's nomination taken place when he, as Napoleon's brothers on their thrones, had devoted himself, not to showing his gratitude to his nephew, but to making himself popular in his diocese. He had, as we have elsewhere said, suddenly changed from being simply a contractor to the army, to a most zealous Catholic and austere prelate, and was eager to make himself the idol of the clergy as Louis was of the Dutch, Joseph of the Spaniards, and Murat of the Neapolitans; and whilst he displayed the utmost submission in the presence of his terrible nephew, he never failed to groan behind his back over the misfortunes of the Church, and to swear that he would rather endure martyrdom than the dictates of tyranny. Napoleon, indignant at such presumption and ingratitude, treated him with severity, and, especially, when he was parading his recently acquired theological knowledge, would the Emperor enquire how he had come by his learning, and whether it were the result of his speculations in the soldier's bread! "Bring to me," he would say, "Pabbé Emery or M. Duvoisin; they know what they are talking about, and are worth the trouble of being listened to." The Abbé Emery, a clever priest, full of fervour which did not darken his understanding, having refused every mitre which had been offered to him, that he might continue to be superior of the seminary of St. Sulpice, was the beloved head of the establishment which had supplied almost all France with clergy and prelates. He was at least a royalist and the enemy of Napoleon, who knew the fact without caring much about it. M. Duvoisin, the Bishop of Nantes, was a prelate faithful in the performance of his duties, profoundly learned, and endowed with a keen intellect. It was his opinion that instead of striving to weaken the Emperor's power, the clergy should rather seek to moderate its exercise, give it a right direction, and turn it to the advantage of the Church. Napoleon liked to listen to M. Emery, but he only followed the counsels of M. Duvoisin, and, as for his uncle, he never paid the least attention either to his words or his advice.

After having nominated Cardinal Fesch, who was already Archbishop of Lyons, to the Archbishopric of Paris, he desired that he should enter upon his see, and govern it as though regularly instituted. The cardinal hesitated to take this step, from the twofold reason that he was unwilling to displease the clergy, and was also anxious to remain for some time in possession of the two archbishoprics which were the richest sees in the empire. This plurality of sees was not without precedent, but the Pope had refused to sanction it, and had demanded that the cardinal should choose between either Paris or Lyons, whilst he refused him institution to either as he had refused it to the other newly nominated prelates.

The Cardinal, determined to keep the archbishopric of Lyons to which he had been both nominated and instituted, persisted in calling himself Archbishop of Lyons, and simply administrator of the diocese of Paris. And to render the position which he had assumed the more manifest, he declined to inhabit the archiepiscopal palace of Paris, preferring to lodge in an hotel which he possessed in the rue du Mont Blanc. Whilst Napoleon permitted the affairs of the church to languish uncared for, he acquiesced in the cardinal's equivocal conduct. But when the moment arrived in which he gave his serious attention to matters ecclesiastical, he happened to go to Notre Dame on some business or other, and not being able to find the cardinal there, felt the inconvenience of the position taken up by his uncle, and said that when he honoured the clergy of the metropolis with a visit, he expected to find the Archbishop at the foot of the towers of Notre Dame. He then caused the cardinal to be asked which of the two benefices he had decided upon keeping. Obligated to make a choice, the cardinal uncle decided, in accordance with his policy of conciliating the orthodox clergy, upon retaining the see of Lyons, as being that with which he had been canonically invested. Immediately a cry was raised in all the sacristies of France in praise of a prelate so disinterested, so faithful to the church, so courageous and self-denying. The reply of Napoleon to all was the choice of a successor which could not fail to excite his uncle's jealousy to the utmost. He nominated Cardinal Maury to the Archbishopric of Paris.

This illustrious defender of the Church who, in the constituent assembly, had displayed so great an amount of eloquence, spirit, and courage, and who by his sallies of wit and *sangfroid* had defended the clergy as a gentleman of the school of Voltaire might have defended the aristocracy, had retired to Rome, where, during the space of fifteen years, he had consoled himself for his exile by the enjoyment of

the belles-lettres. He accepted with gladness the opportunity of revisiting his country, and because he showed towards Napoleon some gratitude for this permission to return, he lost in a single day the glory of the splendid struggle he had maintained ; and he who had been the idol as well of the clergy as the Royalists, became at once the object of their disdain, and even hatred. His character had some of those defects which are frequently found in the company of talent, and even of piety ; he was addicted to the pleasures of the table, and enjoyed free conversation ; his residence in Italy had not cured him of these defects, and they furnished some hypocrites with subjects of slander against him. He had, moreover, notwithstanding his energy and fame, but little influence with the clergy. Cardinal Fesch, in particular, cherished against him the liveliest dislike.

This nomination had been scarcely signed, when Napoleon demanded that Cardinal Maury should be invested with the administration of the diocese ; and this demand the chapter did not dare to oppose, but they accompanied their compliance with an amount of shuffling and trickery which was as degrading to the Imperial authority and the clergy as to the cardinal.

Cardinal Maury hastened to write to the Pope, appealing to his old friendship, and endeavouring to obtain, in default of bulls, at least a provisional institution into the see of Paris. The Pope's reply was awaited without much expectation that it would be of a favourable nature.

It was very manifest that all kinds of difficulties arose from this provisional administration of sees, but Napoleon cared little for this, as he believed that he was on the point of coming to a speedy arrangement with the Pope ; to overcome labour by the resolutions which he had already taken, and from which no one could hope that he would recede, he hastened to convert into an organic law, the annexation of the Roman states. The Duchies of Parma and Placentia were already united under the title of the department of Taro, and that of Tuscany under the titles of the departments of the Arno, the Ombrone, and the Mediterranean. On this occasion the Roman states were arranged as the departments of Thrasimene and the Tiber. In the *senatus-consultum*, one of the most celebrated and the most remarkable of the time, he declared Rome the second city of the Empire ; and decreed that the heir to the throne, whose approaching birth he announced as though he were acquainted with the secrets of nature, should bear the title of King of Rome, and be consecrated successively in *Notré Dame* and *St. Peter's*. He

decided, moreover, that a Prince of the blood should always hold a court at Rome, that the Popes should reside near the Emperors, should hold their sees in Rome and in Paris alternately, in the enjoyment of a rich endowment, and should swear fealty to the empire; and that all the establishments of the Roman Chancery were to be transferred to Paris, and become institutions of the empire. Having made these decisions, Napoleon gave orders for the immediate commencement of preparations at the Archiepiscopal Palace at Paris, at the Pantheon and St. Denis, for the reception of the pontifical government, and the pontiff himself. He projected also works at Avignon, that the Pope, although generally residing at Paris, near himself, might be able occasionally to visit the various ancient residences of the papacy.

It is difficult to persuade ourselves that we are not dreaming, when we listen to the recital of what the church itself was far from considering as impossible. But Napoleon believed that after some few days' wonder, people would become accustomed to the new state of things, that the Pope residing near him, would become more tractable, that the cardinals dwelling in France would become imbued with a French spirit, and that, in short, the world, dazzled by this prodigious spectacle, which recalled in so striking a manner the empire of the west, would involuntarily salute him with that title for which he was so eager, in exchange for which he was willing to sacrifice everything, even his empire itself; the title of Emperor of the West.

Strongly imbued with this idea, Napoleon, whose only anxiety was now respecting an arrangement with the Pope which he believed to be now at hand, devoted himself to ecclesiastical affairs; and hastened to arrange the ecclesiastical establishment which it would be necessary to leave at Rome; so setting aside what was old and establishing what was new, that the Pope, finding at the commencement of the conferences that all the new plans had been carried out, should be compelled to accept as irrevocably accomplished those changes which he most disliked.

There were in the Roman province thirty sees for a population of 800,000 inhabitants, many of which under the name of *Siéges Suburbicaires* furnished titles and endowments for the principal members of the sacred college. Besides these there were an immense number of richly endowed convents and benefices. Napoleon made no delay in abolishing all the sees of the Roman states, with the exception of three, which were each endowed with an income of thirty thousand francs; he suppressed the monasteries and

nunneries, granting annuities to the members of the suppressed establishments, required the oath of fealty from all incumbents of benefices, and sent into exile all who refused to take it. He ordered, likewise, the suppression of the religious orders of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, sparing only some nunneries and some establishments devoted to the cause of benevolence; sequestered the whole ecclesiastical property of Rome, which amounted to 250 millions, devoting 100 millions to the payment of the Roman debt, the maintenance of hospitals, the foundation of new sees, the support of the clergy who had been retained in their benefices; and incorporating the remaining 150 millions with the state property.

These decrees, which were issued with incredible promptitude, were sent to Rome to be put into execution. Three columns of infantry were directed towards Rome from Ancona, Bologna, and Prouse, to afford General Miollis a reinforcement of nine or ten thousand men, in case he should require it, to keep in check a population completely under the influence of the monks; he received instructions to act with decision. "By reason of the peace," said Napoleon, "I have both leisure and troops at my disposal, and I intend to employ both to put an end to the present unsettled state of affairs. Within two months I will treat with the Pope, and it will be necessary that, whether willing or unwilling, he should see reason to assent to the changes which I have made in the church establishment.

Napoleon had intended to send some cardinals and bishops to Savona, to convince the Pope that it was time that an understanding should be come to, since the most sacred interests received injury from the protracted dissensions; to assure him that the dogmas of religion were not in the least interfered with, and to express a conviction that a Pope truly attached to the Faith would not compromise its welfare on account of interests purely temporal; to declare that it was impossible not to see that Napoleon was appointed by Providence to re-establish the Church, to guard it well, and to extend its influence as well by the creation of new cures, as by the establishment of a religious element in education; to hint that the contest between the Pope and the Emperor was not regarded as a religious but as a political one, and that wherever the faith prevailed, the Pope would be blamed for sacrificing its interests to his own temporal principality; and, finally, that it would be to his advantage, before Napoleon was provoked to follow the example of Henry VIII. and to declare himself the head of the Church, to sacrifice his temporal power, which was already irretrievably lost, to

the preservation of his spiritual power which was not yet threatened, and by accepting the same position as that which was held by his predecessors under the emperors of the west, to retire from an obstinate course which might lead to the withdrawal from the bosom of the church of two-thirds of Europe. Such were the reasons which Napoleon wished to be urged with the Holy Father, and they appeared so plausible that the greater part of the European clergy considered them not only maintainable, but even conclusive. Napoleon selected the Cardinals Spina and Caselli, who were supposed to be in favour with the Pope, to visit him and to make the first overtures to an agreement, if they found him in a well disposed mood; but if the Pope should display an inflexible obstinacy, Napoleon determined to have recourse to a means which was in common use in the ancient empire of the west; namely, the convocation of a council, which he flattered himself would be entirely submissive to his will. He would take this method of giving such a peace to the Church as he had given to Europe; tracing its conditions with the point of his sword.

Such were the efforts which Napoleon made at this moment to carry on the Spanish war with vigour, and to enforce the strict observance of the continental blockade, that by the one means or the other might be obtained the maritime peace which was so essential to that of Europe. Such were his endeavours to appease religious differences, to give a settled organisation to his vast empire, and so to arrange all things, that at length, with the crown of Charlemagne on his brow, he might sit on the throne of a peaceful empire of the west.

Whilst he was prosecuting these various undertakings his brother Louis arrived in Paris, and the serious question respecting Holland, which was to be for Europe the drop of water which would make the vase overflow, began to demand serious attention. King Louis arrived in France with a disposition to ill-humour, which nothing he would meet with there was at all likely to dissipate. This singular prince, endowed with a noble spirit, loving the right but regarding it with a distorted vision, liberal in theory but despotic in temperament, brave and yet not warlike, of simple tastes and yet consumed with the desire of reigning, distrustful of himself and yet full of the most irritable *amour propre*, possessing the energy natural to a Bonaparte, and turning it to his own ceaseless torment, believing himself devoted to unhappiness, and indulging in the idea that his whole family was engaged in a conspiracy against him, and still further steeped in this depression of spirits by the bad

state of his health, was entrusted with the government of a kingdom which was destined sooner or later to be the source of the greatest misfortunes to the empire, and which was in a condition as miserable as his own ; but whose miseries had an earlier date than either the continental blockade, the French empire, or the French revolution.

The Dutch, established on a region which was neither sea nor land, had with admirable art converted sandy tracts into ample pastures, and were by turns fishermen, agriculturists, graziers, and merchants. Carrying for sale in all directions by means of their ships the fish which they caught upon their coasts, and the produce of their farms, they formed business connections with the most widely distant countries, and soon became the commercial agents of all nations, conveying to each the products of the others, furnishing the south with the wood, iron, corn, and hemp, of the north, and from the south receiving in return wine, oil, silks, and cloths ; traversing every sea in their maritime enterprises, carrying to the Indies the industrial products of Europe, and bringing to Europe the Indian spices. They thus became the earliest merchants, and in the course of time the keenest and the richest. Very courageous and determined to defend their wealth by sea and land, republican, free and eloquent, but capable of keeping their passions in subjection, fond of the arts, and practising them with an originality due to their soil and habits, they had displayed all the phases of war, liberty, and civilization ; and after having shaken off the yoke of Spain, checked the dominion which France was extending over Europe, and contended with Louis XIV. who had humbled them, and whom they had humbled in their turn, they had finished by giving to England for kings those princes whom she had only condescended to make stadtholders.

But from nations as from individuals all things pass away ; youth, glory, fortune, power. Salt fish and cheeses, which were the origin of the enormous Dutch commerce, were not sufficient to furnish an enduring foundation. Their industry had been employed in the conveyance of the industrial products of one nation to another, and Cromwell had inflicted upon them a mortal injury by his navigation law that one nation should only convey to another its own productions. This principal being soon generally adopted, the Dutch, whose vessels had only entered foreign ports laden with foreign products, saw their commerce rapidly decline ; for whilst England was thus closed against them, the heaviness of the dues in their ports turned the trade with Germany to the towns of Bremen and Hamburg, which were less

exorbitant in their demands, and conveniently placed upon the Wesel and the Elbe. And as the wars which had been waged between Frederick the Great and his powerful allies had been carried on without the intervention of Holland on either side, its importance had suffered much diminution, and its political power had fallen as low as its commercial power.

But if everything suffers change, the change is not necessarily sudden. Its ancient wealth had not departed from Holland without leaving considerable opulence, and abundant sources of prosperity. It possessed numerous colonies, an active commerce in colonial products, and an immense capital, the fruit of economy. The sugar and coffee trade was in their own hands. Whoever had any to sell was sure to find amongst the vast warehouses of Rotterdam and Amsterdam purchasers who would pay in ready money, and could afford to wait until a rise in the price made its resale profitable. The Dutch thus became the greatest speculators of all the world in colonial produce; they were thence led to manipulate the articles of which they possessed such immense stores, and became the best refiners of sugar, and the most expert dressers of tobacco; and, finally, turning to advantage the immense wealth which their economy had gradually amassed, and which was exceeded by the requirements of their commerce, they made loans to the governments of all nations, until at length the making of loans became the chief element of their mercantile activity.

By these means the population of Holland had succeeded in maintaining a considerable degree of opulence, up to the period of the French revolution, at which time it was composed of two classes, an upper bourgeoisie, entirely devoted to the government of the statdholder, and to the English, whose manners it imitated, and filled with prejudices against France which had their origin in the time of Louis XIV.; and a lower bourgeoisie which detested the statdholders, disliked the English, and had a strong feeling in favour of the French, which was chiefly grounded on their having escaped in 1789 from the double bondage of royalty and English supremacy.

But the favour with which France had been regarded by the Dutch democracy, was of short duration, and entirely vanished, when it beheld her passing from a state of sanguinary liberty to subjection, beneath a soldier's rule; especially as in the new state of affairs, Holland became her subject. Almost the whole commercial vigour of the country had suddenly failed; the maritime war had almost entirely stopped the progress of commercial navigation. The

intercourse which Amsterdam and Rotterdam had held with England, and which was so necessary to them, could now only be continued clandestinely; speculations in colonial produce and sugar refining had become almost valueless. The traffic in tobacco had received what was nearly a death blow by the French regulation, which gave to France its exclusive sale. The fisheries, already greatly injured by the English, had completely failed from want of the salt necessary to the curing of their products, since it had to be taken to London for the payment of the navigation tolls. And if, in spite of so many hindrances, some neutral vessels, or those which pretended to be so, brought to Holland the products of the Dutch colonies, the French privateers lying hidden in the entrance to the channels of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Zuyderzée, seized them, and deprived the needy merchants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam of the remnant of profit which might be derived from the transport and manipulation of the little merchandize which escaped the British blockade. The business of money lending had suffered equally with all others, from the general state of distress. Spain had been declared bankrupt; Austria could scarcely pay the interest of her debt; England managed it by means of a depreciated paper money; Prussia paid with difficulty; and Russia paid its creditors with an exactness which nevertheless left them injured. There was not a Dutchman who had not lost fifty per cent. by means of the loans to foreign states.

The state finances, no less involved than those of private persons, and involved to serve France, showed 110 millions of revenue, to meet expenses amounting to 155 millions, amongst which the debt alone presented an item of 80 millions. And even to obtain these 110 millions of revenue which were after all so insufficient, it was necessary to have recourse to imposts the most severe and vexatious. The works in the timber yards were abandoned, the workmen and sailors fled to England, the naval officers were steeped in poverty. In the midst of such a state of things it is easy to conceive how readily might arise once more the ancient hatreds which after the time of Louis XIV. represented the French as frivolous politicians, bad sailors, and intolerant catholics, alliance with whom was only likely to lead to defeat; and as troublesome neighbours, who were as encroaching by land as the English by sea, and equally to be distrusted.

King Louis had no sooner arrived in Holland than he followed the example of his brothers, and showed a desire to reign for himself and his people, rather than for France

and Napoleon. He took care to provide the emperor with as few troops and vessels as possible, and to let the laws restrictive of commerce become a dead letter. This was natural enough, and Murat at Naples, Jérôme at Cassel, Joseph at Madrid, and Louis at Amsterdam, remonstrated with Napoleon with some reason, that to do him honour, those whom he had made kings should render their subjects happy, and lay a safe foundation for lasting dynasties ; as otherwise he would be involved in perpetual wars to support them on their thrones. "Without doubt," replied Napoleon, "I have made you kings that your government may be to the advantage of your subjects, but also that you may comprehend with clearness what is really to their advantage, and that, having been elevated to your positions not by your own merit, but by the arms of France, you may remain her faithful ally. You live by France, and you must live for her. It is in the highest degree to your interest that the power of England should be subdued, for if France does not prevail against her in this struggle, Murat will lose Sicily, Joseph will lose America, and Louis the Indies. You will lose, moreover, the freedom of your commerce and the honour of your flag. It is necessary, therefore, that you should see in my policy the true interest of your subjects, and make them see it also ; that you should render yourselves popular, not by compliance with their weaknesses, but by the display of economy, prudence, industry, and courage ; and that you should show much consideration for the French party which is in every country the democratic party, and endeavour to gain its attachment. But you have on the other hand surrounded yourselves with great lords, who detest both France and me, and alienated by your folly the only party whose affection we might have gained. And this too, when there is not one of you who could retain your thrones a single day, a single hour, after I lost a battle."

There is no doubt that Napoleon might reasonably have asked of the nations, his allies, whom he had entrusted to the government of his brothers, moderate sacrifices, proportioned to their resources and employed exclusively in the protection of the common welfare ; but when, to satisfy his ambition for an universal Empire, he would condemn them to perpetual war, to an indefinite privation from all commerce, and to an overwhelming burden of expense, he demanded what it was impossible that they could grant, and whilst he had cause to blame the weakness of his brothers, he afforded them reasons for resisting his policy. It is at all times only too difficult to obtain from allies the efforts which the common welfare requires. But to deform the cause of the common welfare by

an unbridled ambition, by the demand from friendly nations of unreasonable sacrifices, and the subjecting them to the rule of foreign things, is to aggravate the difficulties which exist in all alliances, to convert the most natural friendships into the bitterest hatreds, and to prepare the way for such cruel mischiefs as those which arose from the dissensions of Napoleon and his brother Louis in respect to Holland.

The accusations which Napoleon brought against his brother, were as follows :—He complained that Holland was of no more assistance to him in maritime warfare, or the suppression of contraband traffic, under the sovereignty of his brother, than it had been when still under republican rule, or even under the government of the grand pensionnaire Schimmelpenninck. He pointed out the fact, that he had at that period at Boulogne and Texel double the flotilla which he now possessed at those places. He declared that the whole of Holland was a vast port as open to English commerce as in time of peace ; that American vessels had been received into its harbours, in spite of his precise orders, on pretence of their being neutrals ; that a hostile feeling towards France existed amongst all classes of its inhabitants, and displayed itself almost as freely as in London ; and that King Louis had imprudently strengthened this feeling, by showing favour to the aristocratic party, whilst he alienated the democratic, by reinstating the old noblesse, and adding new members to its ranks, by burdening the treasury with heavy expenses for the support of a royal guard which was useless in Holland, by the creation of Marshals, who were as useless, and by the grant of dotations which were without motive in a country where no one had obtained victories.

Resting his case upon these causes of dissatisfaction, Napoleon made no attempt at concealing his intention of annexing Holland to the empire, if they were not fully atoned for by compliance with the following conditions :—A considerable flotilla was to be maintained in the two Scheldts, a squadron of ships of the line stationed at Texel, and 25 thousand troops on the coast. The royal guard, the marshals, and the dotations, were to be suppressed, and the debt was to be reduced to a third of the existing capital, for this debt being 80 millions upon a budget of 150, rendered the carrying on of the public service impossible. Nor was this all ; for he demanded that the contraband system should be rigidly suppressed, and that, to ensure the vigorous action of the French cruisers, that questions respecting prizes should be referred to his own tribunals, and that all the American vessels which entered the Dutch ports should be delivered up to him, to be disposed of for his own profit. Finally,

without explaining himself clearly, Napoleon added that the recent English Walcheren expedition had shown on the line of the frontiers of Holland and France certain defects, to obviate which would require certain rectifications in the direction of the two Scheldts, and perhaps in that of the Rhine itself.

King Louis replied to his brother's complaints very completely on some points, and very incompletely on others. He declared that the flotilla was equal now to what it had been at the time to which Napoleon referred—that the greater part of it guarded the Eastern Scheldt, and that it was absolutely necessary to watch it, lest the French troops occupying the Western Scheldt should be turned, and that the remainder occupied the numerous bays of Holland. He made no satisfactory answer relative to the reduction of the fleet at Texel. As for the troops of the line, he asserted that there were more than the required number of 25,000 men, for that three thousand had been sent to Spain, and that besides the many thousands which were shut up in the fortified places, and the numbers that were sick of the Walcheren fever, there remained about 15 thousand employed in guarding the immense line of coast which extends from the mouths of the Scheldt to those of the Ems. He alleged no reason that was even specious to justify the expense of a royal guard, of marshals, and of other creations of a like nature. Respecting the reinstatement in their honours of the ancient noblesse, and the creation of a new noblesse, he announced that he had re-established the ancient aristocracy as a reward for its attachment to his government, and that he had created the new as a means of acknowledging the friendship of some personal friends of his own; with regard to the dotations, he asserted that they took too little from the public domain to raise any question; and finally, that if he held somewhat aloof from that which was called the French party, and had ingratiated himself with that, which was asserted to be an English party, it was simply because he had endeavoured to rally around him all those persons who were of the most importance in the country.

Louis might have added that he had only followed the example of his brother at Cassel, Naples, and Madrid, of his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, amongst the clergy, and even that of Napoleon himself in France. But through all these disputes the simple truth was apparent, that Napoleon was determined not to leave in his brother's hands the performance of what he could do so much better himself, and that he had both the desire and the means of showing that he was master. It mattered little what were the arguments which one or the

other brother might bring forward ; the only question was whether the weaker would obey the commands of the stronger. King Louis promised obedience, or at least undertook, besides the maintenance of a flotilla, the equipment of a squadron of the line at Texel, the rigid suppression of the contraband trade, and the exclusion of American vessels from the Dutch ports. But to reduce the debt to two thirds, to recall the decrees already promulgated with regard to the noblesse, to take away the titles which he had conferred, to deprive his marshals of their batons, to resign the rights of the Dutch crown so far as to send the questions respecting prizes to the Paris tribunals, and to give up to confiscation the American vessels which had been brought into his ports in reliance on his good faith, appeared to him a species of humiliation worse than death, and we are compelled to agree with him. Napoleon, however, with terrible threats insisted upon obedience to his commands, and the unfortunate King of Holland, already overwhelmed with melancholy, began at last to look upon his brother as a tyrant, upon all his relations as selfish cringers before the head of their family, and upon his wife as an accomplice in all the miseries with which he was afflicted. The praise of the Dutch, who were aware of his resistance to his brother, excited him still more, and he permitted himself to cherish the most outrageous plans. Sometimes he determined upon raising the standard of revolt against his own brother, to put the whole country under water by breaking down the ditches, and to throw himself, in short, into the arms of the English, without whose help all resistance to Napoleon was manifestly impossible. He even went so far, on quitting his kingdom, as to make arrangements with the minister of war, M. de Krayenhoff, for the preparation of means of defence against France, and gave orders to the governors of the frontier fortresses of Brabant, such as Bois-le-Duc, Breda, and Bergen-op-Zoom, to refuse admission to the French troops, should they seek to obtain it.

On arriving at Paris, King Louis was anxious to avoid either residing with his wife or at the Tuileries, or with any of the members of his family, and expressed his intention of taking up his residence in the hotel of the Dutch Embassy. When, however, it was pointed out to him that this conduct would increase Napoleon's irritation, he consented to accept the hospitality of his mother who resided in an immense hotel on the faubourg St. Germain. His first act on his arrival was to demand a separation from his wife, and to call together a meeting of his family to decide on the subject. It was agreed, however, that the couple should live apart and the scandal of a separation be avoided. And now, these family

questions being settled, the affairs of Holland engrossed all attention.

The relations of King Louis, especially his mother and sisters, spared no pains to induce him to lay aside his sullen air of defiance and to become reconciled to Napoleon, and were anxious that the subjects in dispute should not be discussed between the brothers personally. Louis was gloomy, excitable, and obstinate, Napoleon quick and imperious by nature, and strengthened in these qualities by the habit of command. There was cause, therefore, for dreading some serious quarrel should these two come into personal contact; and it was arranged that they should meet only in the family circle, and have but little discussion on public affairs except through the intervention of M. Roell, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Holland, and M. de Champagny, Duke of Cadare, Minister of Foreign Affairs for France.

An important personage, whose career was disadvantageously entangled with these affairs, and whose ability was, as we have already said, much weakened by his mania for interfering with everything, M. Fouché, minister of police, perceiving just now an opportunity of mixing himself up with the private disputes of the imperial family, as well as with the most important affairs of the empire, assiduously frequented the dwelling of the empress-mother, to hold interviews with King Louis, and to become negociator between him and Napoleon. But there was little chance of his being accepted in this character, for King Louis, who distrusted even the men most worthy of confidence, had little inclination to be frank with M. Fouché, and Napoleon, although superior to any feeling of distrust, did not care to encourage this officiousness of an over-officious man.

In the meanwhile, however, Louis, from the want of some support in the present emergency, and Napoleon, from a feeling which consisted as much of disdain as of esteem, permitted the interference of this self-constituted mediator; and thus M. Fouché became with M. de Champagny the daily negociator in this long negotiation, which was sometimes carried on by word of mouth, and sometimes by letters,* although all the persons concerned in it resided in Paris.

Napoleon was as usual very precise in the expression of his wishes, and declared his intention of demanding of Holland three things in particular—The energetic repression of contraband trade, an active co-operation in the maritime war,

* These letters are very numerous, especially those of King Louis and Napoleon. They have been preserved, and it is from their infallible records that I have composed this account, of the subject of which they treat.

and the reduction of her debt. And he added, that since he was firmly convinced, that he should obtain from his brother, neither compliance with these nor some other necessary demands; that his brother would neither dare to embroil himself with the commercial world of Holland by taking measures for the suppression of the contraband trade, nor venture to displease the capitalists by taking measures for the reduction of the debt, and providing for the expenses of the fleet; but would, on the contrary, on his return to Holland, permit everything to go on in the old way;—he therefore thought, he said, that it would be better that this state of things were put an end to at once by the annexation of Holland to France; and that as his brother was constantly complaining of the burden of a crown, it would be well that he should indulge his tastes by accepting that honourable and calm retreat which the Emperor of the French was well able to grant to him. That he might be quite at ease as regarded the fate of Holland, for that its union with France would assure to it a glorious position in time of war, and a prosperous career in time of peace. And that, in short, it would be well to lose no time in considering the subject of the annexation, which offered the only solution of the questions on hand, which was simple, decided, and not likely to cause disastrous results.

This firm and decided expression of the Emperor's will filled King Louis with consternation. For although he was unceasing in his declaration of the fatigues of the cares of government, he was most anxious to continue to bear them. And this, not only from a natural ambition of governing, but also from a feeling of *amour propre* which, as naturally, made him very unwilling to resign a kingdom after having shown himself incapable of governing it, or of observing fidelity to France. Always regarding himself as a blighted being, as the only unhappy one in the midst of the happiest family in the world, he saw in this project of dethroning him a frightful fulfilment of his destiny; and felt, especially, that it would be a withering condemnation pronounced by a judge whom the world would regard as both just and well-informed. Rather than endure such a humiliation, then, he was ready to brave every extremity.

At first he deplored his journey to Paris, as a sort of wilful murder, and was anxious to depart suddenly for Holland, to declare war against his brother, with the English for allies. But he believed that he was watched and despaired of reaching the frontiers of the empire without falling again into the hands of an irritated brother, whom his flight would have enlightened as to his plans of resistance. He then

yielded to another set of ideas, and casting himself as it were, at the feet of Napoleon, declared himself willing to do all that was demanded of him, and promised compliance on all the contended points, if his brother would only grant him one more trial.

Napoleon answered, that Louis would not keep his word, but after having made the fairest promises, would no sooner have returned to Amsterdam than he would fall into the hands of the contrabandists and Dutch capitalists, and have no strength of mind to keep one of his engagements. Moved, however, by his brother's grief, and influenced by the prayers of his mother and his sisters, who were all urgent with entreaties in favour of Louis, and believing in his integrity, Napoleon at length showed himself disposed to grant conditions which, while they placed all the real power in his own hands, would permit Louis to retain the nominal sovereignty, at least during the war.

A certain amount of reconciliation arising from this last turn of the negotiation, it became a little less indirect between the two brothers, and they met. Napoleon received Louis at the Tuileries, explained his plans to him, and repeated that his chief wish, because it was his chief necessity, was to obtain peace with England; that on this peace depended both the glory of his own family and the greatness of France; that in his efforts to obtain it, no ally could be more serviceable to him than Holland, and that he was determined, therefore, to obtain from it, either by the exercise of his own power, or by the hands of his brother, all the assistance which its resources could afford; and that this motive, and not the desire to increase an empire which was already too large, had sometimes induced him to entertain the subject of its annexation. Enlarging upon this theme, with his accustomed force, and even with great good faith, for he was at this moment far more intent upon vanquishing England than aggrandising himself; he said, in one of his interviews with Louis, "I attach so much importance to a maritime peace, and so little to Holland, that if the English would open a negotiation, and come to a candid understanding with me, I should neither wish to annex your kingdom, nor to encumber you with distasteful conditions; I would leave Holland tranquil, independent, and intact." Then, as though hurried away by his subject, he would add, "these English perpetually force me to aggrandize myself! Had it not been for them, I should have annexed neither Naples, Spain, nor Portugal to my empire. I have wished to extend my coasts that I might increase my resources. If they continue in their present course, I shall have to annex to

my empire, Holland, the Hanse towns, Pomerania, and perhaps even Dantzic. It were well that they should know this, and you should endeavour to make them know it. Employ the opportunity which is offered by the connection of the merchants at Amsterdam with English houses, of informing England that nothing is more imminent than the annexation of Holland, which will be to her a source of the greatest injury, and that by treating for peace alone could she hope to preserve your independence, and ward off this serious danger from herself." After having conceived the idea of this discourse, Napoleon formed the project of sending immediately M. Roell to Amsterdam, to summon together the ministers, to associate with them some of the members of the Dutch legislative body, to induce them to deliberate upon the state of affairs, and to despatch in their name a safe man to London, to inform the British cabinet of what was taking place, and to implore it to spare Europe the misfortune of seeing the annexation of Holland to the French empire.

Louis, dazzled by his brother's project, was anxious to put it into execution, without loss of time. It was impossible to conceal the present state of the negotiation from the Duke of Otranto, who was determined not to be left out of it, and he was accordingly informed of everything. His mind forthwith became inflamed with the idea that he, also, would contribute to the bringing about a state of peace, by proceeding according to his own fashion, and putting some little force, if it were necessary, even upon Napoleon himself. Proud of the step he had recently taken in arming the national guards, at the time of the Walcheren expedition, and flattered by the encomiums which declared him an audacious genius, whose personal importance might bear comparison with that of Napoleon himself, he thought that it would be a little increased should the attainment of a general peace, which the whole world longed for, be attributed in a great degree to his exertions.

M. Fouché had, for some time, had M. Ouvrard under his charge, had permitted him to leave Vincennes to arrange his affairs, and had been so weak as to listen to his observations on all subjects; nor did he listen only to M. Ouvrard, but also to certain royalist writers, who in submitting plans to him, offered to devote themselves to the great man, raised up by Providence to effect a change on the face of the universe. It is necessary, said they, to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the marriage with Marie Louise to conclude a peace which shall embrace both sea and land, both the old world and the new; which shall pacify all

nations, dynasties, and parties, and enable its fortunate contrivers to have given satisfaction to all interests, even to those of the Bourbons.

To arrive at this advantageous position of affairs, it was necessary to divide the Peninsular, to leave the largest portion to Joseph, and to surrender the remainder to Ferdinand VII., who must marry a Bonapartist princess. The independance of the Spanish colonies which they had already asserted for themselves, was to be confirmed, but confirmed under a monarchical form, for they were to receive as their King (can it be believed ?) Louis XVIII., who was regarded by the Royalists as the legitimate heir to the crown of France, and who would be very happy, it was supposed, to emerge from his retreat, to ascend the throne of the new world !

Such were the projects of the financiers and idle writers to whom M. Fouché listened ; and which would be too puerile to be recited had they not been the source of very serious consequences.

Full of these ideas and impatient to contribute to the arrangement of a peace, M. Fouché had already sent a secret agent to London to sound the British cabinet, and had done this without Napoleon's knowledge. As soon as he had heard of the new project, he had hastened to mix himself up with it, and had sought for some one whom he might use as an agent in the secret negotiation which he was determined to open. M. de Labouchère, the head of the first banking house in Holland, partner and son-in-law of M. Baring, who was on his part head of the chief banking house in England, happened to be in Paris on business affairs. M. Ouvrard, who had sold him piastres at the time of his great speculations with Spain, and had by his means realized some millions in America, had introduced him to the Duke of Otranto, who had received him with the respect due to a banker who was rich, talented, and honest. The commencement of negotiations with England had scarcely been spoken of, than M. Fouché thought of M. de Labouchère, and proposed him as the agent. M. de Labouchère was accordingly chosen as the person exactly suited for this office, which required a person who was without any official character which would attract notice, and who yet had sufficient importance to command a ready reception and attentive hearing.

M. Roell and M. de Labouchère, then, were dispatched to Amsterdam, and in the meantime all resolutions with respect to Holland were suspended. Louis was anxious to take advantage of this interval to return to his kingdom ; but Napoleon, who was unwilling to let him depart until a full

understanding had been come to upon the affairs of Holland, detained him at Paris, until some information should have been received from M. de Labouchère.

There was some difficulty in deciding upon the manner in which this negotiation should be conducted, and in the name of what authority the agent should present himself in London. After mature reflection it had been decided that the Dutch ministers and the members of the legislative body, could not be assembled together without publicity being given to the whole affair, and that there would be some inconvenience in representing the chief members of the Dutch government, as speaking of the political annihilation of their country as inevitable, and almost as a natural consequence, if England did not hasten to prevent it by making some sacrifices. It had, therefore, been judged more expedient to send M. de Labouchère, not in the name of King Louis, who could not enter into direct correspondence with England, but in the name of two or three of the principal ministers, such as MM. Roell, Vanderheim, and Mollerns. It was impossible that such a man as M. de Labouchère should not meet with attention when he declared that Napoleon's recent marriage had changed his views, and that such a peace might easily be obtained from him as would put a final stop to those invasions which were no less to be lamented for the sake of Europe, than they were injurious to England herself; and, whilst he was not to specify any particular conditions, he was authorized to declare, that should England show a disposition to make some sacrifices, France would not hesitate to make such on her side as would satisfy the honour and dignity of each country.

Everything having been finally arranged, M. de Labouchère embarked finally at Bruille, soon arrived at Yarmouth, and lost no time in proceeding to London. We have said that he was the partner and son-in-law of Mr. Baring; we should add that Mr. Baring was one of the most influential members of the East India Company, and a great friend of the Marquis of Wellesley, formerly Governor-General of India, and brother of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who commanded the English armies in Spain. M. de Labouchère had, therefore, but to present himself, to be both heard and believed. The success of his mission depended upon the offers which he was authorized to make; and on the position in which the British cabinet might be at the time. And this position was for the moment one of great difficulty.

After the resignation of Lords Grenville and Grey, who had continued the alliance formed between Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, a resignation which had been caused by the

Catholic question, the exaggerators of the policy of Mr. Pitt had succeeded under the premiership of the Duke of Portland, and during their possession of the government received numerous blows. First of all Lord Castlereagh and M. Canning, the first firm, diligent, and able, but deficient in eloquence, the second on the other hand as superior in powers of oratory as the first was in the conduct of affairs, had given vent to the jealousy which each felt for the other in insults, which led to their retiring from the cabinet to fight a duel. They did not re-enter it. Lord Chatham had fallen in consequence of the Walcheren expedition, and the Duke of Portland was dead. Two persons possessed influence in the cabinet; Mr. Percival and the Marquis of Wellesley. The former a clever barrister endowed with some eloquence, inflexible firmness of character, and imbued with the blind prejudices of the Tory party. The latter, on the contrary, who replaced Mr. Canning at the foreign office, together with a most enlightened mind, possessed a perfect freedom from prejudices, and the rare talent of expressing himself with elegance and simplicity. He had less influence with the Tory party than Mr. Percival, because he had less passion, but he was held in high consideration, which was every day increased by his brother's growing fame.

The position of the English ministry was not, although it possessed the majority in the houses of parliament, very firm. It had experienced an alternation of success and the reverse. Although the victory of Talavera was a doubtful victory, and had been followed by a retreat on Estremadura, it had resulted in two advantages to the English, the first being that it caused the French army to hold aloof from Portugal, and the second that it enabled them to maintain theirs in the Peninsula in the face of the whole power of Napoleon. It had been, on the other hand, a great reverse for them when they failed before Antwerp with forty thousand men, and lost fifteen thousand by death or incurable sickness. Thus the position of the ministry was as undecided as was the opinion of the country on its policy. The opposition, having at its head two eminent persons, Lord Grenville and Lord Grey, declared that the war was carried on against all reason; that every year of its continuance had but given increased stature to the colossus which it was intended to overthrow; that it had caused the loss, if not of Portugal, certainly of Spain and Naples; and that by its prolongation all the northern coasts would be lost up to the mouths of the Oder; that the Peninsular war, in particular, was extremely dangerous, since that if Napoleon should throw

himself upon the English army with a hundred thousand men, not an English soldier would return; that the only force capable of being used in defence would thus be destroyed; that every day England lost some ally; that she had recently lost Sweden, and was threatened with speedily losing America; that the finances were loaded with frightful burdens; that the paper money and the exchange every day suffered fresh depreciation; and that, in short, to persist in such a policy was ruinous. Such was the substance of the daily remonstrances of Lords Grenville and Grey, and it must be acknowledged that there were sufficient reasons wherefore all those who could not foresee the mistakes into which Napoleon would shortly be hurried, should be desirous of peace. Nevertheless, save the millions which it cost to maintain so long a struggle, and the number of men who perished in Lord Wellington's army, which was not after all very considerable, and was made up by volunteers, the British population felt few of the consequences of war, and had, in a manner, become used to it. It had not as yet suffered much in its commerce; for if it had lost the continental markets, it had found others in the Spanish colonies. It was only threatened with serious damage when Napoleon determined to shut out completely from the continent colonial produce. But even in that direction it maintained in spite of his endeavours an immense activity. Its manufactures had received an enormous development; it ceased to feel any anxiety for its troops, whom it found able to keep their ground so well in the Peninsular; and finally, with the exception of some complaints which were sometimes levied rather against certain peculiarities of the income tax, than against the tax itself, it tacitly approved of the policy of the government, without however blaming the opposition for demanding peace. The slightest cause, therefore, was sufficient to incline it to the one side or the other.

Amongst the ministers Mr. Percival was notorious for his desire to prosecute the war with all the blind fury of a Tory. The Marquis of Wellesley, on the other hand, who was both an enlightened and a moderate man, and carried no obstinacy of temperament into the cabinet, was not unmindful that whilst the continuance of the war might procure large additions to the glory of his family, it would also surround both it and England with many dangers. He was therefore inclined to peace, should a serious offer of it be made, and acceptable terms proposed in respect of Spain. But to agitate the public mind by insignificant conferences, to turn aside popular opinion from its present peaceful current into a directly opposite direction, without being certain that there

would be any advantageous result from the change, to turn its warlike attitude into a peaceful one, without any certainty that peace would be really obtained, seemed to him to be a serious imprudence, which he, for his part, would not be guilty of. He had already behaved in a manner conformable to these ideas towards the agent sent by M. Fouché, and had given him an answer as evasive as the mission with which he was charged. An old officer in the army of Condé, and having some relations in England, the agent of the Duke of Otranto, had been presented by Lord Yarmouth, with whom he was acquainted. The Marquis of Wellesley received him politely, and replied to his message, that England had not determined upon prosecuting an eternal war, and would listen to overtures of peace, when brought by ostensible agents, properly accredited, and charged with propositions reconcileable with the honour of each nation.

Mr. Baring having announced the arrival of M. de Labouchère, and that he was the bearer of important communications, the Marquis of Wellesley hastened to receive him, showed him the greatest respect, and listened to him with profound attention. But after having heard him, he displayed extreme reserve, confining himself to general pacific declarations, and repeating that if France were really desirous of peace, England was quite willing to grant it. But he expressed the great doubts he entertained with respect to the real sentiments of the French cabinet, and gave as the source of these doubts, the doubtful character of the present mission, which was secret in its form, and charged with vague proposals, which left every thing in a state of uncertainty. He did not conceal that he had already received an overture of the like nature, borne, it was true, by a person of much humbler pretensions than M. de Labouchère, but exactly similar in its main points, since that also declared a pacific disposition without producing any proof, however slight, of the existence of such disposition. No clandestine mission, he said, no doubtful propositions, nothing which did not give a well grounded hope of attaining a peace, which would be honourable to England, would be listened to. As regarded Holland and the danger it was in of annexation to the French empire, the Marquis of Wellesley seemed little concerned. Whilst Napoleon found Holland too English, the British minister found it too French, and seemed to think that between its actual state and its annexation to France, there would be very little difference. As for the commercial inconveniences with which it menaced England, he seemed neither to have a clear idea of them, nor to foresee their extent, and repeated that every imaginable act of tyranny

had been long expected along the whole European coast, and that Great Britain was already resigned to it.

These declarations, which were as vague as the overtures with which M. de Labouchère was charged, were accompanied with the greatest testimonies of affection towards himself, and assurances that if any person should present himself in London as the bearer of ostensible powers, and of acceptable propositions, he would certainly be received and permitted to open negotiations.

The Marquis of Wellesley, so reserved with M. de Labouchère, was less so with Mr. Baring, and told him almost the plain truth. He and his colleagues, he said, had not determined upon prosecuting an eternal war, they cared little for re-establishing the Bourbons upon the throne of Louis XVI., and were ready to treat with Napoleon, but they distrusted his sincerity, and suspecting an intention on his part of exciting public opinion in England by a feigned negotiation for peace, had decided upon not aiding him in his designs. Influenced by these motives, they would only enter upon a negotiation which was both official and sincere. Resolved, as they were, neither to abandon Spain to Joseph, nor Sicily to Murat, nor to yield up Malta, they hoped that any envoy sent to negotiate would be furnished with such powers as would give a hope of agreement on these essential points.

Mr. Baring, who was a clever man, repeated these observations to M. de Labouchère, told him that England was resigned to the war, and even habituated to it; that she had not yet suffered sufficiently from it to feel inclined to yield; that while she had been very anxious with respect to the fate of the army, she was now re-assured by finding that this army maintained its footing in the midst of the Peninsular; that such a reverse as was little likely to occur was necessary to induce her to decide on peace; that it would never for a moment entertain the idea of surrendering Spain to a prince of the house of Bonaparte, and that no illusion must be indulged in on this point. Speaking with perfect freedom, and discussing all the various possible combinations, Mr. Baring represented as possible, but by no means certain of acceptance, and as solely emanating from himself, an arrangement which, while it left Malta to England, would give Naples to Murat, Sicily to the Bourbons of Naples, and Spain to Ferdinand, with the exception of the abandonment to France for the expenses of the war of the province as far as the Ebro.

Very certain that he should make no further progress in the objects of his mission by a prolonged stay in London,

M. de Labouchère departed for Holland, and reserving his communications respecting the result of his mission for King Louis in Paris, he maintained an impenetrable reserve on the subject towards the rest of the world. It was now evident, after these attempts at negotiation, that Spain was the real obstacle to peace ; and that, having already obscured Napoleon's glory, having exhausted both his armies and his finances, she would continue to be in every subsequent negotiation for peace an obstacle perfectly insurmountable, unless a decisive triumph over the English could be obtained upon her soil.

Unhappily, Napoleon had become as habituated to the war in Spain as the English to the maritime war which she maintained against the universe. He resigned himself to it as to one of those serious maladies which one is able to endure by virtue of a strong constitution, from which one suffers in certain moments, which one forgets in others, and accompanied by which one lives on, endeavouring to deceive oneself respecting its serious nature. From the moment when he received the answer brought by M. de Labouchère, he ceased to expect that the resolves of Great Britain would be shaken by a threat of annexing Holland to France, and he resolved at once to put an end to the disputes between himself and his brother. Being unwilling, however, to give up entirely the indirect negotiation opened by M. de Labouchère, he dictated a note, of which the following was the import :—If England, it said, was habituated to the war and suffered little from it, France was also habituated to it and suffered little less. Victorious, rich and prosperous, France was condemned to pay dear for sugar and coffee, but she was not compelled to go without them. She was, in fact, indemnified by the new sugars which chemistry had discovered for her. A period of temporary suffering would be succeeded by one of unheard-of prosperity. Naples, Spain, and the Levant had brought her cotton sufficient to supply her manufactories, and if the sea were closed against her vessels, the whole continent offered an immense market for her silks, her cloths, her muslins, and dyed fabrics. She would be able, therefore, to maintain herself for a long period in the position which she held. As for Spain, the war had lasted two years and a half, because Napoleon, having had to march yet once more to Vienna, had been unable to devote to it sufficient attention. But he was now no longer occupied with Austria, and was preparing for the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the English, a cruel surprise. He was not distressed by an interruption to maritime commerce, which gave a vast development to French manufactures, nor by the

continuance of a war which, by drawing the English to the continent, furnished him with the occasions he so ardently desired, of matching army against army. And if he desired peace it was because, having made a marriage which tended to reconcile him with the old Europe, he was inclined to terminate the struggle which had been carried on between the ancient order of things and the new. With respect to the kingdoms which he had created, it was not to be supposed that he would sacrifice one. He would never dethrone his brothers Joseph, Murat, Louis, Jérôme. But the fate of Portugal and Sicily was still undecided; and these two countries, together with Hanover, the Hanse Towns, and the Spanish colonies, afforded materials for liberal compensations. But besides all this, if it were found difficult to come to an understanding upon these points, it would be at least possible to give, at once, a more humane character to the war. The English had issued 'orders in council,' to which Napoleon had replied by the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and the sea had thus been converted into a theatre of warfare. England had a greater interest than France in putting an end to this state of things, for a war between her and America was very likely to result from it. If she agreed with this opinion, she had only to repeal her lines of blockade, and France on her side would repeal hers; Holland and the Hanse Towns should remain independent and free; the seas would once more be open to neutrals, the war would lose its bitter character, and it was possible that this first return to moderation might be followed by a complete reconciliation between the two nations whose conflict divided, agitated, and tormented the whole world.

Such were the subjects of consideration which M. de Labouchère was instructed to submit to Mr. Baring, that they might eventually by any means, that should be found most suitable, be brought to the notice of the Marquis of Wellesley. For this purpose M. de Labouchère was authorised either to correspond with, or, if he thought it necessary, to make another journey to England.

Napoleon was anxious that the questions respecting Holland should have an immediate solution, that the complete closure of the coasts of the north sea might be immediately enforced; he still persisted in regarding the annexation of Holland to France, as the surest means of obtaining that result, but perceiving his brother's distress, and yielding to the entreaties of his mother and sisters, he was disposed to give up a part of his demands. He had already, from affection for the Queen Hortense and for the Empress Josephine, bestowed the fair duchy of Berg, which

had become vacant by the advance of Murat to the throne of Naples. Louis far from regarding this as a proof of affection, had persuaded himself, on the contrary, that it was the result of a desire to offend him, by depriving him of the education of his son, who, having become the sovereign, under age, of a principality dependent upon the empire, passed to the guardianship of the head of the imperial family, who was, of course, Napoleon. In spite, however, of these foolish self-deceptions, touched by his brother's state of anguish, he consented to entertain some other arrangement than that of annexation; some arrangement which, by a change of frontier line, and entrusting to French authority the guard of the Dutch coasts, would produce some of the important results which he had in view.

France having possessed, up to this time, Belgium without Holland, the frontier line had quitted the banks of the Rhine below the Wesel, passed the Meuse between Grave and Venloo, left southern Brabant on the outside, and rejoined the Scheldt below Antwerp, giving to Holland, consequently, not only the Waal, but the Meuse and the eastern Scheldt. Napoleon wished, in leaving Holland in his brother's possession, to rectify this frontier, to make the Waal the line of separation, and to adopt the Dutch Diep and the Krammer for the extreme limit, which arrangement would transfer to the sovereignty of France, Zealand, the isles of Tholen and Schowen, southern Brabant, a part of Guelders, the isle of Bommel, the important places, Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Gertruidenberg, Bois-le-Duc, Gorcum, and Nimèguen, that is to say, a fifth part of the population of Holland, and positions more important still than the four hundred thousand persons thus made subjects of the empire.

Besides this change of the frontier line, Napoleon desired that, until the conclusion of the maritime war, the Dutch commerce should be carried on under licences granted by himself, that all the Dutch ports should be guarded by an army of eighteen thousand men, of whom six thousand should be French, and twelve thousand Dutch, commanded by a French general, that all questions with regard to prizes should be tried in Paris, that a squadron of nine ships of the line, and six frigates should be under sail off Texel, by the first of July of the current year (1810), that all American cargoes carried into Holland, should be given up to the French treasury, that the imprudent measures which had been taken with regard to the noblesse, should be immediately retracted, that there should be no more marshals, and that the native troops under arms should never number less than twenty-five thousand men. Amongst these conditions, which

were at least as hard to bear as the loss of a throne, there were many which affected more particularly Napoleon's unhappy brother, who was now paying the penalty of having played the king for a few years; the chief of these was the loss of the territory on the left of the Waal, which would to the greatest extent distress Dutch patriotism, and thoroughly impoverish the finances which were already so involved; a second was the transfer of the jurisdiction with respect to prizes, to the French courts, which involved in a manner the total destruction of authority in Holland; and a third was the subjection of the Dutch army to a French general, which was at the same time to take away all sovereignty from Louis, and to subject him to a cruel humiliation. Louis entreated for less hard conditions, and falling back, in his despair, upon his dreams of resisting his brother's authority, sent off advices to the ministers Krayenhoff and Mallerus to fortify Amsterdam, and those parts of Holland which were most capable of being put in a state of defence. He renewed, also, his order that admission into the Dutch fortifications should be refused to the French troops.

But in the meantime the ancient corps of Massena, commanded by Marshal Oudinot, had descended the Rhine and invaded Brabant under pretence of protecting the country against the English. General Maison having presented himself before the gates of Berg-op-Zoom had found them closed, and having insisted on their being opened to him, had caused the governor to show him the king's letter, which enjoined him to refuse admittance to the French troops. Fearing to overstep his duty if he came to a collision, General Maison paused under the cannon of the place, awaiting further orders. In the meantime information came from Amsterdam that its fortification was being actively proceeded with.

When information of these facts reached Napoleon, he was filled with indignation. He sent successively the Duke of Otranto and the Duke de Feltre to his brother to demand that all the gates of Holland should be opened to his forces, and to threaten that if they were not he would force them. He laid to the account of Louis and his ministers all the bloodshed that would ensue, and even demanded that the ministers who had given these orders should be delivered up to him.

The Dukes of Otranto and of Feltre (in the latter of whom Louis had great confidence), painted in such vivid colours Napoleon's anger, that the unhappy king in a fit of terror yielded every point, gave orders that the French

troops should be received into the fortified places, and consented to the dismissal of the two ministers who were accused of having advised the measures of resistance. "Sire," he wrote to his brother, "I send off this night a courier bearing the dismissal of the ministers Mollerus and Krayenhoff, who are alone to blame for the matters of which your majesty has complained. If you desire the dismissal of any other, I am ready to obey." Overwhelmed with suffering and chagrin, Louis also addressed the following note to his brother, which gives us a fair impression of the state of affairs at this period. "There has been no empire of the west hitherto," he wrote, "but it is most probable that there very soon will be. And then your Majesty will be very certain that I shall be no longer able to make mistakes, or to be disaffected." (Louis alluded to the state of well defined vassalage, which would be the result of this state of things, and render obedience easy to each inferior.) "Consider that I have been thrown, without experience, into a difficult country; permit me, now that I am on the point of losing both your friendship and your support, to entreat you to forget the past. I promise to observe faithfully all conditions you may impose on me."

The submission of Louis was complete, and there would no longer be any difficulty in the arrangement of the affairs of Holland. All the conditions insisted on by Napoleon were included in a treaty, by which Napoleon on his side engaged to maintain the integrity of the kingdom of Holland, or at least so much of it as remained. King Louis was only excused the reduction of the national debt to a third. To conceal them from the Dutch, the arrangements relating to the command of the Dutch army by a French general, to the seizure of American merchandize, to the abolition of certain dignities, and the dismissal of certain ministers, were included in secret articles. Amongst these secret conditions, one, which was not a little singular, was that Louis should have no ambassadors either at Vienna or at St. Petersburg. Napoleon, suspicious of the relations which his brothers might enter into in these capitals, which he knew to be thoroughly hostile to him, had imposed the same condition on Murat, under the pretext of economy.

When these sacrifices were consented to, Napoleon wrote to Louis a letter, which perfectly showed what were his real views.

"To the King of Holland,

"Paris, 13th March, 1810.

"Every political reason urges me to annex Holland to France; but seeing how much this would distress you, I now for the first time turn aside from my true policy to oblige

you. At the same time, be well assured that you must make a complete change in your mode of government, and that the first cause of complaint I have against you, will make me do that which I have now hesitated to do. My causes of complaint against you have reference to two subjects; the continuance of commercial relations between Holland and England; and speeches and edicts contrary to what I have a right to expect from you. It is necessary for the future, that your whole course of conduct should tend to impress Holland with a friendly feeling towards France, and not to be of a nature to excite its enmity and foment a natural hatred in its population. So far from taking away Brabant, I would have augmented Holland by the addition of several millions of people, if you had pursued that course which it was reasonable to expect from my brother and a French prince. But the past was irrevocable. Do not think that I am to be deceived; I read all the documents myself, and you will probably give me credit for knowing the force of ideas and phrases. You have written to me respecting the isle of Java. This subject must remain as yet in abeyance, for considering the powerful maritime resources of the English at the present time, it is necessary before we engage in new enterprises, to augment our naval forces. I calculate upon your being able to aid me almost immediately, and upon your maritime armaments acting in concurrence with mine."

When this agreement, the conditions of which we have shown, was settled, there was a sort of reconciliation between the two brothers. Napoleon loved Louis, to whom he had acted as guardian in his youth, and was loved by him when his spirit was free from the clouds of melancholy which so frequently oppressed it. They passed in each other's company all the period of the marriage fêtes, and in April, Louis departed to explain to his subjects the terms of the arrangement which had been come to, and to make them understand that he had been placed between the alternatives of submitting to the sacrifices which had been demanded of him, or of acceding to the total loss of the national independence. He had chosen well both for them and for himself, for as long as Holland preserved the vital principle of its political existence, it would be grounds for hoping that the day would come when all its losses would be recompensed; especially, as the greater part of the stipulated conditions, with the exception of those which referred to the change of frontier, would cease to be in force upon the attainment of peace. With regard to the loss of territory, Louis had entreated Napoleon to make it up by a grant of German territory, and he had

intimated that he would do so, should Holland render herself deserving of it by her conduct. That the appearance of reconciliation might be the more complete, Napoleon desired that the Queen Hortense should conduct her eldest son, the Grand Duke de Berg, into Holland, and pass some time with her husband there. Her presence, although but temporary, would help to persuade the public that all difficulties had been surmounted, and the delicate state of her health would be sufficient reason for her almost immediate departure.

Louis, therefore, left Paris for the Hague, whilst Napoleon hastened to give those orders which were called for by the new arrangements. He appointed to Marshal Oudinot to occupy southern Brabant and Zealand, as far as the Waal, to take definitive possession of these provinces, and to seize upon the spot all the English merchandize and colonial manufactures he could lay hands on. As Holland had been the great *dépôt*, and the frontier provinces which had been acquired by the late conditions, had been the road by which they had entered France, there was a great probability that they would be found in considerable quantities.

Napoleon next ordered Marshal Oudinot to pass the Waal, and with three regiments of infantry, and two of cavalry, to advance into the northern part of Holland left to Louis; whilst General Molitor, concentrating his division towards l'Ost-Frise, would be ready to enter from the east, if events required it. General Oudinot was to establish his head quarters at Utrecht, to be joined by a number of custom house officers, and to occupy the navigable channels. He was desired to demand the surrender of the American cargoes, and to convey them by the inland channels to Antwerp, where was to be established the *dépôt* and market for the seized merchandize. Besides the effect which Napoleon hoped to produce by these measures on commercial credit in England, and thus again on public opinion, he also hoped to obtain by means of them a large addition to the extraordinary treasury, and thus unite financial advantages with political ones.

In the midst of these various occupations, Napoleon found himself at the end of April (1810), the most favourable period for military operations in Spain, and that at which it was necessary that he should set out, if he intended to direct in person that decisive campaign, which he had determined should take place this year in the Peninsula. But in spite of his desire to set out, a desire so earnest, indeed, that he had already sent beyond the Pyrenees the greater part of his guard, a multitude of reasons still detained him in the bosom of his empire. Married on the 2nd of April, it was scarcely

fit that he should so soon leave his young bride to go to lead armies. The continental blockade, from which he expected such great results, were it only rigorously enforced, was only likely to be so by the influence of his own personal care. The disputes with his brother Louis, although temporarily set at rest, demanded a constant vigilance and unrelaxed firmness on his part, that the waters of Holland might not be suddenly opened to British commerce. The commercial system, much complicated by the grant of licences, required the publication of new regulations, which took up much of Napoleon's time, for he entrusted this business to no one, believing as he did, that he should eventually vanquish Great Britain as much by means of commerce as by his troops. And finally, although he had little hope of any successful result from the negotiation opened by M. de Labouchère, he was unwilling to close it entirely by his own absence from Paris. A commissioner had indeed arrived at Morlaix, to arrange the exchange of prisoners, who was charged with instructions which revealed a considerable change in the dispositions of the British cabinet. It was easy to believe that the last overtures had had some effect in bringing about this change.

There were many reasons to induce Napoleon to remain in Paris, besides his desire that any one should conduct the war in the Peninsula rather than himself; and this, not because he feared the assassination which the reports of the police showed he was in danger of there, but because he could not see in Spain, as he had in Prussia, Poland and Austria, any opportunity of putting an end to the war by one brilliant manœuvre, by one great battle; and did see that the campaigns there must consist of innumerable little conflicts, of sieges rather than battles, and form a methodical war, which could be as well directed from a distance as on the spot. The English alone were in a position to offer occasions which would demand important operations; but there was one amongst the marshals of the empire who, uniting with a rare energy the highest talents of a general, and having been covered with additional glory in the recent campaign, appeared to be exactly suited for the conduct of this war; and this was Marshal Massena. Napoleon fixed upon him as the man whom he would match against the English. The campaign opened by the siege of the fortified places which lay on the boundary line which separated Spain and Portugal, and many months were likely to pass before the commencement of offensive operations. Napoleon would at any time be able to throw himself upon the point at which he might

think his presence necessary. He forced the old warrior, who was suffering both from fatigue and illness, but was not ungrateful for the rewards which had been showered upon him, to depart for Portugal, to direct the operations against the English army ; gave him the best staff that could be got together, placed under his orders the wise Regnier, the brave Junot, the intrepid Ney ; appointed to the command of his cavalry the best officer of this arm of the service who was then living, General Montbrun, besides brilliant lieutenants ; promised him eighty thousand men, and dismissed him, when still suffering from his former exertions, overwhelmed with caresses, and followed him with the most sanguine hopes. Who could imagine, indeed, that the most brilliant of our generals, Napoleon alone excepted, at the head of a superb army, would not be able to overwhelm a handful of English, who were as inferior to our soldiers in numbers as they were in every military quality, except bravery ? We shall presently see how destiny had decided.

After having made these arrangements Napoleon proposed to make a journey to Belgium, taking advantage of the unusually fine spring weather, to show his young wife to the populations which were impatient to see her, to influence favourably the Belgians, whom it was important to attach to the French empire, to make a personal inspection of the scene of the last English expedition, to order those works which would render a second expedition of the same kind impossible, to inspect the fleet at the Scheldt, to take a little nearer view of his brother's conduct in the new stage of his career, and to advance to meet rather than to withdraw from the negotiation with England.

The negotiation with England took, at this period, a most extraordinary direction, and one which we could scarcely believe possible, did not incontestable documents exist to prove it.

Napoleon had shown much reserve in regard to the degree in which M. de Labouchère was authorised to continue the negotiation opened with Great Britain. He had pointed out that France was still able to carry on the war with the endurance of very little suffering on her part, had distinctly signified the particulars in which France would never yield, and given some intimation as to those in respect to which she was disposed to make sacrifices. In the state of public feeling at that time in England these hints furnished but slight materials with which to prolong the negotiation, much less to bring it to a successful issue. M. Fouché thought thus, and had the good sense to wish for peace ; but whilst he had the good sense to wish for peace, he was foolish

enough to desire that it might be procured by means of his own exertions, and if not in spite of Napoleon, at any rate independently of him, flattering himself with the idea of presenting it to the Emperor in almost a complete state, and dazzling him with the glory of so great an achievement. This was a kind of undertaking which would have been unwise under any government, and was most unwise under that of one so absolute and vigilant as Napoleon; and is inexplicable on the part of so clever a man as M. Fouché, except by that passion for interfering with everything which increased upon him with his age and his importance, and, we may say in his excuse, with the increasing manifestation of the perils of the empire. M. Fouché was urged on in this course by those persons with whom he was surrounded, and whom we have mentioned as promulgators of such projects as, that a portion of the Peninsular should be restored to the Bourbons of Spain, that the Spanish colonies should be resigned to the Bourbons of France, &c. . . . to which projects some others were added, such as, for example, that in case Napoleon should be unwilling to deprive his brother Joseph of his kingdom, Ferdinand should be presented with the Spanish colonies, and the Bourbons of France receive a recompense, which was a sufficiently strange one, consisting of nothing less than North America, the United States themselves! Let us observe the source of this notorious idea;—the United States by their law of embargo had embroiled themselves at the same time with both France and England; they were republicans, ungrateful to France and odious to England, whom Louis XVI. had erred in enfranchising, and whom Napoleon, curer of all the evils caused by the revolution, would replace under monarchical and European authority. England could not but be rejoiced at seeing the United States confined to their territories, checked in their enterprise, and punished for their revolt.

M. Fouché had too much good sense to believe in such chimeras, but pressed by M. Ouvrard, whom he had the folly to initiate in so grave an affair, he consented to his departure for Amsterdam, for the purpose of seeing M. de Labouchère, and directing the correspondence of the latter with London, in such a manner as to continue the negotiation, and not in such a manner as to break it off. M. Fouché was persuaded that by moderation and patience, and the war in Spain offering no better results, they would succeed in bringing Napoleon to sacrifice Joseph's kingdom, of which he was greatly disenchanted, perhaps the kingdom of his brother Louis, with which he was still less enchanted, and that by care England might be brought to a point at which

reconciliation with them would be possible, or peace become negotiable; but this, according to his opinion, was without Napoleon's interference.

M. Ouvrard set out in consequence, full not only of the ideas of M. Fouché, but, what was much worse, of his own, quite delighted to be mixed up with so great an affair, and flattering himself that he should recover by a signal service the long lost favour of Napoleon. Scarcely arrived at Amsterdam, he spoke in the name of M. Fouché, from whom he held several letters, was considered by M. Labouchère as the direct and accredited representative of this minister, and in consequence as the representative of Napoleon himself. Thence M. Labouchère found himself encouraged, by that which he heard and that which he read, to send to London new communications of a nature much more likely to satisfy British politics than those theretofore sent. M. Ouvrard in effect had told him that in respect to Sicily, Spain, the Spanish colonies, Portugal, and Holland, Napoleon would not be peremptory in his wishes, and that he must not depict him as such in London; that he wished sincerely for peace; that his inclination was misunderstood in England; that besides there was at that moment a point in common between him and the British cabinet, the desire of punishing the Americans for their conduct. M. Ouvrard touched on all these subjects in a manner more or less precise, and wrote several notes, pressing M. de Labouchère incessantly to transmit them to London. M. Fouché, having the imprudence to second this extravagant negotiation, had recourse to a strange device, such as the police can imagine, to give credit to M. de Labouchère with the British government. An unknown person who called himself Baron de Kolli, and appeared to belong to the English police, had presented himself at Valencay to contrive some method for the escape of Prince Ferdinand. They had arrested him, and thought that they had made an important capture, that would greatly annoy the British cabinet, whose intrigues would be publicly disclosed. M. Fouché authorized M. de Labouchère to write to the Marquis of Wellesley that, if he desired it, this person should be sent back to him. This would be at once a proof of good faith towards the British cabinet, and a way of greatly accrediting M. de Labouchère.

The communications with England were then both rare and difficult, not only on account of the bad state of the roads, but also on account of the war. It required fourteen or fifteen days to send a letter from Amsterdam to London, and receive a reply to it, so that this singular correspondence might still last a very considerable time without any definite

solution being arrived at. In the meantime M. Ouvrard in writing to M. Fouché represented the negotiation to him as making a progress which it did not make, and M. Fouché, in his turn deceiving M. Ouvrard, represented to him that Napoleon was instructed and satisfied with these parleys, which were absolutely false, for M. Fouché, in deferring as long as he could an unpleasant avowal, waited for the matter being sufficiently advanced to be avowed to Napoleon.

During this time the Emperor left Paris with a brilliant court, composed of the Empress, the King and Queen of Westphalia, the Queen of Naples, of Prince Eugène, of the Grand Duke of Wurtzbourg, the uncle of Maria Louise, of the Prince of Schwarzenberg, the Ambassador of the Austrian Court, of M. de Metternich, the first Minister of that court, and of the greater part of the French ministers. Napoleon intended to visit Antwerp, Flushing, Zealand, and Brabant, all provinces newly ceded to the empire, then to return by Picardy, and through Normandy to Paris.

The populace, tired of the monotony of their life, are always eager to run after princes whoever they may be, and often applaud them on the eve of a catastrophe. When Napoleon appeared anywhere the feeling of curiosity, and also of admiration sufficed to collect a crowd, and in the moment when he had just fulfilled his great destiny by his marriage with an Archduchess, the eagerness and enthusiasm were likely to be great. Wherever, indeed, he appeared, the transports were lively and unanimous. Besides, his presence always announced the commencement of numerous works, and in him they applauded not only the great man, but the benefactor. Leaving Compiègne on the 27th of April, he arrived the same day at St. Quentin. Besides the re-establishment of the manufacture of shafts, this town was indebted to him for the great works of the canal of Saint-Quentin, continued and finished since the consulate. The subterranean passage which united the waters of the Seine to those of the Scheldt, was illuminated, and Napoleon passed through it with his court, in elegantly decorated barges, and, so to speak, in open day. He granted, during the passage, to M. Gayant, the engineer who superintended these beautiful works, a pension of considerable amount, with a grade in the legion of honour, and then set out for Cambray and the Chateau of Lacken. He was not to visit Brussels until his return.

On the 30th of April, he embarked on the great canal which runs from Brussels, until it joins the Ruppel, and by the

Ruppel the Scheldt itself. All the boats of the great fleet of the Scheldt, decked with a thousand colours, and worked by the ships crews, came to fetch him, and transported him along the submissive waters of Belgium with the quickness of the wind. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, and Admiral Missiessy, who had shown so much coolness during the Walcheren expedition, commanded the imperial flotilla. They arrived soon in view of the Antwerp squadron, created by Napoleon, and recently removed from the reach of the English torch. All the vessels, frigates, sloops and guns lined the way; Marie Louise passed under the harmless fire of a thousand cannon, which conveyed to her agitated senses the testimony of the power of her husband. The Imperial Court made its entry into Antwerp in the midst of a Belgian population, assembled to meet it, and which had forgotten its feeling of hostility in the presence of so great a spectacle. Napoleon had a great deal to do at Antwerp, and stayed there several days. The continental peace enabled him to devote himself to his projects for the navy of the empire, and of the allied states; he had this year about forty vessels to dispose of, nine for the Texel, promised for the 1st of July; ten actually under sail at Antwerp, two at Cherbourg, three at Lorient, seventeen at Toulon, one at Venice; in all forty-two. He calculated to have seventy-four in 1811, 100 or 110 in 1812, capable, when the necessary quantity of frigates and sloops should have been added, to embark in case of need, 150,000 men for any destination.

In order to reach this number it was necessary to add nine more at Antwerp in the space of one year. To do this, it was indispensable to augment the basins, and to bring wood and workmen to this chosen port.

Napoleon gave the proper orders, and had a vessel of eighty guns launched in his presence, which entered majestically into the Scheldt under the eyes of the Empress, and in the midst of the benedictions of the clergy of Malines, invited to this naval fête. Napoleon had near him Prince Eugène, to whom he desired to show all that he did in the canals of Flanders, that he might excite him to the like in the canals of the Adriatic. "When one has land one can have sea," he exclaimed, "provided one wishes it, and one takes the necessary time." Time! exactly that which is procured by wisdom only, and of which Napoleon would soon deprive himself.

His brother Louis came to see him, and, although less agitated, always seemed extremely melancholy,—melancholy with his own sadness, and with the sadness of his people,

whom so many afflictions had struck at once. Napoleon endeavoured to inspirit him by showing him all that he had done at Antwerp, and all that he still proposed to do there, again urgently ordered him to have his fleet ready for the Texel for the 1st of July, unfolded to him his vast maritime projects, and announced to him that his troops were about to be brought on the coast, and that in a short time he should have at the mouth of the Scheldt, at Brest and at Toulon, vast expeditions ready to carry entire armies, that Massena would march on Lisbon with eighty thousand men, that in two months the English would be sharply pressed at all points, and that the war, of which they seemed to have made a habit, would soon be rendered insupportable to them, above all, if by rigorous observance of the blockade, a severe blow were struck at their mercantile interests.

With reference to this subject Napoleon conversed with his brother Louis on the negotiation of Labouchère. By a singular accident he had just encountered M. Ouvrard on his way, returning in all haste from Amsterdam to Paris, in consequence of the strange communications going on between Holland and England. Napoleon, with his ordinary promptitude of mind, had foreseen that M. Ouvrard, enjoying the favour of the Duke of Otranto, and connected in business with M. de Labouchère, had come to mix himself in that which did not concern him, to endeavour to detect some secret of the negotiation, perhaps to give counsels which were not required, and perhaps also to establish some speculation on the probabilities of peace. Full of a singular presentiment he caused M. de Labouchère to be forbidden to hold any intercourse with M. Ouvrard, demanded from him all the letters exchanged between Amsterdam and Holland, and added an order that all such letters should be sent to him during his journey wherever he might be. Louis set out again for Amsterdam without having wished to assist at any fête, above all at a moment when Napoleon was about to enter into the territory recently taken away from Holland. Napoleon, after having employed five days in directing the necessary works, and especially the new defences which were to render Antwerp impregnable, ordered the fleet to descend on Flushing, and to give the necessary time he went to visit the new territories acquired between the Meuse and the Waal, as also the several places of Berg-op-Zoom, Breda, Bois-le-Duc, and Gertruidenberg. At Breda he received, with the civil and military authorities, the Protestant and Catholic clergy. In these newly-acquired territories of the empire the Catholics found themselves enfranchised from the Protestant domination, and yet

they were far from seeming satisfied. Whilst the chief Protestant minister came in his robe of state, the vicar apostolic, on the contrary, presented himself in a plain black dress, as if he feared, on such an occasion, to put on a holiday costume. Napoleon, by the simple attitude of the bystanders, had divined all their sentiments, and, the bad habit of not being able to contain himself each day increasing, he gave himself up to a transport of anger, in part sincere, and in part the result of calculation. Feigning at first not to see the vicar apostolic, he heard with benevolence the Protestant minister, who, speaking with much simplicity and modesty, addressed him in a few words of resignation, the only words proper in the mouths of citizens who were just torn from their ancient country, to be attached to a new country which, though great, was foreign. "Sire," said the representative of the Protestant clergy, "in us you see the ministers of a Christian community, whose custom is to worship in all that happens the hand of Providence, and to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." "You are right," instantly replied Napoleon, "and you will find that you do well in so doing, for I wish to protect all kinds of worship. But why, sir, are you dressed in the costume of your ministry?" "Sire, that is the order." "It is then the custom of the country," replied Napoleon. Then turning towards the Catholic clergy he said: "And you, sirs, why are you not here in your sacerdotal habits? Are you solicitors, notaries, or physicians? And you, sir," addressing himself to the representative of the Roman church, "what is your title?" "Sire, vicar apostolic." "Who nominated you?" "The Pope." "He has not the right. I alone, in my empire, nominate the bishops charged with the administration of the church. Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's. The Pope is not Cæsar, I am Cæsar. God has not given to the Pope the sceptre of the sword, but to me. You Catholics, for a long time placed under the dominion of the Protestants, have been enfranchised by my brother, who has placed all kinds of worship upon an equal footing. You are about to be indebted to me for a still more complete equality, and you commence by showing a want of respect for me! You complain of being oppressed by the Protestants! by your conduct it would seem that you have merited it, and that it is necessary to place the weight of a strong authority upon you. Be sure that this authority will not be wanting. I have here a present proof that you do not desire to obey the civil authority, and that you refuse to pray for the sovereign. I have already caused two refractory priests to be arrested, and they will remain in prison. Imitate the Protestants, who, in

remaining steadfast to their faith, are citizens submissive to the law, and faithful subjects. Ah! you do not wish to pray for me!" continued Napoleon, with an accent of increasing anger. "Is it because a Roman priest has excommunicated me? But who gave him the right to do so? Who below can unbind subjects from their oath of obedience to a sovereign instituted by law? No one, you should know it, if you know your religion. Are you ignorant that it was your culpable pretensions which drove Luther and Calvin to separate from Rome, a part of the Catholic world? If it had been necessary, and if I had not found in the religion of Bossuet the means of assuring the independence of the civil power, I also should have enfranchised France from the power of Rome, and forty millions of men would have followed me. I did not wish it because I thought that the true principles of the Catholic faith were reconcilable with the civil authority. But give up all thought of putting me in a convent, and shaving my head, as Louis the Debonnaire, and submit yourselves, for I am Cæsar! Otherwise I shall banish you from my empire, and disperse you like the Jews over the surface of the earth." In pronouncing these last words the voice of Napoleon was raised and his eye flashed. The unfortunate priests who had provoked this burst were trembling. "You are," he added, "of the diocese of Malines; go and present yourselves to your bishop, obey the concordat, and I shall then see what I shall have to ordain for you."

This scene, calculated for effect, produced a great one. The words of Napoleon, taken down at the moment, and repeated by the permission of the police in the greater part of the newspapers of the country, produced a great effect.

Encompassing all things in his activity, Napoleon passed rapidly to other objects. He visited Berg-op-Zoom, Breda, Gertruidenberg, and Bois-le-Duc, and everywhere took wise resolutions, dictated by his profound knowledge of war and of administration. On seeing these countries so fertile in flax and hemp, he decreed that a prize of a million francs should be given to the inventor of a machine for spinning flax. He found also in these provinces manufactories which produced common cloth at a very low price, and well adapted for troops, and decided to use it to a considerable extent for that purpose.

Arrived on the banks of the Waal, which presents so strong a frontier and so excellent a means of communication in the interior, he felt all the ardours of his ambition for France rekindled, and conceived a regulation which should

insure to French boatmen the exclusive navigation of the Rhine. He decided that every boat not being French which entered the Rhine should, at Nimeguen if it came from Holland, and at Mayence if it came from Germany by the Maine, deliver its cargo to French boats, which alone could navigate this great river. Napoleon thus treated the river waters as the English treated the waters of the ocean.

Anxious to have timber proper for ship building for Antwerp, he ordered that all wood of this kind brought along the Rhine, should be obliged to pass into Belgium instead of going into Holland, whither it had been usually drawn by the great wealth of the inhabitants. He drew up at the same time several regulations to induce unoccupied workmen to come from Brest, where they built but little from want of wood, for employment at Antwerp.

After having visited the frontier places, and been conveyed successively to the islands of Tholen, of Schouwen, of North and South Beveland, in short of Walcheren, he decided, on account of the terrible fevers of these countries, that those posts only which were indispensable, should be maintained, taking care to choose them well and to provide them with every defensible force of which they were capable. At Flushing he ordered immense works to shelter the garrison from the fire of vessels, and to overwhelm with destructive projectiles any hostile squadron which should endeavour to pass the great channel. At the sight of the ruins of Flushing he showed himself more just towards the unfortunate General Mounet, who had recently fallen in defending the place, and gave the most requisite orders to prevent the past being renewed again in the future. According to an observation often made that men of a ripe age and acclimated are less susceptible of fever than young men newly arrived, he decreed an organization, by virtue of which the defence of these islands should be reserved for the veteran and colonial battalions. He desired that a numerous flotilla of gunboats might always be joined to the fleet, and that the basins of Flushing should be prepared to receive twenty vessels of the line. Whilst he directed these things his court gave and received fêtes, and occupied itself with the frivolous part of the journey, of which he reserved for himself the useful part.

His stay in these parts was prolonged until the 12th of May; he re-ascended the Scheldt, and this time only passed through Antwerp, visited Brussels to show his wife, again descended to Ghent and to Bruges to conclude the necessary works on the left of the Scheldt, and from thence west to

Ostend, where an English army in disembarking might have marched straight upon Antwerp. Napoleon here decided on works which could give sufficient strength to the place, and then set off for Dunkirk, where he ordered several necessary repairs, chastised the idleness of several engineer officers in fault, visited the camp at Boulogne, the abandoned theatre of his first projects, and held several reviews there, to cause uneasiness to the English; gave two days to Lille, and at last proceeded to Havre, where he occupied himself attentively with the defence of this considerable port. On the evening of the 1st of June, he returned to St. Cloud, satisfied with what he had done and ordered, with the reception everywhere given to the Empress, and the hopes which the nation seemed to place in the young sovereign. However, notwithstanding the numerous satisfactory subjects which this journey had procured for him, he returned with a profound irritation of which the Duke of Otranto was the principal object. King Louis, as Napoleon had ordered him, had demanded from M. de Labouchère all the papers relating to the communications with England, who, firmly believing that in continuing, at the instigation of M. Ouvrard, the overtures commenced, he acted according to the orders of the Duke of Otranto, and, in consequence, of the Emperor himself, had delivered over without dissimulation all that he had written to London, and all the replies which he had received. Napoleon, reading during the journey these papers, transmitted to him by his brother, learned for certain that the negotiation had been continued unknown to him, and on a basis which was far from being agreeable to his purposes. These papers did not disclose all that had passed, for the correspondence of M. Ouvrard with M. Fouché was wanting, but what was sufficient to prove to Napoleon, that they had negotiated without his orders, and after other indications than his. He surmised, without being quite certain, that M. Fouché had taken a principal part in these singular intrigues, and he wished to enlighten himself on the point immediately. On the morning after his arrival, that is on 2nd of June, he called the ministers to St. Cloud, M. Fouché was present. Without any preamble, Napoleon asked for an account of the going to and fro of M. Ouvrard in Holland, of the continued parleys with England, as it appeared without the sphere of the government. He asked him besides, one after another, if he knew anything of this strange mystery, if he had sent or not, M. Ouvrard to Amsterdam, if he was an accomplice or not of his inexcusable manœuvres. M. Fouché, who had reserved himself to speak at a late period to the Emperor of what he had

dared to attempt, surprised by his sudden revelation, which he did not expect, and pressed irrefutably by these embarrassing questions, stammered some excuses for M. Ouvrard, saying that he was an intrigant who meddled in every thing, and whose proceedings should not be attended to. Napoleon was not to be satisfied with these reasons. "These are not," he said, "insignificant intrigues, which should be despised; to permit oneself to negotiate with an enemy's country unknown to one's own sovereign, and on the conditions of which that sovereign is ignorant, and will not perhaps admit, is an unheard of treason. It is a treason which the weakest of governments ought not to tolerate." Napoleon added that he looked upon that which was just passed as so serious that he desired that M. Ouvrard should be immediately arrested. M. Fouché, fearing that his arrest would lead to a discovery of the whole affair, in vain attempted to appease Napoleon's anger, but the result of his efforts was only to increase Napoleon's suspicions, and attract them towards himself. Napoleon, who was fully resolved that M. Ouvrard should be arrested, had avoided entrusting the execution of his will to M. Fouché, lest he should find some means of evading it, and had chosen for this duty Savary, who had become Duke de Rovigo, and was entirely in his confidence. Within two or three hours M. Ouvrard was cleverly arrested, and all his papers seized. At his first examination it was discovered that the negotiation had been carried farther than had been suspected, and that M. Fouché had taken as large a part as any one in the singular intrigue which had been discovered.

Napoleon had been very dissatisfied with the restless spirit of this minister, who already on various occasions had officiously taken the initiative, or exceeded the bounds of his instructions, as for example in the matter of the divorce, in the excessive extension of the national guard, and especially in this negotiation with England. Napoleon had not failed to remark his rash spirit of enterprise, and that ambition of his to make himself of importance, which was very likely to prove in the course of time exceedingly dangerous. He perceived in Fouché's eagerness to conclude a peace in spite of himself, an indirect censure on his policy, and a wish to acquire credit at his own expense. We may add, moreover, that he had begun to conceive a vague feeling of discontent against all his old servants, for they all, especially the most distinguished amongst them, appeared, each in his own manner, to express disapproval of his actions. M. de Talleyrand gave his reproofs the form of sarcasm, the wise

Cambacérès blamed him by his silence, and M. Fouché by the exertions he had made to bring about peace. He had in reply made Talleyrand feel the weight of his temper, and maintained a rigid reserve towards Cambacérès, which chiefly injured himself, as it deprived him of precious counsels. With regard to M. Fouché he was resolved to give full scope to his anger.

The letters found in the possession of M. Ouvrard showed very plainly what part had been taken by the Duke of Otranto in the second Labouchère negotiation. The following day, the 3rd of June, fell on a Sunday; and all the chief dignitaries had gone to hear mass at Saint Cloud, and to assist at the Emperor's levee. After the celebration of mass Napoleon had the dignitaries and his ministers, with the exception of M. Fouché, summoned to his presence, and addressed them thus: "What would you think of a minister who, without the cognizance of his sovereign, should open negotiations with foreign states, conduct them on principles arranged only by himself, and thus compromise the whole policy of the state? What punishment is awarded by our laws for such a fault?" As he uttered these words Napoleon scrutinized narrowly each of those who surrounded him, as though he would ask of them such an answer as would enable him the more easily to pour his full vengeance on the head of the Duke of Otranto, for he felt in the midst of all his power that to punish him severely was no light thing. The complaisant courtiers easily read the meaning of his glances, and exclaimed that such a crime would be of the deepest dye. M. de Talleyrand, who was not this time the object of the imperial wrath, smiled carelessly; and the arch-chancellor, who guessed that M. Fouché was alluded to, and resolved to persist in declaring himself the friend even of his enemies, answered that there could be no doubt that the fault was a grave one and deserved a severe punishment, unless it were committed only through an excess of zeal. Napoleon hereupon exclaimed that an excess of zeal which should lead a man to act in the way he had described, would be as strange as dangerous, and he proceeded to repeat with vehemence all that he knew of M. Fouché; concluding by announcing his irrevocable determination to deprive him of his office, and requesting the advice of those present with respect to the choice of a fit person to succeed him.

This was a source of great embarrassment to all. It was difficult to make a choice, for to the post of minister of police belonged an immense importance, which was the consequence of the arbitrary powers belonging to it, and which M. Fouché had known how to increase and to identify with himself. Each,

moreover, feared to make any choice which might be repugnant to Napoleon's own secret determination, and to contribute, even indirectly, to the deprivation of a minister who was dreaded even in disgrace. All were eager to declare that serious deliberation was necessary before fixing on the man who would be a worthy successor to M. Fouché. But M. de Talleyrand, after having looked about him for some time in silence, and with an ironical expression flitting over his impassable countenance, at length said, turning to his neighbour, in a voice sufficiently loud to be heard by all around: "M. Fouché has certainly committed a great fault, and I will name the one man who alone ought to be his successor,—it is M. Fouché himself!" Vexed that this assembly of great persons should have not only failed in giving him any advice worth having, but should have been the means of exposing him to a stroke of Talleyrand's raillery, Napoleon abruptly retired, taking with him the arch-chancellor, and saying to him, "Much advantage have I gained from consulting the gentlemen! You see what useful advice they have given me! But my choice is made, and the Duke de Rovigo will be my minister of police." Napoleon had had occasion to prove the skill and boldness of the Duke de Rovigo, had remarked his devotedness to himself, and felt very confident that he would not imitate M. Fouché's example of taking to himself the credit of every act of grace, and attributing to the Emperor all those of a contrary character. The appointment of the Duke de Rovigo to this post would, moreover, be a source of general consternation, and this was by no means contrary to Napoleon's inclination. It was a choice, however, which filled the arch-chancellor with uneasiness, for whilst doing full justice to the merits of the Duke de Rovigo, he felt that an ill effect would result from a military air being given to the police, and hinted that public opinion, being somewhat estranged, was scarcely likely to be conciliated by the appearance of a minister of police in military uniform. To this Napoleon replied; "so much the better! The Duke of Rovigo is resolute and cunning; and as he will be feared, may afford to be gentler than another!" There was no answering this; and it may be observed of the Duke de Rovigo that he was intelligent, crafty, and unscrupulous, and yet free from malice, and perfectly capable of speaking the truth to his master's face. But the truth, unfortunately, in whatever guise it may reach a sovereign's ears, if he be not inclined to receive it, is but an empty sound, and begs for admission at a gate which will not be opened to its entreaties.

The course of affairs thus led to the removal in less than three years, of the two most important ministers of state, the

Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Police, M. de Talleyrand and M. Fouché. With respect to the ministry of foreign affairs, although filled with modesty, prudence and discretion, by M. de Cadore, it had seemed to be vacant since it had passed from the hands of M. de Talleyrand. Of polished manners and a pleasing exterior, M. de Bassano, a man who was devoted to the Emperor, and desired to serve him well, but too apt in a spirit of complaisance to give up his own opinions for those of the Emperor, aspired to the ministry of foreign affairs, and as a means of rendering his attainment of this post the easier, would have wished to place in the ministry of police a friend of his own. This friend was M. de Sémonville, a man at once cynical, daring, and supple, fraught with all the unscrupulous doctrines of a minister of police, but not possessed of the necessary judgment, tact, and vigilance. M. de Bassano had contributed to the fall of M. Fouché, by giving currency to more than one damaging report, and had paved the way for the elevation of M. de Sémonville, by extolling above measure some inferior services rendered by him in the course of the negotiations respecting the Austrian marriage. But if it were possible for complaisant mediocrity to gain access to Napoleon, as is the case with all great men, there was but little chance of his being imposed on by small artifices, especially when the matter in question was no less than in the choice of a minister of police. Indeed, whilst M. de Bassano had sent for M. de Sémonville to Saint Cloud, that he might be ready at the favourable moment, urgent and repeated messages were sent to the Duke de Rovigo to present himself in the Emperor's cabinet. The anti-chambers were filled with the curious, and those who had gone to Saint Cloud in the hope of assisting at some great change in the high ministerial appointments. The Duke de Rovigo arrived at length, and was much surprised at the announcement which Napoleon made to him, without any preface. "You are Minister of Police, take the oath, and begin your work!" The new minister murmured some modest objections to his fitness, to which Napoleon paid no attention, took the oath, and passed through the imperial apartments, which echoed with the news that the Duke of Rovigo was made minister of police, and the Duke of Otranto in disgrace. The effect of this news was disadvantageous; for M. Fouché, who after having performed great services by means of his knowledge of men, and by his considerate manner of treating party spirit, both appeasing and diverting it, had undoubtedly detracted from the merit due to these services, by his own officiousness, was nevertheless regretted by the public, as one of the men who had been

Napoleon's counsellors in his most prosperous years. He was regretted as Talleyrand and Josephine were regretted ; with a regret which regarded them as witnesses of, and actors in a time which had been glorious, and which, it was feared, would not be equalled in prosperity by the future.

Napoleon did not, however, intend to disgrace M. Fouché, without giving him some compensation ; and he made him governor of the Roman states, where his tact and experience in revolutions would find ample and suitable employment. Previously to this, he sent two letters to the ex-minister ; one of them public and full of gratifying testimonies of esteem ; the other private and more severe. We quote the second, because of the two it is the one which is the most conformable to the truth.

“ Saint Cloud, June 3rd, 1810.

“ Monsieur le duc d'Otrante, I have received your letter of the 2nd of June. I am fully aware of all the services which you have rendered me, and I have perfect confidence in your attachment to my person, and your zeal for my service. I should, however, be wanting in what is due to myself, did I any longer leave you in possession of the portfolio. The office of minister of police is one which demands that perfect confidence should be reposed in him who holds it, such a confidence as I can no longer place in you, since, in the most important matters you have compromised my tranquillity, and that of the state ; conduct which is not excused in my eyes by the legitimacy of the motives which led to it.

“ A negotiation has been opened with England, conferences have taken place with Lord Wellesley. This minister has known that he was treating with you, when he ought to have believed that it was with me ; from this results a total confusion in all my political relations, and if I should endure it, a stain would be upon my character which I am determined not to endure.

“ Your peculiar opinions regarding the duties of the Minister of Police are not consistent with the good of the state ; and although I have full confidence in your attachment and fidelity, I am forced to a perpetual surveillance which fatigues me, and which I can no longer bear. This surveillance is rendered necessary by the number of things which you have done of your own head without knowing whether they agreed with my wishes or views, or were consistent with my general course of policy.

“ I wish to inform you by my own hand of the reasons which induce me to deprive you of the portfolio of police. I have no hope of your changing your mode of acting, since during several years, the most decided and reiterated evidences of

my dissatisfaction have not altered it, and because you have been determined not to understand that it is possible to do much harm whilst attempting to do much good.

“Apart from this, my confidence in your talents and fidelity is complete, and I desire to find some occasion of employing them in my service.”

M. Fouché on quitting his post had taken care to burn all the papers relating to it, and felt a malicious pleasure in withholding from his successor's hands all the innumerable threads composing the finely spun web of the system of police. The Duke of Rovigo, therefore, suddenly appointed to the head of this department whilst completely ignorant of its details, and, moreover, without means of communicating with the secret agents whom M. Fouché declined to point out to him, was at first surprised and then terrified at his new position. But he speedily became reassured and saw clearly where all had at first appeared confused and intricate. One by one crept up to him those mysterious secret agents, which are so necessary to a minister of police, and whose use is measured not by their own disposition but by that of the minister who employs them; a sort of timid and famished animals such as are all those which habitually live in the shade, flying at the least alarm, but quickly driven forth again by the pangs of hunger towards the hand which offers them food. These persons soon made the Duke of Rovigo acquainted with those secret plots, generally rather puerile than dangerous, which it was necessary to watch without appearing to make them of too much importance; and it was not long before the new minister found himself well able to conduct the affairs of his office, although he never acquired the authority of M. Fouché, to whose piercing eyes had been almost attributed omniscience.

Of all the secret proceedings which it was now the office of the Duke of Rovigo to trace out, Napoleon felt the most interest in the singular negotiation which had been pursued in his own despite. He wished to know the several parts which had been taken in it by M. Fouché, M. Ouvrard, and M. de Labouchère. M. Ouvrard frequently underwent examination and maintained a rigorous silence; M. de Labouchère was summoned to Paris, and ordered to bring with him the papers relating to the matter which he still had in his possession. By means of these and by interrogating M. de Labouchère the real facts of the case were speedily discovered to be as we have described. M. de Labouchère was considered to have behaved with discretion and sincerity, and to have only intermeddled with the negotiation in accordance with what he believed to be the wishes of the government.

M. Ouvrard and M. Fouché were found to have revived a negotiation which had been half abandoned, and to have completely disregarded the instructions of the Emperor in showing a disposition to sacrifice that which he was resolved not, on any consideration, to resign. But the chief source of annoyance to Napoleon was the idea that he might be suspected in England of duplicity, and of being willing to traffic with the kingdoms given to his brothers, especially that of Spain. An additional circumstance which came to light caused him particular alarm, and made him resolve to convert the almost nominal disgrace of M. Fouché into one both public and severe. It was discovered that independently of the communications which had been carried on by M. de Labouchère, and which were but the revival and protraction of an authorized negotiation, there had been others which had no such foundation, and which had been solely the idea of M. Fouché himself. M. Fouché had in November, as we have said, selected an agent named Fagan, formerly an officer in an Irish regiment, well connected in England, and a friend of Lord Yarmouth, who had introduced him to the Marquis of Wellesley. There was reason to suppose that written communications had passed in the course of this affair, and Napoleon sent to M. Fouché, demanding that he should deliver up all such as were in his possession, and threatening the severest penalties in case he should hesitate to obey.

The agent had brought from London only a few unimportant papers, and these M. Fouché had burned, partly because they were of little interest, and partly because prudence counselled the destruction of the least traces of so rash an undertaking. When a message to this effect reached him, Napoleon surrendered himself to the most violent paroxysms of rage, for he feared that this obstinacy of M. Fouché concealed some important secret; he deprived him of the governorship with which he had just invested him, and exiled him to Aix in Provence.

The alarming suspicions, however, which had arisen, were soon set at rest. The agent who was the object of so much inquietude appeared, frankly answered all the questions that were put to him, said that he had seen the Marquis of Wellesley, and had from him the only written document that he had received; and that this was a note containing about six lines, and simply repeating the ordinary declaration of the British ministers, that they were ready to take part in a sincere formal negotiation, which should comprise all the allies of England, and especially Spain.

The result of the inquiry into this strange affair seemed,

in fact, merely to show that M. Fouché had been guilty of an act of great temerity, and that the Emperor might possibly be considered in England more accommodating than he really was. Napoleon soon saw the matter in its true light and grew calm, but he still left M. Fouché in disgrace and exile. Fearing, however, to be accused of lightly sacrificing his old servants, he had an account of the whole affair drawn up and communicated to those ministers and great persons who had been witnesses of the bursts of passion to which it had excited him. "It is right that they should see," he said, "that I do not permit myself to be causelessly and arbitrarily severe towards my old servants."

This attempt at negotiation showed very clearly that without the sacrifice of Spain, which Napoleon was determined not to sacrifice, peace was impossible; and that it only remained to prosecute the war with vigour, and to enforce with the utmost possible rigour the continental blockade. In the latter measure the assistance of Holland was indispensable, and therefore became the object of increased attention.

Had King Louis had a judicious and clear-sighted understanding, he would have acted a manly part in the position in which he found himself, and since he had determined to resign, for the sake of preserving the safety of Holland, a portion of his territory, he would have endeavoured to instil submission into the hearts of his subjects. The most sensible of them, in truth, needed no persuasion; they were well aware that resistance was unavailing whilst they were under the hand of Napoleon, who, after all, was not an enemy, but a rather exacting ally, who taxed them severely for the common good. But King Louis had, unfortunately, a cankered heart. Softened for a moment by the expostulations of the members of his family, on his return to Amsterdam all his usual bitterness of soul returned, aggravated by the sacrifices which he had been compelled to make. On entering his capital he seemed to read on every face reproaches for his having resigned the fairest provinces of the kingdom, and he hastened to show himself the most distressed of all. The Queen who followed him displayed a countenance as full of gloomy meaning as his. This was not the way to please at Paris, nor to lead to that resignation at Amsterdam which could alone prevent some terrible outbreak. But, unhappily, the actions of the King were even more imprudent than either his looks or his language.

He commenced by writing the most affectionate letters to the two ministers whom he had shown himself so ready to sacrifice at Paris; by giving titles of nobility to those who were now to lose their rank as marshals, a method of com-

pensation which was very convenient perhaps, but quite at variance with the policy which he had promised to pursue ; by degrading the Burgomaster Vander Poll, who had opposed the putting Amsterdam into a state of defence. To these acts he added one which was more serious still. Having taken a dislike to the French ambassador, M. de Laroche-foucauld, whom he regarded as being a spy upon his conduct, he was anxious to take advantage of his absence to receive the Corps Diplomatique, and only have to receive M. Sérurier, a simple chargé d'affaires. M. Sérurier was a prudent and reserved man, who only concerned himself with the punctual performance of the duties laid upon him by his court. There was no reason why he should not be treated, at least, with politeness. The King passed before him without either word or look, and overwhelmed with civilities the Russian envoy beside him. This scene became the source of much remark and anxiety in Amsterdam, and was reported in Paris by the French agent, who could not maintain silence on subjects which excited general attention.

The difficulties which had their foundation in the personal character of the King were accompanied by others which were the result of circumstances. The last treaty exacted severe sacrifices from the Dutch. In the first place all those American cargoes which had entered the Dutch ports under the flag of the United States, and had been seized at the instance of the French government, had to be given up. Now these cargoes were either the property of Dutch houses, or of English houses which had commercial connections with Dutch merchants ; and all these houses opposed the execution of this measure, those of the one class alleging that these cargoes were composed of Dutch merchandize conveyed under the American flag from the colonies of Holland ; and those of the other contending that they consisted of true American merchandize brought over in American vessels. King Louis attempted to deliver up in the place of these cargoes those which had been seized by our cruisers, and belonged to them. But the delivery of these cargoes was one of the articles of the treaty, on the exact performance of which Napoleon most strenuously insisted, either because he would thus strike a blow at the principal branch of the contraband trade, or because he was anxious to enrich the treasury extraordinary at the contrabandists' expense. This question, therefore, became the subject of the most animated and bitter communications.

The establishment of a French custom-house service along the coasts of Holland, presented another great difficulty. There had come from Boulogne, Dunkirk, Antwerp, Cleves,

Cologne, and Mayence, legions of French custom-house officers, who did not speak Dutch, were accustomed to a most rigorous surveillance, and brought to the exercise of their functions a sort of military honour, which rendered them almost proof against corruption. The Dutch were thus compelled to endure on their coasts and in their ports the presence of foreign functionaries, and to submit to their minute investigations; a state of things well nigh unbearable by a people who were almost exclusively mercantile, and who had always been accustomed to the utmost commercial freedom. And had it been necessary to endure this restraint only on the exterior frontier, the annoyance, though still great, would have been less severely felt. But the configuration of Holland rendered its presence necessary at its very centre; for besides being traversed by a multitude of rivers and canals, it is penetrated by an arm of the sea called the Zuyderzee, which affords the most convenient possible means of communication between all parts of the country. Had this Zuyderzee had but one outlet, that might have been watched and the interior navigation of the country been left unimpeded; but as there were many in various positions, it had been found necessary to subject the interior of the country to an intolerable surveillance; and in addition to this commissions were established composed of French custom-house and military officers, to pass summary judgment on all offences and offenders against the laws of blockade. Louis had not reckoned on this infringement on his sovereign rights, and he ordered the liberation of all the individuals arrested under the authority of these tribunals.

But far beyond all these difficulties in gravity was that which arose from the military occupation, and which increased as the French advanced posts drew nearer to Amsterdam. Marshal Oudinot, who commanded the combined forces which were to guard the avenues of Holland, had his head quarters at Utrecht. He had established military posts from Utrecht to the mouth of the Meuse, and, ascending the coasts of North Holland, from the mouths of the Meuse to the extremity of the Hague. But it was necessary to rise still higher, if the Zuyderzee and Amsterdam were to be closed against the contrabandists. But this, either swayed by his own wishes or the secret partisans of a revolt, Louis was determined not to suffer; for whilst they were only at Utrecht or the Hague it was still possible, by opening the sluices and cutting off North Holland, to dispute with Napoleon Batavian independence, as two centuries since it had been disputed with Louis XIV. But to preserve the

ability to effect this it was necessary to prevent the ascent of the French troops beyond Leyden.

Besides this reason, King Louis was especially anxious to prevent the appearance of foreign troops in his capital, since their presence would have reduced him to the rank only of a Royal Prefect. He urgently insisted, therefore, with Marshal Oudinot that the French troops should not ascend higher than Leyden, declaring that it was contrary as well to his honour as his dignity to permit troops which, although friendly, were nevertheless foreign, to be quartered in the city of his royal residence. And in fact, an advanced guard having presented itself before Harlem, it was denied admission, and the Imperial eagle was forced to retire.

In addition to these greater or less infringements of the treaty, was the neglect of one of its articles, on the performance of which Napoleon laid particular stress, namely, that which related to the armament of the flotilla of the Texel. Some vessels had been assembled under Admiral Winter, but they had scarcely a quarter of the proper number of men; and this condition of the treaty which was the most easy to comply with, the most fitted to appease Napoleon's anger, and the fulfilment of which must have been advantageous even in the event of resistance being determined on, was left unsatisfied from want of financial resources. All accounts from the Texel concurred in stating that the armaments which had been announced were illusory.

All these numerous disputes became known, in the common course of things, to the public, receiving a heightened colour from those who wished Holland to throw itself into the arms of England, and being deplored by those sensible persons who foresaw their inevitable consequences, and regarded by the suffering masses as so many proofs of an insupportable tyranny to which it was intended to subject them. And Louis, as much excited as the humblest of the crowds of the labouring classes who collected every day on the empty and desolate quays of Amsterdam, so far from attempting to appease the public emotion, excited it on the contrary both by word and gesture.

Matters had at last arrived at that pitch that the least thing was capable of causing an explosion; and one Sunday, one of the servants of the French embassy walking in his livery through some public place, was recognized, first hooted, then mobbed, and finally only rescued with great difficulty from the hands of the excited populace.

At any other period such an incident would have been but of slight importance; but occurring when it did it was sure to bring matters to a crisis. The facts we have just related,

having been reported without any exaggeration to Napoleon by Marshal Oudinot and M. Sérurier, had filled him with rage. That his chargé d'affaires should have been insulted, his eagles forced to retire from before Harlem, and the livery of his ambassador outraged, seemed to him to be an accumulation of unbearable affronts, especially since the essential conditions of the treaty were either left unperformed or executed only in part. He had his passport sent to M. Verhuel, who was the Dutch ambassador at Paris, and although he held him in high consideration, ordered him to quit France without delay. He prohibited M. de Larochefoucauld from returning to his post, and M. Sérurier from re-appearing at the Court of Louis. He demanded that those who had been guilty of the outrage against the livery of the French embassy, should be instantly given up to him; desired that the burgomaster of Amsterdam should be reinstated in his affairs; that the gates not only of Harlem, but also of Amsterdam itself, should be re-opened to the French troops, who were to enter with drums beating and colours displayed; that the American cargoes should be given up without exception; that the French custom-house officers should be everywhere received; and that an explanation should be given with respect to the armament of the fleet promised for the first of July. He concluded by declaring that if one of those demands remained unexecuted, he would speedily put an end to what he called the ridiculous comedy, and take possession of Holland, as he had taken possession of Tuscany and the Roman States; he enforced his threats by actions. The troops of the division Molitor, which were at Embden, were commanded to enter Holland by the north, and those which were in Brabant were directed to enter it by the south, with a view to the reinforcement of Marshal Oudinot.

The news of these startling proceedings fell, blow after blow, upon Amsterdam, and the alarm occasioned was increased by the declarations of Admiral Verhuel, who had quitted Paris in accordance with the injunctions he had received, and who perfectly well understood what were the intentions of Napoleon. He urged upon those who were at the head of affairs, the absolute necessity of coming to some determination, of either adopting a course of resistance which would most probably end in disaster, or of making that absolute submission which could alone avert the peril. King Louis had recourse to a great consultation, to which he summoned not only the ministers in office, but also ex-ministers, and the principal officers both of the navy and the army. With the exception of some madmen, and those who were devoted to

the interests of England, all those present were of the same opinion. Much as they detested the yoke of France, they considered that that of England, which was the only alternative offered, would have been still less endurable. Moreover, that whilst the greater portion of the Dutch territory would have to be resigned in a contest with Napoleon after having suffered frightful ravages, the least portion could only be preserved from his hands by drowning it, and by giving up to the English the timber yards, arsenals and fleets. No one who retained the least portion of common sense or patriotism, could pronounce in favour of a measure so rash. All the sensible persons present at the consultation expressed both by word and look their opinion of the utter uselessness of any attempts at resistance, and King Louis found himself deserted by those, even, on whose devoted support he had most confidently reckoned. Besides, although some exalted families might have a strong leaning towards England both from interest and sentiment, and the populace might attribute to us the wretchedness they endured, and the bourgeoisie be alienated from us by their commercial sufferings, the latter began to perceive the perils which surrounded Holland, and which threatened to cast her desolate and ruined at the feet of the English aristocracy, and raised their voices against the imprudent conduct of the government. In the midst of this state of affairs, Louis, who had pledged himself not to suffer the presence of the French in Amsterdam, finding himself deserted by those of his subjects whose passions he had too warmly abetted, knew not what course to take, and fell into a state of the utmost mental distraction.

In this position of perplexity it occurred to him, as it already frequently had, to offer entire submission to his brother's will, and to avoid a contest which it would be impossible to maintain. He summoned to his presence M. Sérurier, the French chargé d'affaires, to whom he had a few days previously shown so great a slight, received him very civilly, asked his advice, promising to follow it most faithfully, offered to have the individuals who had insulted the livery of the French embassy prosecuted, to reinstate the burgomaster of Amsterdam, to deliver up the American cargoes, to submit to the French custom-house officers, and to hasten the armament of the fleet; naming as the only condition in return for those acts of submission, that the French troops should not enter his capital; this, he said, would be a humiliation he could not endure. This unhappy prince had in fact so often declared that he would not permit the presence of foreign troops in the city of his royal residence, that he believed their actual presence there could not but

overwhelm him with shame. We must add, moreover, that from the midst of his profound and incurable distrust, had sprung up an idea that Napoleon had resolved to depose him, and that immediately on the arrival of the French troops in Amsterdam, he would be dethroned, without even having in his power the honourable, though sad alternative of abdicating. He was very eager, therefore, to delay their advance upon that city.

But the orders of Napoleon had been so positive, that neither Marshal Oudinot nor M. Séurier dared to defer a measure which they had been peremptorily desired to carry out. M. Séurier entreated the King not to be alarmed at the presence of the French soldiers, who were his fellow countrymen, who had raised him to his throne, who always regarded him with the respect due to the brother of their Emperor, and who were, moreover, ordered to conduct themselves towards him as was fit towards a royal ally. But he could not modify the Marshal's instructions, and was obliged to permit the advance of the French troops, whilst he hastened to send word to Paris of what was taking place in Amsterdam.

Situated between the Dutch who were averse to a resistance which could only prove ruinous to their country on the one hand, and the French troops who continued to advance upon Amsterdam on the other, and seeing no other way of preserving some show of dignity, the King resolved voluntarily to resign his throne. He called together his ministers and informed them in secrecy that he was about to abdicate in favour of his son, and to confide the regency to the Queen; since one who was a woman, a mother, dear to Napoleon, and willing to do all that he desired, would by her very feebleness disarm his anger, and be able to submit to him without degradation. His ministers listened to him in silence, and expressed some regret at losing a King so devoted to the welfare of Holland, but they did not insist on this point very strongly, for they were well aware that, at the pass to which things had now come, the reign of an infant under the regency of a woman, offered the only combination which could prolong for a time the existence of Dutch independence. Upon the King's earnest request, they promised to keep his intentions secret, until he should have time to abdicate, and to retire in freedom whither he might choose. This precaution, inspired by his habitual distrust, was superfluous, for neither M. Séurier nor Marshal Oudinot could have prevented him from abdicating, or had any intention of infringing his personal liberty.

Forty-eight hours only were devoted to the preparations

for this abdication. The French chargé d'affaires and general-in-chief had no intimation of it. It was arranged that the King should depart unattended and in a disguise, through which recognition would be impossible; that the act of abdication should be then immediately carried to the legislative body; that the ministers, as a council of regency, should assume the functions of government in the name of the young King, until the return of the Queen, who had only remained a few days in Holland, and that this princess should be invited to Amsterdam to take upon herself the regency and the education of the heir to the throne. The necessary documents were signed on the 2nd of July, 1810, and immediately after having signed them King Louis throwing himself into a carriage set out, leaving his most confidential ministers in ignorance as to his intended place of retreat. On the morning of the 3rd of July the city of Amsterdam, to its surprise and disquietude, and the French army and embassy to its profound astonishment, learned the extreme step which had been taken by the Emperor's brother.

The ministers first went to pay their compliments to the infant who was now a King and then proceeded to make the legislative body acquainted with the events which had taken place. During the course of the afternoon the French army, which had already arrived at the gates of Amsterdam, was received by the old Burgomaster Vander Poll, who had been reinstated in his office, and by the Dutch military authorities. The reception was almost amicable. The populace made no show of resistance. The great bulk of the inhabitants, while regretting Louis, considered that it was now necessary to place all their reliance on Napoleon, and to seek in a reunion with the vastest empire in the universe a recompense for the loss of independence and the sufferings which must fall on them, from the rigorous application of the continental system. The resolutions which should be taken at Paris with respect to these affairs were awaited with a species of breathless expectation.

M. Sérurier had instantly dispatched an attaché of the embassy to inform Napoleon of the King's strange abdication; but on the very day of the arrival of this messenger in Paris, the 6th of July, a report was presented to Napoleon, which had been drawn up with the view to the explanation of the reasons which called for the annexation of Holland to the Empire. His resolution, therefore, had been come to before his brother's abdication. Nevertheless, determined as he was, Napoleon had perceived in the very moment of converting intention into action, the full gravity of the measure he was

about to take. In fact, immediately after the treaty with Vienna and his marriage with Marie-Louise, he had directed all his thoughts towards the attainment of peace, and had manœuvred his forces with a view to the evacuation of Germany, and to quieting the anxieties of the continental powers. But how would all Europe be alarmed by his seizure within the space of three months, of Brabant, Zealand, and the whole of Holland, thus adding two millions of souls to his empire, and extending its frontiers from the Scheldt to the Waal, from the Waal to Ems. This incessant spirit of acquisition, which had been made the ground of so much reproach against France, would once more manifest itself in the most alarming guise. And how would England, who held in her hands the power of granting that last and most desirable peace, namely, a maritime peace;—how would she endure, in addition to the annexation to France of Antwerp and Flushing, the annexation also of Helwoet-Sluis, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and the Helder? Napoleon perceived all these difficulties; but delighted at the idea of adding to France such territories, such bays and ports, and of closing, moreover, many a broad avenue against British commerce, and considering that the annexation was excused by the position in which he was placed by his brother's abdication, he declared Holland to be annexed to the empire of France. Receiving the information on which he founded it on the evening of the 6th, the arrangement of the conditions of this annexation occupied but two days, and on the 9th July, 1810, it was decreed.

The motive publicly assigned for this annexation was, that Holland being without a king, and it being necessary to prevent its falling into the hands of the English, Napoleon had found himself compelled to bring it under the vigilant and vigorous administration of the empire; and further, that Holland thus annexed would give important naval assistance to the common cause, and add largely to the extent of coast closed against British commerce. But the reason which was chiefly urged with the Dutch themselves was, that placed between a sea closed against them by the English and a continent closed against them by the French, they must speedily have perished, or at least have been utterly crushed under the weight of an enormous debt; but that being, on the other hand annexed to the most powerful empire in the world, they would have the continent open to them during the war, and during peace both sea and land; that under this latter condition of circumstances their commerce would become more vigorous than it had ever been at the period of their most brilliant prosperity; that their maritime power, at present

almost annihilated, when incorporated with that of France, would bring back the glorious days of Tromp and Ruyter, and dispute with Great Britain the dominion of the seas; that they themselves, placed on an equality with the inhabitants of France, would be amply recompensed by the acquisition of a new and powerful country for the country they had lost.

With a surprising audacity of language, Napoleon decreed that *Holland was annexed to France!* and decided, moreover, that Amsterdam should be the third city of the empire; Rome having been, four months previously, declared the second. He arranged that Holland was for the future to send six members to the senate of the empire, six deputies to the council of state, twenty-five to the legislative body, and two members to the Cour de Cassation. A tempting bait was thus offered to every kind of ambition; he confirmed the naval and military officers in their various ranks, incorporated the royal guard of Holland with the French imperial guard, and ordered that the Dutch regiments of the line should have rank in the French army, in order with the regiments already existing, and in accordance with their numbers. What could be more flattering to the Dutch troops than such an affiliation as this?

The kingdom was divided into nine departments, namely, the departments of the mouths of the Scheldt, of the mouths of the Rhine, of the Zuyderzee, of the mouths of the Meuse, of Upper Yssel, of the mouths of the Yssel, of Friesland, of western Ems and of eastern Ems. The existing system of taxes was to be maintained until the 1st Jan., 1811, when the French imposts, much less burdensome than the Dutch, were to be established throughout the nine departments.

It was in its finances, together with its commerce, that Holland had most seriously felt the consequences of its isolated position. It was now evidently necessary to take some steps with respect to its debt. In a budget of about 155 millions of expenses set against 110 millions of revenue, the interest of the debt alone was set down at 80 millions. It was impossible that such a state of things should continue, and this was made sufficiently apparent by the fact that the interest of the debt had not been paid either in 1809 nor in 1808. The treasury bills were discounted at a considerable loss; and this deficiency had been both the cause of the annihilation of the Dutch navy, and that three thousand of its seamen had emigrated to England for the sake of obtaining a subsistence.

Napoleon, considering that these first moments of agitation in Holland were the most convenient season for the infliction of a painful operation, and comparing its present situation

with that of France after the revolution, made it one of the clauses of the act of annexation, that the national debt should be reduced to a third part. But he ordered the immediate payment of the dividends in arrear of the years 1809 and 1808, which to many of the small fundholders was an immense consolation. Napoleon hoped, by cutting off the amounts paid to certain princes, enemies of France, such as the princes of Hesse and Orange, to make twenty millions suffice for the payment of the interest of the debt after its reduction to a third; by the suppression of many portions of it which the annexation had rendered useless, to make fourteen millions suffice for the expenses of the civil service; and that thus, twenty millions being devoted to the army and twenty-six millions to the navy, the annual expenses should only amount to eighty millions. The Dutch had always had a predilection for maritime pursuits, and Napoleon hoped by affording them the means of indulging it, and giving orders for the immediate commencement of operations in the dock-yards, to rouse their drooping spirits and inspire them with a favourable idea of the annexation.

The commercial affairs of Holland next claimed his attention. The removal of the line of French custom-house officers between France and Holland would of course have been an immense commercial advantage; but as it had already taken possession of the ground, Napoleon decided that it should remain until the 1st January, 1811, at which period was to take place the complete fusion of the interests of the two countries. An immediate impulse would, nevertheless, be given to Dutch commerce, as well as a great gratification to French consumers, by permitting the influx into France of the immense stores of sugars, coffees, cottons and indigoes, which had been amassed at Amsterdam and Rotterdam; and the dispersion of these stores, whilst affording much relief to the commercial classes of Holland, would also make the duties of the custom-house service far lighter. But as the price of colonial produce in Holland, on account of the facility with which it was brought in, never reached a quarter of that which prevailed in France, the grant of full liberty of importation to the Dutch merchants, would have been to them an enormous advantage, which they could never have expected, and on the other hand a serious blow to the French merchants, who had founded their arrangements on a very much higher scale of prices. To avoid this, Napoleon imposed a tax of fifty per cent. upon all colonial produce imported from Holland into France, and this, whilst it left a large margin of profit to the Dutch merchants, placed those of France on a much more equal footing with them, and saw

also the means of pouring large sums into the imperial treasury.

Such were in general the measures which accompanied the decree of the 9th July. There were some others whose purpose it was to soften still more the disfavour with which the Dutch might regard the annexation of their kingdom. In order that Amsterdam might not be immediately deprived of a court, he arranged that there, as at Turin, Florence, and Rome, some high personage should reside, whose duty it would be to exercise the imperial authority, and represent it with considerable state. As there was at the moment no prince of his family ready for the post, or capable of managing the financial and administrative details of the annexed kingdom, and as, moreover, none such could decently replace King Louis, Napoleon determined to appoint to it the arch-treasurer Lebrun, a man of a gentle, conciliating spirit, very skilful in matters of finance, and who knew how to bring the truth before his master's eye under the guise of good-natured and amiable pleasantry. Napoleon could not have chosen a representative more suited to the Dutch character. The arch-treasurer himself was anxious to decline an office of such great difficulty ; but Napoleon without listening to his remonstrances hastened his departure, bestowing upon him an ample revenue and extensive powers. He associated with him M. Daru to take possession of the public properties, the arsenals, and magazines ; M. d'Hauterive to take charge of the archives relating to foreign affairs ; M. de Las-Cases to take necessary measures with respect to the maritime projects ; and the talented engineer, M. de Ponthon, to inspect the roadsteads, gulfs, and ports from Flushing to Embden. He hoped within the space of fifteen days to have received all their reports, and to have given the necessary orders as well for the rigorous enforcement of the continental blockade as for the defence of the new territory annexed to the empire, and the revival of the Dutch marine. And finally he sent General Lauriston, his aide-de-camp, to take possession of and bring to Paris the Prince Royal, who was to receive the title of Grand Duke de Berg in exchange for his crown.

General Lauriston lost no time in proceeding to Amsterdam, arrived there on the 13th July, and obtained possession of the prince, who had been treated with most respectful care, but had not been regarded as a king. The arch-treasurer Lebrun arrived on the 14th, and was well received. The royal guard, the national guard, and the civil authorities, assembled to meet him at the city gates. The royal guard, gratified at becoming a portion of the imperial guard,

raised some cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* The populace maintained a calm silence. The various functionaries, anxious to keep their appointments, saluted the new master, as new masters are generally saluted in all times, in all countries. The next day they took the oaths, and it was one of the new Dutch ministers who reminded Prince Lebrun, who was always a little forgetful, that he had neglected to order a form of prayer to be read in the churches for the Emperor. The arch-treasurer told this story himself to the Emperor, remarking with a little malice, that he was not the most zealous of his subjects in Holland.

The Dutch are calm and reserved, and of a character which has a good deal of keenness and prudence mingled with its integrity. As a people they were not desirous of quarreling with the man who had become their master as he had become the master of so many other countries, and perceived, moreover, that they would derive some considerable advantages from the annexation of their country to the empire. The isolated and troubled existence which had been theirs during the reign of King Louis, more Dutch than the Dutch themselves, of course could not continue. So situated between France and England, that it appeared inevitable that they must be subject to either the one or the other, they resigned themselves to their annexation to France, in the hope that when peace should be established they would become the commercial agents of the vastest empire in the world. This was the substance of all the opinions expressed by sensible men on the subject. The change might pain their hearts, but it did not disturb their minds. The fund-holders, were, it is true, distressed at the loss of two-thirds of their dividends; but in general the affairs of these little capitalists gained little attention, for they were neither sufficiently rich nor sufficiently numerous to attract it. The inhabitants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, habituated to the possession of command and influence, had been favourably inclined by the immediate opening of the dockyards. Admiral Winter, who was generally beloved by the seamen, had endeavoured, as far as possible, to inspire them with confidence in the intentions of Napoleon, and an expectation of the speedy revival of the Dutch navy. All classes, therefore, found some reason for being pleased with the change. But it remained to be seen how they would bear the presence of foreign troops, the conscription, impressment, the prolonged closure of the seas, and, in short, all the annoyances resulting from subjection to a foreign government, which would send its orders from a distance, and express them in a language which was not the national one.

Napoleon had scarcely received the first reports of his agents when he determined on his projects with respect to the Dutch navy. He decided on the formation of three fleets, one to be built at Antwerp, another at Rotterdam, and a third at Amsterdam. He ordered that the construction of vessels should be immediately commenced both at Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and that all the vessels yet capable of service should be repaired. He had seamen levied, and although a considerable number were in the English service, he yet hoped by the offer of good pay to obtain a sufficient number to man the fleets. There was an abundance of ship building material in Holland; and funds were as plentiful as material, since the tax of fifty per cent. upon colonial produce, and the sale of American cargoes, filled the coffers of the Dutch departments.

The annexation, therefore, succeeded better than could have been expected, and the continental blockade was enforced as far as the mouths of the Ems. As for King Louis, who had in a manner fled after his abdication, it was discovered that he had arrived at the Baths of Teplitz. Napoleon instructed his diplomatic agents to treat him with the utmost respect, to attribute all that had passed to his bad state of health, and to place at his disposal such funds as he might require. Thus, for the moment, all the difficulties attending the annexation seemed to vanish; but Napoleon, after his marriage, had experienced extreme anxiety to set at rest the uneasy suspicions of the various governments, to evacuate Germany, and to turn aside from all other enterprises to carry on against the English a vigorous war, both commercial and military; and yet he had already, with a view to enforcing the continental blockade and increasing his maritime power, extended his territory from the Scheldt to the Waal, from the Waal to the Meuse, from the Meuse to the Helder, from the Helder to the Ems. Where was he to pause in this career? and how could he justify to the European powers these dangerous aggressions?

Napoleon, in fact, in his eagerness to attain the two great objects of his desire, had almost forgotten his intention of reassuring Europe; and scarcely deigned to submit to the various governments a few insignificant reasons in explanation of this vast addition to his empire. He instructed M. de Coulaingcourt to let fall at the Court of Russia the observation that Holland had scarcely changed masters in consequence of its annexation to the empire, since that it had always in reality belonged to France whilst it was under the government of King Louis; that his brother's abdication, in consequence of the state of his health, had left the Emperor

no alternative but to take possession of it; that it was a country of such a nature that its resources could be employed to the injury of England alone; that its incorporation with the empire of France was the only means of rendering the continental blockade really effectual, of increasing the naval forces of the allies, and obtaining that peace which all the world desired.

The observations which Napoleon addressed to Austria on this subject were even briefer, and he scarcely mentioned it to the other governments. Those cabinets which received such communications on the annexation as he chose to favour them with, made no reply, for they had in fact nothing to say. They saw, pondered on what they saw in silence, and awaited the as yet unforeseen opportunity of expressing the very strong opinions they had on the subject. We may notice also, that Austria, very sensitive on the subject of Trieste, was exceedingly indifferent with respect to Amsterdam, and that Russia did not consider the Helder sufficiently near to Riga to induce her to display any great zeal in behalf of Holland.

It was at this period that M. de Metternich finally quitted Paris to place himself at the head of the Austrian cabinet; as will be remembered, he came to France with a secret mission to the Emperor, after his marriage with Maria-Louise. Under pretext of serving as a guide to the young princess through the first months of her residence in Paris, his real office had been to watch Napoleon, to endeavour to discover whether his marriage had laid at rest the spirit of conquest within him, or whether it had but delayed for a moment the execution of his designs upon Europe. M. de Metternich adopted the second of these suppositions.

Whilst awaiting the results of his encroaching policy, which he loved to dissemble, even in his own eyes, Napoleon directed his whole attention to the employment of his new territories as far as possible, in the enforcement of the continental blockade. In spite of the most rigorous surveillance, and the infliction of the most severe penalties upon contrabandists, a certain quantity of colonial produce and English manufactures still reached the continent; but as this contraband traffic was only carried on at a cost of forty or fifty per cent., the English merchants suffered considerable loss; the goods accumulated in their warehouses underwent a rapid depreciation in value; and the manufacturers on the continent who devoted their attention to the spinning and weaving of cotton, to the extraction of sugar from grapes or beet-root, potash from sea-salt, and dyes from various chemical combinations, found sufficient encouragement in the state of the

markets to induce them to persevere. Thus the manufactories on the continent, especially those of France, were in a state of great activity; and a twofold advantage was attained,—expansion was given to new branches of French industry, and the elements of English commercial wealth were depreciated.

Nevertheless, that state of affairs was not altogether satisfactory, which compelled the people of Paris to pay a premium of fifty or sixty per cent. to the contraband traders of all nations, and to purchase at a dearer rate than any other persons, sugar, coffee, cotton, and indigo; these articles decreasing in price, in proportion to the increase of the distance from Paris; and the cause of this commercial phenomenon simply was, that the surveillance became less vigilant the farther it was removed from the centre of administration. The occupation of Holland, and the presence of Marshal Davoust with his troops on the shore of the North Sea, diminished this difference to a great extent, but it still existed.

The existence of this state of things was a source of the extremest annoyance to Napoleon, and what he saw taking place in Holland suddenly suggested to him the proper manner in which to treat it. Being willing that the Dutch should reap some benefit from the annexation of their country, he had permitted the importation into France of the colonial produce accumulated in their warehouses, on condition, however, of the payment of a duty of 50 per cent., that their long insubordination might not be followed by too great a commercial prosperity, and that the admission of their stores into France might not be too disadvantageous to those French merchants who had bought their goods at a much heavier price. This restricted liberty had gratified the Dutch, and brought a considerable sum to the treasury.

Napoleon, while glancing over the papers of the departments of customs which revealed these facts, was suddenly struck by an idea. He held two councils of commerce in the week, and in these he was perpetually importuned with the remonstrance, that the contrabandists forced his frontiers, whatever provisions he might make to the contrary, and levied an exorbitant premium which fell more severely on French consumers than on any others. "Ah! well!" he said, one day, "I have thought of a plan by which I shall be able to disappoint the calculations of the English and the contrabandists. I will permit the importation of colonial produce at a very exorbitant duty, say fifty per cent.; I shall thus preserve between the depôts of London and the markets

of the continent the obstacle which renders the price of colonial produce in London at least fifty per cent. lower than what it is in Paris, Hamburgh, and Amsterdam. Far from relaxing in the rigour of my surveillance, I will render it still stricter, permitting no importations but what shall have first paid this duty, in order that the English, whilst selling their colonial produce, as they do already, will be able to sell them no dearer since the conditions will remain the same, and the only alteration will be that they will pay the duty on the importation of their goods to my custom-house officers instead of to the contrabandists; and whilst maintaining the depreciation in the value of their stores, I shall keep up for the produce of our own manufactories the high prices by which they are encouraged. And besides this, as my treasury will receive those profits which are now obtained by the contrabandists, I shall thus compel the English to bear the expenses attending the re-establishment of my navy."

Napoleon found, after due enquiry, that 50 per cent. would in fact maintain in London that depreciation in value which ruined the English merchants, and upon the continent those high prices which gave vigour to the French manufactories; and that, moreover, the high prices which the war imposed upon all consumers on the continent, would by this plan be rendered equal for those of Paris, Amsterdam, Hamburgh, and Switzerland. Besides this, there was great hope that the new tariff would prove a fruitful source of supply to the impoverished treasury; and this last consideration had more weight with Napoleon than all the others.

Resolved to levy this duty upon all colonial produce, but being nevertheless, unwilling to infringe by the execution of his new plan the system of the continental blockade, Napoleon maintained in complete theoretical vigour the prohibition against holding any communication with the English, or receiving the produce either of their colonies or their manufactories; and repeated his determination respecting the seizure and confiscation of all such produce as could be proved to have its origin from English colonies or manufactories; but there was colonial produce which had other origin, and this was called *origines permises*; as, for example, that found in vessels which had been taken by our privateers or the privateers of our allies, that which formed the cargoes of licensed vessels, and that conveyed by vessels *bonâ fide* neutral. Napoleon decreed that the colonial produce imported by either of these means, should be allowed free sale on payment of fifty per cent. As, however, these sources could be by no means sufficient for provisioning the continent nor bring in very large receipts to the treasury, it was inti-

mated to the officers of customs that they were to allow to pass for genuine the *certificates of origin* which had been fabricated in London, or given by corrupt consuls, of whom unfortunately, there were by no means few; and as the payment of so heavy a duty before the sale of the goods would be a matter of great difficulty, it was arranged that it might be paid either in money, by bills, or in kind; in the latter case, half of the goods themselves being surrendered in liquidation of the duty.

This principle once established, all colonial produce would have to pay the duty wherever it might be found, and if it could not be proved to have paid it, would be declared contraband and seized; and Napoleon gave orders that in all places to which his power extended, sudden searches should be made for colonial produce, to enforce the payment of the duty on that which had been openly declared, and to confiscate that which was contraband. It is easy to perceive what must have been the result of such a measure, enforced throughout almost the whole continent at the same moment, and what consternation it must have caused amongst the numerous accomplices of British commerce. It was not only in Holland that there were found vast stores of colonial produce, which were the accumulations of contraband traffic, but also at Bremen, at Hamburgh, in Holstein, Pomerania, Prussia, Dantzic, in the great commercial towns of Germany, such as Leipzig, Frankfort, Augsburg, in Switzerland, throughout almost the whole of Italy, of Venice, at Genoa, at Leghorn, and Naples.

But whilst Napoleon was willing to permit the importation of the produce of the English colonies, on conditions as disadvantageous to British commerce, as they were advantageous to the French treasury, he was especially anxious to depreciate the value of all the productions of British manufactures; he determined to wage against them a war of extermination, and with this intention gave orders that wherever they might be discovered, and in whosever possession, they should be confiscated and publicly destroyed.

This system was established by a decree of the 5th of August, and scarcely had the decree been issued, when Napoleon despatched his couriers through all the states of the confederation of the Rhine, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia and Russia, forcing adoption of this system upon some of these states, and representing to the others the advantages of its adoption in glowing terms.

Napoleon hastened to put his system into execution, and to make seizures. But there was not much likelihood of its being fruitful in any great degree in the interior of the

kingdom, for the customs' officers had not left much colonial produce in that quarter, to be affected by it. The contraband depôts were most generally situated on the frontier; and in consequence of this, Napoleon had the audacity to declare that as every such depôt established within four days' journey from the frontiers of France, was manifestly intended as an injury to her, he should consider himself perfectly authorised in treating them as though they had been within the territory. He ordered, therefore, the generals who occupied the north of Spain, to institute searches in all suspected places; and commanded Prince Eugène to send unexpectedly six thousand Italians into the Canton du Tessin, to seize a depôt from which English colonial produce was furnished to the whole of Italy. As for that portion of Switzerland which bordered France, he was unwilling to employ French troops in its search, and confined himself to sending thither a French officer of customs to direct the Swiss troops in the proper method of conducting it. He directed the seizures to be made at Frankfort by the troops under Marshal Davoust. At Stuttgard, Baden, Munich, Dresden and Leipzig, the decree of the 5th of August was adopted and put into immediate execution. At Bremen, Hamburgh and Lubeck, Napoleon discovered and seized, without taking the least notice of the authorities, immense stores of the prohibited produce. He pursued the same course of action at the Prussian towns, Stettin and Custrin, and at the Polish town, Dantzic; all of which places, we may remember, contained French garrisons. Prussia, whose government had assented to the decree, was informed that all the merchandize seized upon her territory would be sold and accounted for in part discharge of her debt. Denmark, which, although faithfully preserving her position as a neutral, had admitted a considerable amount of contraband goods into Holstein, under the guise of sales of the contents of vessels taken by her privateers, gave her adherence to the decree; but Napoleon, not having any great confidence that it would be very strictly enforced in that country, and considering that Holstein, which was filled with the prohibited produce, had a frontier very difficult to watch, ingeniously determined to allow two months for the diffusion through Germany of its contraband stores, on condition of the payment of the very productive duty of 50 per cent. The depôts then became exhausted, and a very considerable amount of duty obtained.

Napoleon reiterated to Sweden his threatening and serious declaration, that he would break the peace so recently concluded, and re-occupy Swedish Pomerania, if new depôts of

prohibited merchandize were permitted to be formed at Stralsund. All the states in fact, required to submit to the decree of the 5th of August yielded to it, with the exception of Russia. This latter country, without opposing the decree, contented herself with intimating that, excellent as it might be for adoption by other states, there was no occasion for its adoption by her; and that, still faithful to her allegiance, and engaged in strenuous warfare with Great Britain, she would not fail, even for her own interests, to throw all possible obstacles in the way of British commerce. At the same time she expressed a little distrust at perceiving the extension of the French troops along the coasts of the north seas, even up to Dantzic. These remarks, however, were made in a tone of extreme moderation, and with all the discretion of a power which was in an attitude of expectation and not of hostility.

The French customs' officers made numerous seizures in the north of Spain, Italy, Leghorn, Geneva, and Venice, and especially in the Tessin. The Swiss, disturbed in their fraudulent traffic, raised some outcry, but Napoleon replied to them, that he could not permit a country which he had restored to tranquillity and independence, to become the accomplice of his enemies. The stores on which the duty was levied, or which were confiscated at Frankfort, Bremen, Hamburgh, Stettin and Dantzic, were also of considerable extent; and as a fifth part of the seizures was bestowed on the customs' officers and the soldiers by whom they were made, they performed this part of their duty with considerable zeal.

The treasury, independently of its money receipts which reached a very considerable sum, suddenly became proprietor of an immense amount of merchandize, which had accrued to it, partly from the payments in kind of the 50 per cent. duty, and partly from the confiscations of stores. That portion of this merchandize which was seized in Holland was sent to Antwerp, and that which was gathered in the north of Germany, to Magdeburg; and Napoleon intended that the artillery waggons returning to France, should convey it to Strasburg, Mayence, and Cologne. A sale by auction, at which assembled all the merchants of the empire, who were engaged in the colonial trade, was commenced at Antwerp, and carried on during many weeks, with the most profitable results. The same thing took place at Mayence, at Strasburg, at Milan, and Venice; and whilst colonial produce was being seized throughout almost the whole of the continent, and, becoming the property of the treasury, was sold by public auction, all English woven fabrics were publicly destroyed, wherever discovered. There was an immense amount of

these tissues in Germany, and their destruction by fire was a source of much consternation to the agents of contraband commerce.

The effect of these measures upon England was great, and was rendered still greater by an accidental circumstance. Contrary winds had detained for some time numbers of English vessels at the entrance of the Baltic, more than six or seven hundred assembled within sight of Denmark and Sweden, anchoring wherever they could under the protection of the British flag. On receiving information of the new vigorous measures they all, almost simultaneously, endeavoured to retrace their path, although Napoleon, in the hope of enticing them in, had relaxed the surveillance at the entry of the ports; some of them became prizes to our privateers, and the others added their cargoes to the mass of unsold merchandize, with which England was overburdened, and which made her experience poverty in the midst of abundance. Desirous of reducing British commerce to the last extremity, Napoleon prepared with the utmost secrecy, at the mouths of the Elb and the Weser, a little naval expedition, which was to proceed rapidly to Heligoland and carry off the riches with which at this moment it was stored.

As insatiable in his desire for the success of French industry, as he was for that of its armies, and in administration as in war, neglecting no means by which it appeared probable that he could gain his ends, Napoleon set himself to contend with other rivals besides the English. The Swiss had displeased him, both because they were extensively engaged in the contraband trade, and because they were, next to the English, the most formidable rivals of our manufacturers. Their cotton fabrics were not so good as those of France, but they were produced much more cheaply, partly on account of the less dearness of labour amongst their mountains, and partly on account of the fraudulent methods by which they obtained the raw material in a cheaper market; and the cotton tissues of their manufacture they sold as English in Germany and Italy. Napoleon, therefore, forbade Prince Eugène to permit this sale in the latter country, writing to him, that Italy might well make some sacrifice in return for all that France had done for her; and that, moreover, if she behaved as Holland had done, she should receive the same treatment. In addition to this, as Italy exported a considerable quantity of raw silk, which reached England through the north of Germany, and was there woven for exportation to the Americans, Napoleon raised one third the export duty upon raw silks, when they were conveyed by Switzerland and the Tyrol, in order to direct them away from

England and throw them into France, by Chambéry and Nice. He hoped by these means to render Lyons the greatest silk market in the world, and to enable the Lyonese to add to their unrivalled skill in manufacture the power of having the best materials.

In his eagerness to subject every thing to his purpose, Napoleon extended his system of licenses, and applied it to every branch of commerce. Originally only a certain class of vessels had made their voyages under the protection of licenses; but from this time every ship which navigated the oceans, or the Mediterranean sea, was compelled, to avoid being liable to seizure by our privateers, to take out a license, in which was to be stated the place from which it set out, that to which it was bound, and the nature of its cargo. By virtue of these licenses, vessels were even permitted to visit England, notwithstanding the decrees of Berlin and Milan, provided they exported national products, such as grain, woven fabrics, Parisian objects of luxury, and wines, and brought back in exchange dockyard materials, American cottons, indigoes, cochineal, dye woods, rice, and tobacco. Sugar and coffee were, of course, prohibited articles. Thus the whole system of commerce was regulated by decrees, and in short almost brought to a dead-lock; and the results which Napoleon really obtained by these singularly violent but efficacious means, was the infliction of a heavy blow at British credit, by the depreciation of all that merchandize which was a pledge of the value of the British bank paper. It was impossible to say how far the effects of those important measures would extend if persevered in.

Whilst Napoleon was waging this ceaseless and ruinous war with England, he was preparing for her an additional peril, in the shape of a rupture with America. On the occasion of his seizing certain American vessels, on the ground that some French ships had been seized in America by virtue of the law of embargo, he had reiterated to the United States' government his readiness to repeal in favour of America, the decrees of Berlin and Milan, if she would compel England to respect her neutrality also; a declaration which he repeated in a decree of the 1st November, 1810.

Nothing was better planned than this policy, for the Americans treated as neutrals by France, could not but demand to be similarly treated by England, even to the extent of threatening war in case of her refusal to do so, and affairs seemed to be tending in this direction. We have seen how America, having equal cause of complaint against each of the belligerent parties, had prohibited her citizens from navigating the seas of Europe, and had forbidden

entrance into her ports to either the French or the English, unless driven into them by stress of weather. But as this law punished themselves for the faults of others, they substituted for it another, by which communication with France and England was alone interdicted, and by which it was also declared that this interdict would be withdrawn, in respect to that of the two powers which should put a stop to its violent conduct towards the neutral powers. England, anxious to gain the good will of the Americans, immediately revoked her orders in council in their favour, and dispensed, in their case, with the visit to the Thames, for the sake of paying toll ; but she substituted for this navigation tax, the famous paper blockade, and declared that neutrals might freely visit every part of the world, save the ports of the French Empire, which were blockaded from Embden up to Spain, from Marseilles to Orbitello, from Trieste and Venice to Pesaro.

But the Americans observed, with much reason, with regard to this regulation, that to release them from visiting the Thames and the payment of toll was nothing, if they were to be prevented by a fictitious blockade from touching at vast countries which could never be blockaded in reality. In vain England replied that the revocation in their favour of the orders in council, was an immense concession, and that Napoleon was so far from intending to put into execution his fair promises, that he had recently intimated in secrecy to the British cabinet intentions of a very different nature towards the United States. The Americans were not to be thus persuaded. Having received Napoleon's decrees which declared commercial relations fully re-established with the Americans on the first of November, provided they enforced due respect towards their flag, the President of the Union announced by a proclamation that, if England had not by the 2nd February, 1811, revoked all its measures, including the fictitious blockade, the commercial interdict would be withdrawn with respect to France, and maintained with the utmost rigour against England. From the interruption of commercial relations between England and America, to a state of war between these two countries was but a step, for it was tolerably certain that the English would prevent the American vessels from entering the French ports, and even capture them on their way, and that America could not fail to take measures for avenging the outrages thus offered against her honour and safety.

Such were the means employed by Napoleon during the year 1810 to ruin British commerce, whilst his generals were employed in the Peninsular, in driving the English armies into the sea ; and these means which displayed at once the

extent of his genius, the profundity of his calculations, and the vehemence of his passions, were fitted for the attainment of the end he had in view, but they were also capable of leading to other far different results. It was necessary therefore, that a state of things so odious to all the world should not be prolonged, and that by the devotion of his whole resources to the prosecution of the war in Spain, he should inflict so heavy a blow upon Great Britain, as together with her commercial sufferings, should oblige her to agree to peace and to assent to the transformation of Europe. It was Spain, therefore, which was to decide, and which did decide, as we shall see, the destiny of Europe, for it was absolutely requisite to strike heavily and swiftly in this direction, if the patience of the whole world were not to be worn out by a state of things which, before becoming insupportable for England, was very likely to prove to be so for the constrained allies of France, for her sincerest friends, and even for herself.

BOOK XXXIX

TORRES VEDRAS.

VICISSITUDES of the Spanish war during the latter part of the year 1809—Retreat of the English after the battle of Talavera, and their long inaction in Estremadura—The assembly of the Cortes at the commencement of 1810 determined on—Events in Catalonia and Aragon—Skilful manœuvres of General St. Cyr in Catalonia for covering the Siege of Gironne—Protracted and heroic defence of this place by the Spaniards—General St. Cyr disgraced and replaced by Marshal Augereau—Conduct of General Suchet in Aragon since the taking of Saragossa—Battles of Alcanitz, Maria, and Belchite—Definitive occupation of Aragon, and its good administration by General Suchet—Troublesome growth of bands of *guérillas* throughout the whole of Spain, and especially in the North—Unwilling to confine themselves to this species of warfare, the Spaniards desire to commence grand operations, in spite of the advice of the English, and march upon Madrid—The battle of Ocana, and dispersion of the last Spanish army—Consternation and disorder at Séville—Project of the Junta of retiring to Cadiz—Commencement of the year 1810—The French plans for this campaign—Employment of the numerous reinforcements sent by Napoleon—Situation of Joseph at Madrid—His Court—His systems, political and military, opposed to those of Napoleon—Joseph desires to take advantage of the victory of Ocana to invade Andalusia, expecting to find great resources in that province—Notwithstanding his determination to unite all his forces against the English, Napoleon consents to the Andalusian expedition, intending to send his troops from Andalusia to Portugal—March of Joseph upon the Sierra-Morena—Entry into Baylen, Cordova, Séville, Grenada, and Malaga—The error of not advancing immediately upon Cadiz enables the Junta and the Spanish troops to retire—Commencement of the siege of Cadiz—The 1st Corps appointed to the prosecution of this siege; the 5th sent to Estremadura, the 4th to Grenada—Unfortunate dispersion of the French troops—During the Andalusian expedition Napoleon converts the provinces of the Ebro into military governments, with the view of ultimately uniting them to the Empire—King Joseph falls into a state of despair, and sends two of his ministers to Paris to protest against the proposed annexation—After long delay the operations of the campaign of 1810 are at length commenced—Whilst General Suchet besieged the fortifications of Aragon, and Marshal Masséna besieged Cadiz and Badajoz, Marshal Masséna to take Ciudad Rodrigo, and Alméida, and to march immediately upon Lisbon at the head of 80 thousand men—Siege of Lerida—Marshal

Masséna having been appointed against his own wish to the command of the army of Portugal arrives at Salamanca in May 1810—Disordered state in which he finds the troops intended to carry on the campaign in Portugal—Bad disposition of his lieutenants—The army reduced at the commencement of the campaign from its proper strength of eighty-thousand men, to fifty-thousand—Efforts of Marshal Masséna to supply deficiencies—Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Alméida in July 1810—After the taking of the two fortresses, Marshal Masséna prepares to invade Portugal by the valley of Mondego—Finds great difficulty in procuring means of transport for provisions and ammunition—Passage of the frontier on the 15th of September—The political and military views with regard to the Peninsular, of Sir Arthur Wellesley, now Lord Wellington—Choice of an impregnable position in front of Lisbon, as a means of resisting all the forces Napoleon could send into Spain—Lord Wellington prepares to retreat, first destroying all the resources of the country in front of the advancing French—Retreat of the English army upon Coimbre—Marshal Masséna pursues the English in the Valley of Mondego—Difficulties attending his march—The English pause upon the lines of Sierra d'Alcoba—Battle of Busaco—The French unable to force the position of Busaco, proceed to turn it—Precipitate retreat of the English upon Lisbon—Energetic pursuit on the part of the French—The English enter upon the lines of Torrès Védras—Description of these famous lines—Marshal Masséna, after having carefully reconnoitred, despairs of forcing them—He determines to blockade them, until the arrival of reinforcements—In the meanwhile, takes up a firm footing upon the Tagus, and prepares a bridge which may enable him to manœuvre upon both sides of the river, and to provision his army at the expense of the rich province of Alentejo—Mission of General Foy to Paris, to inform Napoleon of the events of the Campaign, and to ask him for instructions and for succour—State of the English army in the lines of Torrès Védras—Lord Wellington's disputes with the Portuguese government, and misunderstandings between him and the British Cabinet—State of Public feeling in England—Anxiety respecting the fate of the British Army, and disposition towards peace—Assumption of the regency by the Prince of Wales—His disposition towards the various parties in the British Houses of Parliament—The slightest incident capable of inclining the balance in favour of the opposition and bringing about peace—General Foy's journey across the Peninsula—His arrival in Paris and presentation to the Emperor.

BOOK XXXIX.

AFTER the Battle of Talavera, and the loss of the bridge of Arzobispo, the English and the Spaniards had fallen back with precipitation, from the Tagus upon the Guadiana. Although its issue was indecisive, this battle, having drawn the French forces around Madrid, had had for them all the effects of a defeat, for it had forced them to retreat into the heart of the Peninsula, leaving behind them their wounded, their sick, and even part of their stores. The Spaniards fled into Andalusia behind the sierra Morena; Sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position in the environs of Badajoz. Then, complaining as was his wont, of the feeble co-operation of the Spaniards, and above all of their negligence in supplying the commissariat, as though they could provision his troops when they were unable to procure food for their own, surrounded by a rich country, with a safe retreat open to him towards Portugal, he resolved to make no more rash incursions into the Peninsula, estimating at its full value his late almost miraculous retreat. Attributing his inactivity to the intense heat, he advised the Spaniards to avoid great battles, and to enlist upon their side the lapse of time, always a great enemy to invasion.

There was much wisdom in these counsels, but they were easier to give than to follow, and expressed, moreover, in a manner little calculated to gain attention, or to be of much use to the Spaniards, whom a devoted loyalty had thrown into a revolution almost as violent as that into which a passion for liberty had hurried the French some twenty years before, and who laboured under the task, at the same moment, of governing themselves, and of repelling a formidable invasion. But whatever bitter reproaches Sir Arthur Wellesley might direct against them, they transferred to the Central Junta, which had replaced the regency of Aranjuez, and on which it was the custom to heap the blame of every misadventure.

If the English were discontented, if their wants could not be satisfied, if the heat of the weather or the policy of their

leaders held them inactive, if undisciplined troops led by monks were unable to hold their ground against the veteran bands of Napoleon, the cause was in every case attributed to the bad spirit and the incapacity of the Central Junta. The provincial juntas, likewise, overwhelmed it with reproaches, and that of Badajoz perpetually demanded the convocation of the Cortes, which was the new remedy expected to be a cure for every ill.

Nothing would have been easier than to yield to this wish, and the Central Junta, worn out with its distressing and perilous duties, would have gladly resigned its duties into the hands of the Cortes, had the desire for their assembly been unanimous, but it was not so. Although Spain had not commenced its revolution, as France in 1789, by an explosion of liberalism, but had commenced it on the contrary, by an explosion of loyalty, it had soon taken a very similar tone, and discussed the same questions which had been discussed in the constituent assembly. There was one party in the country which thought that the temporary absence of royalty afforded a good opportunity for the execution of necessary reforms, and that by the adoption of these reforms Napoleon would be deprived of the pretended object of his invasion, the regeneration of Spain. This party was not composed exclusively of the bourgeoisie, but numbered also amongst its ranks many members of the Spanish aristocracy, and those clear-headed men who are to be found in all ranks, and whom circumstances had now united in a party which the progress of events rendered powerful. But the holders of the opposite opinions were also of all ranks, and consisted of the less enlightened portion of the noblesse, of the clergy, the magistracy, the army, some part of the bourgeoisie, and of a certain number of enlightened men whom the French revolution had filled with terror. Whilst the one party, desiring a complete reform of the monarchy, demanded the assembly of the Cortes as the only possible means of effecting a social revolution, the other, which desired no revolution, demanded the immediate re-adoption of a Royal Regency, which consisted of five or six high personages chosen from amongst the generals, the superior clergy, and the ancient ministers of the monarchy. At the head of this last party were the Palafoxes, the defenders of Saragossa, the Duke de l'Infantado, General Gregorio de la Cuesta, a singular character, the Count de Montijo, a noble who lived amongst the people and delighted in arousing their passions, the Marquis de la Romana, who commanded the armies in the north of Spain, and the old minister Florida-Blanca. At the head of the opposite party were the celebrated M. de

Jovellanos, and many such men, as MM. de Tareno, Arguelès, and others, who were less known at this period than they afterwards came to be, and who were anxious to bestow upon their country a government worthy of a civilized nation.

After a long struggle between the two parties, an unexpected event brought matters to a crisis. A discovery was made of a kind of conspiracy formed by the heads of the party opposed to any kinds of reform, the object of which was to dissolve the Central Junta, to seize the reins of power, and to govern monarchically, and without reform. Desirous of obtaining the support of the English, the members of this conspiracy had made overtures to Henry Wellesley, the English Ambassador, and brother to Arthur Wellesley, the General of the British Army. The Ambassador, although England regarded with little favour either the Central Junta or a system of general reform, in a spirit of good faith gave information of the affair to the members of this Junta. The conspiracy was thus baffled; but the Central Junta perceiving how impossible it was that they should maintain their ground, were anxious to give place to really national representatives, and decreed that the Cortes should be convoked for the commencement of 1810, reserving to themselves the power of fixing the time, mode, and place of their meeting, according as the events of the war might render advisable. Feeling at the same time the necessity of some more concentrated authority, it established an executive commission of six members, which was to exercise all the functions of government, and retained only for itself the duties of legislation. Amongst the members of this commission was the Marquis de la Romana, a man of a restless spirit, and much given to boasting, but who had as yet accomplished nothing save his escape from Denmark with his division. He had been transferred from Old Castille in Andalusia for the purpose of reorganizing the troops in this part of the Peninsula.

The Spanish armies were divided at this period, into the army of the left, which disputed with the French Generals Old Castille, the kingdom of Léon, the Asturias, and Galicia; the army of the centre, comprising the troops which guarded Estramadura, La Mancha, and Andalusia; and the army of the right, composed of the troops which, under Generals Reding and Blake, had attempted during the whole of the year 1809 to snatch Catalonia from General Saint-Cyr, and Aragon from General Suchet.

The plan formed by the new executive commission, was to collect a vast army, and to endeavour to snatch Madrid from King Joseph, who had at his immediate command eighty thou-

sand of the first troops in the world. In vain Sir Arthur Wellesley, advised them to risk no great battles with the well-trained French troops; the new heads of the government paid little heed to his counsel, and energetically proceeded with the assembly of their vast army. They brought together the troops which, under Gregorio de la Cuesta, had been vanquished at Talavera, and those composed the armies of Estremadura and La Mancha; to these was added a detachment of Valenciens. They hoped to form an army of 50 or 60 thousand men, provided with an excellent cavalry, and the best artillery in Spain. The proud Gregorio de la Cuesta was to be at the head of this army; but the Junta regarded him with little favour, and upon his sending in his resignation, which he was constantly in the habit of doing, in the manner of a threat, he was taken at his word, and General Egria was appointed as his successor. It was proposed, as soon as the weather should have become cooler, to act on the offensive against the troops which Joseph had assembled around Madrid, and that in the meantime the armies of the left and right should press upon the rear of the French, to force them to retreat northwards.

In the meantime events of considerable importance were occurring in Catalonia and Aragon on the one side, and in Old Castille on the other. In Catalonia General Saint-Cyr had carried on a contest during the year 1809 with the Catalans and the troops of General Reding, which he had ended by driving back into Tarragonia. He had then fallen back upon Barcelona, to re-organize and provision his army, and to relieve it of the prisoners made in the four battles which he had gained in Catalonia. He had conducted those prisoners to the frontier and then commenced the siege of Girone, which Napoleon had assigned to him as an easy task, which would be the crowning achievement of his glorious services. General Verdier was charged with the conduct of the actual attack, and General Saint-Cyr reserved to himself the duty of covering the besiegers. It was not at that time sufficiently well understood, even after the taking of Saragossa, that sieges in Spain were great military operations, more difficult to conduct than battles. But terrible and famous examples were soon to teach us the lesson.

General Saint-Cyr leaving with General Verdier all the forces he could spare, and taking with him only twelve thousand men skilfully took possession of the fertile plain of Vich, by which means he secured an ample supply of provisions both for his own troops and those of General Verdier, and held a position in which he would be able to check the

advance of the forces which would, in all probability, be sent to the aid of Girone.

The heavy artillery, after having been long expected, having at length arrived, General Verdier commenced operations. The city of Girone, situated on the bank of the Ter, at the foot of fortified heights, encompassed with regular works, filled with a fanatical population, the very women of which took an active part under the title of the company of Sainte-Barbe, defended by a garrison of seven thousand men, and an heroic governor, Don Alvarez de Castro, had declared that its resistance should render it immortal, and we shall see how well it kept its word. The long interval of time moreover, which was occupied in preparing for the attack, and which had been protracted by the difficulty of transport, had afforded ample opportunity for making every preparation for defence.

General Sanson, an able officer, who had the conduct of the engineering operations, having decided that it would be necessary to commence by taking the heights, the trenches were opened in front of the Fort de Montjouich, and after some time a breach was effected; but as, unfortunately, some days were allowed to elapse between the moment of its becoming practicable and the assault, the enemy were enabled to prepare an energetic resistance and repulse our troops; an event which filled the whole city with intense exultation.

The point of attack against the Fort de Montjouich appearing to have been ill chosen, the works were opened in another direction; a course of proceeding little calculated to increase the ardour of the French troops, or to diminish the fanatic zeal of the inhabitants. At length, another breach was declared practicable, and the Spaniards perceiving that they could no longer hold Fort Montjouich against us, evacuated it during the night. And thus we gained possession of this fortification after the lapse of a period equal to what had sufficed for the greatest sieges.

Weary of the delay occasioned by these preliminary operations, our soldiers determined to attack the town itself, and descending to the banks of the Ter, took up a position under the plunging fire of the heights which yet remained in the enemy's position. Operations were directed against the enceinte of the town, and a practicable breach having been effected, it was directed to carry it by assault. Don Alvarez de Castro, at the head of the garrison, and supported by the whole population, male and female, had sworn to die rather than surrender, and if the French cannon overthrew their walls, to keep out the enemy with others built of their dead bodies. Our soldiers rushed to the assault with vigour,

were repulsed, and again advanced with fury under the fire from the town itself, and from the heights, and amidst the clanging of bells, and the wild cries of the inhabitants. Many times our troops obtained the summit of the wall to find there an impenetrable mass of infuriated men. Priests, women, and children, threw themselves into the breach, and mingled with the combatants; and it was at length found necessary to retire before the noble delirium of Spanish patriotism, and to convert the siege into a blockade; a means of attack which was most likely to be attended with success, as fever and famine had already seized upon the heroic defenders of Girone, and the governor himself was dying.

To prevent any kind of relief from reaching the garrison now afforded the only chance of success, and became the care of General Saint-Cyr; for although he had been deprived of his command and succeeded by Marshal Augereau, the Marshal after having eagerly sought the appointment showed less eagerness in fulfilling its duties, and it was therefore necessary that General Saint-Cyr should remain, at a most critical moment, at the head of an army the command of which he was to resign within a few days.

At the same time General Blake, knowing that Girone was in danger of being compelled to surrender by famine, collected the remnants of the armies of Catalonia and Aragon, and advanced to its relief with a thousand beasts of burden. General Saint-Cyr hastened to take up a position in front of the point in the line of blockade which was the weakest and most liable to attack. For three days the hostile forces remained opposite to each other in the midst of a thick mist, which entirely concealed them from each others view. At length one of the French divisions engaged in the siege allowed itself to be surprised, and the Spanish General threw into Girone, besides the convoy of provisions, a reinforcement of four thousand men; this latter succour being rather disadvantageous than otherwise, for it was not men but food that was required.

The unhappy Alvarez de Castro, whose resources had been little increased by this operation, sent an earnest request to General Blake for new succours; and the latter again approached the city by remote routes with an immense convoy. But General Saint-Cyr, entrusting this time the necessary measures to no one but himself, having placed his troops in ambush, permitted the enemy's troops with the convoy to arrive at the very gates of the city, and then suddenly taking them in flank and rear, obtained possession of many thousand beasts of burden and some thousands of prisoners. The wretched inhabitants of the besieged city, thus deprived of

the succour of which they had such urgent need, decimated by fever and famine, and deprived of the services of their commandant who was at the point of death, found themselves compelled to surrender, which they did on the 11th of December, after an ever memorable siege of six months.

Such were the events which took place in Catalonia during the latter part of the year 1809. The events in Aragon had also been important. After the surrender of Saragossa, the 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, had advanced upon the Tagus, and the 3rd, exhausted by the terrible siege of Saragossa, had remained in Aragon. Fortunately, this corps received a wise, talented, and firm leader in the person of General Suchet. His corps was composed of three old regiments of infantry, of four new, of three regiments of Polish infantry, of the 13th Cuirassiers (the only regiment of this arm in Spain), of some light cavalry and excellent artillery. He devoted the utmost attention to his troops, and endeavoured to inspire them with a feeling of duty and of resignation to a war which the siege of Saragossa had rendered hateful to them. After having allowed them a certain period of repose, he led them in front of the enemy. General Blake, who commanded the army of the right, had formed the project of taking advantage of the departure of the 5th corps, to throw himself upon Aragon, and retake Saragossa; General Suchet was unwilling to await his attack, and proceeded towards Aleanitz to meet him; but the French General soon perceived that fatigue, disgust, and an insufficient organization had affected his troops more vitally than he had at first supposed, and he was compelled to lead them back. Fortunately General Blake neglected to seize the favourable opportunity, and gave him time to concentrate his forces at Saragossa, to recruit the regiments with fresh troops drawn from Navarre, and thoroughly to reorganize and refresh them; and there General Suchet, his soldiers being inspired with an entirely new spirit, awaited at Maria, in an advantageous position, the arrival of General Blake. The Spaniards exhausted their ardour in a furious attack upon his position, and being attacked in their turn, were routed with considerable loss; pursued by the French forces to Belchite, they once more ventured to give battle, and were again beaten, leaving in the hands of the victors the whole of their artillery, and many thousand prisoners.

Completely master of Saragossa and the fertile plains of Aragon, General Suchet devoted his attention to tranquillising the country, freeing it from the guerilla bands, and obtaining from its resources the necessary subsistence for his

troops in the manner least burdensome to the inhabitants, and to immense preparations for the siege of the hostile fortifications. Knowing from experience that the subsistence of an army, although undoubtedly a heavy burden to a country, need not be a ruinous one, if instead of being seized by a rough military grasp it be provided for by the hand of an intelligent and just administration, he called together the former members of the provisional government, and declared to them his anxiety to cause the maintenance of his army to fall as lightly as possible upon the inhabitants, and asked them to assist him in carrying out these views. The man's whole air and manner convinced those whom he addressed both of his ability and of his sincerity, and they resolved to comply with his requests to the utmost of their power. Saragossa considered that it had done its part towards maintaining the independence of Spain by its heroic defence, and now, its more passionate and implacable spirits having either perished or been scattered, the remainder of its inhabitants was anxious for repose. This disposition accorded well with the intentions of General Suchet, and within the space of a month Saragossa appeared to have arisen from its ashes.

The French General re-established the old imposts, the accustomed authorities, and ordering that all the revenues should be paid in to the treasury of the province, gave up a large portion of them to the service of the province itself, reserving the surplus only for the necessary expenses of his army, and reiterating his promise, which he scrupulously observed, to respect both the persons and property of the inhabitants. In the meantime he made every preparation necessary to the siege of the important places of Lerida and Mequinenza, which it was necessary to take before the army of Catalonia could advance upon Tortosa and Tarragonia.

The guerilla bands were the only obstacle to the complete pacification of Aragon. Whilst the Central Junta of Spain employed itself in the formation of regular armies which were always vanquished, there arose spontaneously irregular troops, which without either officers or commissariat, led only by instinct, and acting according to the circumstances of the moment, supplied themselves with everything they required, whilst they rendered their enemies destitute; were always present at the precise moment when least expected, dispersed if the hostile troops were in force, and re-appeared as soon as they were scattered in picquets or escorts of stores; never attempted to vanquish their foes in mass, but cut them off man by man, showing no more humanity than was to be expected of the Spanish people, or of any people perfidiously invaded, and sparing neither the wounded nor the sick; and

this was a system of attack which could not fail, if persevered in, to overcome the most valiant armies, for a constant part of the operations of an army consists in the appointment of detachments to the duty of foraging, escorting stores, and conveying the sick, the wounded, and recruits; and an army from which these detachments are incessantly cut off, must languish, wither and die, as a tree deprived of its branches.

These guerilla bands which had always been troublesome, had increased immensely since the dispersion of the Spanish regular troops, and it was difficult to say whether the Peninsular were more effectually defended by the English army or these bands, which snatched from the French the fruits of their victories, and rendered their defeats disastrous.

Sometimes it was an officer whom the dispersion of the Spanish armies had left without employment, sometimes a restless monk, a pastor who desired to defend his village, or a farmer anxious for the safety of his fields, a student who was glad to exchange his books for a new kind of life, or a shepherd weary of his flocks, who, inspired either by patriotism or religion, the spirit of adventure, or that of self aggrandisement, collecting here and there a few peasants, a few fugitives from the vanquished armies, or prisoners escaped from the hands of the French, either by themselves or in the train of some leader already renowned, established their quarters in some district, where they obtained either from the sympathy or terror of the inhabitants all that they needed, transported themselves hither and thither as the movements of the enemy or their own plans rendered advisable, and so harassed the invaders, that the victorious troops of the latter became as wretched, wearied and destitute, as those whom they had vanquished. Whilst the interior of Aragon had been subdued by the arms and the policy of General Suchet, all its borders were overrun with hardy and numerous bands of guerillas. One body under the command of an officer named Renovalès, was established in an almost inaccessible convent, in the valley on the south of the Pyrenees; another, under Mina, a young student nineteen years of age, completely intercepted the road from Pampeluna to Saragossa; in the south of the province, an old officer named Villacampa, with a troop composed of soldiers and peasants, commanded the environs of Calatayud; in the mountains of Montalvan, at the celebrated convent of Notre Dame del Aguila, was Colonel Raymon-Gayan, at the head of about three thousand men; and the famous l'Enmeccinado, at the head of two thousand five hundred insurgents, infested the road between Saragossa and Madrid.

Against these guerilla bands, General Suchet at length prepared to take active measures; Mina was pursued and taken, and sent as a prisoner to Paris; Renovalès was deprived of his convent stronghold, and the bands of Villacampa and Raymon-Gayan, were vanquished and dispersed. By these successful operations the Valencian and Madrid routes were rendered free, and good expectation was obtained, that when once the fortifications of Lerida and Mequinenza were taken, and after them, those of Tortosa and Tarragonia, the province of Aragon, and even that of Catalonia, would be reduced to peace.

But these happy results, which were as much due to the administrative ability of General Suchet, as to his military skill, were far from being equalled in Biscaye, the two Castilles, and the kingdom of Léon. In vain the French Generals pursued the guerilla bands in these countries, which were especially given to this irregular mode of warfare, and peculiarly adapted by local circumstances for its pursuit. Besides this, the sufferings which the inhabitants had to endure from the exactions of the guerilla bands, and the supplies which they had to provide for the French troops, frequently drove them to revolt. Generals who were unendowed with the wisdom of General Suchet, cared not how they obtained what was necessary for their troops, and frequently seized it in a manner which rendered utterly destitute the already ruined inhabitants; and if, unhappily, they chanced to have been hardened by twenty years of warfare, to have been exasperated by suffering, and irritated by crimes committed against our troops, they shot unfortunate wretches who were guilty of no fault; or who, at the most, had attempted to preserve bread for their children; shot them in revenge for the assassinations committed by the guerillas. And these latter on the other hand frequently seized soldiers of our detachments and hung them on the trees, often side by side, with Spaniards who had been accused of favouring the French. Thus there prevailed throughout these unhappy provinces a feeling of despair; and the excesses of our soldiers and the crimes of the Spaniards themselves, were equally laid to our charge.

In certain districts the guerilla bands were innumerable. El Pastor in Guiposcoa, Campilla in Santander, Porlier in the Asturias, Longa between Aragon and Castille, Merino in the neighbourhood of Burgos, Capuchino and the curé Tapia, in the plains of Castille, El Amar, at la Rioja, Duran in the mountains of Soria, Don Camillo Gomez, in the environs of Avila, Don Julian Sanchez (a brave warrior whom the death of his parents and his sister had driven from his fields, and

almost goaded to madness), in the environs of Salamanca, and a host of others too numerous to mention, crept amongst the mountains and scoured the plains. Sometimes uniting in masses to engage in important expeditions; sometimes dispersing to avoid our pursuit, and frequently when pressed too closely by the French troops, embarking in English vessels to descend on other coasts. They were guilty of horrible crimes and enormous ravages. They murdered our sick and wounded, stopped despatches, the delivery of which was often of the utmost importance, kept all our agents in a state of perpetual terror, completely crippled the exertions of our commissariat, and impeded the reinforcement of our armies by compelling battalions and squadrons to remain in the north, and exhaust themselves in fruitless movements, before they had been able to join the regiments they were intended to recruit.

These detachments consisting of raw recruits, and commanded by officers wanting both in experience and talent, no sooner arrived at Pampeluna, Tolosa, Vittoria, Burgos, and Valladolid, than they were sent to chase the indefatigable guerillas, and being unaccustomed to fatigue, and individually inferior to the bandits they pursued, found in this kind of warfare a fatal apprenticeship to their trade of war. The greater number of them, after a week or two, went to perish in the ill provided hospitals, and of the reinforcements intended for the armies in the field, scarcely a fourth part reached their destination. The destruction of the horses was as rapid as that of the troops themselves, and it was of ordinary occurrence that a troop of three hundred cavalry should lose within the space of a few days two-thirds of their horses. Almost at the first moment of arrival at these first stations of the army of Spain, both soldiers and officers breathed in with the infected air, a feeling of deep discouragement, and regarded themselves as destined to a useless and inglorious death; and this feeling was not a little increased by the conviction that they would never come under the eyes of Napoleon himself.

The Generals commanding at the various stations, being left entirely to their own imaginations, proposed various methods, some of them odious and some ridiculous, for the destruction of the guerilla bands, such as cutting down the woods within a certain distance of the roads, and burning or decimating those villages, of which any of the inhabitants had become guerillas. The most sensible of them, General Kellerman, not knowing to what measures to have recourse, addressed the following reflections to Major General Berthier.

“The force which I command is manifestly inadequate,

and independently of the hostile troops, against which it is necessary to make head, is scarcely large enough to protect itself against the swarms of brigands, and the strong organized bands which infest the country, and which by their activity, but more especially by means of the sympathy of the inhabitants, elude all pursuits.

“Permit me then Prince, frankly to express to you my opinion,—that the Spanish war is no ordinary affair, and that whilst we need fear no disastrous reverses, this nation will destroy the French army in detail. It is in vain that the heads of the Hydra are cut off on one side, they arise again on another, and if there be not some change in the sentiments of the inhabitants, it will be long before this vast Peninsula is brought to submission, and in the meanwhile, it will absorb both the population and the wealth of France. Its object is to conquer us by the aid of time and perseverance; its submission can only be obtained by the absolute destruction of its strength, and annihilation of a moiety of its population. The present disposition of the inhabitants is such, that we can gain over no party amongst them to our side. All the moderation and justice we show towards them are of no avail in diminishing their rancour against us, and would fail to obtain for any governor or commander the aid of ten men in a moment of peril.

“Reinforcements are necessary; the Emperor is perhaps tired of sending them; but we must either at once conclude this war, or shut ourselves up in one half of Spain, in order to make the conquest of the other. In the meantime the resources of the country fail, agriculture is neglected, the coin is withdrawn from circulation; it is impossible to provide for the pay or maintenance of the troops, for the requirements of the hospitals, or, in short, for any of the innumerable things necessary to an army, which is in want of every thing: wretchedness and privations increase the number of sick, and continually enfeeble the army; and in addition to this, bands of the enemy swarming in every direction, every day pounce upon little detached parties of our men, who, with the utmost imprudence, and in spite of the most positive and reiterated prohibitions, continually expose themselves to this danger.

“When I fall into such reflections as these, I am lost, and only recover myself to exclaim, there is need of the head and arm of Hercules! His strength and skill alone can terminate this contest, if indeed it ever shall be terminated.”

The meaning of this was, that the presence of Napoleon himself was necessary to the termination of the war; but although the picture of the state of affairs as drawn by

General Kellerman was by no means an exaggerated one, the difficulties opposed to us were not equally great in all the provinces. It was still possible that success might, in the course of time, be the result of perseverance; but its attainment would require all the resources of France, and all the genius of Napoleon.

The northern provinces were, as we have said, those which the nature of the country and the exasperation of the inhabitants rendered the most difficult to subdue. Besides the guerilla bands, there was, in this part of Spain, a regular army to be overcome, that of the Duke del Parque, called the army of the left, being that which was formerly commanded by the Marquis de la Romana. This army was composed of the united troops of Galicia, the Asturias and Léon, which Marshal Soult had neglected, to plunge into Portugal, which Marshal Ney had repulsed but not destroyed, and to which he had been compelled to resign Old Castile, when ordered to join the other Marshals in the rear of the British army. Marshal Ney, after the battle of Talavera, had gone to Paris to discuss with Napoleon all those matters which had been subjects of dispute between himself and Marshal Soult. His corps, (which was the sixth) reduced by the effects of fatigue and the diseases prevalent in Autumn, to nine thousand effective soldiers, was, about the end of October 1809, in the presence of the army of the Duke del Parque, which numbered almost thirty thousand men. This General, in accordance with the reiterated instigations of the Junta to assume the offensive, advanced as far as Tamamès, by the route of Ciudad Rodrigo, to Salamanca, with the object of concurring in some degree with the ambitious views of the government of Seville. Profiting by the example of the English, he prudently and skilfully took up a position upon a group of rocks which were very difficult of access, and of sufficient height to be easily defended against the most valiant troops, unless led to the attack with the utmost caution.

General Marchand, full of the audacious spirit of his chief, and accustomed to despise the Spanish troops, advanced upon Tamamès upon the 18th of October, and did not hesitate to attack the enemy's position. Some pieces of cannon posted in advance of the heights occupied by the Spaniards and covered by cavalry, were speedily taken and the cavalry dispersed; but after this first easy success the heights themselves still remained to be taken. Two regiments, the 6th léger, and the 69th of the line, advanced to the attack, and were withdrawn after having suffered considerable loss. Our whole line followed this retrograde movement, and the intre-

pid 6th corps for the first time paused in the front of the Spaniards ; and so furious was the enemy's fire that we were compelled to resign the cannon which had been taken, all the horses which drew it having been slain.

This was an insignificant check, but one which was well calculated to inspirit the Spaniards, and to confirm them in their project of assuming the offensive. Nothing could be more to our advantage than their attacking us in great masses, for our troops were being cut off in detail, and in general actions alone we achieved success. The central government residing at Seville, already strongly disposed, notwithstanding the advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley to the contrary, to direct the forward movement of the army of the centre, did not hesitate, after the affair at Tamamès, to give orders for marching upon Madrid. The Central Junta finding even General Eguia too timid, had replaced him by Don Juan de Areizaga, a young officer who had distinguished himself in the affair of Alcanitz against the troops of General Suchet. This new chief, who attributed to their officers the defeats suffered by the Spanish troops, and to a certain extent substituted for them others who were younger and more inured to the perils of actual warfare, inspired such confidence that the heads of the government already began to discuss the measures which ought to be taken when Madrid should have been reached.

Don Juan de Areizaga having collected upon the sierra Morena the troops of Estremadura, those of La Mancha, and a detachment of Valenciens, traversed La Mancha in the course of November, and reached the banks of the Tagus above Aranjuez, in the neighbourhood of Tarancon. His army consisting of more than fifty thousand foot soldiers, somewhat more disciplined than the generality of Spanish soldiers, of fourscore well-served pieces of cannon, and of seven or eight thousand good cavalry, was inspired with the confidence usual with the Spaniards ; and, on the other hand, the news of its approach was received with joy at Madrid, where preparations were made to give them a proper reception.

Marshal Soult who had become Major General of the Spanish army, since the departure of Marshal Jourdan, had at first some difficulty in discovering the intentions of the Spanish General ; but having a great part of his troops behind the high Tagus, towards Aranjuez, he was in a position to offer a front to the enemy from whichever direction he might come, and was not compelled to make any decided movement. He had under his command the 2nd, 5th, 4th, and 1st corps, and could muster 60,000 excellent troops, which were twice

as many as were sufficient to vanquish all the regular armies in Spain. Unable to divine the plans of an enemy who had scarcely formed any, Marshal Soult made such arrangements as might best suit all probable contingencies; he sent the 2nd corps (general Hendelet) from Aropesa to Talavera, with orders to watch the Estramadura route, by which the English would come, if at all. He brought back the 5th, (Marshal Mortier) from Talavera to Toledo, and concentrated the 4th, (General Sébastiani) between Aranjuez and Ocana.

About the 15th of November, the enemy having entirely quitted the route of Séville for that of Valencia, and appearing to direct his movements against our left, Marshal Soult, attentively watching the enemy's movements, brought back the 4th (General Sébastiani) from the left to the right, and ordered it to cross the Tagus near to Aranjuez, by the bridge of la Reyna. He drew off the 5th (Marshal Mortier) from Toledo upon Aranjuez. He placed the 4th and 5th corps under the supreme command of Marshal Mortier, and directed that they should debouch upon Ocana. He ordered Marshal Victor, at the head of the 1st corps, to pass the Tagus between Villareja and Fuenteduena, upon the left of the corps of Sébastiani and Mortier; a movement which was a little contrary to rule, and was calculated to render Marshal Victor's corps almost useless, but which could be, however, a source of little peril in the presence of an enemy, whom any one of our corps might have encountered singly without danger. Marshal Soult himself set out from Madrid with King Joseph, the King's Spanish guard, and the remainder of the division Dessoles.

In the afternoon of the 18th General Sébastiani approached the Tagus with the Dragoons of Milhaud, and crossed the river by the bridge of la Reyna with his cavalry, leaving behind him his infantry, which was still on its march. On arriving at the edge of the plateau la Mancha, General Sébastiani perceived the Spanish cavalry which covered the main body of the army of Arcizaga on its march from Santa-Cruz upon Ocana. This troop consisted of about 4000 well-mounted and well-equipped horsemen, and as those of General Sébastiani numbered only about eight or nine hundred, he found himself in a somewhat embarrassing position; but Marshal Mortier had, fortunately, just arrived at Aranjuez, and sent him the 10th Chasseurs, together with the Polish Lancers, which raised the troop at his disposal to the number of 1500. With these troops the imposing mass of the enemy was dispersed by a brilliant feat of arms, which gave good hopes of our success in the battle which would

evidently take place on the morrow. The body of the Spanish army was already in sight, and Marshal Mortier made his arrangements for the approaching conflict. The French army consisted of about twenty-four thousand men, a number very insufficient to oppose the 50,000 or 55,000 of the army under General Areizaga. Marshal Soult and King Jerome arrived at the moment when Marshal Mortier had completed his arrangements for the battle, and had only to confirm them.

At eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 19th of November, General Leval attacked the enemy's right with the German and Polish regiments, these troops being soon somewhat broken by an overwhelming fire from the enemy's musketry and artillery, and General Leval seriously wounded, General Girard, forming in column the 34th, 40th, and 64th regiments of infantry, whilst he opposed the 88th to the Spanish cavalry which threatened his left, passed between the Polish and German regiments, and attacked the Spaniards with the utmost resolution. The enemy began to give way, and to fall back upon Ocana. Our troops continued their attack, and signs of disorder were soon visible in the Spanish army. In the meanwhile our cavalry attacking that of the enemy which covered the baggage in the direction of the road from Santa-Cruz to Ocana, dispersed it, and then dashed into the midst of the broken and flying masses of the enemy's infantry. Within the space of a few moments some four or five thousand fell under the sabres or bayonets of our soldiers. Forty-six pieces of cannon, thirty-two flags, and fifteen thousand prisoners remained in our possession, besides an immense quantity of baggage, and two or three thousand horses. The triumph needed only to have been obtained over the English to be complete.

This event naturally caused excessive dismay at Seville, and excited anew the outcry against the Central Junta. The project of replacing it by a Royal Regency was reproduced on this occasion with more earnestness than ever. The Marquis de la Romana, however, who had formerly desired to deprive the Central Junta of its authority, having now obtained possession of the chief part of its executive power, hastened to check its most daring adversaries, and placed in arrest the Count de Montijo, and Francisco Palafox. But as repeated news of misfortune continued to arrive in rapid succession, the Junta, perceiving no secure asylum but at the bottom of the Peninsular, behind the lagunes which cover Cadiz, decided to re-assemble in the isle of Léon at the commencement of 1810, in order to prepare the convocation and assembly of the Cortès for the 1st March.

Thus the campaign of 1809 may be said to have terminated with advantage and glory to our arms; and there was fair reason to hope the near approach of a termination to this long and cruel war.

But, as commonly happens, embarrassments and chagrin were not the lot of the vanquished alone; for they prevailed at Madrid, in the very court of the victorious King. Joseph in Spain had as many subjects of dispute with his powerful brother, as Louis in Holland. We have already seen that he believed himself capable of arriving much sooner at an understanding with the Spaniards by means of his powers of persuasion, than his brother ever would by the exhibition of all his terrors; that, in common with all those whom Napoleon had made kings, he espoused the cause of his new subjects, against the French armies charged with the duty of compelling their submission to him, and that Napoleon was transported with passion when he found that Joseph showed greater favour to the Spaniards than to the French troops, who shed their blood to make him a king, a disgraceful and indecent animosity arose in consequence, between the two courts; and as the English obtained from the guerillas more than one letter taken from the French couriers, they did not fail to parade in their journals these sad divisions in the Imperial family.

Joseph had naturally desired to establish a court at Madrid, as his brothers had established courts at Amsterdam, Cassel, and Naples. Some complaisant but second rate French officials, military and civil, and some Spanish adherents of the new king, composed this court, to which Joseph gave his entire confidence, and on which alone he bestowed any favours. Its members in return admired his superior understanding, his amiability, and exquisite tact, and were prone to reiterate that Napoleon was surrounded by flatterers, who exaggerated his merits at the expense of his brothers, that his undeniable military talent was sadly deteriorated by a want of prudence and moderation; and some of these flatterers of Madrid, who were such good judges of the flatterers of Paris, had had the imprudence, during the campaign of Wagram, to calculate the chances which threatened the life of Napoleon, and whilst expressing a due sense of the misfortune which a loss of so much talent and glory would be, asserted that his death would not be so great a calamity for the empire as was generally supposed; for that, in that event, the attainment of peace would be as easy as it was now difficult, and both France and Europe would obtain that repose they so much needed. These assertions, which contained a considerable amount of truth, were imprudently

made in the presence of generals who repeated them to Napoleon, because they hated the Spanish Court, in the presence of the French Ambassador, who reported them because it was his duty to do so, and in the presence of a police, which gave information of them in accordance with their instructions. The consequent irritation in Paris may be easily conceived.

Joseph would have gladly rewarded his flatterers, but his whole revenue sufficed only for a third part of the absolutely necessary expenses of his household, his guard, and the salaries of the functionaries who received his orders. But one resource was open to him, and that consisted in the raising money on the national domains. With the money thus obtained Joseph had made some presents to his favourites; he had, moreover, bestowed on them some titles of nobility, some decorations, and some commands in his guard. In justification of these acts, Joseph declared that it was necessary that a king should have something to give, that he should be able to reward those Frenchmen who had attached themselves to his fortunes, and to recompense the Spaniards who had alienated themselves from their countrymen to devote their services to himself.

Nor were these Joseph's only weaknesses, for, being very coldly received by the French troops, who regarded him neither as a friend nor a general, and more coldly still by his subjects in Madrid, who could not look on him as their legitimate sovereign, he passed the greater part of his time in retirement, in the society of his complaisant friends, and of a beautiful and intellectual person who was one of the few Spanish ladies who dared to present themselves at his court.

Napoleon, who could never pardon those errors of his brothers, which he was ready enough to forgive in his own case, and who was irritated by a number of malevolent reports, manifested even a greater degree of anger against the Court of Madrid than he had shown towards that of Amsterdam, for in addition to all those reasons of his displeasure, to which we have alluded, was the ceaseless and poignant chagrin which he experienced on account of the Spanish war. He declared repeatedly, that Joseph had no idea of how to conduct a war, that he had neither genius nor character, and that without the presence of three or four hundred thousand French soldiers, he would not remain eight days upon his throne; that his gentleness was out of place, and that there was greater need for him to render himself feared, and to cherish the French troops, than to conciliate the Spaniards; that this mode of governing was no doubt very distasteful to one of so gentle a character as Joseph, but that Napoleon had not forced him

to become King of Spain, and that after having accepted the crown, it behoved him to wear it in a becoming manner; that his financial embarrassments were the result of his own incapacity, and the incapacity of his ministers; that Spain had already cost the Imperial treasury two or three hundred million, and that France could not be ruined for her sake; that Spain contained immense resources, and that were he, Napoleon, able to go there, he would easily procure from them subsistence for his armies, and an ample surplus for the expences of the civil service; that he was about to send a reinforcement of 120,000 men to put an end to this wearisome war, that he would provide them equipment, but that Spain must bear the cost of their subsistence; that his brother's guard was an useless, and even a dangerous establishment, which absorbed money which was required for other purposes, and which would desert on the first occasion; that it was absolutely necessary that Joseph should cease to rule Spain, or continue to do so in accordance with the views and wishes of Napoleon; and that if the government were not conducted agreeably to his will, he would simply convert into military governments the provinces occupied by the French armies, restoring them to the king on the conclusion of the war, withholding only, as a recompense to France for her exertions and expenses, the provinces comprised between the Pyrenees and the Ebro.

When these remarks of Napoleon were repeated to Joseph, he declared that he already had sufficient to complain of, that he endured a thousand annoyances from the French Generals, and that if the proposed military governments should be established, and it should become necessary to announce to the people the dismemberment of the monarchy, not three or four hundred thousand, but a million of men would be required to keep down the Spaniards;—and even a million would not suffice.

We may observe in this quarrel with Joseph a repetition of Napoleon's dispute with Louis, and how little Napoleon gained by employing his brothers as the instruments of his authority, since they invariably became the supporters of those interests which he sought to sacrifice to his inflexible designs.

At the present moment, however, as the despair of Joseph and the anger of Napoleon were tempered by the hopes in which each indulged that the next campaign would put an end to their anxieties and sacrifices, they devoted themselves wholly to efforts to render the approaching campaign as effectual as possible.

Joseph wished to commence this campaign by an expedi-

tion to Andalusia, and his ministers, lending a ready ear to those Spaniards of Seville who represented Andalusia as weary of the government of the Junta, and ready to surrender itself to the new king, declared that force need have little part in its conquest, and that Joseph's power of gaining hearts would be its only vanquisher; that to him alone would belong both the glory and the profit; that Grenada and Valencia would speedily follow the example of Seville, and Cadiz soon be as the other three; that he would thus have almost the whole of the south of Spain under his direct authority, and being then possessed of abundant financial resources would be independent of his brother, and become indeed King of Spain. Joseph, readily entering into these views, earnestly requested of Napoleon permission to make the conquest of Andalusia, and was supported in his request by Marshal Soult, who also believed that it would be very easy, and desired its accomplishment as a means of effacing the remembrance of Oporto.

Napoleon however, contrary to his usual habit in the case of military affairs, hesitated; he was well aware of the advantage of obtaining immediate possession of Andalusia, and of the probability that its example might lead to a submission of the whole southern portion of the Peninsula. But his great military talent taught him, that the first necessity was the expulsion of the English, which would lead to a general peace; and the conclusion of a general peace would leave the passions of the Spaniards as a fire unsupplied with fuel, and destined to be speedily extinguished. In accordance with these views, he had made preparations for overwhelming Lord Wellington with an overwhelming mass of troops; but unhappily he permitted himself to be diverted from this wise project, and, considering the expedition to Andalusia as but a temporary employment for the excellent soldiers which he had around Madrid, consented that it should be undertaken.

In permitting this expedition, which Joseph was to carry out with 70,000 veteran soldiers, Napoleon had considered that at least 30,000 at the close of the campaign might be detached, and led towards Lisbon by the left bank of the Tagus, whilst Masséna marched by the right, at the head of the 60,000 troops of Ney and Junot, with the 15,000 of the guard, and the 10,000 cavalry of Montbrun, which, without taking into account the reserve of Drouet, would form an overwhelming force which the English would be unable to withstand; and which would probably render the campaign of 1810 the last of the Spanish war.

In accordance with these ideas, without losing sight of his

main object, which was the expulsion of the English, Napoleon permitted the expedition to Andalusia, regarding it but as a profitable employment of the troops concentrated around Madrid, until the great army of Portugal destined to march upon Lisbon, under the illustrious Masséna, should have been assembled in Castille.

But whilst consenting to the Andalusian campaign, Napoleon directed Joseph to observe certain precautions in its conduct. He commanded him to march with three corps, the 4th, under General Sébastiani, the 5th under Marshal Mortier, and the 1st under Marshal Victor, the division Dessoles remaining in reserve. He ordered the 2nd to remain upon the Tagus, *vis-a-vis* with Alcantara, in order to watch the English, whose plan of operations could not be discovered since their retrograde movement into Portugal. He also recommended Joseph to carry with him a siege train, that the want of it might not stop him before Seville as Marshal Monecy had been stopped before Valencia.

These instructions having been given, Napoleon directed General Suchet to take Lerida and Mequinenza, whilst Joseph was employed in the conquest of Andalusia. General Suchet, aided in this undertaking by Marshal Angereau, would in turn be able to assist him in taking Tortosa and Tarragona, and then marching upon Valencia be in a position to complete the conquest of the south, already commenced by Joseph. In the meantime Marshal Ney in Old Castille would organize his corps, pursue the insurgents of Leon, assist General Bonnet in the Asturias, and prepare for besieging Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, with which the campaign of Portugal was commenced.

Joseph was extremely delighted at receiving permission to undertake the Andalusian expedition, chiefly because it gave him the opportunity of acting out of Napoleon's sight, and with the counsel of Marshal Soult, who served as his major general, and showed towards him the greatest deference; the Marshal himself being sufficiently pleased with an expedition into Andalusia, where in the absence of the English the issue of the battles was rather to be looked forward to with hope than fear.

Although the authority of Joseph over the corps which were not placed immediately under him was of a very undefined nature, Marshal Soult wrote in his name to General Suchet, directing him to abandon the idea of the siege of Lerida, and to march upon Valencia, in order to cover the left of the army of Andalusia. Addressing an order of the same kind to Marshal Ney, he recommended him to commence immediately the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, to draw the

English towards the north of Portugal, and to set free the right of this army of Andalusia, which was protected in every kind of way as though it encountered the greatest dangers.

These precautions having been taken, they advanced upon the sierra Morena with the intention of making the attack upon the 19th or 20th January, 1810. General de la Romana, who had been charged with the duty of re-organizing the Spanish army commanded by General Areizaga, which had been half destroyed and dispersed amongst the numerous recesses of the sierra Morena, had promised much and done nothing. Scarcely twenty-five thousand demoralized and destitute troops were ranged in three divisions in front of the three passes of Almaden, Despena-Perros, and Villa-Mourique. A division detached from Old Castille, under the Duke of Albuquerque, had crossed the Tagus in the neighbourhood of Alcantara, and marched to cover Seville.

The troops under General Areizaga defended but feebly the defiles of San-Estevan and Despena-Perros, and retired in all haste upon Jaen to cover Grenada. The others having fallen back from Almaden upon Cordova, had directed their retreat, not towards Seville, which the Spaniards expected to offer but a slight resistance, but towards Cadiz, where they hoped to find a secure asylum, behind the lagunes of the isle of Léon and under the cannon of the English ships. The French army followed to a certain extent in this twofold direction. The 4th corps, forming our left, under General Sébastiani, pursued towards Jaen the two divisions which retreated into the kingdom of Grenada, in order to drive them from this kingdom and the port of Malaga. The 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, forming our centre, having reached the Guadalquivir, turned to the right, and rejoined the 1st corps which, under General Victor, had descended upon Cordova. From Cordova they turned towards Seville, pausing at Carmona, a little city not far from Seville. Joseph, who was not inclined to attempt the capture of towns by assault, wished to await at Carmona the effect of the secret relations which Messrs. O'Farill, d'Azanza, and Urquijo, were attempting to establish with the interior of Seville.

It would have been better, whilst awaiting this pacific result, to have left Seville on the right and to have hastened directly upon Cadiz, to intercept the troops, the material, and, above all, the members of the government who were on the point of flying. The possession of Cadiz would, in fact, have been of more importance than that of Seville, for the walls of the latter might at any time be battered down by the siege train, but it would not always be easy to pass the

lagunes which separate Cadiz from the firm land of Spain, and it was only by a surprise that we could hope to make the capture of this important town.

Joseph proposed to direct a detachment against Cadiz, and to march with the 1st corps only upon Seville. This plan was supported by many of the generals, but combatted by Marshal Soult, who objected to it that, the army being already weakened by the despatch of General Sébastiani to Grenada, it could not bear any further diminution, and that Cadiz would fall of itself into their hands on the capture of Seville; the Marshal's opinion diverted Joseph from the execution of his idea, and he marched directly upon Seville with the united corps of Marshals Mortier and Victor. The reserve under General Dessoles was left in the defiles of Despena-Perros, between the Val de Penas, Caroline, and Baylen.

The approach of the French caused the greatest excitement in Seville; the central Junta left to an executive commission the care of defending the city, and one by one withdrew to Cadiz; but many of them were maltreated by the populace which arose in insurrection, proclaiming the Junta of Seville the Junta of defence, and bringing forth from prison the Count de Montijo and Don Francisco Palafox, to dispute with the French possession of the capital of Andalusia.

Whilst the inhabitants were immersed in useless excitement, the French had advanced to the gates of Seville by the route of Carmona. On the 29th the corps of Marshal Victor appeared in sight of Seville; all the bells were tolled, the populace assembled in masses upon the ramparts and the roofs of the houses, shouted forth the most furious cries. Marshal Victor summoned the place to surrender, declaring that if the gates were not immediately opened, he would instantly commence the attack, and put to the sword all who resisted. These threats, in conjunction with the secret correspondence which had been carried on with the interior of the city, had the effect of bringing about conferences during which the chief personages, with the Marquis of Romana at their head, made their escape. The Provincial Junta then consented to deliver up the capital of Andalusia, and on the 1st February the gates were opened to Joseph's army, which entered with drums beating and colours flying.

The city was almost deserted; the upper classes had fled either to Cadiz or the provinces, or into Portugal; the monks had been equally eager to withdraw themselves from the power of the conqueror, and the mass of the people had scattered themselves in dismay over the surrounding country; but as the troops respected both persons and property, and

Joseph hastened to put into practice his system of conciliation, the greater portion of the inhabitants soon returned, tired of enduring cold and hunger in the open fields.

The truth of Marshal Soult's declaration that the conquest of Seville would undoubtedly be succeeded by the submission of Cadiz, now remained to be proved; and the various corps speedily commenced those movements which would put it to the proof.

The 5th corps marching upon Estremadura had dispersed on its way some detachments led by the Marquis de la Romana, and made some considerable captures of baggage and money belonging to the numerous fugitives who were flying to the shelter of the strong walls of Badajoz. On arriving at the gates of Badajoz the French General summoned it to surrender, and received an answer from the governor in the name of the Marquis de la Romana, that the fortress would make a resistance worthy of its natural strength and the determination of its defenders. Marshal Mortier, having no siege train, had then taken up a strong position on the Guadiana, and had placed himself in communication with the 2nd corps (General Reynier's) which had now advanced as far as Truxillo.

In the meantime General Sébastiani, at the head of the 4th corps, chasing before him the wreck of Areizaga's army, had successively entered Jaen and Grenada, and had then appeared before Malaga, where the infuriated populace declared their determination to make a furious resistance; but an advanced guard of cavalry and a few light infantry regiments had speedily quelled their ardour and reduced the place to submission. The 4th corps might reasonably expect that its establishment in the kingdom of Grenada would be equally easy.

Matters in relation to the capture of Cadiz, however, were far from wearing a similarly favourable aspect. The ministers of King Joseph had written to many members of the government and to several generals, who even at Seville had appeared disposed to surrender, utterly weary of this devastating war and the interminable civil dissensions. But these last, constrained as they now were by all that surrounded them, replied only in a most vague and unsatisfactory manner. As for the inhabitants of Cadiz, full of confidence in the natural strength of their town and in the support of the English troops which had been promised them, they surrendered themselves to unbridled fury, and met the French summons to surrender with outrageous bravadoes.

A local insurrectional Junta had been formed and made preparations for the defence; the Duke of Albuquerque with

his division, joined the numerous and important political refugees who were now in Cadiz, without giving up the great arsenal of the Caraque to the English, without even opening the interior roadstead to their fleet, the Junta of Cadiz had admitted them into the exterior roadstead and consented to to receive into the enceinte of the place 4,000 of the soldiers. Eighteen thousand Spanish troops were already either within the town, or in the isle of Léon.

In the meantime the political movement which had been interrupted at Seville by the arrival of the French, continued at Cadiz with the greatest violence. Its first result was naturally the dissolution of the central Junta, which, persuaded of the impossibility of its retaining its authority for any considerable time, hastened to resign, and amidst the universal applause of the inhabitants and the refugees, immediately convoked the Cortes and nominated a royal regency, to be invested with executive power. This regency was composed of five members, the bishop of Orense, a man of mediocre and fanatic spirit, General Castanas, a man of some skill and wisdom, Saavedra, a state counsellor, a renowned sailor, Don Antonio Escano, and a Spaniard of the American colonies, Don Miguel de Lardizabal, appointed to represent in the government the transatlantic provinces. After having performed these two acts, the Junta separated, receiving the greatest ill treatment from its enemies, who even examined the baggage of many of its members, to discover whether they had abstracted any of the public funds; a most unmerited outrage, as they had generally been accounted persons of strict honesty.

The new regency had scarcely been appointed, when it displayed a very manifest inclination to delay the convocation of the Cortes; but the people of Cadiz, and the refugees were alike anxious for their immediate assembly, and it was determined that they should be convoked in March.

Affairs were in this state when the first corps under Marshal Victor arrived before the canal of Santi-Petri, three or four days after the entry of the French into Seville. Had he appeared before Cadiz with an imposing force when the government, the armies, and the most impetuous spirits were still at Seville, it is probable that he might have surprised and ensured its reduction; but now it was necessary to make preparations for a long and difficult siege.

Some time would be necessary for the collection of the various means of attack, and the consideration began to strike every one, now that it was spread over this immense tract of country, which extended from Murcia to Grenada, from Grenada to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Seville, and from

Seville to Badajoz, that our noble army, twice as large at least as was necessary for the invasion of the south of Spain, would have much difficulty in retaining possession of it. Marshal Victor, with twenty thousand men, had scarcely sufficient for the investment of the isle of Léon and for keeping in check its garrison, which was more numerous but happily less brave than the 1st corps; and if he had sufficient troops for the preparations for the siege, he certainly had not enough for its accomplishment. The 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, obliged to furnish a garrison for Seville and a corps of observation before Badajoz, had great difficulty in performing this twofold task. General Sébastiani who, with the 4th corps, had to hold Malaga, to occupy Grenada, and to make head against the insurgents of Murcia, had not a soldier too much. Dessoles' division, posted amidst the gorges of the sierra Morena, in order to protect the line of communication, was thoroughly employed, for it had to guard, besides the defiles of the sierra Morena, Jaen, which commands the route of Grenada and the plains of la Mancha; and to provide a garrison for Madrid. Finally the 2nd corps, under General Reynier, posted upon the Tagus, between Almaraz, Truxilla, and Alcantara, could not prudently be withdrawn from this position, for it was there that the English had passed in the preceding year, on their march from Abrantés to Talavera. We see, therefore, that this numerous and noble army, the most valiant of all the armies of the empire, having no rival but the corps of Marshal Davoust in Hanover, and which numbered nearly 80,000 men, was already scattered over the provinces of Grenada, Andalusia, and Estramadura, that it was scarcely in force at any one point, and certainly not in a condition to afford any assistance to the army which was about to act against the English in Portugal. That the hope of being able to divert a detachment of it towards Lisbon, which had decided Napoleon to permit the Andalusian expedition, was consequently utterly dissipated, and was succeeded by the fear that it would prove insufficient even for the defence of Andalusia.

The new Regency entrusted the Marquis de la Romana with the command of the troops of Estremadura encamped around Badajoz, and having summoned General Blake from Catalonia, where he had been replaced by General O'Donnel, had placed him at the head of the army of the centre, the remnants of which had fled into the kingdom of Murcia; Blake rallied them, and in concert with the garrison of Cadiz, directed expeditions upon Grenada and Seville, and in every other direction in which he could afford support to the

guerillas of Ronda. We must add, that the twofold diversion which had been ordered to be made upon our wings, and which consisted in throwing Marshal Ney upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and General Suchet upon Valentia, had not succeeded.

The order which had been incautiously given to Marshal Ney to attack the important fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, without siege artillery, and in the neighbourhood of the English, who had withdrawn to the north of Portugal, had only resulted in a vain bravado. Marshal Ney had confined himself to throwing a few balls against the place from his field guns, and to sending to the governor a summons to surrender, which received just the kind of answer such an attempt deserved. The Marshal had then returned to Salamanca. General Suchet, believing that the order to march against Valentia had been concurred in by Napoleon, presented himself before that city, which, according to some accounts was well disposed to surrender, and thrown into it a few cannon balls; but the inhabitants showed a determination to resist which it was vain to expect to subdue without the aid of heavy artillery. General Suchet retired, therefore, in all haste, towards Aragon. This was the second French army, (counting that of Marshal Monery) which had presented itself before Valencia, and been compelled to withdraw without having forced the gates of that proud city; a fact which considerably increased the triumphant feelings of the inhabitants.

In the meantime the whole country from Murcia to Grenada, from Grenada to Cordova, and from Cordova to Seville, was in entire subjection to Joseph, who visited these cities in the character of their king, making what his courtiers called a triumphal progress, but which was not so regarded by persons of more discernment. It is true that the fickle and inconstant populace of these cities, much as they detested the French, applauded this king in a manner which afforded his flatterers an opportunity of declaring that he had obtained more by his personal grace and condescension than Napoleon by his terrible soldiers; and that were he only permitted to pursue his own plans he would speedily effect the subjugation of Spain,—but the persons who uttered these sentiments forgot that eighty thousand of these same terrible soldiers were at the present moment affording to Joseph the means of trying the effect of the charms of his manner upon the people of Andalusia. In the meantime both Joseph and Marshal Soult were satisfied.

But in the midst of these self congratulations on the subject of the Andalusian expedition, a thunderbolt was

launched from Paris, which turned all Joseph's exultation into bitter dismay. The Andalusian expedition had occupied the first months of 1810, and this was the very period of the most serious disputes between Holland and Napoleon, who had not quarrels only with King Louis, but also with King Jerome, on account of Hanover, and with respect to the execution of the financial conditions attached to the cession of that country. Tired of finding his brothers perpetually the cause of some obstacle in his path, and unable to perceive that they were in reality only the passive agents of the resistance of circumstances to those impossible achievements he was attempting; and receiving a multitude of reports respecting the tone and conduct adopted by Joseph, he took measures with respect to him which were very severe, and by no means of a nature calculated to facilitate the performance of the work which remained to be performed by him in Spain. In the first place he was displeased that General Suchet should have been called off from the siege of Lerida to carry his heavy artillery against Valentia, by which means the French army had been caused to make a second ineffectual appearance before the walls of that city, and he forbade General Suchet from obeying henceforward any authority but that of Paris. He expressed equal disapproval of the imprudent demonstration which Marshal Ney had been ordered to make against Ciudad Rodrigo.

Joseph's gift of money to his favourites, when resources were utterly wanting for the supply of even necessary expenses, angered him beyond expression. "Since money can be found," said Napoleon, "for gifts to the idle and the intriguing, means ought to be found for the support of the soldiers, who pour out their blood for King Joseph; and since their wants are not supplied, I must provide for them myself." Accordingly he converted Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, and Biscay, which were the four provinces on the left of the Ebro, into military governments. He arranged that in those governments the generals commanding should exercise civil as well as military authority, that they should receive all the revenues on account of the army chest, and whilst treating the government at Madrid with apparent deference, should neither obey nor be accountable to it.

After having taken military possession of the territories on the left of the Ebro, Napoleon secretly communicated to the generals, his intention of annexing them to France, as some indemnity for the sacrifices she had made to secure the throne of Spain for his brother; and directed them, in case they should receive orders from Madrid, contrary to those they received from Paris, to declare that they had been prohibited

to obey any other government but that of France. This was a serious step, not only for Spain, but also for Europe. It seemed, in fact, that Napoleon, as insatiable in peace as in war, was resolved to rule by his decrees where he could not vanquish by his sword. He had annexed to the empire Tuscany, the Roman States, and Holland; he was at this very moment contemplating, although he maintained silence on the point, treating Valais and the Hanse towns in the same manner. To add to these acquisitions, the country between the Pyrenees and the Ebro was, in effect, to say to the world that nothing could escape his avidity.

The secrecy enjoined upon the generals relative to the annexation of the four provinces, was not long possible. The establishment of the military governments in these provinces, would have alone sufficed to reveal Napoleon's real intentions; but Napoleon did not confine himself to this measure, but took others which restricted Joseph's authority within the gates of Madrid. Besides the acts above mentioned, he distributed the troops in the field into three armies, one of the south, one of the centre, and one of Portugal. He placed Marshal Soult at the head of the army of the south, having renounced upon consideration, the intention of inquiring into his conduct at Oporto, and confided to him the 4th, 1st and 5th corps which occupied Grenada, Andalusia, and Estremadura. He composed the army of the centre of Dessoles' single division, added to it the dépôts generally established at Madrid, and entrusted it to Joseph. The army of Portugal was formed of all the troops assembled in the north, to march upon Lisbon, under the orders of Marshal Masséna; the generals commanding these armies were to obey only the orders of the French minister, which meant of Napoleon himself, who had adopted the title of Commander-in-Chief of the armies of Spain, and had appointed Prince Berthier his major general. Joseph had, therefore, no command over the governor of the provinces of the Ebro; none over the generals of the three acting armies; his authority being confined to the army of the centre, which was the least numerous, and was appointed to the performance of but an insignificant task. His authority could scarcely have been more restricted or rendered more nominal, and this certainly was not the way to exalt him in the eyes of the Spaniards. The orders, moreover, relating to the finances were as severe as those relative to the military hierarchy. The revenues received in the provinces of the Ebro were allotted to the armies by which they were occupied. The acting armies were to obtain support from the countries in which they conducted their opera-

tions, and as it was possible that sufficient money would not be found for their pay, Napoleon agreed to send to Spain two millions a month for that purpose. Henceforth Joseph only had for revenue the taxes which he could obtain from Madrid itself, and the hatred which the Spaniards bore towards him, not on his own account but on account of the invasion of which he was the representative, began to change into a feeling of contempt, which was still more formidable.

Joseph received information of the above circumstances at Seville, and was overwhelmed by it. MM. O'Farill, Urquijo, d'Azanza, and d'Almenara, who had accompanied him to Seville, fell into the deepest despair. Struck by so heavy a blow Joseph had no longer any taste for remaining at Seville, where his presence was no longer likely to have that effect upon his new subjects which he had expected. He found himself, also, without authority in Andalusia, Marshal Soult having become general-in-chief of the army of the south, and determined to visit France, to come to some understanding with his brother, and to make him acquainted with the probable consequences of these his last measures. He took leave, therefore, of his ministers, leaving Marshal Soult absolute master of Andalusia; and thus eighty thousand of the best troops in Spain were paralysed to make, not Joseph, but Marshal Soult king of Andalusia.

Joseph passed rapidly and without ostentation through Andalusia, which he had lately traversed with so much triumph, and passing through the defiles of the sierra Morena, where was cantoned Dessoles' division, the only active force which remained to him, and then, leaving some infantry regiments in these defiles, and one or two regiments of dragoons to scour la Mancha, he concentrated around Madrid the few troops upon which he could rely.

He had no sooner entered his capital than he received the most extraordinary information from Seville. Marshal Soult considering himself not sufficiently strong in troops with the three corps which had been confided to him, and which comprised the best troops in Spain, pretended that all those in the arondissement of the south belonged to him, and consequently ordered the brigade which was between la Mancha and Andalusia to approach to receive his orders. General Laboussage, to whom these orders were addressed, replied that he was under the commands of the état major of Madrid, and could not, without its authorization, quit the post which he occupied. Marshal Soult repeated his orders, accompanying them with severe threats in case they should be disobeyed. Joseph, on the other hand, forbade General Laboussage to obey, and whilst in the midst of this quarrel

with Marshal Soult, experienced a new annoyance quite as painful as any of the others. The generals stationed in the kingdom of Léon and Old Castille, where the military governments were not as yet established, put into practice the principle laid down by Napoleon, that each army should be supported by the province which it occupied, and should levy contributions without employing the financial agents of Joseph, and without holding themselves accountable to his authority. These repeated blows rendered Joseph's humiliation complete, and he was ready to abdicate, even without compensation, the burdensome crown of Spain. By the advice, however, of his ministers and of some persons who enjoyed his confidence, and who were unwilling to lose the king to whom they had become attached, he directed his wife, who was in Paris, and two of his ministers, MM. d'Azanza and d'Hervás, who were about to proceed thither, to negotiate with his brother and to make him understand that the loss of the provinces of the Ebro exposed him to the hatred of the Spaniards, that the reduction of his authority brought on him their contempt, and that he would rather resign the Peninsula than retain it on such conditions.

Napoleon received the Spanish ministers without severity but with some disdain; spoke contemptuously of Joseph's system of policy; and displayed great inflexibility on the subject of the finances, declaring that if Joseph were not willing to obtain of Spain the necessary money for the troops, he must procure it himself by the hands of his generals, taking care, however, that whatever surplus remained beyond the necessary expenses of their armies should be paid over to Joseph's treasury. He was unable, he said, to change the distribution of the various military commands, for that he had need of two great armies, that of the South and that of Portugal, to act in concert for the expulsion of the English, and that by leaving between these the army of the centre, and entrusting it to Joseph, he had conceded all that was possible.

With respect to the provinces of the Ebro in which he had established military governments, Napoleon did not dissemble his project for annexing them to France as a means of indemnifying her for her expenses; Portugal, he added, which would one day be annexed to Spain, would be a noble compensation, but it was first necessary to conquer it, to drive out of it the English, and after having driven them out, to force them to make peace; the accomplishment of all which was difficult, and rendered desirable for the present the postponement of any determination, and complete silence on these topics. The Spanish ministers remained therefore at

Paris, with the intention of negotiating and seizing every opportunity of making some impression on Napoleon's inflexible will.

For the moment Napoleon permitted them to add some troops to the army of the centre. He decided that Marshal Soult in endeavouring to take Cadiz should try also to capture Badajoz on the frontier of Portugal; that Marshal Masséna on his side, whilst his armies completed their formation, should undertake the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which were the protection of Portugal on the side of Castile, and that these supports once assured they should take the offensive during the course of the month of September by marching altogether upon Lisbon, Marshal Masséna on the right bank of the Tagus and Marshal Soult on the left. According to this new plan the whole of the summer would be devoted to the different sieges, and orders were given that it should so be employed, and with the greatest possible activity.

General Suchet had in effect since the month of April, undertaken the task which was assigned to him. Having promptly repaired the fault which they had caused him to commit, in drawing him upon Valencia, he sat down before Lerida to besiege that place. His corps made up to an effective force of thirty and some odd thousand men, by the arrival of recent reinforcements, could not furnish more than twenty-three or twenty-four thousand combatants. Of these he kept about 10,000 to guard Aragon, and with thirteen or fourteen thousand he had marched on Lerida, investing that place on the two sides of the Segre. These forces were just sufficient for attacking the place, but there was reason to fear that they would be insufficient, if it should prove necessary to cover the siege against the endeavours which would very likely be made from without. It was the duty of Marshal Augereau to cover the siege of Lerida and Mequinenza, whilst Marshal Suchet carried them on, and it was the duty of Marshal Suchet in his turn, to cover those of Tortosa and Tarragonia, whilst Marshal Augereau devoted his forces to that purpose.

Lerida is famous in history, and from the time of Cæsar to that of the Grand Condé has in every age played an important part; it is on the right of the Segre, a river which carries to the Ebro the waters of one half at least of the chain of the Pyrenees, and being situated at the foot of a rock, which is surmounted by a strong castle, it is protected in one direction by the waters of the river, and on all by the cannon of the castle. The rock on which this castle is built, is almost perpendicular on every side, save towards the south-west, on which side it is accessible by a gentle

ascent, which commences almost from the town itself, but this also rises abruptly towards its extremity, and is strongly fortified. It was necessary, therefore, to take the town under the fire of the castle, and after the town the castle itself; unless, indeed, a well arranged system of operations should obtain the simultaneous accomplishment of both these results.

At the moment when the trenches were about to be opened, an intercepted letter apprised General Suchet that the Spanish General, O'Donnel, was approaching with the troops of Catalonia and Aragon to raise the siege. On the 23rd it was known that he was only one march distant. He came from Catalonia by the left of the Sègre, whilst the town and the besieging army were on the right. General Suchet made his arrangements for holding his ground against both the enemies without and those within. On the 23rd April, at daybreak, General O'Donnel appeared at the extremity of the plain of Margalef, which extends on the left of the Sègre, and immediately commenced the action. After a brief contest victory declared itself for the French, and the Spaniards fled, leaving behind them almost six thousand prisoners, with many cannon, colours, and a large amount of baggage.

After this brilliant success General Suchet, wishing to know if the result of the battle which had deprived the garrison of all hope of succour had inclined them to surrender, sent them a summons to do so; but the governor proudly replied that the garrison had never relied upon any external aid for the success of its defence. It was necessary, therefore, to proceed with the siege.

The trenches were opened on the 29th April. The execution of the works was difficult, not on account of the hardness of the soil, but because the spring rains had caused the waters of the Sègre to overflow, and because great inconvenience was experienced from the artillery of the castle.

On the 6th and 7th of May all the batteries were constructed and armed, and the cannonade was commenced; but our artillery suffered so severely from the fire from the castle, most of the pieces being speedily dismounted, that the cannonade had to be suspended for the purpose of erecting new batteries and redispersing the direction of the old. These new works occupied until the 12th of May, when the fire was recommenced, and with complete success; our batteries silenced those of the town itself, whilst those of the castle had been rendered less dangerous by being approached nearer. At length a practicable breach was effected and an assault rendered feasible. It was arranged that this should take place on the 13th. Two columns were to advance

simultaneously to the assault, whilst a company of sappers and miners was to break down one of the gates, by which the army might be admitted. The General-in-Chief and Colonel Haxo remained in the trenches at the head of the reserves, ready to advance in whichever direction it might be desirable.

At the approach of evening four bombs having given the signal, the two columns poured from the trenches into the breaches and clambered up them, in spite of a terrible fire from the front and flank. Having arrived on the rampart they were for a moment thrown into confusion, but they soon rallied and entered the town, which they found defended by barricades, which were immediately taken. In the meantime the sappers and miners had succeeded, after a hand to hand conflict, in opening the gate situated near the bastion of the Madelaine, and thus giving admittance to the columns which waited behind them. Our troops thus penetrating into the town in all directions drove the garrison and the inhabitants, mingled together in confusion, towards the slopes which led to the castle. Filled with terror they threw themselves into the castle itself and even into the fosses. All through the night this mass of mingled men, women, and children was, by General Suchet's order, overwhelmed with missiles from every species of ordnance; a scene of tragedy being the result, which it was impossible to avoid, for the immediate conclusion of the siege depended on the state of despair to which this unhappy mass of persons might be reduced.

However great might be the determination of the garrison and their leader it was impossible to persevere under these circumstances, and on the 14th May, therefore, the governor Garcia Conde hoisted the white flag, and surrendered himself and the garrison prisoners of war. The result of this siege gave to us the most important fortification in Aragon, and producing an immense sensation in this part of Spain much diminished that confidence in their walls with which the inhabitants had been inspired by the siege of Girona.

Whilst these events were taking place in Aragon, Napoleon had at last compelled Marshal Masséna to quit Paris to proceed to Salamanca. Unable to place himself at the head of the armies of Spain, various motives induced him to bestow the chief command upon Marshal Masséna. Soult, having been twice tried against the English, had not, in Napoleon's opinion, shown sufficient vigor to justify his being opposed to them again. Marshal Ney possessed, on the contrary, that power of energetic action which was neces-

sary in a struggle against such enemies, but he had never commanded in chief, and it was necessary that the general to be matched against so skilful a tactician as Wellington, should unite with consummate generalship and great energy of character, that habit of command which enlarges the spirit, and renders it capable of bearing fitly all the anxieties attending a great responsibility. Marshal Masséna was the only man whose ready spirit, clear judgment, and ardent temperament rendered him fit for such a post. Marshal Masséna, with Ney and Junot for his lieutenants would be able to surmount all obstacles. But Marshal Masséna, whose clear sightedness was not confined to military affairs, perceived that a rapid advance was being made towards some great catastrophe. Having conducted all kinds of warfare in Calabria, Italy, Germany, and Poland, he augured no good from that which was so obstinately maintained in Spain, and he was by no means inclined to compromise his high renown upon a theatre whereon all the difficulties which Napoleon had excited against himself appeared to have assembled. He showed the greatest repugnance to undertaking the management of the campaign in Portugal, and when required by Napoleon to give his motives, alleged, that besides the difficulties which he foresaw in the conduct of the operations, and the want which he suspected there would be of proper means for carrying them out, his health was broken, and his energy most probably enfeebled in consequence; and that moreover, there would be some inconvenience in his assuming the command over those Marshals who considered themselves his equals, and were accustomed to obey none but Napoleon himself. Napoleon, with that persuasive manner which he knew how to assume with his old companions in arms, had caressed the old soldier, reminding him of his renown, his proverbial energy; declared that he had never displayed more youthful vigour than in the last campaign, that the army re-echoed with his name, that neither Marshal Soult nor Marshal Ney considered themselves his equal, and that neither of them would refuse the obedience demanded by his superiority, his age, and the Imperial confidence with which he was invested; that if they were Marshals and Dukes, he was Prince of Masséna; and that there were, moreover, means of forcing unruly spirits to submission; that as far as his health was concerned, the climate of Portugal was exactly the one most likely to restore it; that he would be afforded time for repose by the lapse of three or four months which would intervene, being employed in siege operations, before the commencement of movements in the field; that as regarded the means

necessary to the conduct of the campaign, they would be furnished in abundance, 80,000 men being placed under his orders, together with an immense matériel; and that, being entrusted with the conduct of this campaign, it was probable that he would become both the most glorious and the most popular of the soldiers of France, by obtaining that maritime peace which was alone required, because it was the only one which had not as yet been obtained. These arguments, accompanied by a thousand caresses, had rendered Masséna unable to refuse the request of the most generous of masters; his far-seeing spirit, therefore, sadly yielded to the persuasions of gratitude and the habit of obedience, but not to self-deception.

Masséna having thus, whether he would or no, accepted the command of the army of Portugal, proceeded to Salamanca, his arrival being a source of terror to the insurgents, of confidence to the troops, and of displeasure to Junot and Ney. It happened, unfortunately, that his energy was unaccompanied by that dignity which, whether natural or assumed, imposes upon men, and which was one of those qualifications for command, the neglect of which in Napoleon was compensated for by the prestige of his prodigious genius, his dazzling glory, and unrivalled fortune. Masséna arrived at his head quarters in a manner and with an attendance little calculated to impress his already discontented lieutenants, and indiscreetly complaining of his fatigue. "Masséna is grown old," was the constant murmur around Marshal Ney at Salamanca, and around Junot at Zamora. Masséna was not left long in ignorance of this circumstance. "They consider me old, do they?" he exclaimed with anger; "I will soon make them understand that my will at least is not old, and that I know how to exact obedience from those who are placed under my orders." A third lieutenant, General Reynier, whose corps was to join the army of Portugal, conducted himself, at first at least, with more propriety than the other two, receiving his commander-in-chief with the respect which was to be expected from a modest and earnest officer.

But these difficulties were by no means the least serious of those which Masséna had to encounter. His army was not as yet either organized or supplied with the necessary matériel, and Napoleon refused to furnish the funds by means of which alone it could be obtained. He found, on arriving at Salamanca, that such matériel as had been sent from France since the peace with Austria had been seized on its way, as far as possible, by each corps, and consumed before the campaign had commenced. The weather, moreover, had been

as frightful in the Castilles as in Aragon; and in addition to all these difficulties, guerilla bands, more numerous and more audacious than ever, intercepted every convoy that was not guarded by a considerable force. The urgency of the necessities of the army had given birth to abuses which the generals, either indolently or purposely, connived at. The soldiers and sometimes the officers seized the peasants' cattle or corn, not to use for their own support, but to convert into money. They assisted also the contraband traffic in colonial merchandize by permitting mules burdened with this merchandize to pass by on the payment of a tribute; and they even went so far as to permit some of the Spanish prisoners to escape for bribes. Masséna was deeply distressed at this low state of discipline of his old companions in arms, whom he found changed in every thing save that martial daring which neither misfortune nor all Europe gathered under the walls of Paris could subdue.

Independently of this general state of the army, each corps had its own particular distress; and none of the corps were of that strength which Napoleon had hoped and promised they should be. Masséna was able, indeed, to assemble an army of 60,000 men, but the diseases attending the summer season, the sieges which were to be undertaken, and the garrisons which would have to be left in the conquered places, would certainly reduce it by fifteen or sixteen thousand men, and leave the army of Portugal numbering no more than 50,000 effective combatants. The aspect of things in general, the inferiority of the number of the troops, the want of matériel, the bad spirit manifested by the Generals, and the utter decay of discipline, filled Masséna with dismay, and he wrote to Napoleon letters which were as talented as they were sad. Nevertheless, old and worn out and hopeless as he was, he applied himself to the work in hand with more energetic zeal than he had ever displayed at any previous period of his life.

Aided by the members of his staff and by General Thiébauld, Governor of Salamanca, he applied himself to the creation of that which did not exist, and the reparation of that which was destroyed. With a view to these objects he ordered to be brought into the chest of the central army the contributions which each corps had seized for its own use from the province which it occupied. He urged the supply of funds from Paris for the acquittal of the arrears of pay; he took possession of the mules bought in France for the army of Portugal, and accelerated the transport of the heavy artillery towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Ciudad Rodrigo, distant three or four marches from Salamanca, was situated in a vast, arid, desolate

plain, of some twenty or thirty leagues in extent. Masséna sent thither subsistence for the troops of Marshal Ney, which were about to assemble there, and ordered the establishment of all that was necessary for a siege. As it was possible that the English, who, since our entrance into Andalusia, had quitted Spanish Estremadura to retreat into the north of Portugal, might attempt to interrupt our operations, he ordered General Junot to quit Léon and Benavente, and to take up a position between Ledesma and Zamora, in order, if necessary, to be able to concentrate themselves upon the right of Marshal Ney. By these means Masséna began to assemble at Salamanca the matériel of a considerable army, and to concentrate around Ciudad-Rodrigo a portion of what was necessary to the prosecution of a long siege. Unhappily the route between Salamanca and Ciudad-Rodrigo was infested by guerillas who dared to show themselves despite the incessant presence of our troops, and often occasioned us serious disasters. Masséna, therefore, did not fail to send most urgent messages to Paris for the prompt arrival of the corps of General Druet, affirming that after his departure for Portugal the presence of numerous forces alone could keep open the means of communication.

Whilst preparations were thus being made for commencing the new campaign of Portugal by the siege of Ciudad-Rodrigo, a disputed point arose between Masséna and his lieutenants. The English were encamped at Viseu, three marches from the frontier. The accounts respecting their numbers varied very much, from the fact of the Portuguese troops being frequently reckoned with them, but no one supposed that the English themselves were more than 24,000. Their near neighbourhood inflamed the burning courage of Ney; he found it but tedious work, directing the noble ardour of his soldiers against stone walls. He considered that by making an unexpected attack upon the English with the 6th and 8th corps, and the cavalry of Montbrun, which would amount altogether to about 50,000 men, there would be a great chance of vanquishing them, and ensuring, by their defeat, the fall of the fortified places themselves.

Narshal Ney proposed this plan of operations to the general-in-chief with all his natural ardour, suggesting it, at the same time, by letter, to General Junot, in order that, receiving the same advice from both, Masséna might be, in a manner, forced to adopt it. But although the impetuous Junot added his entreaties to those of Ney, the firmness of the general-in-chief was not moved, for Napoleon's orders were precise; directing that the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo

and Alméida should precede every other operation ; that no advance into Portugal should be made, until after the intense heat should have diminished, and until provisions should have been got together sufficient for the subsistence of the army for fifteen or twenty days. But Junot and Ney spread abroad amongst their several corps that it was Masséna who, grown old, and no longer the same man, preferred wearisome and murderous sieges to an active and decisive campaign.

The plan laid down by Napoleon was evidently the wisest, and the designs of the English Generals afforded a full justification of his views. Sir Arthur Wellesley had acquired by his last operations a great reputation with the English government, and even with the English people, who, since General Moore's precipitate retreat, had never ceased to be haunted by the fear that their troops might be driven into the sea. On finding, however, that their new General, Arthur Wellesley, so far from being driven from the Peninsula, had, on the contrary, driven Marshal Soult from Portugal, they had begun to take confidence ; but the services which he had already rendered to his country, and the high reputation which he began to acquire did not suffice to silence the attacks of the opposition, which desired peace, or the objections of the government, which was in continual dread of some disaster. Thus the British Government constantly kept at the mouths of the Tagus an immense transport flotilla, to be always ready to receive the army should it be beaten. The peace which France had made with Austria increased its apprehensions, for it believed that Napoleon would throw into the Peninsula his best army and his best general, namely, himself ; and this idea filled all England with anxiety in behalf of Lord Wellington, and the army which he commanded.

The English public tormented the Cabinet, and the Cabinet tormented Lord Wellington, by the expression of unceasing terrors. But the latter endured this annoyance, whilst he saw more clearly than Napoleon himself the course of affairs in the Peninsula, simply because he was on the spot, and not misled by any of those illusions in which Napoleon, having entered on an ill judged line of action, loved to envelop himself. He saw that the resistance offered by national hatred, climate, and distance ; by the want of method in operations conducted by different generals, and by the disagreement with Joseph, would prevent Napoleon from obtaining possession of certain extreme points, such as Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Lisbon, which were protected by their remoteness and the sea ; and he declared that if England

continued to excite and to aid from these extreme points the hostility of the Portuguese and Spaniards, the struggle would exhaust the resources of the empire, that Europe would sooner or later revolt against Napoleon, and that he would only be able to meet that revolt with armies half destroyed by an interminable and destructive war. But in pursuing this line of conduct all depended on the resistance which should be opposed to the French at the extremities of the Peninsula, and Lord Wellington had sought with great care, and discovered with rare quickness of eye, an almost impregnable position, from which he flattered himself that he might defy all the efforts of the French armies. This position, which he thus rendered immortal, was that of Torres-Vedras, near Lisbon. He had remarked between the Tagus and the sea a peninsula six or seven leagues broad and twelve or fifteen long, which might be easily isolated by a line of almost invincible works, and behind which Lisbon, the transport flotilla, and the stores of the army might be safe from every attack. Having fixed upon this position he delineated to his engineers the works which he desired to have thrown up, and, Europe remaining in perfect ignorance of the fact, employed many thousand Portuguese peasants in constructing, under the direction of the English engineers, the celebrated lines of Torres-Vedras. More than six hundred cannon were prepared to arm the numerous redoubts which were thus thrown up across the peninsula of the Tagus.

From the time that the French had invaded Andalusia, Lord Wellington had hastened to quit Estremadura, and had retired into Portugal, with the desire of devoting himself exclusively to the defence of that country, for it was of little importance whether the English were in Spain or Portugal, their presence upon some point of the Peninsula being sufficient to sustain the hopes of the insurgents, and to perpetuate the war. With the bulk of his forces, namely 20,000 English, and 15,000 Portuguese, he took up a position at Viseu, at the entrance of the valley of Mondego; his plan being to watch from thence, the movements of the French, and to retreat if they advanced to give him battle; until having come to a strong position, and the enemy being exhausted with fatigue, he should be able to engage them with all the chances in his favour; but to risk nothing for the sake of saving the Spanish or Portuguese fortresses, or of protecting the countries of his allies from hostile ravages.

On the side of the French, therefore, that plan by which it was proposed that Ciudad Rodrigo should be first taken,

that great magazines should be established, and that no movement should be taken without the accompaniment of an ample supply of stores on the backs of mules, was the only practicable one, since Lord Wellington had resolved only to accept battle at his own pleasure, and to retreat and leave us to perish of hunger in his track.

About the commencement of June, Marshal Ney invested Ciudad Rodrigo. This fortress is situated upon the Agueda, a little river which falls from the Sierra de Gata into the Douro. It had an excellent governor, old indeed, but full of skill and energy; General Herrasti, aware of the preparations which had been made by the French for the attack, had long since taken every precaution; the fortress contained a garrison of 4,000 soldiers, together with a fanatic population of 6,000 persons, increased by the wealthy proprietors of the country, who having sought an asylum in the place for themselves and their moveable property, had furnished a good battalion of militia numbering 800 men. The artillery was numerous, and well served, and every preparation was made for affording Ciudad Rodrigo the means of making a long and vigorous resistance.

After having consulted with his engineer and artillery officers, Ney perceived very clearly the best point to make the attack, and chose the north side for the commencement of the siege works, that being the side on which there were only artificial defences, which could be battered down by artillery. On the night between the 15th and 16th of June, the trenches were opened at 500 metres distance from the place. The works were carried on during the following days with the utmost diligence, and in spite of the repeated sorties of the enemy, who were on every occasion driven back to the fortress with heavy loss.

The rain which had lasted during the whole month of May, and which now recommenced, caused us more damage than all the sorties of the enemy. It rendered the trenches uninhabitable, and delaying, by the effect it had on the roads, the arrival of the siege train, compelled our soldiers to work without the protection of artillery. Marshal Ney supplied the want of it, by forming six companies of the best marksmen of his army, and placing them in front of the trenches in great holes, which were made so as to be able to contain three men with provisions and ammunition for twenty-four hours. From this shelter our marksmen directed such a fire upon the enemy's artillerymen, that the inconvenience to our troops of working in front of unopposed cannon was very much diminished.

On the evening of the 24th June, the General-in-Chief

himself arrived in the French camp; after having inspected and approved of the works, he hastened the erection of the batteries, that an immediate attack might be made, to open a breach. On the following day, the 25th, was commenced the cannonade. The fire from forty-six pieces of artillery caused great havoc in the enemy's works. Nevertheless, the cannon of the fortress replied to ours, and occasioned us some damage. Many of our pieces were dismounted and a considerable number of our artillerymen slain. Marshal Masséna, thinking that our artillery was not served with sufficient energy, imperiously ordered Eblé to take upon himself its command. This was a new source of vexation to Marshal Ney, who took careful account of all his annoyances, whether inevitable or not. The speedy result of General Eblé's efforts, was that two breaches became practicable, and Marshal Masséna wished immediately to proceed to the assault, as the unhealthy nature of the soil exposed the troops to disease, and the English had passed the Coa, a little river parallel to the Agueda, and threatened an attack. He summoned General Herrasti to surrender, telling him that he had already done all that honour demanded, that he could not hold the breach against the courage of the army of Portugal, and that if he still persisted, he would expose the garrison to destruction by the edge of the sword.

The garrison, indeed, began already to despair, but the monks continued to excite the people, and the refugees from the country, who had taken into the town all that they possessed, were unwilling to surrender; one circumstance favoured their determination to hold out. The breach having been opened from a distance, and before the French had carried their works up to the border of the fosse, the counter-scarp remained untouched. Thus the breach which was practicable on the side of the town, was not so on the side of the country, for troops could only throw themselves into the fosse for the purpose of mounting to the assault, by precipitating themselves from a high wall; the defence might, therefore, according to the recognised rules, be still prolonged. General Herrasti, who was impelled, not by fanaticism, but by a sense of military honour, to maintain the defence to the utmost, made this circumstance a reason for refusing to comply with Marshal Masséna's summons to surrender, and sent a messenger to Lord Wellington with an earnest entreaty that he would come to his assistance.

This unexpected resistance excited Marshal Masséna's extreme displeasure, and selecting from the 8th corps an officer of distinguished merit, Colonel Vallazé, who had already distinguished himself at the siege of Ostarga, he

ordered him to continue the works so as to reach the side of the fosse as soon as possible. Hearing twelve days spoken of as the time this work would occupy, he demanded that it should be completed in seven or eight, for provisions began to fail, and the 6th corps had been already put on half rations.

As for the English, Lord Wellington having advanced as far as the Coa declined to risk an engagement. In vain General Herrasti sent messages for aid, in vain the Marquis de la Romana had visited Badajoz to entreat him to interrupt the operations of the French; he replied that he could only save the fortress by a battle, and he had resolved not to hazard the fate of the English army to preserve a place already almost lost. This stern answer, although founded on the strongest arguments, reduced the Spaniards to despair, and exasperated them with what they called the cold egotism of the English.

In spite of all Colonel Valazé's efforts the brink of the fosse had not been reached until the 5th or 6th of July; but at length on the 8th, the masonry which had been the cause of the delay, was thrown by means of gunpowder into the fosse, and the breach became practicable on both sides of the fosse, namely, on the descent as well as the ascent. On the morning of the 9th everything was arranged for the assault. At four o'clock in the morning our batteries hurled upon the unhappy town of Ciudad Rodrigo a hail of shot and shell. The enemy's artillery, which at first replied with some quickness, was soon silenced. The two breaches presented only a heap of shelving ruins, which would be easily accessible to the agility of our soldiers. Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon they were declared by our engineers to be perfectly practicable, and Masséna ordered the assault. But just as the chosen columns had reached the foot of the first breach and were preparing to throw themselves into it, a white flag, the token of surrender, appeared upon the second. An aged man, with white hair (General Herrasti), presented himself to discuss with Marshal Ney upon the ruined walls the terms of capitulation. Ney accorded him all the honors due to his brave defence, permitting the officers to retain their swords, and the soldiers their knapsacks.

This first act of the campaign in Portugal had passed off well. The troops, notwithstanding the unyielding tempers of their generals, and the disorganisation which had resulted from their wretchedness, had displayed their accustomed courage. Ciudad Rodrigo being taken it was now necessary to attack Almeida. Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on the 9th of July; offensive operations could not be commenced before the subsidence of the heat, and as that would not be until the

month of September, the months of July and August might be devoted to the siege of Almeida, which was said to be more strongly fortified and better armed than Ciudad Rodrigo.

Before quitting Ciudad Rodrigo Masséna ordered the breaches to be repaired, and all the defences to be put in an efficient state. As the town contained the richest inhabitants of the country, who had sought safety within its walls, he levied upon them a contribution of 500,000 francs, of which he was in urgent need for the liquidation of his artillery and engineer expenses, and then returned to Salamanca, where, in his absence, the most important matters had made but little progress. He immediately made the most vigorous exertions for the collection of provisions sufficient to last the troops for twenty days, besides what would be sufficient to provision Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida for several months.

In the meantime he had given directions for the investment of Almeida. Marshal Ney had advanced with the 6th corps, followed by the 8th, to attack the English on the Coa, a little river which, as the Agueda, flows from the Sierra de Gata into the Douro. Almeida is on the right of the Coa, and was consequently on our side. Lord Wellington persisting in remaining inactive in spite of the curses of the Spaniards, had encamped at Alverca, and quietly watched the progress of events. Marshal Ney, in obedience to the orders he had received, obliged the English rear-guard to make a precipitate retreat, and chased them before him as far as a fort called Fort Conception, a regular work on the route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Almeida, and at the summit of a plateau which commanded this route.

Almeida was a regular pentagon, perfectly fortified, completely armed, provided with a garrison of 5000 Portuguese, and built on a rocky soil in which it would be a work of great difficulty to open trenches. The first fortnight of August was occupied in collecting provisions, procuring the necessary matériel, and in awaiting the arrival of the siege train. On the 15th the trenches were opened. Whilst the approaches were being carried on, eleven batteries were constructed, armed with 64 pieces of heavy ordnance which had been brought from Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca. On the morning of the 20th of August, the artillery being ready, Marshal Masséna gave orders that the fire should be opened. The place, which was but small, although well fortified, was almost surrounded by the batteries of its assailants and suffered considerable damage. The enemy replied with vigour, but were not able to make head against our artillery, which was served with as much precision as quickness.

Many edifices took fire ; towards night a shell, happily aimed, falling upon a powder magazine which was in the very centre of the town, caused a frightful explosion ; many of the houses were thrown down, and almost 500 persons, soldiers or inhabitants, killed. Some of the cannon were thrown into the fosses, and portions of the ramparts laid open. On the following day, the disaster which the town had suffered was manifest in all its horror. The inhabitants in consternation, demanded that they should no longer be exposed to such dangers ; and the garrison, indignant at the obstinate immovability of the English, also began to speak of surrendering. Masséna judging correctly how great confusion would prevail throughout the place, summoned it to surrender, writing to the governor to the effect that after the accident which had happened, it would be impossible for him to prolong his resistance. The governor therefore entered into a discussion respecting the conditions of surrender ; but as he continued to dispute respecting the terms during the whole day, Masséna had the cannonade recommenced ; a few rounds however, caused the conditions which we had dictated to be accepted. The conquerors found within the fortifications 5000 men, a great quantity of stores, and some very good ordnance.

The first part of the plan of the campaign, that which consisted in the conquest of the fortresses of the frontier was successfully accomplished ; and a good base of operations was established, if only the conquered fortresses could be provisioned, hospitals and magazines formed, and sufficient troops afforded to cover the communications. It was now September, and he proposed to pass the frontier on the 10th or 15th. Napoleon, who was much rejoiced at the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, urgently pressed him to commence at length active operations, and to throw himself upon the English. "They are not more than 25,000," he wrote ; "your troops must still, despite the sieges and the diseases of summer, number 60,000 ; and how are 25,000 English to resist 60,000 Frenchmen commanded by you ? To hesitate, would be a scandalous weakness, which we need not fear on the part of the Duke of Rivoli, and Prince of Essling." Masséna needed no exhortation to attack the English, when once they should cross his path ; but he perceived with grief Napoleon's illusions respecting the strength of the two armies, and had a vague presentiment that he would be the first victim of these illusions from which no one was entirely free but the British General.

Whilst resigning himself to entire obedience, Marshal Masséna wrote again to Napoleon, to assure him that his forces were insufficient, that the roads were dreadful, that he

could procure no provisions, that all his communications would be almost immediately intercepted, that it was scarcely possible to keep up any communication between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, that he could receive nothing, that it was a great problem how his soldiers would find subsistence when in the presence of the English army, provided with every necessary, and very much increased in numbers, and that he had no chance of success, unless a considerable body of troops were despatched to follow in his rear, with provisions and munitions of war.

But Napoleon, notwithstanding the letters which he received, still persisted, for he had been long since accustomed to hear his generals exaggerate the resources of the enemy, and diminish their own; he considered the English army, moreover, as amounting only to the number of those troops which were actually English, for he held the Spanish and Portuguese troops in no account. He was ignorant of the lines of Torres-Vedras, knew not what auxiliaries the enemy would find in the remoteness of the country, its climate, and the sterility of certain portions of it, and had contracted a habit of believing that everything would be accomplished just as he desired.

Masséna, therefore, determined to set out, and fixed on the 10th of September, for the passage of the frontier; he adjourned it to the 16th that he might be better prepared, and that the heat of the weather, which was still very great, might be somewhat diminished. When the moment of departure arrived, he found that he was only able to store four months' provisions in the two fortresses; that he must renounce his plan of forming magazines, in the rear of the army; and that he had been able to procure no more than sixteen days' rations for his troops. But the army, in spite of the ill humour of certain of its leaders, was rejoiced that the moment was at hand when it would arise from its long inaction, and at length attack the English. The infantry, badly clothed, but well shod, and well armed, ripe both in age and experience, was full of confidence. The dragoons, blackened by exposure to the sun, and thorough adepts in horsemanship, were armed with long Toledo sabres which gave mortal wounds at every stroke. If it were ever possible for valour to overcome the force of circumstances, this army was worthy of making the attempt. Had its Generals acted together with good will, they would have been equal to the accomplishment of such a task, and at the head of such troops would probably have accomplished it.

On the morning of the 16th of September Masséna set his army in motion. It debouched in three columns across the

frontier of Portugal. The first steps taken in this terrible country justified all previous fears. The troops had expected to find it barren, but they also found it devastated by fire and sword. Everywhere the villages were deserted, the mills idle; what the inhabitants had left undestroyed had been destroyed by the English. Not a single available guide could be found; a few old persons alone being met with, from whom but little information could be obtained; and it was only by means of three or four Portuguese officers attached to the army that it was able to make its way along roads scarcely fit for the passage of the roughest vehicles.

On the 19th the army arrived at Viseu, a little town of seven or eight thousand souls. The whole population had fled, with the exception only of some few whose decrepitude had detained them. But although the English had destroyed the bakehouses, the mills, and the granaries, and burnt the stacks of corn, the troops were able to obtain here a good supply of vegetables and even cattle.

The artillery and the transport corps were the most distressed portions of the army. The roads were almost impassable, and three days' marching had sufficed to exhaust the horses and to cause great damage to the gun carriages. On this account Marshal Masséna, who, anxious as he was to come up with the English, preferred to encounter them in a more open country, granted to the army two days' repose, to rally the troops which guarded the baggage train and to repair the artillery carriages.

On arriving at the bottom of the valley of the Mondego, it became evident that the English would there attempt to resist us, for both on the one side of the river and the other they held equally strong positions. Reynier and Ney considered, however, and very rightly, that they had not established themselves as yet very firmly on the ground, and that they ought to be immediately attacked, before they had time to do so. But Masséna was not, unfortunately, upon the spot. Delayed either by fatigue, to which he had begun to be very sensible, or by exertions to bring up the rear of the army, encumbered with an embarrassing waggon train, he did not arrive until the evening. His lieutenants not having dared to engage in a general action in his absence, had awaited his arrival.

Marshal Masséna, after having inspected the position of the enemy, was of opinion, as were his lieutenants, that the English intended to offer battle upon that ground. The nature of the country in advance rendered it necessary either to carry the position or to retreat. Opinions were divided as to the proper course to pursue. Marshal Ney, who had

at first considered that an engagement would be the most advisable step, now held the contrary opinion, saying that it was now too late, since the English had had time to establish themselves in their position, and it would be better to retreat than to lose a battle, and to have to retreat amidst such frightful gorges before a victorious enemy.

Masséna indignantly rejected the idea of retreating, which was an easy one for Marshal Ney, since the responsibility of a retrograde movement would not fall on himself; he declared such counsel unworthy of a Marshal, and maintained that it was necessary to give battle. Reynier, ordinarily very cautious, held an opinion on this occasion contrary to his character, as Ney's was contrary to his, and supported the advice of Marshal Masséna. He affirmed that, having well examined the position, he thought that he could take it. Masséna took his advice, and it was resolved that the battle should take place the next day. It was arranged that Reynier should endeavour at a very early hour to advance by the road on the left, named San Antonio, whilst Ney should advance by that on the right, named Moria, that Junct, who arrived late in the evening, should remain in reserve to protect the retreat, if the attack should not succeed, and that Montbrun, with all his cavalry, should hold himself in readiness at the foot of the heights to sabre the English, should they attempt to descend, and that the artillery should be placed on the various elevations from which it could throw its shot against the enemy. Masséna himself was to remain between the two attacking columns, to give such orders as the events of the day might render necessary.

The French Generals were not deceived in supposing that Lord Wellington intended to give battle on those heights. The English General, in fact, although very cautious, was unwilling to enter his lines as a fugitive, had resolved as soon as he should come to a strong position, to give battle on the defensive, by which he hoped to render his retreat freer from molestation, and to raise the spirits of his troops, for the defence of the lines of Torres Vedras, and by which, should its result be entirely advantageous, he would be spared the necessity of retreating upon Lisbon. Having formed this plan, he judged that the sierra Murcelha and the sierra Alcoba presented, either of them, such a position as he desired. Being ignorant which of the two the French would attempt to carry, he had posted on the sierra Murcelha General Hill's division, and had established himself with the bulk of his army, on that of Alcoba. On perceiving the direction taken by the French army, he had ordered General Hill's division to join him.

On the evening of the 26th the Anglo-Portuguese army was, therefore, assembled in its whole strength of 50,000 men on the plateau of the Sierra Alcoba. The French army consisted of nearly an equal number, and as it had found itself superior to the English on the plain, believed that its courage would compensate for the difficulties offered by the ground it was about to attack.

At daybreak on the 27th the corps of Reynier and Ney were formed, the one in front of San-Antonio, the other in front of Moira, ready to climb the sierra; the artillery took up a position on some heights in the face of the enemy; the cavalry were drawn up on the plain, ready to cover the army should it be repulsed.

At daybreak Reynier commenced the engagement. The division Merle led the way, followed by the brigade Foy and the division Heudelet. A thick mist covered the advance of our columns. After following for some time the route de San Antonio de Cantaro, the division Merle diverged to the right of this route, and commenced ascending the mountain through the trees and thickets by which it was covered, whilst the brigade Foy and the division Heudelet continued to march along the route. After an hour's toil the division Merle, protected for some time by the mist, arrived at the summit, exhausted with fatigue, and immediately on its arrival at the edge of the plateau threw itself upon the 8th Portuguese, which it routed, gaining possession of its artillery. But Picton's whole division was there supported on one side by Leith's division, and on the other by a strong battery and by Spencer's division. Scarcely had the division Merle attempted to deploy than it received in flank the fire from the artillery on its right, and in front the fire of the musketry of Picton's division, distant only fifteen paces. A great number of officers fell before this terrible fire, and General Picton, perceiving its success, charged, with the bayonet, our troops who were taken by surprise, exhausted by their painful ascent, and deprived of almost all their commanders. They were compelled to retreat to the edge of the plateau. At the same moment the division Heudelet, preceding Foy's brigade, debouched by the route on the left of Merle's division, and hastened to support it. But assailed, before it had time to form, by grape and musketry, and deprived of its Colonel Desmeuniers, it fell back. At length Foy's brigade appeared upon the plateau, having on its right and left the regiments of Merle's division which had been reformed by General Sarrut. But at the same moment Lord Wellington having directed Leith's division against our left, and Spencer's division against our right, with all his

reserves of artillery, fought with fifteen thousand men, perfectly fresh and established in a firm position, against our seven or eight thousand soldiers who were thoroughly exhausted and entirely unprovided with artillery. After having torn our ranks with grape Lord Wellington ordered the entire mass of his infantry to charge them with the bayonet. Our troops were compelled to retreat, carrying in their arms many of their generals killed or wounded.

In the meantime Ney had, on his side, met with difficulties no less serious; for towards our right the sierra forming a curve to rejoin that of Caramula, it was impossible to climb it without being exposed to a terrible convergence of the enemy's fire. The division Loison marched first, followed at some distance by the division Marchand, in close column. A third division, that of General Mermet, was held in reserve.

After a brisk conflict of sharpshooters, in which we had the advantage of skill but not of position, Marshal Ney threw his troops upon the position. Loison quitted the road, with his two brigades, and endeavoured to escalade the flank of the sierra, whilst Marchand continued to follow the road. With the utmost firmness and courage two brigades, those of Simon and Ferrey, succeeded, in spite of the murderous fire of the Portuguese, in reaching the summit of the mountain; when suddenly General Crawford's artillery overwhelmed them with grape, and they were at the same moment charged with the bayonet, before they had time to form, and were forced to retreat. At this moment the division Marchand arriving at the point where the division Loison had turned off from the road, found itself in the midst of a semi-circle of fire pouring upon it from all the heights, and in a position from which it could neither advance nor retreat.

In this posture of affairs Masséna, who, had he commanded but a simple division, would have probably renewed the attack, and possibly have triumphed over every obstacle, by means of his unequalled judgment, considered, in his character of General-in-Chief, that 4,500 men were sufficient to lose in an unsuccessful attack, and without despairing of dislodging the English, he resolved to make the attempt in a different manner. He assembled around him his lieutenants, and without addressing to them any reproaches, listened to them with that imperturbable *sang froid*, which never failed him in moments of difficulty. He made no attempt to excuse the result of the day by accusing his lieutenants, but contenting himself with repelling indignantly the idea of a retrograde movement, ordered them to rally their troops at the

foot of the sierra, to bring in their wounded, and hold themselves in readiness to march, and then retired to determine upon his next movements.

Considering it very unlikely that the English would descend from the heights to the plain; and convinced in his own mind, notwithstanding the information which he had received to the contrary, that there was some outlet towards the right, he sent General Montbrun and Colonel Sainte-Croix, an officer of distinguished merit, to employ the night, taking with them a party of dragoons, in searching for it. Having adopted this course of proceeding he awaited patiently the result of the investigations he had ordered.

At noon, on the day after the battle, the 28th of September, Masséna was informed by General Montbrun and Colonel Sainte-Croix, that they had discovered amidst the sinuosities of the hills, which united the two sierras, a road which extended into the plain of Coimbra, and joined the high road of Coimbra, near a place called Sardao. The English had remained stationary, and seemed as paralysed as though they had not been victorious. Masséna, without loss of time, ordered Junot to march off in silence in the evening along the road which had been discovered, and to take possession of the plain beyond. He arranged that Ney should follow Junot, that the baggage train now loaded with three thousand wounded, but lightened of the provisions which had been consumed, should follow Ney, and that Reynier's corps should form the rear.

It was not until the evening of the 29th that the English General perceived the movement of the French army. He had remained during two days without moving from his position, or endeavouring to discover the enemy's movements, by means of well-directed reconnaissances. He only discovered what they had been, when the helmets of the French dragoons filled the plain of Coimbra with their glitter. Victorious on the 27th, he was in a manner vanquished on the 29th, and whilst Coimbra was illuminated for the pretended victory of Busaco, he passed through it in all haste, forcing the inhabitants to quit it, and destroy what they did not carry away.

Such was, under Marshal Masséna, this first encounter between the French and English armies; with respect to which, it may be observed, that if Marshal Masséna failed to obtain on the day of the battle the result which he desired, he obtained it on the following day; and that it was a grave error on the part of the English General not to have perceived from the aspect of the country and the position of

the villages, that some communication must exist between the valley of Mondego and the plain of Coimbra by the depressed portion of the Alcoba and Caramula sierras.

When the French entered Coimbra, they found the greater part of the population fled, and all the wealthy inhabitants embarked with their most precious possessions, on board vessels which left their moorings to descend the Mondego to the sea.

In marching from the north to the south towards Lisbon, along that depressed chain which is the prolongation of the Estrella, as the Estrella is itself the prolongation of the Guadarrama, and which becoming continually more depressed, ends at last between the sea and the mouth of the Tagus; there are three routes which may be followed, the route of the Tagus, which is reached by traversing the chain of the heights between Pombal and Thomar and following the river from Abrantes to Santarem, from Santarem to Lisbon; the middle route running almost from the crest of the heights by Pombal, Leyria, Moliano, Candieiros, and descending thus upon the bank of the Tagus—by Alcoentra and Alenquer; and lastly the route on the sea coast which passes by Alcobaca, Obidos and Torrès-Védras. Having arrived at Pombal the English General sent General Hill with his division towards Thomar, directing him not to lose an instant in reaching the Tagus, whilst he himself with the bulk of his army, took the two other routes, making all possible haste to escape from the energetic pursuit of our advanced guard.

Montbrun and the brave Sainte-Croix were on the track of the English, and Masséna, uncertain of the direction taken by the British troops, since he perceived their traces on all the three routes, chose the middle road which was the shortest, by no means the worst, and which, even if wrongly chosen, would lead but a comparatively short distance from the enemy.

On the 9th the advanced guard reached Alenquer, took some prisoners, and killed as many more. On the next day, it entered Villa Nova, which it found well furnished with all sorts of provisions, and pursued even to the heights of Alhandra the rear guards of the divisions of Generals Crawford and Hill, which disappeared behind entrenchments of formidable aspect.

On the 11th, the various divisions of the army reassembled, and took up a position in front of Alhandra and Sobral. On every side the heights were seen to be crowned with redoubts; our Generals had heard *en route* that the English had thrown up some works in front of

Lisbon, but they were ignorant of their nature, and far from supposing that they would be capable of opposing any considerable resistance to our attack; and it was a painful surprise for our army, which had arrived full of ardour and confidence, by no means dispirited by the affair of Busaco, but convinced on the contrary of its superiority over the English, to find the enemy which it pursued suddenly escaping, and enclosing itself within so formidable an asylum; but it was still far from losing its confidence, and only saw in this obstacle, a difficulty over which it would speedily triumph by its courage; but the obstacle thus so lightly esteemed presented more serious difficulties than were yet imagined.

We may here give some account of these famous lines of Torrès-Védras, of which we have above mentioned the object, the site, and the name. As has already been said, it was towards the month of October, in the preceding year, that Lord Wellington had taken care to secure for his army, in the extremity of the Peninsula, an entrenched position, almost impregnable, in which he might be able to resist the attack of the accumulated French forces, and assist that decay of the Imperial system, which, according to him, was at hand. The promontory formed by the depressed extremity of the Estrella, extending between the ocean and the waters of the Tagus, seemed to him to be the site best suited for his purpose. In the first place, the various lines of works by which he intended to isolate this promontory, being some leagues in front of Lisbon, he would be entirely independent of its numerous and fickle population. Lord Wellington habituated to the institutions of his country, which he was wise enough to love, although he often suffered from them, detested those popular agitations which attended the first appearance of liberty on the continent. A man of strong understanding, sternly advancing towards his object, and never hesitating to immolate to the success of his plans the people whose independence he had come to defend, he wished to be entirely independent of the population of Lisbon, so as to be relieved even from the anxiety of providing for their support. The following is the plan of the works which he had thrown up:—

At nine or ten leagues in advance of Lisbon, between Alhandra on the Tagus, and Torrès-Védras towards the ocean, he had taken care to create a first line of entrenchments, which would cut off the promontory at a dozen leagues at least from its extremity in the sea. This first line was composed of the following works. On the bend of the Tagus, the heights of the Alhandra, on one side, falling

perpendicularly to the river, and on the other rising even towards Sobral, formed over a space of four or five leagues escarpments that were almost inaccessible, and washed in all their extent by the little river Arruda. The road which passes between the foot of these heights and the Tagus, and which leads to Lisbon by the bank of the river, was cut off by lines of cannon. Ascending from this point as far as Sobral, the English had artificially escarped all the hills which were not naturally inaccessible. In the hollows formed by the bed of the ravines and presenting little accessible hills, they established such redoubts and *abattis* as entirely closed the passages. Finally, they had raised on the principal summits, forts armed with heavy artillery, crossing fire with each other, and commanding from afar all the avenues by which an enemy could approach. At Sobral itself, a platform which had little natural strength, was covered with a multitude of works of the greatest strength, and on an eminence called Monte-Agraça, had been constructed a veritable citadel, which could only be taken by means of a regular siege. Beyond these extended a new chain of heights, which stretched as far as the sea, and were washed by the Zizambro. This little river passed Torrès-Védras in its windings, whence the immortal lines of Torrès-Védras have received their name. There as on the side of Alhandra, the heights had been escarped, the gorges closed by *abattis* and redoubts, the summits crowned by forts; and the course of the Zizambro was, moreover, rendered almost impracticable by the construction in its bed of barricades which retained the water, and would preserve the marshes along its banks through every change of season.

The well stored arsenal of Lisbon had been emptied, to supply these various works with artillery, and all the oxen of the country employed in carrying the guns to their appointed positions. The garrisons were permanent and those of some of the works amounted to a thousand men. Large and easy roads had been provided between the various positions that reinforcements might be conducted to any of them with extreme rapidity. A system of signals, borrowed from the navy, rendered easy the transmission to the centre of the line, of precise information of all that might be taking place at its extremities. At its very entrance, that is to say, vis-a-vis with Sobral, was a sort of battle field, which had been prepared that the English army might be able to advance in its entirety upon the weakest point, and add its defence to the thousand fold fire of the surrounding works. The fortifications were, of course, garrisoned by Portuguese,

there being amongst them three thousand Portuguese artillerymen, who had had considerable training and were well skilled. The English army, with the better part of the Portuguese troops, was destined to occupy the principal encampments which had been skilfully disposed near the most probable points of attack.

General Hill had retired along the bank of the Tagus, and taken up a position behind the heights of Alhandra; General Crawford was established with his light division, between Alhandra and the plateau opposite Sobral; General Picton, who had followed the road on the coast, occupied the banks of the Zizambro, and the heights behind it, as far as Torrès-Védras; General Leith guarded the entrance of this immense entrenched camp, supported by the divisions of Spencer, Cole, and Campbell.

Lord Wellington having ordered the Marquis de la Romana to leave Badajoz, the defence of which was of less consequence than that of Torrès-Védras, and to join him at Lisbon, had brought about eight thousand Spaniards, who were excellently fitted for that system of defence which it was intended to commit to their charge. The English General had, therefore, thirty thousand English, over thirty thousand Portuguese, and eight thousand Spaniards, with whom to defend the position in which he had established himself.

Three or four leagues behind the first line of works was a second, and behind this second a third, which consisted of a semicircle of heights, escarped and bristling with cannon, inaccessible on the side of the land, and affording by its concavity turned towards the sea, a position in which the whole English fleet might lie in safety. In the case of the two first lines of defence having been carried, this last might have been held sufficiently long to have enabled the troops to embark and escape from a victorious enemy.

The works which we have described were on the right of the Tagus; a few had been executed on the left, but they were of slight importance in spite of the urgent remonstrances of the Portuguese regency; for it caused Lord Wellington but little solicitude that from the left bank Lisbon could be bombarded and destroyed. It had been proposed to construct upon this left bank an entrenched camp, to be defended by the populations of Alentejo; but Lord Wellington regarded them as incapable of defending themselves, and feared that the capture of that camp, which he could not doubt would take place, would have a depressing effect on the defenders of the lines of Torrès Védras.

Lord Wellington on being consulted by the English gov-

ernment respecting his position, at the very moment when he took up his position behind the lines, and respecting the possibility of withdrawing the transport flotilla, which cost the country more than 75 millions a year, replied that he considered himself in perfect security, but that it would be more prudent not to withdraw the flotilla, as the French army might be largely reinforced, and that should he be attacked by such soldiers under the leadership of Masséna, he could not be certain of the result.

Such was the unexpected obstacle by which Masséna found the progress of his army checked; and which, as soon as he had made the proper arrangements for the encampment of his army, he reconnoitred during several days with his own eyes. All the information that he could obtain was unanimously to the effect, that after this first line of entrenchments there were a second and a third, the three being armed with 700 pieces of cannon, and defended by 70,000 regular troops at the least, without taking into account the militia and fugitive peasants. It was not, therefore, a simple entrenched camp, to be carried by a bold assault, but a series of natural obstacles, the difficulties of which had been extraordinarily increased by art; and whilst the English, moreover, by means of the roads which they had constructed and the system of signals they had established, were enabled to throw the entire mass of their forces on any one point, the French met, on their side, with an accidental formation of the ground which would preclude them from any manœuvre of this kind.

Everything being taken into consideration it appeared impossible, at least for the moment, to attack the position. Masséna perceived that it was by no means probable that an assault would be successful, and that a repulse must be attended with certain loss. He was far from having now the 50,000 men with which he had entered Portugal; indeed his army did not number more than 45,000 effective combatants. To take the lines would have required 90 or 100,000 men, and had Masséna attacked them with his 45,000, he would have uselessly sacrificed 10,000 in dead and wounded, and have been compelled to retreat before an enemy emboldened by success, through the midst of infuriated populations and a desolated country. It is probable that he would not have regained Almeida without the loss of his whole army, and his campaign would have ended in utter disaster.

Masséna could not hesitate, therefore, to renounce any immediate attack on the lines of Torrès Védraz. But it did not follow because the attack was not immediate that it would not, nevertheless, take place; and it was, moreover, very

possible that the immense population of Lisbon becoming, in the course of time, subdued by famine, would open to our troops the gates of the city on the left bank of the Tagus, whereupon the lines of Torrès-Védras would, as a necessary consequence, speedily fall into our hands. Favourable chances would, therefore, be open to us by our remaining in front of the English lines; but it was necessary that whilst we strove to famish others we should provide for our own subsistence, and for this purpose it was indispensable that we should occupy both banks of the Tagus, in order to withhold from the enemy, whilst we procured them for ourselves, all the resources of the fertile province of Alentejo.

After a series of skilful and energetic manœuvres, which had for their aim the subsistence of his troops, and the preparations of means for enabling them to cross the Tagus either above or below Abrantès, Masséna fell back some leagues and established himself along the Tagus, from Santarem to Thomar, with a division at Leyria to watch the Estrella, and to guard the great road of Coimbra. This new position between Santarem and Thomar was calculated, by placing us at some leagues distance from the English lines, to afford us greater ease and security, whilst it by no means diminished our power to blockade them rigorously, at least on the right bank of the Tagus. We were thus relieved from the fatigue of having to engage in perpetual small skirmishes, and the distance between us prevented any serious attack from the enemy in the nature of a surprise.

On the 14th of November the change to the new encampment was speedily and skilfully accomplished. Reynier's division was established on the heights of Santarem; and Junot's encamped in the centre of the plain of Galgao, at Torrès Novas. Ney established his head quarters at Thomar, having his divisions so arranged as to cover the timber yards of Punhête, to threaten Abrantès, and to be able to throw himself upon Leyria, by a movement from left to right, should Wellington endeavour to turn us.

This position was impregnable, and at the same time adapted to the various objects Masséna had in view, and which were the passage of the Tagus, the capture of Abrantès, and the blockade of the English lines, until the arrival of reinforcements. Marshal Ney habitually discontented with the orders which issued from head quarters, had desired that the whole should be collected between Leyria and Coimbra. He regarded the movement which had taken place as a sort of retreat, as the abandonment of the banks of the Tagus, and the renunciation of affecting a passage across it, as also of the projects against Abrantès, without procuring any

additional security, or any greater chances of communication with Almeida; and declared that had we, on the other hand, kept only the cavalry and a brigade of infantry at Leyria, we should have been certain of regaining the Coimbra and Almeida roads at pleasure, without the renunciation of any essential object; moreover, that by having the posts upon the Zêzere, we should have been in a position to communicate with the Spanish frontier, by a route less infested with the guerilla bands.

Whilst the army awaited reinforcements which were expected by the way of Almeida, or from Andalusia by that of Badajoz, it employed itself in making the preparations necessary for the passage of the Tagus and the attack of Abrantès. In the meantime Masséna had hastened to take measures for making known at Paris his position and its necessities. For this purpose he had sent to Paris an intelligent and brave officer, accompanied by a little body of troops, since it was only by being so attended that he could hope to reach the Spanish frontier. He had chosen for this mission General Foy, a man of frank, attractive manners, possessing great powers of expression, and decorated with a wound received at Busaco. To him he confided the task of detailing to Napoleon the operations of the army, from its departure from Almeida to its encampment at Santarem. Independently of the despatches with which he furnished him, he instructed him to explain every thing verbally to the Emperor, to urge the immediate transmission of stores and reinforcements, as the means of putting a speedy termination to the war, whilst their non-arrival would be the source of the utmost disasters.

The two brilliant soldiers whom fate had now brought face to face at the extremity of Portugal, could not have pursued any wiser line of conduct, than that which they did, in fact, adopt; the one could not have desired any better means for the defence of that extremity of Portugal which alone remained to him of the Peninsula, and the other made those preparations for attacking his position, which were the best possible. On this extreme promontory rested the fate of the nations of Europe, for had the English been once expelled from Portugal, the universal tendency of affairs throughout Europe would have been towards peace, and on the other hand, were they once firmly established in this country, and Masséna compelled to retreat, the fortunes of the Empire would begin to succumb to those of Great Britain, as the first, perhaps, towards some immediate catastrophe; the crisis was, therefore, of the most serious nature, but its event

depended less on the two generals charged with its decision, than on the two governments whose duty it was to supply them with the means of doing so; the one of these countries being agitated by the spirit of party, and the other governed by a master whom prosperity had blinded.

Marshal Masséna's position was sufficiently serious, but that of Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was not without its own embarrassments; whilst the French General considered it difficult to carry the lines of Torrès-Védras, the English General considered that it would be difficult to defend them, if the French took the course naturally pointed out by the nature of attending circumstances. For Lord Wellington was threatened by two dangers; the first being the possible concentration of the French forces towards Lisbon to overwhelm him; and the second, that the English government, divided in its counsels, as every free government must be, on the consideration of an important question, should recall him from Portugal, or take those measures which would render his longer stay there impossible. These two dangers, each of them alike serious, although they were not alike probable, presented themselves so forcibly to the mind of the English General as to seriously disquiet it, steadfast as it was.

He had sufficient reason to dread the concentration of the French forces in front of Lisbon; there were many reports respecting the arrival of the famous divisions of Essling, and there was yet a more serious cause for apprehension in the withdrawal towards Lisbon, of the French troops in Andalusia, which, either partially or in mass, could join Marshal Masséna's army, by the left bank of the Tagus, thus securing to him the possession of both banks, and enabling him to attack the lines of Torrès-Védras, with formidable forces. This was the principal source of anxiety to the English General, and he entreated the Spanish regency to give the French all the occupation possible before Cadiz, to destroy the bridges of the Guadiana, and to render Elvas, Campo Mayo, and Badajoz, fortresses of such importance that they would not dare to neglect them to pass on to the siege of Lisbon. He was also anxious to devastate the province of Alentejo, that the French, should they invade it, might find it impossible to find subsistence there. But the Portuguese regency refused to comply with this demand, saying with some bitterness, that it would be better to combat the French with arms than famine, and better to deliver Portugal than to ruin it.

But the English General was not to be moved from his resolution, of risking no battle with the French, although the difficulty of procuring subsistence for his troops rendered

persistence in his plan a matter of considerable difficulty. In the meantime, there was considerable murmuring in the English army, notwithstanding its high state of discipline, and esteem for its General, at the hardships it endured and its state of inactivity. Many officers sent home letters full of bitter complaints, which contributed to increase the anxiety which prevailed throughout England respecting the fate of the British army.

In London few persons, even amidst the members of the government, believed in the possibility of maintaining a footing in Portugal; and an unfortunate event which took place in England at this time, increased the difficulties which had previously attended the position of the ministry, and consequently aggravated those which surrounded Lord Wellington himself.

The English monarch George III. suffered a relapse in his health, and was a second time subject to mental alienation. It was at first hoped that the attack might be but temporary, and a month was permitted to elapse before the proposal to Parliament of those measures which such a defect in the royal authority demanded. Both the Parliament and the public concurred in this course on account of their respect for George III., and their estrangement from the Prince of Wales, on whom the royal authority would devolve in the character of Regent. After having waited, however, as long as possible, it was at length necessary to address Parliament, and to ask it to bestow the Regency on the Prince of Wales. The Prince was the friend of all the heads of the opposition, and no doubt was entertained that he would bestow on them the ministerial offices. Mr. Pitt's party, therefore, which was the war party, made every endeavour to restrict the powers of the Regent, whilst the opposition made every endeavour to extend them. In accordance with that species of inconsistency which is frequently to be met with amidst political parties, it was the opposition which professed the most monarchical sentiments, and the government which maintained those which were least so. The opposition maintained that no law could be passed, since that concurrence of the three powers of the state which was necessary to the passing of a law was here impossible; and that, therefore, the Houses of Parliament should request the Prince of Wales to assume the royal authority, which accrued to him as of right during the incapacity of his august father, in all that entirety which was necessary for the preservation of the balance of the powers of the constitution. The ministry maintained, on the other hand, that the royal sanction could be supplied by an order of Parliament directing the keepers

of the Royal Seal to affix it to the bill; and that the authority of the Regent, which would be, it was hoped, but temporary, should not be as complete as though it were permanent; and that it would be inconvenient to give him the power of so far altering the state of affairs, that the King on regaining his health would find it impossible to resume the policy of his reign. The majority decided on bestowing by bill the regency on the Prince of Wales, with certain limitations. It was expected that the Regent would nominate to the offices of his ministry Lord Holland, Lord Grey, and Lord Grenville, all of Mr. Fox's party. But although he was personally averse to the existing ministers, especially Mr. Percival, he feared to effect so considerable a change, and one which would have involved the exchange of a war policy for that of peace. He wished to know, before taking any decided measures, whether the King's illness would be of sufficient duration to enable him to effect any important change in the state policy. With this view he had consulted the medical men, and imparted his doubts to Lords Holland, Grey, and Grenville.

This crisis in the domestic affairs in England took place in December, 1810, at the very time when Marshal Masséna and Lord Wellington were encamped opposite each other at the lines of Torrès-Védras. The opposition, perceiving that even a partial success would decide the Prince Regent, redoubled its attacks on the Cabinet; taking advantage not only of the incessant anxieties of the war, and the enormous expenses resulting from it, but also of the sufferings arising from a serious and extraordinary commercial crisis, which was the result of the measures taken by Napoleon, and certain peculiar circumstances. The Spanish colonies having refused to recognize the authority of Joseph, and taken advantage of the occasion to declare themselves independent, had opened their ports to British commerce. On receiving information of this the English manufacturers, with that blindness which is equally the attendant of avarice and ambition, had manufactured quantities of goods which far exceeded what all the Americans could either consume or pay for. They had sent immense quantities of merchandize to the Spanish colonies, and a part of this merchandize had returned unsold. That which had found purchasers had been paid for in colonial produce, which had added to the already encumbered state of the London warehouses. In fact the amount of unsold exotic produce had grown to that extent, that many cargoes of sugar, coffee, cotton, tobacco, wood, and indigo, were not of sufficient value to defray the expense of warehousing; the bills drawn on their value were for the

most part protested; and the necessary consequence was that the exchange on England suffered a still further depreciation.

It may be easily imagined how eagerly the opposition would avail itself of these circumstances. "See!" cried they, "how contrary to all reason this prolonged war has been conducted. By attempting to humiliate France we have urged it on to still increasing greatness and dominion over Europe, and given into her hands a part of Germany, together with Italy, Spain, and Holland; if we continue to act as we have hitherto acted, who can tell what will be the limit to her power? Our revenue," they added, "amounts to 37 millions sterling, and we expend yearly 56; a state of things which necessitates an annual loan of 19 millions. It is impossible to borrow such a sum every year without incurring actual ruin, and in the meantime the weight both of our direct and indirect taxation has reached its utmost limit. Besides this, the continually increasing mass of paper money will speedily render it equally impossible for us to carry on either commerce or war. Let us then put an end to this disastrous war by an honorable peace. The victories in which we rejoice are but decoys, and however well the British army may be manœuvred, its situation fills all patriots with alarm. Whilst we reward and decorate its generals, it suffers us to lose the important fortresses, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; and after having on one day repulsed the enemy at Busaco, it permits him to seize on the next Coimbra and the rest of Portugal. Confined now to a tongue of land where its only source of maintenance can be what it receives by sea, and where it is exposed to an attack from the French, who will be very ill advised if they do not assemble the whole of their forces to overwhelm it, it exists but by a miracle, and may at any moment fall beneath some catastrophe. What will become of England if this army, in which lies our only hope against invasion, at length succumbs, or signs some capitulation, which shall constitute its troops prisoners of war? What political advantages, what territorial acquisitions can be placed in the balance, with such risk?" Such was the language constantly in the mouths of the opposition, and the temper of the nation was such, that any day some unexpected vote might induce the Prince Regent to change his ministers, and to substitute a peace policy for that of war.

The ministry, trembling beneath the pressure of the nation's fears, continually sent to Lord Wellington despatches breathing apprehension in every line; and also filled with complaints of the excessive expenses of the war. These

despatches were received by the English General with an intense scorn, to which, however, he gave but partial expression, complaining that his experience of two years' warfare, face to face with the French, in the Peninsula, should not have inspired more confidence; and declaring that on the appearance of any serious danger, he would not hesitate to retreat rather than compromise the British army and his own glory.

Such were the difficulties thrown in the path of a firm and able General by a free country, amidst whose people the longing for peace, and the desire for the continuance of the war, were almost equal and were continually opposed. It might have been expected that Marshal Masséna, on the other hand, having only to do with a man of genius, with Napoleon himself, would have readily obtained every kind of assistance necessary to enable him to solve that military problem, in the solution of which was involved the destiny of the world. In the course of the following book, we shall perceive how far this was really the case.

General Foy, sent from Santarem to make known at Paris the requirements of the General Commanding-in-Chief, and to reply by word of mouth to all the Emperor's questions, performed his perilous journey, at the most favourable moment. Accompanied by four hundred picked men, he set off by the route which lies along the valley of Zezère, and after a journey of six or seven days passed amidst dangers of all kinds, arrived in safety at Ciudad Rodrigo.

General Foy continued his journey through Old Castille, now desolated by the guerillas, whose boldness increased every day, and found the Spaniards as full of confidence as the French were discouraged, at the length to which the war was protracted, in spite of the numerous reinforcements which had arrived, and at finding the only result of the Andalusian expedition to have been the capture of Seville, whilst the only fruit of the campaign of Portugal had been a march to the Tagus. He found that General Drouet had but one of his two divisions at Burgos, and was awaiting the second; and that General Dorsenne had the greatest difficulty with fifteen or eighteen thousand men, in protecting the road from Burgos to Valladolid. He urged General Drouet to proceed towards Coimbra and Thomar, and then continued on his road to Paris, which he reached towards the latter end of November, about twenty days after his departure from the banks of the Tagus. Immediately after his arrival he obtained an audience of the Emperor.

BOOK XL.

FUENTÈS D'ONORO.

TENDENCY of Napoleon's ideas at the period of General Foy's arrival in Paris—His interviews with the latter—Necessity for the despatch of a reinforcement of sixty or eighty thousand men to Spain, and the impossibility of sending so many—Napoleon's last encroachments on the coast of the North Sea—Annexation to the Empire of the Hanse Towns, of a part of Hanover, and the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg—The Emperor Alexander's displeasure on hearing that his uncle had been deprived of the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg—Instead of conciliating the Emperor Alexander, Napoleon insists, with threats, on his compliance with his commercial regulations—The Czar resists, and whilst being undesirous of war, prepares for it by ordering the construction of some works on the Dwina and the Dnieper—Napoleon, informed of the course of affairs in St. Petersburg, hastens to make preparations for war whilst Russia, being fully occupied in the East, may be unable to reply to his armaments by immediate hostilities—First idea of a great war in the North—Immense preparations made by Napoleon—Unwilling to diminish the forces under his own command by sending reinforcements to the Peninsula, he contents himself with ordering Generals Dorsenne and Drouet and Marshal Soult to proceed to the assistance of Masséna—Napoleon's illusions respecting the efficacy of this aid—General Foy returns to the army in Portugal—Protracted encampment of this army on the Tagus—Its industry and sobriety—Excellent temper of the troops, and despondency of the Generals—Firm attitude assumed by Masséna—General Drouet traverses the province of Beira and arrives at Leiria—Delight of the army at the appearance of General Drouet's corps—Abatement of this delight when it is discovered that this reinforcement amounts only to seven thousand men—The Generals assemble at Gulgao to consult respecting the execution of the orders sent from Paris, and resolve to remain on the Tagus, and to attempt to cross it for the purpose of obtaining the resources of Alentejo—General Eblé's admirable efforts to create means for crossing the river—Events in Spain during the period of the encampment on the Tagus—Results of the sieges conducted by General Suchet in Aragon and Catalonia—Tortosa invested at the close of 1810, and captured in January 1811—Preparations for the siege of Tarragonia—Events in Andalusia—Dispersion of the army of Andalusia amidst the provinces of Grenada, Andalusia, and Estremadura—Embarrassments of the 4th corps compelled to contend at the same time with the insurgents of Murcia, and those of the mountains of Ronda—Efforts made by the 1st corps with:

a view to the commencement of the siege of Cadiz—Operations of the 5th corps in Estremadura—Marshal Soult demands a reinforcement of 25,000 men—The order to advance to the assistance of Masséna having arrived in the meanwhile, he positively refuses compliance with it—Instead of marching upon the Tagus he undertakes the siege of Badajoz—Battle of Gcvara—Destruction of the Spanish army which endeavoured to raise the siege of Badajoz—Distress suffered by the army of Portugal during the siege of Badajoz—Masséna is at length compelled to retreat upon Mondégo, in order to establish himself at Coimbra—The retreat commences on the 4th March, 1811—Successful march of the army, and pursuit of the English—Masséna desires to make a pause of two days at Pombal, for the purpose of giving his sick and wounded and the baggage time to escape—Unfortunate quarrel with General Drouet—Marshal Ney's fears for the safety of his corps, and his disputes with Masséna on this subject—His retreat upon Redinha—Marshal Ney precipitately evacuates Cordeixa, whereby the whole army is compelled to fall back upon the road of Ponte-Murcelha, and to renounce the idea of establishing itself at Coimbra—Retreat upon the sierra of Murcelha—A false movement of General Reynier compels the army to re-enter definitively Old Castille—Appearance of the army on its return to Spain—Masséna's obstinate determination to recommence offensive operations immediately, and to return to the Tagus by Alcantara—Marshal Ney's refusal of obedience—Masséna sends Ney to the rear of the army—Difficulties which prevent Masséna from executing his project of returning to the Tagus—His army in a frightful state of destitution—Empty promises of Marshal Bessiéres, the commander-in-chief of the provinces of the North—Advantageous position of Lord Wellington after the retreat of the French, and triumph of the war party in the British Parliament—Lord Wellington leaves a portion of his army before Almeida, and sends the remainder to raise the siege of Badajoz—The capture of Badajoz by Marshal Soult—Marshal Soult proceeds to Cadiz after the capture of Badajoz for the purpose of supporting Marshal Victor—Marshal Soult demands, in vain, aid of the army of Portugal—The English invest Badajoz—Plan formed by Masséna during this period—Although very ill-supported by the army of Andalusia, he conceives that it would be excellent policy to throw himself upon the English who blockade Almeida—He begins to put this project into execution on the 2nd of May, instead of on the 24th of April as originally proposed—In consequence of this delay Lord Wellington has time to return to Estremadura to put himself at the head of his army—The battle of Fuentes d'Onoro on the 3rd and 5th of May—Masséna's energy during this memorable battle—Daring escape of the garrison of Almeida—Masséna re-enters Old Castille—The battle of Albuera—Great loss suffered on each side, and continuance of the siege of Badajoz—Noble defence made by the garrison—Difficult position of the French in Spain—The circumstances which rendered fruitless their efforts during the campaigns of 1810 and 1811, and decided the fate of Spain and of Europe—Errors of Napoleon and his lieutenants—Masséna unjustly disgraced.

BOOK XL.

GENERAL FOY, since so celebrated as an orator, united to great bravery, an exalted mind, and brilliant but too often ill-regulated imagination, which shone in lines of fire from his strongly marked and open countenance. The General and Napoleon were mutually charmed. The information thus received was the only news which had been received of the army of Portugal; those interested having hitherto been reduced to search for it in the English journals. General Foy found Napoleon perfectly convinced of the question which was about to be decided on the Tagus, for no one had so thorough a comprehension of the general situation, and he was persuaded that to vanquish the English, or even to hold them in check for some time before Lisbon, was the surest means of obtaining peace for Europe. But General Foy found him still full of illusions respecting the circumstances of the Peninsular War, and still unjust towards Masséna, whom he preferred to blame for not having performed the impossible, to blaming himself for having ordered it; and still persisting in considering the French army as consisting of seventy thousand men, and the English of only twenty-four thousand. After having incessantly ordered engagements with the enemy, he now blamed the attack at Busaco; and he who had desired that the English should be thrust into the sea, now complained that a halt had not been made at Coimbra. And the difficulty was not how to convince him of his error on these points, so much as how to persuade him to admit the truths which were opposed to his calculations.

General Foy maintained that those movements which had been condemned, had been forced on Masséna by circumstances; that the attack of Busaco was necessary to the honour of the French arms, and had not an altogether unfavourable result; that to have halted at Coimbra would have been a most calamitous confession of weakness; and that all would still be well, if, in accordance with the lessons of past experience, the means employed were henceforward in pro-

portion to the end in view. Napoleon did not take leave of the General, without learning to a great extent, what was the true state of affairs, and being well aware what steps it was necessary to take.

Having now become acquainted with Masséna's true position, he resolved to send in his direction all the disposable troops of Old Castille, and he prepared the most formal orders for the Generals to concur in the conveyance of troops in the direction of Portugal. The moment was a suitable one for the sacrifice of secondary objects, to the grand one of succouring Masséna, had not Napoleon unfortunately, during the progress in the Peninsula of the events above related, given serious provocation in the north, and excited a serious crisis of affairs by that exorbitant ambition which tyrannised over him, as he tyrannised over Europe.

We have seen how, on the termination of the campaign of Wagram, he desired to render Austria his sincere ally, to appease Germany, to distribute all the territories which yet remained in his hands, in order to be able to evacuate the countries beyond the Rhine, to devote his whole attention to the prosecution of the Spanish war, and to force England to make peace by the twofold means of the continental blockade, and the infliction of a great reverse on the army of Lord Wellington; and how, notwithstanding these pacific intentions, he had, for the purpose of rendering more effectual the continental blockade, annexed Holland to the Empire, extended his military posts upon the coasts of the north sea, as far as the frontier of Holstein, devised a vast scheme of taxation of colonial merchandize, which was a source of great gain to him and his allies, but extremely vexatious to the various populations, and had ordered some governments, and recommended others, to adopt its almost intolerable provisions. Already, as was inevitable, this policy, of which peace was the aim, but the instruments of which were military occupations, usurpations of territory, violent confiscations, and ruinous exactions, had aroused all that distrust which Napoleon had desired to dissipate. To convert indeed into French departments, not only Rome, Florence, le Valais, but also Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Groningen, was not the best method of reassuring those who believed that it was Napoleon's intention to subject the whole continent to his rule. Nor had Napoleon stopped at this point; for he had already entertained the idea that the extension of the territory of the Empire, which was already carried as far as the Ems, by the annexation of Holland, to the Weser and the Elbe, by the annexation of Bremen, Hambourg and Lubeck, would be exceedingly advantageous; since he would thus

envelop in the vast extent of his coasts those seas from whose bosom Great Britain rose. What difficulties opposed the execution of this design? The Hanse Towns were in his power; Hanover, of which it would be necessary to take a certain portion, belonged to his brother Jerome, and the possessions of certain German princes, which the fulfilment of this plan would absorb, were as much at his disposal as those of any French subject. The Prince of Oldenburg, uncle to the Emperor of Russia, might be compensated for his territories which lay between Friesland and Hanover, the mouths of the Ems and those of the Weser, by the grant of Erfurt, which still remained in Napoleon's hands. As for the portion which would be required of the Duchy of Berg, lately granted to the young son of Louis as a compensation for the crown of Holland, that would be a matter for family arrangement, and need be no cause for anxiety. Napoleon had no sooner entertained the idea of this plan than he hastened to put it into execution.

By a decree of the 13th December, 1810, Napoleon converted into three French departments, the Duchy of Oldenburg, the territory of the Princes of Salm and Arenberg, a portion of Hanover, the territories of Brême, of Hambourg, and of Lubeck, and at the same time took possession of Valais, which he converted into a French department by the name of the department of the Simplon. A simple intimation of the above facts were addressed to the dispossessed Princes; the Prince of Oldenburg being informed, however, that out of regard for the Emperor of Russia he had been recompensed by the grant of the city of Erfurt. Napoleon felt strongly tempted to add to the above acquisitions the principalities of Mecklenburg, which would have given him an ample extent of coast upon the Baltic, and placed Swedish Pomerania in his power; but he dared not, as yet, take so extreme a step. He contented himself with demanding of the princes of Mecklenburg assistance in the execution of his plans against England, under penalty of annexing their states to the Empire.

Russia,—treated most cavalierly on the occasion of the Austrian marriage, offended and alarmed by the refusal to sign the convention relative to Poland, very exactly informed of the gradual augmentation of the garrison of Dantzic, and filled with consternation at beholding the French frontier successively extending over Holland, Hanover, Denmark, touching Sweden, and thus approaching Memel and Riga, was deeply offended at the informal and rude manner in which a kinsman was treated, in whose welfare it had always displayed considerable interest.

The neglect of his decrees relating to false neutrals and colonial merchandize, had occasioned Napoleon to address Russia in language of considerable bitterness, and it was simply as an addition to some of these reproaches that Napoleon briefly announced at St. Petersburg, the annexation of Oldenburg to the Empire, and the confiscation of Erfurt, which had been granted, he declared, out of regard for the Emperor Alexander.

These disquieting and offensive proceedings, accompanied as they were by language so little calculated to extenuate them, and following the disdainful rejection of a matrimonial alliance, which was at first eagerly sought, as well as the just but peremptory refusal of any satisfactory engagement with regard to Poland, profoundly affected the Emperor Alexander, and proved that with Napoleon there was but a short interval between estrangement and actual warfare. The Emperor Alexander was not inclined to pass over this interval quite so rapidly, having sufficient reasons to avoid, or at least to delay, a war, which to avoid seemed now almost impossible. Great as was his reliance on his resources, he was by no means anxious to tempt once more the dangers he had incurred at Eylau and in Friedland. He was, moreover, the originator of the policy of forming an alliance with Napoleon, which had occasioned bitter criticisms, and it was painful to him to give his censors a triumph by so speedily deserting that policy for war. But if he were reduced to this extremity, he was anxious not to break off the alliance before it should have produced the fruits he had expected from it, and to obtain which was the only means of disarming the harsh judgments passed against him. Finland was gained but the Danubian provinces were not, and he desired to have them in his possession before exposing himself to the terrible chances of a war with France. The campaign of 1810 against the Turks had been successful, although the progress of the Russian Generals had been very slow. The Turks had not as yet, however, definitively lost the line of the Danube, and a much greater degree of success would be necessary to wring from them the great sacrifices of territory which Russia demanded, and which extended not only over Moldavia, but also Wallachia, reaching to the bed of the old Danube, and which stretched from Rassova to Kustendjé, besides the sovereignty of Servia, a portion of territory along the Caucasus, and the payment of the expenses of the war. To obtain such concessions as these from the Porte at least one more campaign was necessary, and that of a very prosperous nature.

The Emperor Alexander, therefore, was by no means

desirous of a war with France, and was especially anxious, should it indeed be inevitable, to defer it. But there were certain sacrifices, namely, those relating to commerce, to which he was fully resolved not to submit. He was reconciled to those which had necessarily resulted from war with England, because they were the price of that alliance with France, which was a necessary condition to the attainment of those two great conquests at which he aimed, of Finland in the north and the Danubian provinces in the south. But he was most unwilling to deprive his subjects, already deprived of all commerce with England, of the commerce which was still carried on by means of the Swedes and the Americans. He had, indeed, as a token of his strict observance of his treaties with Napoleon established a tribunal charged with the duty of condemning those American vessels which had, too manifestly, not come from America, and those Swedish ones which carried in too open a manner English merchandize. But whilst he was willing that Russian commerce should be limited and cramped for a time, it was far from his intention to suffer it to be destroyed. He would yield so far as was necessary to preserve him from a rupture with France until, at least, the war with Turkey should have been brought to a conclusion ; but he would choose war rather than suppress the commerce of his kingdom.

Fearing, however, that the greatest precautions might not suffice to prevent a quarrel with one of so obstinate a disposition as Napoleon, he resolved to take some military precautions which should be efficacious whilst entirely free from any appearance of menace. Being desirous of making no movement in the neighbourhood of the Polish frontier, which was in some sort the French frontier also, he abandoned the line of the Niémen, and selected a line of defence further back, on the Dwina and the Dnieper, rivers which after rising at no great distance from each other, trace, as they flow, the former towards the Baltic and the latter to the Black Sea, that which is the true defensive line of the Russian interior. Before so impetuous an opponent as Napoleon it would be necessary to place the point of resistance within the empire. Alexander, employing himself in the company of experienced men, in the consideration of military details, ordered the construction of fortifications at Riga, Dunaberg, Vitepsk, Smolensk, and, above all, at Bobruisk, a place situated in the midst of the marshes bordering on the river Bérésina. In addition to these defensive works, which ought not, he maintained, to be considered as of any more threatening nature than those which Napoleon had erected at Dantzic, Modlin, and Torgau, he took some measures

with respect to the organisation of his troops. There had remained in Finland, since the war with Sweden, a certain number of regiments belonging to the divisions ordinarily stationed in Lithuania. He replaced these regiments in Lithuania, and employed himself, moreover, in placing on a war footing all those divisions which were stationed on the frontiers of Poland, and had remained for the most part in the same cantonments since the peace of Tilsit.

Having taken these measures Alexander was careful to adapt his language to his policy. He resolved to enter into explanations with M. de Coulaincourt on all those subjects which Napoleon had made grounds of complaint, with great gentleness, and at the same time with that firmness which should show that he was well informed respecting the Emperor's own proceedings, and that whilst he was by no means desirous of war, he would choose it in preference to making sacrifices to which he had determined never to submit.

He had displayed some coldness towards M. de Coulaincourt since the failure of the marriage negotiation, and the rejection of the convention relative to Poland, but in a manner which showed that it was directed against the French government and not against M. de Coulaincourt himself. He knew that M. de Coulaincourt, finding his position a difficult one, had demanded and obtained his recall, and being unwilling to send away discontented a man whom he had esteemed and loved, and also being desirous of giving to his language that amicable character which was wanting to his actions, he had affected to restore the French ambassador to all that favour he had formerly enjoyed at St. Petersburg, and held with him frequent and long conversations; the Emperor's own share in which generally consisted of gentle complaints, that Napoleon had not acted in accordance with the spirit of the alliance with himself.

The occupation of Oldenburg, he said, insisting more especially on this point, had touched him nearly, apart from any personal feelings, on account of the deplorable effect it had produced on his court and people. As for compensation in the shape of Erfurt, its acceptance, he declared, could only cover him with ridicule; and indeed, whilst he refused that he asked nothing else, for Napoleon had nothing to offer him but what he must first have torn from some poor innocent German Prince, and he was unwilling to place himself in a position to be accused of taking part in those violent confiscations which had so greatly disgusted, during the last twenty years, the moral sentiment of Europe. Of course, he continued, it was unnecessary to say that he should not de-

clare war on account of the Duchy of Oldenburg, but he wished it to be understood that its seizure had wounded and even afflicted him, and that he earnestly hoped, whilst he neither demanded it, nor intended to do so, that some reparation would be made which would satisfy the offended dignity of the Russian nation.

Speaking of Napoleon's anger at the imperfect enforcement in Russia of those additional commercial restrictions on which he laid so much stress, the Emperor Alexander would exclaim:—By what right does Napoleon demand of Russia these sacrifices? Does he demand them in the name of treaties? Russia has faithfully executed that of Tilsit. She undertook at Tilsit to make war with England, and without expecting to derive any benefit from it for herself, she has done so, and proscribed the English flag. But are those decrees by which Napoleon has been pleased to declare denationalized all vessels that shall have touched at England, obligatory upon Russia? Must an alliance between the two countries necessarily infer that they are under the government of the same sovereign? And was Russia bound blindly to adopt Napoleon's measures, when he himself had contradicted his own decrees by adopting the system of licenses, by which any ship was enabled to enter the English ports, and, under certain conditions, to return from them loaded with British goods? And whilst France knew not how to bear, in a cause which was her own, the privations resulting from the continental blockade, were other nations to make unexampled sacrifices for the sake of a cause which was but very indirectly their own? It is impossible justly to reproach me with having been unfaithful to the alliance. I am, on the contrary, anxious to maintain it. It has worked me both good and ill, but having once entered into it, both my dignity and my interest demand that I should continue true to it. I acknowledge that it has already gained me Finland, and will most probably be the means of my obtaining possession of Moldavia and Wallachia; but these acquisitions are far from being equal to Spain, the Roman States, Tuscany, Westphalia, Holland, and the Hanse Towns. Nevertheless, without making any comparison of the advantages which it has brought to the one and the other of us, I wish that it should still exist between us, and obtain for us that peace with England which will assure to us the peaceable possession of all our acquisitions. Let us remain united in a firm bond of concord, mutually excusing necessary and inevitable actions, and carefully abstaining from dissensions which would be speedily noised abroad, to the great injury of the alliance and diminution of the chance of a general peace.

For my part, I know very well what is being done at Dantzic, and I know what the Poles say ; but I will take no step in that direction ; if we are to direct our cannon against each other, the first shots shall come from you. In that case I will appeal to God and my people and all Europe to judge between us, and I and my whole nation would rather perish sword in hand than submit to an unjust yoke. However great may be Napoleon's genius, however valiant his soldiers, the justice of our cause, the energy of the Russian people, the immensity of the distances to be traversed, all concur to give us the most favourable chance in a war which on our side will be a defensive one.

Each time that Alexander indulged, and he very often did so, in this course of observations, he spoke with an accent of truth, and with mingled grace, gentleness, and force. He touched and confused M. de Coulaincourt, who knew not how to reply to reasoning which was partly true and wholly plausible.

For my own part, as a sincere historian, loving my country better than anything else in the world, but unable to sacrifice truth for its sake, I must declare that, after having perused all the documents relating to the subject, my decided impression is, that the Emperor Alexander was sincerely averse to war. Whilst distrust of Napoleon's character impelled him to prepare for it, he would have done anything to avoid it, for besides the great dangers with which it threatened him, it would be a condemnation of his policy, an avowal that he had committed an error in adopting the French alliance at Tilsit, and compel him to renounce Wallachia and Moldavia.

Such was the disposition of the Russian court at the time when territorial aggressions had carried the French frontier as far as Lubeck, and Napoleon put forth his new demands relative to the observance of the continental blockade. M. de Coulaincourt sent a perfectly true account of the state of affairs to Paris, and expressed his own opinion that the Czar was far from being desirous of war. He was silent only because ignorant of them, respecting the military preparations which Alexander's distrust of Napoleon had induced him to make, but these had been speedily perceived, and loudly announced, by the Poles of the army, and the grand Duchy.

Napoleon on learning from M. de Coulaincourt the replies made by the Emperor Alexander to his remonstrances respecting the ill observance of the continental blockade, was much displeased with the Ambassador, declaring that the arguments used by him in his discussions with the Russian

Emperor had been extremely weak. But when he heard of the works constructed on the Dwina, and the Dnieper, and the movements of the troops of Finland in Lithuania, he saw in those simple precautions of the Russian Emperor both the declaration and the commencement of war. That which he demanded of Russia was not indispensable to the success of his designs, but he was accustomed to command as absolute master, and irritated at meeting with opposition on the part of a power which he had vanquished although not destroyed, he determined to give it another and a final lesson. He suddenly gave himself up to the idea that by striking one of those terrible blows in the north, which he knew so well how to strike, he should attain the solution of all his difficulties, and found himself regarding a new war with Russia as a matter fully determined on, without being at all conscious of the day or the hour when his resolution had been first formed.

This idea having once taken hold of his mind, he took the measures necessary to its realization with incredible promptitude; and indeed, having determined to reduce Russia to as absolute a state of submission as Prussia and Austria, he had certainly good reason to take his measures as speedily as possible and before she was free from the war with Turkey.

The chief difficulty to be overcome in a war with Turkey consisted in the enormous distances which would have to be traversed. To convey five or six hundred men from the Rhine to the Dnieper, with an enormous pontoon equipage to provide for the passage of the rivers on the line of route, and with the extraordinary supply of food, not only for men but also for horses, which would be necessary on a march through countries which would most probably be found as completely devastated as Portugal was found devastated by Masséna—was an undertaking which presented difficulties never yet surmounted by the art of warfare; for when the barbarians threw themselves on the Roman Empire, or the Tartars on China and on India, barbarism invaded civilization and was able to find subsistence amidst its fertility; but when civilization would invade barbarism it has to surmount the serious difficulty of having to carry with it all the necessities of existence.

Perceiving that the distances which would have to be traversed would offer the most serious obstacle, Napoleon determined to place his base of operations no more on the Rhine, but on the Oder or the Vistula, and even, if possible, on the Niémen, that is to say, at three or four hundred leagues from the frontiers of France. He determined, therefore, as quietly as possible and under false pretexts, to

assemble an immense number of troops from the Rhine to the Elbe, from the Elbe to the Oder, from the Oder to the Vistula, and from the Vistula to the Niémen; and at the moment when pretexts became of no more avail to make a rapid march from Dantzic to Koenigsberg, so as to place behind him and secure from the Russians the rich country of Poland and Old Prussia.

The principal point in his plan of operations was Dantzic, destined to be a vast depôt of all the immense matériel of our troops. After Dantzic the fortresses of Thorn and Modlin on the Vistula, of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau on the Oder, and of Magdebourg on the Elbe, merited the chief attention. These places Napoleon gradually stored with troops and every kind of war matériel. In addition to these preparations he established between the Oder and the Rhine at Hamburgh, a depôt, which was as vast and secure as that of Dantzic.

Besides providing a sufficient amount of matériel for the future army of Russia, he had also to consider the means by which men were to be provided to fill its ranks. The year 1810 was the first which he had suffered to pass, for a long period, without the levy of a conscription. It is true that the class of 1810 had been levied in 1809, in accordance with the habit which had been contracted, of taking each class a year in advance; but the eyes of the people had been spared during the whole space of that year from the afflicting spectacle of the levy, and the class of 1811 remained at the commencement of that year intact, not having been called out before its time.

Napoleon now resolved on its immediate levy. As it was unlikely that hostilities would commence before 1812, he was able to calculate among the number of the forces with which he would be able to take the field, the conscription of that year also. These additions to the effective troops already stationed in various parts of Europe would enable him to have an army consisting of three hundred thousand French troops and a hundred thousand allies on the Vistula, a reserve of a hundred thousand French on the Elbe, and 135 battalions at depôts, which would be employed in the interior of the empire in instructing recruits and guarding the frontiers, whilst the forces devoted to the prosecution of the Peninsular war would remain unweakened.

Napoleon did not, however, confine his attention to military measures, but also took care to make his diplomatic policy subserve his projects, especially in all that related to Turkey and Austria.

Since the conferences of Tilsit and Erfurt, all the details

of which the English had related to the Porte with much exaggeration, the Turks had considered themselves as entirely given up by the French to the Russians, and entertained so violent a feeling of distrust towards us that they scarcely endured the presence of our representative at Constantinople, and only addressed him to complain of what they called our treason. Napoleon hoped, however, that when they found we were in a state of hostilities with Russia, they would begin to regard us once more as friends, and be ready to listen to proposals of alliance; and he accordingly directed the French legation at Constantinople to lose no opportunity of making friendly advances to the Turks, of intimating the estrangement between France and Russia, and of making the Porte comprehend that as Russia would soon be obliged to direct her forces elsewhere than on the Danube, they ought to avoid concluding a disadvantageous peace, but rather to continue the war, forming in the meantime a firm alliance with France.

Overtures of the same nature, and in an equally cautious manner, were made to Austria. But there was less embarrassment to be encountered at Vienna than at Constantinople. Both the courts and the populations of the two kingdoms had been somewhat reconciled by the marriage. Napoleon had sent by M. de Metternich a most amicable letter to his father-in-law, and the renunciation of the most important article of the last treaty,—that which limited the Austrian army to 150,000 men. Napoleon, abandoning the Russian alliance as abruptly as he had embraced it at Tilsit, ordered M. Otto in his conferences with M. de Metternich to express a feeling of disgust towards the Russian court; and extreme regret with regard to the subject of the Danubian provinces which France had engaged to suffer to fall into the hands of Russia. In the meantime M. Otto was directed to behave towards the Russian Embassy with great reserve and the utmost caution.

It was impossible that such military preparations as these, and these diplomatic manœuvres should long remain hidden from Russia. Napoleon had, nevertheless, determined to dissemble the object of these proceedings as long as he possibly could, and only to avow their real meaning, when it could no longer be concealed. He therefore directed his agents, in their communication with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, to say with regard to the garrison of Dantzic, that it had been rendered necessary by the direction of an immense English armament towards the Sound, and that as the troops in question were German, it was impossible that the matter could be any just cause of offence. As for the conscription,

they were to say that, none having been levied in 1810, and the Spanish war absorbing a great number of men, a portion of the class of 1811 had been called out for the purposes of this war alone. When all these excuses should have been exhausted and found unavailing, M. de Coulaincourt was authorised to declare, that in fact it was possible that France was arming against Russia, as well as England, feeling some natural distrust of the former, since the withdrawal of her troops from Finland to Lithuania, and the construction of entrenchments on the Dwina and the Dnieper.

In his anxiety to put himself in an advantageous position with regard to Russia, Napoleon gave but a divided attention and slender resources to the conduct of the war in the Peninsula. He no longer thought of carrying it on in person, and it was impossible to send to Torrès-Védras a reinforcement of sixty or eighty thousand men for the purpose of crushing the English, when he was wholly occupied in preparing three armies between the Rhine and the Vistula. It only remained therefore to make the best use of the resources already existing in the Peninsula. Napoleon had already organised a division of reserve for Catalonia, as a means of hastening the progress of the sieges of Tortosa and Tarragona. He had also organised another division of reserve for the provinces of Castille; by means of these resources, together with the corps of General Drouet, and the army of Andalusia, he hoped to furnish Marshal Masséna with sufficient reinforcements to enable him to triumph over the English; and he immediately sent the necessary orders for the concentration of all the forces in the Peninsula towards the Tagus, accompanying them with declarations that no object in the Peninsula was of equal importance to Santarem and Lisbon, on which depended the fate of Europe.

After having shown him every mark of favour, Napoleon sent back General Foy to Marshal Masséna, to inform him of the arrangements he had made for his reinforcements, and to convey to him Napoleon's instructions for his future movements. Whilst the events above narrated were taking place in the north, Marshal Masséna passed the winter of 1810-11 on the banks of the Tagus, between Santarem and Punhête, making unheard of efforts to support his army and preparations for the passage of the river, had remained for five months without receiving communications of any kind from the government, and displayed the whole strength of his character in his endeavours to preserve alive a good spirit, not amidst his troops, who bore their strange position with complete equanimity, but amongst his superior officers, some

of whom were discontented because they had not the chief command, whilst the rest were disgusted with a campaign which afforded no opportunities for the performance of brilliant actions.

The chief want experienced by the army was in the article of clothing, almost all the garments of the troops being in complete rags. But the officers alone were really worthy of pity; nothing could exceed their state of destitution, for they had no means of subsistence, but that which was afforded them by the affection of the soldiers, and not having the ability possessed by the latter, of mending their own tattered garments, or manufacturing sandals of the skins of beasts, to supply the place of their worn out shoes, they were compelled to pay enormous prices to the few workmen who remained at Santarem and some neighbouring villages.

In the meantime General Eblé was solving the problem involved in the construction of a pontoon equipage without tools, without wood, and almost without workmen, with a perseverance and fertility of invention, worthy of all admiration. But whilst he advanced most successfully in the execution of his task, a most disadvantageous result of its performance was the ruin of the horses belonging to the artillery and the baggage train. There was but a very insufficient supply of food for them, and they died in great numbers.

The last great difficulty to be overcome, consisted in the necessity of obtaining a supply of cordage and means of effecting moorings, such as anchors, grappling irons, &c.

With incredible energy General Eblé had established manufactories of cordage, which were supplied partly with hemp and partly with old ropes found at Santarem. He had also, as anchors could not be procured, had grappling irons forged, with which the boats of the bridge might be fastened to the banks. But how the bridge, when completed, was to be launched, in the presence of the enemy, was the great question in all minds.

The bridge was being constructed at Punhête, situated on the Zézère, at some distance from the point at which this river falls into the Tagus; on the left and at no great distance was Abrantes, whither Lord Wellington had sent Hill's corps, and on the right, but much lower, Santarem, to which Lord Wellington had carried his own advanced posts. It was now a matter of doubt whether the bridge should be thrown across the river near Abrantes or Santarem. There were excellent reasons both for and against the choice of either of these positions. The comparative narrowness of the river at Abrantes would render the launching of the bridge there

easier, but the operation would have to be performed in the presence of a numerous and well established enemy, and only a portion of the French forces could be made available for its defence. At Santarem the river presented many natural obstacles, but sufficient forces could be concentrated there for the defence of our lines, and the protection of the passage.

On this as well as other questions respecting the passage of the river great difference of opinion prevailed both among soldiers and generals, and no inconvenience would have resulted from this had it not been accompanied by bitter expressions directed against the General-in-Chief, as though he had been responsible for the strange position in which the army found itself on the Tagus, and were not the first victim of an inflexible will, which took its resolutions at an immense distance from the theatre of war, and in a most complete forgetfulness of facts. This state of things even reached such a point that Ney, since the occupation of the new position on the Tagus, had never visited Marshal Masséna, and remained at Thomar, as though he had been the General Commanding-in-Chief, and Thomar head quarters. These things somewhat irritated Masséna, who was not of course left in ignorance of them, but ensconcing himself in his accustomed negligence and disdain, he contented himself with presenting to his lieutenants an example of firmness and coolness which they should have imitated, but did not. This infringement of good discipline, however, did not infect the troops. They, unaffected by the envious declarations of their immediate generals, but on the contrary full of confidence in the character, the fame, and the good fortune of Masséna, and confidently expecting the arrival of reinforcements from Napoleon, hopefully awaited the hour when they should perform those great deeds which had been promised as the result of this campaign. But whilst they were perfectly ready to sacrifice themselves for the attainment of any important object, the sad state of the hospitals had taught them to regard a sick or wounded soldier as a dead man, and made them demand to be spared the risks of skirmishes which were of no apparent necessity.

The army being in this position we may readily understand how apropos, how useful, and agreeable to the real state of affairs, were the Imperial instructions transmitted to Masséna, by which he was directed to insure the power of manœuvring on both banks of the Tagus by throwing, not one, but two bridges across it; to establish vast magazines of provisions and war matériel, in order to be enabled to prolong his sojourn under the walls of Lisbon; to capture Abrantès, where vast resources were certain to be found;

to harass the English incessantly, and to endeavour to entice them beyond their lines to risk a general engagement, &c.

Repeatedly urged by Napoleon, and especially by the last instructions received from him, to enter Portugal, and to reopen, at all hazards, communications with Masséna, General Drouet at length set off with his nine thousand men by the route which lies through the valley of Mondego, taking with him neither provisions nor war matériel, of which indeed he was entirely destitute; having been even compelled during his sojourn in Old Castille to subsist on the stores in the two fortresses, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which was a great misfortune, since there was great probability that those places would sooner or later be invested by the enemy.

General Drouet traversed, almost without meeting any obstacle, the sierra Murcelha, and debouched upon Leyria, his troops obtaining such subsistence as they could find on their road. In the meantime the army of Portugal experienced the utmost impatience for the arrival of a French troop, were it to consist even of only a few hundred men. At length a troop of dragoons led by General Gardanne, joined Ney's advanced posts between Espinhal and Thomar, and were received with the greatest demonstrations of affection. General Gardanne gave information that General Drouet was on his way with a strong division, and that another division followed him, that the ninth corps could not number less than twenty or thirty thousand men, that it was accompanied by abundant stores, and that when communications were once reopened, provisions and war matériel would arrive with the utmost ease. Shortly afterwards the news of General Drouet's arrival filled the whole army with enthusiasm. Calculating on the almost immediate arrival of thirty thousand of their comrades, Masséna's soldiers delivered themselves up to the most flattering hopes. Winter had now given place to spring; the lines of Torrès-Védras no longer appeared insurmountable.

Masséna had an interview with General Drouet, and received from him a mass of despatches which should have arrived earlier. Some of them no longer had any bearing on the actual condition of affairs, and others, the more recent ones, and written since Napoleon's interview with General Foy, contained some criticisms on his movements, at which Masséna could only sadly smile, as proofs of the erroneous impressions in which Napoleon was determined to remain. These despatches were chiefly useful as showing what were the means which Napoleon furnished for the accomplishment of his great object, and which was, either to force the position held by the English, or to blockade them until they should

be compelled to abandon it. And here all was deception and vexation. The ninth corps, announced as consisting of thirty thousand men, scarcely amounted to fifteen thousand ; and of these eight thousand had been left at Viseu, sixty leagues distant, to maintain the communications.

At the very moment when the army was full of joy at the arrival of this reinforcement, Masséna was a prey to bitter disappointment, and completely disabused as to the reality of the succour which had been promised him. For even of the nine thousand that had arrived, Gardanne's detachment alone was to remain, for General Drouet's seven thousand were soon to depart again to keep open the communications with the frontier of Spain, and had only come, in fact, as an escort of insignificant despatches, and to fill the army with a false joy.

Masséna resolved, however, not to allow General Drouet to depart. His departure, after a short stay, would have thrown the army into despair, and would have deprived it of courage even to attempt the passage of the Tagus. Masséna might have simply, in his character of General commanding-in-chief, have ordered General Drouet to remain, but he preferred to reason with him, and obtain his free assent. But General Drouet, without any feeling of ill will, alleged his instructions, with which he was deeply impressed, and which were, unfortunately, extremely precise ; directing him to carry succour to the army of Portugal but at the same time not to allow himself to be cut off from Almeida, and by no means to lose his own communications for the sake of establishing those of Marshal Masséna. The General commanding-in-chief contended, on the other hand, that he ought not, for the purpose of fulfilling one part of his instructions, to neglect another which was of more importance, that namely, which directed him to convey succour to the army of Portugal, and concluded his arguments by declaring that if General Drouet were now to desert the army of Portugal, he would be personally responsible for all the future evils which might result from that step. General Drouet no longer hesitated to remain, and Masséna directed him to take up his position at Leyria, on the further side of the Estrella, where he would defend the army from being turned by the road along the coast, whilst it was encamped on the route of the Tagus.

Although the reinforcements which had arrived only consisted of about nine thousand men, as the army now numbered about fifty three thousand, Masséna saw in it the means, not of attacking the English lines, but of rendering the passage of the Tagus infinitely less perilous. By leaving twenty three thousand men on the right bank, whilst he crossed over with thirty thousand to the left, he would have

comparative little cause for anxiety for the fate of the two portions of the army, separated from each other by a great river ; the danger however remaining very serious for both, should the bridge between them be broken, as that on the Danube at Essling. The peril incurred in dividing the army on the two banks of the river was much diminished by the reinforcements which had been received, and Masséna finally resolved on putting his plan of crossing the Tagus into execution, for when the army should have once entered the province of Alentejo, it would be able to find subsistence sufficient for three or four months in the environs of Santarem, to obey the instructions of Napoleon, by which he enjoined the continuance of the blockade of the lines of Torrès-Védras, and thus to await the expected arrival of the army of Andalusia. When this reinforcement should arrive, the army of Portugal would be enabled to leave the defensive for the offensive, and to terminate under the walls of Lisbon the long war which for twenty years had devastated Europe.

When the army learned the true nature of the reinforcement which had been received, it passed from enthusiastic delight to a state of despondency, and blamed the Emperor who had left them in such a situation, without provisions, war matériel, or reinforcements. It began to be imbued, as were all the troops which were sent to Spain, with the feeling that they were sacrificed without mercy, without the chance of glory, to the ungrateful task of creating *royautés de famille*. It needed but a few more sources of dissatisfaction to excite insubordination in its ranks.

In the meantime General Foy arrived with a new detachment of two thousand men, with Napoleon's verbal instructions, and the inspiration drawn from his numerous interviews with the Emperor. At Ciudad-Rodrigo he had taken advantage of an opportunity which offered for sending to Marshal Soult a letter, urging upon him the necessity of uniting the whole or part of the army of Andalusia with the army of Portugal. He described to him the situation of Europe, especially that of England, and the indubitable hope which existed of changing the war policy of Great Britain to a peace policy, if one serious disaster could be inflicted on Lord Wellington's army. He put forth these views not so much as his own as those of Napoleon himself, and declared that he understood the Emperor to express his decided will to be that the army of Andalusia should march upon the Tagus.

On the 5th of February General Foy arrived at head quarters. His arrival produced a great sensation in the army, because, being full of impressions received at Paris in his inter-

views with the Emperor, he brought with him the conviction that the army of Portugal was the instrument of great designs, and that but a little patience was necessary to enable it to accomplish its glorious task. This had the best possible effect on the spirit of the army, and compensated in some degree for the ill effect produced by the weakness of the last reinforcements. Unhappily, however, the arrival of General Foy added to the embarrassments of General Drouet, for he brought with him a packet of despatches containing the most formal instructions to assist Masséna, only so far as he could do so consistently with securing himself from being cut off from Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo. But by remaining with the army of Portugal, General Drouet would be as completely cut off from those places as Masséna himself; it was a new argument to urge with the Commander-in-Chief. But as the moment for effecting the passage of the Tagus had now arrived, he consented to remain still at Leyria, in the rear and on the flank of the army of Portugal.

Masséna now submitted to the generals serving under him the following questions; was it necessary to cross the Tagus? at what point should it be crossed? and in what manner should the operations be conducted? And would it not be more prudent, should the difficulty attending the passage of the stream in the face of the English be found too great, or the division of the army on the two banks of the stream too dangerous, to retreat, since it would be impossible to obtain subsistence for any length of time in the present encampment, upon the Mondego, whose valley had escaped devastation, whilst the city of Coimbra would then be the principal point of a position in which the army could hold the English in check, and await the necessary reinforcements from France.

The last proposition was unanimously and instantly negatived, as though to entertain it would be a kind of crime, since it was contrary to the wishes of the Emperor. It remained, therefore, to attempt the passage of the Tagus, however perilous it might be. The idea was at first entertained of selecting Punhête as the point from which to attempt it, and Junot supported this project; but General Loison, who knew better than he the nature of the place in question, having been encamped there, pointed out some dangers which would attend such a choice, and the project was then entertained of passing lower down, namely at Santarem, which offered, according to General Reynier, who knew the place well, an almost invincible position, since, should an hostile force attack it in front, they would be destroyed at the foot of the heights, and should they attempt to turn it, be enclosed and taken. There was one disadvantage attending the choice

of this point, from whence to attempt the passage of the stream, which was, unfortunately, a fatal one; and consisted in the expansion of the river before Santarem, and the incessant variation of its size according to the rise or fall of its waters. However, by sacrificing some of the advantages attending the proximity of Santarem, sufficiently great facilities were offered by an island situated at the mouth of the Alviela, a little river which throws itself into the Tagus, under the protection of the heights of Boavista. This island being placed beyond the principal breadth of the river, there remained, after it should have been reached, but a small arm to be crossed. By occupying it during the night with the necessary forces, it would be easy to fasten to it the bridge of boats which would thus rest on a fixed point, easily defended.

There was but one objection to this plan, which unfortunately appeared a far more serious one to General Eblé than it really was, and consisted in the fact that the materials of the bridge were at Punhête. According to General Eblé to transport them by land to the mouth of the Alviela would require means which we did not possess, since the horses were worn out, and a length of time which would be sufficient to betray our plan to the enemy; and that to descend to the Tagus by water would occupy more than a night, and compel us to pass along the enemy's bank of the river under so close a fire from the English, that the boats would run great danger of being destroyed.

The great authority of General Eblé, who had accomplished a sort of miracle by the creation of the materials for this bridge, supported by General Masséna's opinion, determined the neglect of this isle, which would doubtless have been for us a second Lobau.

However this might be, as the proposal of passing at Santarem had been rejected, as well as that of making the passage near Abrantes, it now remained to be considered from what point it should be really attempted. As first one plan was proposed and then another, General Foy said that in all probability the 5th corps would within eight or ten days appear on the left of the Tagus, and that then all difficulties would vanish of themselves, for that the English at the sight of the 5th corps would not remain opposite Pouhête, that the left bank would be thus cleared, and that the passage of the Tagus could be then made at that point with perfect ease. The arrival of the 5th corps appeared so probable, that all the generals assented to General Foy's reasoning, with the exception of Reynier, who declared that his soldiers would die of hunger before Soult's arrival, and Masséna, who never

flattered himself that Soult would come to his aid. He knew too much of Spain and of men to expect such a thing. He entertained the idea, therefore, of retreating upon the Mondego, for he could see no probability of any succour arriving from the direction of the south, and General Drouet's arrival had taught him to expect none on the north. In the meantime the army awaited the arrival of the reinforcements which it expected from Andalusia.

That we may judge of the probability of the arrival of these reinforcements so earnestly expected, we must direct our attention to the course of affairs in Andalusia and Aragon. After General Suchet had taken Lerida, the capture of which has been described in the preceding book, and Mequinenza, a small but very important place, since it commanded a part of the course of the Ebro, there remained for him to take Tortosa and Tarragonia, the two strongest fortifications of Catalonia, or perhaps even of Spain, if we except Cadiz. Tortosa is situated on the lower Ebro, near its mouth, and commands the direct route between Catalonia and Valentia; Tarragonia, situated more to the north, between Tortosa and Barcelona, on the sea coast, in the centre of a fertile country, was to the north-east of the Peninsula what Cadiz was to the south, and Lisbon to the south-east.

On the 19th of December General Suchet opened the trenches before Tortosa; the point of attack having been chosen on the south. The trenches had been opened boldly very near the enceinte, and were pushed on so vigorously that within a few days they had reached the foot of the enemy's works. The enemy made numerous sorties with the design of compelling us to relax in our exertions, and on the 28th of December a body of three thousand men boldly led, vigorously attacked our men employed in carrying on the works, killed many of our engineer officers, and began to destroy the trenches, when Generals Hubert and Abbé coming up with a body of troops drove them back with a loss in killed or prisoners of 400 men. On the following day, the 29th of December, after some indispensable repairs had been completed in our works, forty-nine cannon of heavy calibre threw into the place a hail of shot and shell. On the 30th two large breaches were visible and gave promise of affording in about a couple of days free access to the courage of our soldiers. On the 1st of January the assault was about to commence amidst the shouts of our troops, when a white flag announced a desire to capitulate. General Suchet refused to grant the terms demanded by the Governor, and as he threatened that if the place were not immediately surrendered he would put the garrison to the

sword, on the 2nd of January the gates were opened, and 9,400 prisoners defiled before him, laying down their arms.

This successful siege had cost the army of Aragon seventeen days, and five or six hundred men. The siege of Tarragona would most probably be both as difficult, and as long, and everything tended to show that the army would be detained in Catalonia during a portion of the year 1811. It was, therefore, impossible that it should afford the army of Andalusia any immediate succour.

During this period, that is, from June, 1810, to January, 1811, the army of Andalusia had been no less occupied than that of Aragon.

The Central Junta having resigned, as we have seen, in favour of a Royal Regency and the Cortès, the Cortès had assembled at Cadiz with much solemnity on the 24th of September, 1810, and immediately passed decrees declaring that the national sovereignty was in the Cortès, and the royalty in the house of Bourbon. After having promulgated these decrees, the assembly at Cadiz had demanded of the Regency, that it should accept them, and swear to observe them. These preliminaries having been completed, the assembly betook itself on the laws of the kingdom, with a view to the reform of the Spanish monarchy. In the meantime the Regency, General Castanas being the most prominent in this matter, concerted with General Blake, with the other generals of the army, and with Henry Wellesley, brother of Lord Wellington, the scheme of military operations.

Cadiz and the Isle of Leon were abundantly provided with troops and all kinds of resources. Besides seven thousand English troops, it contained seventeen or eighteen thousand soldiers, the remnants of all the regular Spanish armies. In addition to this force assembled at Cadiz, there was in the province of Murcia a body of twenty thousand men, composed of the troops which had retreated from the defiles of the sierra Morena towards Grenada, and of the insurgents of Murcia. In the centre between Grenada and Seville, there were, besides the fierce mountaineers of Ronda, the contrabandists of the environs of Gibraltar, who were at this period unemployed, and very apt in assuming the character of guerillas. Finally on the left, at the mouth of the Guadiana, in the country of Niebla, there were other bold contrabandists, and higher up, upon the Guadiana between Badajoz, Olivença, Elvas, Campo-Mayor, and Albuquerque, was the army of Romana, consisting of 27,000 or 28,000 men, of whom seven or eight thousand had joined Lord Wellington under the Marquis de la Romana.

It was with these forces, aided by situation and season, that Generals Castanas and Blake had resolved to paralyse the three corps which formed the army of Andalusia.

General Sébastiani, occupied alternately in the Ronda or in the Alpuxarras, had been obliged sometimes to direct his whole force against Blake, whom he had vanquished at Baza, at another time to give battle at Fuengirola, to the English, whom he had forced to re-embark; and had finally been compelled to burn the principal villages of the Ronda without having suppressed the insurrection, although he had succeeded in driving into Gibraltar the troops which fomented incessantly the disturbances amidst these mountains.

The campaign of the 1st corps, although it had cost fewer men, had not been less laborious. Marshal Victor, aided by Sénarmont, the skilful General of Artillery, had embraced within a series of redoubts, most accurately placed, and adapted in the best possible manner to their object, all the space which extends from Puerto-Santa-Maria to Puerto-Real, from Puerto-Real to Santi-Petri; and had wrested from the enemy Trocadero and the fort of Matagorda, which, forming an advanced point in the roadstead, could overwhelm Cadiz with the fire of its artillery. To arm this fort Marshal Victor had had an immense number of mortars of a peculiar construction founded at Seville. He had also collected a hundred and fifty gunboats, and a sufficient number of boats for the transport of 10,000 men, which he had conveyed partly by water and partly by land to Puerto-Real. The preliminary works were therefore in an advanced state; but there was still the want of sailors to manœuvre the flotilla, of artillerymen, of matériel for the ordnance, and a reinforcement of infantry. Had these wants been supplied it is most probable that the whole state of affairs in the Peninsula would have been changed. But, in fact, not only were these wants left unsupplied, but Marshal Victor was, also, entirely unaided by Marshal Soult.

In the meantime the career of Marshal Mortier was no less laborious than that of General Sébastiani in Grenada, or Marshal Victor before Cadiz. Sometimes obliged to march with the 5th corps to Badajoz against the troops of Romana, sometimes against the insurgents of Niebla and the detachments which made sorties from Cadiz, and sometimes to Jaen to aid General Sébastiani, his troops were thoroughly worn out with fatigue. He had been successful, doubtless, but on reentering Seville towards the end of the year 1810, there were only eight thousand men out of his whole force capable of taking the field.

Napoleon severely blamed Marshal Soult, who was

General-in-Chief of the army of Andalusia, for a want of vigour and a defect of combination in the manœuvring of the troops; and indeed, instead of directing all his forces upon Cadiz, and being contented to hold simple posts at Cordova and at Seville, for the purpose of keeping open the route of Madrid, by which mode of operations Cadiz would have been readily taken, and the whole of Andalusia speedily reduced to subjection, he had endeavoured at one and the same time to threaten Valentia and Murcia, to occupy Jaen, Grenada, Malaga, to reduce the Ronda to submission, to blockade Gibraltar, to guard Seville, and to besiege Cadiz, Badajoz, Elvas, and Campo-Mayor, whereby he had exhausted the army of Andalusia with fatigue, and destroyed it by exposure to disease, and reduced himself to the necessity of sending to Napoleon for a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand infantry, a thousand marines, a thousand artillerymen, and a fleet; with these reinforcements he promised speedily to take Cadiz, and to reduce the whole south of the Peninsula from Carthagenas as far as Ayamonte.

Having made these demands for reinforcements, Marshal Soult was surprised, we may even say filled with consternation, at receiving a formal order to send the whole 5th corps, together with a siege train to Abrantes, and to sacrifice every other object, except the siege of Cadiz, to this supreme one; for this was to order him to perform what was both extremely difficult and extremely perilous, and to aid the undertakings of another at the expense of his own. He resolved, therefore, to defer obedience to those Imperial orders, on the ground that to obey them would probably involve the loss of the 5th corps itself, and to implore that an officer might be sent to examine and confirm the truth of this assertion; adding that, being anxious to aid Marshal Masséna, he intended to throw the whole 5th corps, together with some detachments of the two others, upon the Guadiana, in order to undertake the siege of Badajoz, of Olivença, and Elvas, which movement would most probably prove to be a most advantageous diversion in favour of the army of Portugal. He had, accordingly, set out at the commencement of January 1811, with the division Girard, followed by the division Gazan, which was to march more slowly, in order to escort the siege train.

On the 11th of January he reached Olivença, and invested it without delay. This fortress, situated on the left of the Guadiana, had during two ages belonged sometimes to the Spaniards and sometimes to the Portuguese, and since 1801 had been the property of the Spaniards. It contained a population of five thousand souls, a garrison of four thousand, and

had a feeble governor. It was well fortified, and might have opposed a certain amount of resistance, had the governor taken due precautions and been careful to arm the exterior works. Our officers and soldiers of engineers, well aided by the infantry, carried on the approaches with great boldness, and within ten days the breaching batteries were enabled to open fire and overthrow a large portion of the wall. At the sight of our columns ready to mount to the assault, the populace, which had at first displayed much ardour, was terrified; the garrison and the governor made no endeavour to prolong the defence, and on the 23rd of January the gates were opened to our troops.

On the 26th Marshal Soult departed for Badajoz, the second fortress situated on the left of the Guadiana, and the only important one. On the right bank of the Guadiana, almost *vis-a-vis* with the castle of Badajoz, is the fort of St. Christoval, which serves as a protection to an entrenched camp established on the heights of Santa-Engracia. The river Gevora, which falls into the Guadiana, washes and protects this camp of Santa-Engracia, and here, at this period, was the Spanish army of the Marquis de la Romana, which after having been dispersed by the 5th corps had speedily reformed, as was usual with the Spanish armies, and had been rejoined by the seven or eight thousand men, who had been sent to Lisbon. The whole army after having left in Badajoz a garrison of nine or ten thousand men, presented on the opposite bank, in the entrenched camp of Santa Engracia, an army of twelve thousand men; and as a stone bridge, in the enemy's possession, joined the two banks at that spot, it was possible that the besiegers might at any moment be attacked by twenty thousand men. Besides an excellent governor, the fortress contained provisions for six months, and fortifications in a perfect state of defence. To the twenty thousand Spaniards spread over the two banks of the Guadiana, the French army could only oppose nine or ten thousand, until the arrival of the division Gazan, which would increase it to fifteen or ten thousand. It should be observed that our troops had no means of crossing from the one bank to the other, if we except a small craft which could only carry a few men at a time.

Happily the quality of our troops compensated for their inferiority, and it was with a less number that General Suchet had taken places infinitely stronger within a space of fifteen or twenty days. On the 20th of January the trenches were opened, and at the same time was commenced the construction of some batteries, as though it were intended to commence the bombardment almost as soon as the approaches. In the

meantime continual rains retarded our operations, and the lot of our troops became worthy of commiseration, for as all the horses had been employed in the draught of the heavy Artillery, it had not been possible to carry the foraging excursions to any great extent, and the soldiers were in want of bread. For many days together their only food was flesh, and from the use of such a diet sprang several distressing maladies.

The progress of the works was at first very slow, by reason of the unfavourable state of the weather, the absence of the division Gazan, and the want of any energy in the conduct of the siege. The Governor, Menacho, on the other hand, resolved to delay our proceedings by means of numerous sorties with strong bodies of troops. On the 31st of January, in particular, he directed one against our central works of attack which caused us considerable loss in men; but our works were too distant and in a stage too little advanced to suffer much. During the following days the rains were so violent that work of any kind became impossible. At length, fortunately, the division Gazan arrived with about 6,000 foot soldiers, together with heavy ordnance and tools. Our troops now numbered, therefore, about 12,000 infantry, 1,200 sappers and miners and artillerymen, and about 2,500 cavalry. A little more energy was now thrown into the conduct of the siege, but several days were occupied in repairing the damage done to the trenches by the rain, and there was made but little real advance.

On the 6th of February news was received in our camp of the arrival of the enemy's army of succour. This army, which had been partly drawn from Lisbon, as we have before mentioned, and which consisted of 10,000 infantry, and 2,000 cavalry, took up a position on the right of the Guadiana, in the camp of Santa-Engracia, from whence it was in communication with the fortress by means of the stone bridge of Badajoz; and the enemy could now therefore by uniting the army and the garrison, throw a force of 21,000 men on any selected point, and, it was not at all impossible, by such a movement succeed in raising the siege.

The first employment which they made of their forces was to attempt, on the 7th of February, a great sortie. After having made a feigned demonstration against our left, they debouched upon our right, and boldly advancing in a compact mass of seven or eight thousand men, arrived even as far as our lines, whilst those detachments of our troops which strove to resist them failed to do so. As commonly happens in sorties, the enemy held the ground for an instant, and destroyed some works of little importance; but Marshal Mortier soon succeeded in driving them back in disorder,

leaving 700 killed or wounded. Unhappily the ardour of our troops leading them to expose themselves to the fire of the fortress itself cost us on our side about 100 killed and 300 wounded.

Marshal Soult now conceived the project of attacking the enemy in the camp of Santa-Engracia, and depriving him of the possibility of renewing such attempts by the destruction of the army of succour. But to effect this purpose it was necessary to obtain means of crossing the Guadiana, which would be a feat by no means of easy accomplishment, on account of the fullness of the stream; and in the meantime he directed his attention to the object of disembarassing himself from the Spanish army, encamped beyond the Guadiana, and the removal of which would render our siege operations much more rapid. There was never any difficulty in overcoming the Spaniards in the open field, and they had, in spite of Lord Wellington's remonstrances, neither erected a palisade nor removed a square foot of earth; they guarded their camp, moreover, in the most careless manner, and with secrecy and promptitude seven or eight thousand troops might easily surprise and take it.

This movement projected by Marshal Soult, was as well executed as conceived. On the 18th February his engineers had provided means of crossing the Guadiana sufficient for six thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. On the night of the 18th, Marshals Soult and Mortier effected the passage of the river, with troops chosen from the two divisions Gerard. At the break of day on the 19th, they found themselves on the further bank of the Guadiana; and as they had crossed it above Badajoz, it was necessary to descend the right bank of this stream, in order to arrive at St. Christoval, and the heights of Santa-Engracia, on which was established the Spanish camp. A thick mist favoured the march of our little army.

The bank of the Gevora was soon reached, and before the Spaniards had made any preparation for disputing its passage with us. The cavalry crossed it at some distance to the right, and dispersed without difficulty the Spanish cavalry, which covered the camp on the side of the plain; whilst our infantry, led by Marshal Mortier, plunged through the Gevora, the water reaching breast high, and speedily arrived in the best order, at the foot of the escarpment of Santa-Engracia at the moment when the mist dispersed.

Our soldiers, who had but little fear of Spanish troops, boldly attacked the height of Santa-Engracia, under a terrific fire, which caused them serious loss; but in a few moments they reached the summit of the escarpment, whilst two

battalions which had been sent to the left intercepted the road of the fort of St. Christoval, and the cavalry, which had been thrown to the right, on the plain, gained the rear of the enemy. The Spaniards finding themselves threatened in front by our infantry, in flank and rear by our cavalry, formed themselves into two firm and imposing squares, which, however, were immediately broken and dispersed by the charge of our infantry and dragoons. Of the twelve thousand men with whom the Spaniards had commenced this action, at the most only five thousand escaped, by taking flight in every direction.

Marshal Soult took advantage of his victory to invest completely the fortress on the right of the Guadiana; and being now freed from the proximity of the Spaniards quietly and slowly proceeded with the operations of the siege of Badajoz. In the meantime Lord Wellington and Marshal Masséna awaited, with very different sentiments, the result of this siege. Lord Wellington regarded his position as a difficult one, considering that if the French were to assemble in force, under Marshal Masséna, he would have much cause for fear, even in his position behind the lines of Torrès-Védras. He never ceased, therefore, to urge the Portuguese to devastate Alentejo, and to carry into Lisbon as much of its resources as possible. His entreaties, however, had but little effect, for the Portuguese were by no means inclined to prevent the French from seizing their property, by destroying it themselves. He was far from intending to give battle to Marshal Soult had he quitted Andalusia to come to the succour of the army of Portugal, and had ordered Marshal Beresford, who commanded at Abrantes, to defend the *affluents* of the Tagus, which traverse the province of Alentejo, just so far as might avail to retard the progress of the French, but not so far as might entail the risk of losing a battle; to avoid which, he was to enter the lines of Torrès-Védras. The route was thus entirely open to Marshal Soult, but he was ignorant of the fact, and the phantom of the English army, moreover, withheld him from the idea of marching upon Abrantès.

Masséna held this phantom in less account, and was only withheld by the want of every kind of provision and matériel of war; and he had, moreover, to struggle against the increasing disgust of the army, the first symptoms of which had sprung from the arrival of General Drouet with no more than seven thousand men. As the famine amongst the troops grew more severe, and the hope of their being reinforced by Marshal Soult entirely vanished, it was scarcely possible to restrain them within the bonds of discipline, the more especially as they were under the influence of commanders

who gave full licence to their tongues. At length when the month of March arrived, with no appearance of Marshal Soult, with no hope of effecting the passage of the Tagus, with an impossibility of obtaining subsistence, resulting from the impossibility of crossing the Tagus, and with only fifteen days provision of biscuit remaining, Masséna took the resolution of executing that retrograde movement upon the Mondego, which he had always regarded as the wisest step he could take, and from which he had only been withheld by Napoleon's formal command, that he should remain on the Tagus as long as possible. He gave orders for such preparations as would enable the troops to be in full retreat on the 4th or 6th of March.

It was absolutely necessary that the retreat of the army should be preceded by the sick, the wounded, and the heavy baggage at least two days in advance, to avoid confusion; and the inconvenience attending this movement, would be that it must necessarily excite the notice of the English, and too soon draw them in pursuit of us. This danger existed but to a slight degree on the route of the Tagus, but with respect to the route along the coast it was to be feared that if they should be informed of our retreat they would march rapidly to Leyria, Pombal, and Condeixa, and thus anticipate us in our movement on Coimbra and the Mondego. In this case it would be necessary to renounce our intention of taking up a position at Coimbra, and perhaps even that of following the valley of the Mondego, and to resolve upon a short but disastrous retreat by the valley of the Zezère, which is on the south of the Estrella. It was possible to avoid all these inconveniences by occupying Leyria in force, by means of a well-combined and well-timed movement. Such a movement Masséna conceived and executed with rare precision.

On the 4th of March the sick and the heavy baggage were sent forward, and on the evening of the 5th the whole army was ordered to commence its march. Reynier, who was at Santarem, in a position very near the enemy, destroyed the bridges of the Rio-Mayor, and then pursued in silence the route of Golgao. Junot took the road of Torrès-Novas, Chao de Maçans, and Ourem. This excellent man, unhappily less talented than brave, had received, in a recent skirmish, a wound in the forehead which could scarcely fail, sooner or later, to be fatal, and always devoted to his duty although somewhat untractable, he was anxious to superintend the retreat on horseback; but Masséna, to spare him this fatigue, had placed himself in person at the head of the 8th corps. Ney, on his side, threw himself on Leyria and Ourem, in order to watch the great road of Coimbra.

The arrangements made by Marshal Masséna were carried into execution with extreme precision. On the 6th the army was in full march, without being pursued by the English; on the 7th it had reached a line from which it might have given battle, Reynier being at Thomar, Junot at Ourem, Ney at Leyria; whilst Loison remaining at Punhête, awaited the close of day, to set fire to those bridge materials which were the marvellous and useless result of the exertions of General Eblé.

It was not until the morning of the 6th that Lord Wellington received exact information respecting the retreat of our army. The movements which had taken place on the 4th, and certain information which he received, had prepared him for the event, but as he could obtain no certain information, his customary prudence withheld him from hazarding any movement; and indeed, the retreat of the French was in itself so great a triumph for him, that he had good reason not to compromise this success by any precipitate action, which might expose him to some serious reverse. Receiving information at this time that Badajoz was reduced to the last extremity, he sent a message to the governor of this place, promising immediate succour, and urging most earnestly the protraction of the defence; and immediately despatched Marshal Beresford with the troops of General Hill, from Abrantès, to save a place which was the key of Alentejo. These arrangements having been concluded, he proceeded to follow in the track of our army, resolving at the same time to conduct his movements with the most extreme circumspection, since he had conceived for Marshal Masséna's talents, even after this campaign, which has been subsequently so much blamed, the most profound esteem.

On the 9th of March our rear guard, the 6th corps, was at Pombal, between Leyria and Coimbra, under Marshal Ney; and as it was a position possessed of some resources and means of defence, various strategical reasons induced Marshal Masséna to remain at Pombal, during the 9th and 10th. On discovering this proceeding on the part of the French, Lord Wellington conjectured that they had resolved to make amends for their retreat, by giving him battle; and being somewhat intimidated by this idea, he countermanded his orders with respect to some of the troops which he had directed Beresford to take to the aid of Badajoz, and assembled around himself, by the high road of Coimbra, the greater portion of his forces.

Ney discovering from Pombal the concentration of the English army, informed Masséna of it on the evening of the 10th, and demanded that either he should be permitted to

leave his position, or that he should be supplied with sufficient reinforcements to enable him to make head against the enemy. Masséna hastened to Ney's head quarters, and took pains to reassure him, whilst he urged him to maintain his position at Pombal until the next day, and on the succeeding day to make a stand at Redinha, so as to give the necessary time for the occupation of Coimbra and Mondego, by the troops of Junot. Ney was by no means so easily convinced of the security of his position as Masséna desired, but promised to hold it as long as possible. To increase the embarrassment of the moment, General Drouet, who was charged with the duty of supporting Ney, was seized once more with the desire of seeking what he considered his proper position, and announced his immediate departure, which would have reduced Ney's force to two divisions. Masséna committed the error of not decidedly commanding him to stay, and permitted himself to be satisfied with Drouet's promise to retire slowly. Ney promised to maintain his position at Pombal, but did not say for how long. Masséna was guilty of a twofold fault on this occasion, for he failed to command with sufficient vigour, and omitted to take advantage of this position of Pombal to inflict a severe blow on the English.

On the morning of the 11th Ney, posted at Pombal on the right bank of the little river Arunça, saw the English descending by the left bank in order to cross it below Pombal, and immediately ordered a retreat without attending to the remonstrances of the chief of the staff, Fririon, who endeavoured to induce him to maintain his position. Contenting himself with sending a few battalions under General Fririon's command to check the immediate advance of the English, which duty they effectually performed, he quietly commenced his retreat, descending the right bank of the river in the face of the English who occupied the left. He halted at night-fall at Venda da Cruz, at the point where the road quits the valley of the Arunça to take its course along that of the Soure.

On the following day, the 12th, Ney commenced his march before daybreak, in order that he might not have the enemy at his heels, in the defiles through which he would have to pass. With his seven or eight thousand men he slowly retreated, followed by twenty-five thousand English, formed into three columns, the one on the right composed of the troops of General Picton, and the Portuguese under General Pack, the central one composed of the troops under General Cole, the third, on the left, consisting of the light infantry of General Erskine. The cavalry of General Slade, that of the

Portuguese and the sharpshooters, formed the connecting links between these three columns. Ney, as a lion pursued by hunters, kept his eyes fixed on his assailants, prepared to hurl himself upon the one that should be most rash. When one of these columns pressed too closely, he swept it with musketry, or charged it with the bayonet, or hurled his dragoons upon it, employing each arm in turn according to the varying nature of the ground, with admirable skill and irresistible vigour. He thus employed half the day, whilst he gave way, at the most, no more than two leagues, and prepared for the English on the bank of the Soure a final and warm reception, which would form a worthy conclusion to the exploits of the day.

Ney had now reached the chain of heights which border the Soure, and at the foot of which, on the very bank of the river, is the village Redinha. His position now, therefore, rested on the bed of the Soure and Redinha, whilst in front of him there was a little plain, through the midst of which the English advanced with awkward movements. It was an advantageous position to defend, since it commanded on every side the ground occupied by the enemy, and even offered the opportunity of a decided success, since it would be possible, whilst repulsing the English, to drive them headlong into the defile which had been traversed by each army in the course of the morning, and to precipitate them from thence into the valley of the Arunca. With twelve thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry at his disposal, Ney was almost certain of success in such a mode of proceeding, but prudential reasons restrained him from making the attempt, for in the position which he now occupied, he was exposed to the danger of being driven into the Soure, and also of being pursued into a frightful defile which lies between Redinha and Condeixa; he took up his position therefore on the heights which he was determined to defend, and having taken ample precautions for securing a retreat in the case of a reverse, he awaited the arrival of the enemy.

Generals Picton and Pack attempted to climb the heights on the left, in order to be able to dispute with Ney his retreat upon Redinha, whilst Generals Cole and Spencer advanced in the centre, and Erskine's light infantry endeavoured to cross the river on our right. But Ney, employing each arm of his forces with the same ready skill, directed an overwhelming fire upon Picton's troops, and forced them to make an oblique movement for the purpose of avoiding it. Having at length, however, succeeded in climbing the heights, after having suffered considerable loss, they advanced upon Ney's

flank, and had arrived within musket range of it, when he overwhelmed them with grape from six pieces of cannon, and then charging with the bayonet drove them to the foot of the heights. Lord Wellington then carried his centre forward, for the purpose both of rallying and covering his right, and with the intention of attacking the front of the French position. Ney, permitting this mass to approach, first received it with the fire of his artillery, then with that of his musketry, and finally charging with the bayonet, drove it down the declivity of the ground. He then sent forward the 3rd hussars, which broke the first line of the English, and sabred a great number of their infantry. At this moment the confusion in the whole mass of the English troops became extreme, but Ney being anxious not to compromise the safety of his troops, called them back, and drawing them up in battle array, remained in position during more than the space of an hour, continuing to hurl shot against the English, and thus causing them the most serious losses.

It was now four o'clock in the afternoon; Lord Wellington, deeply chagrined at finding himself thus baffled by a handful of men, drew together his whole army, formed it into four lines, and advanced with the manifest intention of forcing the position at any price. The moment had now come when it was proper for Marshal Ney to retreat, for it had not been his intention to maintain, but to dispute his position, and he conducted his troops with great skill, and in good order to the other bank of the Soure. The English having reached the heights which we had just abandoned, hastened to descend to the bank of the river, with the purpose of attempting to cross it, but perceived our troops posted on the opposite bank, covered by a cloud of sharpshooters who prevented any approach.

The various circumstances of this engagement were of a nature to render the English very cautious and the French very confident. Ney had retreated into the defile, which led from Redinha to Condeixa, and abutted on heights which might be easily defensible. It was the last step which had to be traversed on the high road from Lisbon to Coimbra, and had to be so taken as to afford Junot time to establish bridges on the Mondego, and to occupy Coimbra, which is on the other bank of this river.

On the evening of the 12th, after the splendid battle of Redinha, Masséna complimented Ney on his triumph, but at the same time expressed some regret that he had not maintained the position in front of the Soure, and implored him to resist to the utmost, as the nature of the ground would well enable him to do, on his way to Condeixa. Marshal

Ney appeared to be but slightly moved by the exhortations of the General-in-Chief, and offered to do his best, without promising success. He seemed to be particularly anxious respecting the movements of the English on his left, demonstrations which, if serious, might have separated him from Loison and Reynier, that is to say, from the bulk of the army; to provide against all danger on this side, Masséna had directed the movements of the divisions Loison and Clausel, so as to connect Ney's left with Reynier, and believing that he was thus sufficiently supported, and would obey the orders given by his General-in-Chief, Masséna proceeded on the morning of the 13th to visit Loison, and from the position which he occupied to endeavour to learn the true projects of the enemy.

Scarcely had Masséna departed than Ney began to employ himself in making observations on the least movements of the English, with a strange distrust of the position which he occupied, and in which there was nothing to give just cause for alarm. A movement made by General Picton on his left thoroughly persuaded him that all his fears were about to be realized, and that he was on the point of being isolated from the main body of the army, perhaps even surrounded. Hurried on by this terror, and perhaps also by a desire to quit the land of Portugal, which he had learned to hate, he disputed but for a few moments the heights of Condeixa, and then hastened to quit them, taking a road which led along a defile to Miranda de Corvo, and would enable him to rejoin Loison, Clausel, and Reynier.

In adopting this important resolution, after the formal orders he had received to maintain a position at Condeixa, he took too much responsibility upon himself, and for the sake of avoiding an imaginary or at most doubtful danger, he exposed the army to certain peril. But however this may be, Ney entered the defile above mentioned, and as he perceived that he thus exposed Montbrun, who held a position on the bank of the Mondego, to being cut off and taken, he informed him of his own movements, and ordered him to retreat immediately with his cavalry, ascending the banks of the Mondego, by a movement parallel with his own.

In the meantime Masséna had repaired to Fuente-Cuberta, where Loison, supported by Clausel, was the link which united the divisions of Ney and Reynier, and was prepared to defeat every attempt which the English might make to penetrate between the two principal masses of the French army. From the elevated point at which he now was Masséna could perceive the movements of General Picton, and saw in them no cause for apprehension, when therefore it was announced to him

in the middle of the day that Ney had evacuated Condeixa, and had thus taken upon himself to decide the issue of the campaign, he expressed aloud his indignation to Fririon, the chief of the staff, and was so greatly angered as to entertain for a moment the idea of depriving Ney of his command; but perceiving the inconvenience which must result from the loss of the services of one of his lieutenants, he restrained himself to a cold expression of his discontent, at the same time drily ordering Marshal Ney to stop as soon as he should have issued from the defile in which he then was, in order to give Montbrun and the heavy baggage an opportunity of effecting a movement similar to that executed by the 6th corps. Marshal Ney's precipitate retreat had, to a certain degree, imperilled Masséna himself, who had under his own command the divisions Loison and Clausel, for being now uncovered on his right he might, had the English been more active, have been cut off from the 6th corps. But he immediately set his troops in retreat, marching by moonlight during the whole night, and debouching in the morning between Casal-Novo and Miranda de Corvo, behind Marshal Ney.

Marshal Ney on emerging from the defile which ran from Condeixa towards Miranda de Corvo, stopped at the village of Casal-Novo. On the following day, the 14th, in spite of a thick mist, he commenced a series of manœuvres in the presence of the English, with a dexterity, precision and skill, which excited general admiration. And now the two armies slowly proceeded, the one behind the other; the French only yielding their ground step by step, after a well planned resistance at every point, and the English advancing with difficulty under a murderous fire, and against positions in which they attempted to come up with the enemy, and as perpetually failed to do so. At the close of the day they were compelled to halt in the presence of the French army, which was assembled in force in an almost impregnable position.

No loss had resulted from the movements of Marshal Ney, but the failure of the execution of the plan which had been so wisely formed by the General-in-Chief, of establishing the army on the Mondego. All the corps of the army were reunited, together with their matériel, after a loss of men inferior by three-fourths at least to that suffered by the English, and after having successfully passed the most difficult portion of their road. The English roughly handled at Redinha and Casal-Novo, showed no impatience to attack our troops, and appeared rather to escort than to pursue them.

Our army had passed the night of the 1st on the bank of the river Ceyra, which it had crossed; but Ney, with too much confidence, had permitted two of his divisions to pass the night on the same side of the river with the English. Masséna had intimated to him the danger to which he thus exposed himself, but he disregarded the hint, in the belief that the English would not have the audacity to attack him. Lord Wellington, however, who was determined, with all his prudence, to lose no opportunity of destroying us, if we were so foolish as to afford any opportunity, perceived that a considerable portion of the 6th corps had remained on his side of the Ceyra, and on the morning of the 15th hastened to envelope it with masses of troops. Our soldiers, surprised by this unexpected attack, ran to arms, a portion of them (the division Mornet) proceeding to occupy the heights which surrounded the ground on which they had been encamped during the night, in order to hold in check the enemy, whilst Marshal Ney directed the retreat of the remaining portion (the division Marchand) by the narrow pass of the bridge of the Ceyra. Whilst the troops were crossing the bridge, several slight circumstances concurred to create a panic amongst them, which turned their retreat into a disorderly flight. Ney endeavoured in vain to rally them, and could not even make his voice heard amidst the confusion. After some moments of this tumult, however, he succeeded in rallying a battalion of the 27th, and some companies of Voltigeurs, and with this handful of men he ascended the heights, where General Mornet with his second brigade was maintaining a desperate struggle against the English. The presence of the feeble reinforcement brought by Marshal Ney reanimated the courage of our troops, and charging the English they compelled them to retire with loss. In the meantime the tumult at the bridge had subsided; the fugitives perceiving the heights behind them to be securely occupied by French troops, became reassured, and defiled across the bridge in tranquillity. The second brigade, after having held the heights as long as was necessary, descended, and crossing the bridge rejoined the rest of the 6th corps.

The army took up its position behind the Ceyra, without being disturbed, for Lord Wellington had learned that this army, always so great in the hour of danger, could not be easily crushed; on the 17th, it advanced to the Alva. Masséna suffered cruelly, as may be well supposed, at being forced to this retreat, by the error of his master, who had assigned to him the performance of an impossible task, by the error of his lieutenants who had thwarted all his plans, by the error of the other generals in the Peninsula, who had

failed to succour him, and finally by the conspiracy as it were, of circumstances against him. He was deeply distressed, and endeavoured to give the movement the character of a manœuvre rather than of a retreat. It was with this motive that he had formed the plan of establishing a position on the Mondego; and being deprived of this resource by Ney's precipitancy in quitting his post at Condeixa, he would have wished at least to remain upon the Alva, which flows along the sierra Murcelha; but this position was a very insecure one, since the English could turn it by ascending the right bank of the Mondego, and it was distant, moreover, many days march from Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which contained the resources of the army. It would be, therefore, rather a consolation to his honourable pride than a manœuvre, the success of which was important.

On the 18th the French army reached the Alva. Junot was on the right (in respect to the enemy), near the point of junction of the Alva with the Mondego; Ney was in the centre behind Ponte Murcelha, Reynier on the left towards the mountains and on the sides of the Estrella, whence the Alva takes its source; and Drouet, whom the orders of Masséna could no longer detain, on the Almeida road. Masséna had particularly urged upon Ney the importance of defending the Ponte-Murcelha position, and he had both promised and intended to do so.

But this time, so great a fatality seemed to pursue the army of Portugal, the disobedience was to come from the most obedient of Masséna's lieutenants, General Reynier. Marshal Ney established on the Alva, in the position of Ponte-Murcelha, endeavoured to ascertain by reconnaissances whether his wings were well guarded, and whether there were no risk of being again surprised by the enemy. On the right he had found the posts of Junot's division closely connected with his own; but on his left he failed to find those of Reynier's division precisely at that part of the Murcelha sierra which, being but slightly connected with that of the Estrella, could be passed. Ney, uneasy at finding himself almost completely unprotected on his left, made earnest complaints to Masséna on the subject. The General-in-Chief sent officers after officers to make enquiries of Reynier, and he was found far from the sierra of Murcelha, on the sierra of Moita, another detached branch of the Estrella, and situated very much in the rear of the actual position of the army. The source of this conduct was some ill humour which Reynier had conceived against the General-in-Chief, in consequence of certain reprimands the latter had found it necessary to give him; and now, far from obey-

ing the order he received to place himself on the left of the army, he replied to it by detailing the plan of an attack on the English, which, according to him, must have great results; and whilst he was discussing these operations, Ney, finding himself completely exposed, and distinctly perceiving the advance of the English, on the other side of the Alva, against his left, was compelled by many prudential considerations to abandon Ponte-Murcelha; and thus once more, although involuntarily, to frustrate the projects of Marshal Masséna. The position of the Alva was from that time no longer tenable, and that this was the case could only be a subject of regret on account of Masséna, to whose pride it was a consolation. To regain the Spanish frontier was all that now remained to be done.

The English, on their side, as their provisions began to fail on account of the difficulty of transporting them so far from the sea, and as they despaired of crushing an army which defended its retreat so vigorously, perceived the necessity of making a halt of some days duration; the Portuguese troops, whose subsistence was never cared for till the English troops had been supplied, began to die of hunger, and complained bitterly. Lord Wellington resolved, therefore, on a halt of three or four days between Ponte-Murcelha and Coimbra. The French army continued its march in three columns without being pursued, arrived about the 22nd of March at the line of heights which separate the valley of the Mondego and that of the Coa, and found himself within sight of the frontiers of Spain, from which he had departed six months before to invade Portugal.

The old Marshal re-entered Spain with a heavy heart. Although his retreat had not, indeed, been like that of Junot from Lisbon after a capitulation, nor that of Soult from Oporto with the loss of his artillery; although he had maintained his position on the Tagus during six months, without succour of any kind or even communications with France, in one of the most difficult positions in which a General could be placed; although he had performed a march of sixty leagues through a sterile and devastated country, pursued by an army twice as numerous as his own, without the loss of a single cannon, wounded man, or baggage waggon, and inspired the enemy with so much respect that it had relinquished its pursuit; although his movements had, in general, been such that he could find in them no cause for self-reproach, yet it was cruel at his age, after so much toil, after so many triumphs, to add to his numerous campaigns one which, however meritorious in the eyes of the well-informed and the thoughtful, could not but be regarded by the public

in general, which only judges of actions by their results, as a failure. The aspect of his army, moreover, was calculated to affect him deeply. The discipline of the troops was still admirable, but half of them were constantly scattered in every direction in a search for provisions. The greater number of the draught horses were either dead or thoroughly worn out, and scarcely sufficient remained to manœuvre a few pieces of cannon in front of the enemy. The soldiers, blackened by the sun, attenuated, ragged, shoeless, but vigorous, inured to fatigue, haughty, arrogant, and licentious in their manners as their language, failed to endure the state of distress in which they were with that resignation which sometimes so highly ennobles the miseries of warfare. Masséna himself had by this time, unfortunately, been deprived of his accustomed prestige partly by the indiscreet observations made respecting him by the Generals under him, and partly by his own errors. In the season of victory soldiers smile at the faults of their leaders, but in the hour of adversity they regard them as crimes. But the General-in-Chief was still far from being overwhelmed by circumstances under which most men would have been crushed, and resolved on the execution of new operations, calculated to give another character to his retreat. He proposed to refresh and provision his troops, and then, by Guarda and Belmonte, to cross the sierra of Gata, to descend upon the Tagus by Alcantara, and thus to recommence the campaign of Portugal. He had still, after the withdrawal of Drouet, 40,000 men under his command, of incomparable valour, and proof against fatigue and fear, and with such a force, acting in connection with the army of Andalusia, he flattered himself that he might penetrate into Portugal by a new road. But when orders having for their aim the execution of this project emanated from headquarters, they were the object of violent criticism throughout the army, and universal indignation.

Full of this project, which consoled him for his disappointments, Masséna, on arriving on the frontier of Old Castille, directed his three corps towards the sierra de Gata, and assigned to each the cantonments it was to occupy after the march they were about to perform. He appointed Belmonte, which is situated at the sources of the Zézère, as the position to be occupied by Reynier's corps; whilst Junot's corps was to establish itself at Guarda, which is at the sources of the Mondego, and Ney's corps at Celarico, a stony, arid, desolate district, which separates the waters of the Coa from those of the Mondego. As soon as Masséna's project became known the Generals of the various corps raised their voices against it, declaring that it would be

impossible to remain forty-eight hours in the positions to which they had been ordered, and that it was impossible to recommence operations without a supply of clothes, shoes, money, and horses. Marshal Ney especially was dissatisfied at the idea of making another campaign under Marshal Masséna. Encouraged by the complaints which arose around him, and the popularity he enjoyed in his corps of the army, he permitted himself to indulge in an action of insubordination; writing to the General-in-Chief a letter in which, declaring the sufferings endured by his corps, the impossibility of procuring subsistence at Celorico, the necessity of leaving it to fall back upon the Coa, and enumerating the inconvenience which would attend a new campaign on the Tagus, he formally demanded the production of the orders of the Emperor, and declared that if those orders did not exist, as he believed was the case, he should find himself compelled to disobey the commands lately laid upon him.

Marshal Masséna was convinced that the insubordination of his lieutenants had alone hindered him from carrying the enemy's position at Busaco, from crossing the Tagus at Punhete, from seizing the line of the Mondego at Condexa, and finally, from being able to make a stand on the line of the Alva. He had hitherto smothered his anger that he might not cause any commotion in the army, which would be dangerous during the progress of a retreat; but now, aroused from his habitual calmness by this last act of Marshal Ney's, he determined to deprive him of his sword in the presence of the whole army. He repeated his commands to him, and demanded to be informed whether he still refused to obey. Marshal Ney began to perceive that he had made a false step, but he dared not now recede, and once more, although in more moderate terms, insisted on the communication of the Emperor's own orders.

Masséna no longer hesitated; but ordering Marshal Ney immediately to quit the 6th corps and to retire into the interior of Spain, there to await the Emperor's commands, he directed General Loison to assume the command. The flatterers who had enticed him on to his insubordination, now quailed before the energy of the General-in-Chief, and endeavoured to persuade Marshal Ney to yield. And this he did; atoning for a moment's error by a most praiseworthy submission.

This sad sacrifice having been made to discipline, the language of the troops became less insubordinate, but they were still as disinclined as ever to renew those attempts on the Tagus which they regarded as both calamitous to the army and useless to the designs of the Emperor. They

were resigned to obey, but hated those who demanded such obedience. Although Masséna had too little consideration for the sufferings of his troops, he had consented that the 6th corps should approach Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo for the purpose of obtaining provisions from the stores which they contained; unhappily the country in which the troops now were was as destitute as themselves.

A new measure taken by Napoleon at this period, namely, the nomination of Marshal Bessières to the command of all the north of Spain, still further aggravated and complicated the unsatisfactory state of affairs. The Emperor, perceiving the inconvenience of having distinct commands at Burgos, Valladolid, Léon, and Salamanca, and being discontented with General Kellerman, had been anxious to consign the command of all the troops scattered throughout the north of Spain to a single Commander-in-Chief, to whom would also be committed the government of the Provinces of Biscay, Burgos, Valladolid, Zamora, and Léon; Marshal Bessières was selected for this exalted post, because he had served in the north of the Peninsula, and was at the head of the Imperial Guard; he was already established at Burgos when the army of Portugal entered Old Castille. Masséna had written to him announcing his arrival, his necessities, and his plans, and requested immediate supplies of provisions, munitions, and horses. Bessières had in return been prodigal of assurances of the most complete devotion, but failed to send anything to the succour of the army of Portugal more substantial than promises.

After having waited on the frontier of Old Castille during some days, Masséna, finding that no succour arrived, receiving very unsatisfactory information respecting the resources of Estremadura, and perceiving the stores of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida diminish with fearful rapidity; seeing that his cavalry and artillery were without horses, and taking into consideration that the whole army was exasperated at the idea of a new campaign on the Tagus, Masséna finally renounced a project which, since the successive loss of the lines of the Mondego and the Alva, had been his sole consolation.

Marshal Masséna immediately sent a confidential officer to inform Napoleon of the events of the retreat, the causes which had prevented him from establishing himself on the Mondego, and those which had withheld him from again marching on the Tagus, and of the deplorable quarrel which had occurred between himself and Marshal Ney. This officer was also directed to demand supplies and orders, and all that would be necessary to the immediate recommence-

ment of the campaign. In the meantime Masséna led the army into Old Castille, and having placed it in cantonments at Almeida, Ciudad-Rodrigo, Salamanca, and Zamora, went himself to Salamanca, in order to inspire by his presence some activity into the administration of the army.

In the meantime Marshal Soult had continued and accomplished the siege of Badajoz ; this siege had been conducted at first with great slowness and afterwards with great rapidity. The news received from all sides on the state of affairs, at length lent an impulse to the works, which triumphed over every obstacle. Information was received from Andalusia that Marshal Victor was in the greatest peril, being threatened by an Anglo-Spanish army that had been formed in front of Gibraltar, and to oppose which he had only seven or eight thousand men ; that General Sébastiani, instead of holding himself in readiness to succour Marshal Masséna, had on the contrary directed his principal forces against the kingdom of Murcia ; that there was great danger that the siege of Cadiz would be raised, and the immense matériel collected for the purposes of this siege destroyed. From the neighbourhood of Lisbon news was received that the English threatened the fortresses of Estremadura, and that an English army, probably that of Lord Wellington himself, was advancing to raise the siege of Badajoz, and this, amongst other reports, gave rise to the belief that Marshal Masséna had at length been compelled to retreat from the Tagus.

On the receipt of this news, Marshal Soult visited the trenches in person, accompanied by his chief engineer and artillery officers, and declared that he hoped to be in Badajoz within forty-eight hours. Finding that before a breach could be rendered practicable, the removal of the summit of the wall of the counterscarp would be necessary, and that to effect this in the usual manner would require a space of two days, he determined that a detachment of soldiers should pull it down by hand, under cover of the night.

On the 10th the breach was declared practicable, and Marshal Soult, who had received from Andalusia and Portugal news even still more disquieting, was anxious not to lose an instant, and had the place summoned to surrender. The governor perceived the danger of resistance, but endeavoured to enter into negotiations, for he had been informed of the approach of the English. Marshal Soult, however, refused to allow himself to be tricked, and ordered that the assault should take place at four o'clock in the afternoon ; but at the moment when our columns were about to throw themselves into the breach, a white flag announced that the fortress had surrendered. On the 11th of March our troops

entered Badajoz, forty-two days after the first opening of the trenches. Having devoted two days to the repair, arming and provisioning of Badajoz, that it might be able to resist the English, Marshal Soult hastened to proceed towards Cadiz, feeling great anxiety with respect to what was taking place in that quarter.

The following had, in the meantime, been the state of affairs in the neighbourhood of Cadiz. Being in constant dread of the concentration of our troops on the Tagus, the English had resolved to make such manœuvres between Murcia, Grenada, Gibraltar, and Cadiz, that the French troops which were in Andalusia would not dare to leave it even though they had taken Badajoz. The plan was well conceived, and the errors committed on our side rendered its execution easy. Murat at Naples, after having made every preparation for a descent on Sicily, had renounced his project and dispersed the troops he had collected for its execution, thus leaving the English at liberty to send four or five thousand of their best troops to Gibraltar. These troops, together with some others which were already at Gibraltar, and a part of the garrison of Cadiz, were assembled at the camp of Saint-Roch, and formed an army of about 20,000 men, eight or nine thousand English, and twelve thousand Spaniards. So large a proportion of English rendered this army formidable, and the junction of General Sébastiani with Marshal Victor was necessary to oppose it. But unfortunately the movements of General Blake in Murcia had drawn General Sébastiani thither, and a few feeble columns which he had despatched to Tarifa and Ronda were not calculated to be of any assistance to Marshal Victor.

Marshal Victor had no more than 8,000 effective troops at his disposal. He left at the various posts of the line of investment as few as possible, sent 2,500 men of the division Villate towards Santi-Petri, to hold in check the garrison of Léon, and with the 5,000 men of the divisions Leval and Ruffin which remained, and with 500 horse, he marched by his left, in the direction of Gibraltar, to meet the enemy's army, of the strength of which he was ignorant.

On the 3rd of March General Villatte surprised the Spaniards, who had thrown a bridge over the extremity of the canal Santi-Petri, and had already passed across, and drove them back into the isle of Léon, with the loss of a hundred killed, a hundred drowned, and about 400 prisoners. He then took up a position near the canal, awaiting the appearance of the English army, which Marshal Victor had gone in search of. On the 4th information was received that it was on the sea coast, and on the 5th that it had been seen in a

position on the sandy heights, with the sea behind it, its left being towards Santi-Petri, and its right towards the tower of Barrossa.

On the morning of the 5th Marshal Victor had no hesitation in taking the offensive, with the five thousand men whom he had under his orders. Leaving on his right General Villatte, who by occupying the banks of the canal, was the object of attack to a portion of the enemy's forces, he made a vigorous movement towards the sandy heights occupied by the Anglo Spanish troops. When the attack commenced, the impetuosity of our men obtained them some temporary success, but there was no probability that five thousand men could vanquish twenty thousand, especially when nine thousand of them were English. Marshal Victor, therefore, took up a position somewhat withdrawn, and then awaited General Villatte, whom he had sent for, and ready, in spite of all perils, to renew the struggle, should the disembarked army endeavour to quit the sea coast to penetrate into the interior of Andalusia.

The enemy, fearing that if Marshal Victor should be reinforced, they might be driven into the sea, determined to retreat, and to renounce the endeavour to raise the siege of Cadiz.

When Marshal Soult returned to Andalusia, he found every thing retrieved, and the siege of Cadiz continued, and that a most decisive triumph might have been obtained, had he known how to concentrate at the proper moment the forces of General Sébastiani and Marshal Victor. He found himself, however, in a most critical position; the battles in which he had engaged had left Marshal Victor scarcely sufficient troops to maintain the blockade of Cadiz; Marshal Mortier, left at Badajoz with some thousand men, was reduced to the alternative of either departing from it, or shutting himself up within its walls; it was tolerably certain that the English would attack it almost immediately, and snatch it from our hands, unless succoured by an efficient army; and Soult himself had at his disposal no more than seven or eight thousand effective men. Devoured by anxiety, Marshal Soult hastened to write to King Joseph and to Masséna for succour, and to send to Paris earnest entreaties for reinforcements, and that orders might be given to the army of Portugal to join him in Estremadura.

Information of the greater number of these events was carried to Napoleon by General Foy, who was personally well received, but scarcely listened to, when he attempted to present the defence of his General-in-Chief. Napoleon had no pity for his illustrious Lieutenant, and, even as the blind

public only judged by results, and took not into account the nature of attending circumstances. "Why?" exclaimed Napoleon in each of his interviews with General Foy, "Why give battle at Busaco? Why, instead of stopping at Coimbra, march upon Lisbon? Why remain so long on the Tagus without doing anything? Why quit the Tagus when Marshal Soult was in the act of marching upon Abrantes? Why retreat so precipitately and so far?" We have already repeated these reproaches, and shown how far they were founded in reason. Without paying any heed to the truth, Napoleon spoke so severely against Masséna, that General Foy, intimidated, defended him but badly. After numerous interviews with the General and the officers who had recently arrived, Napoleon gave the following orders to his Generals commanding in Spain:—

Perceiving the impossibility of making Ney serve under Masséna, he replaced the former by Marshal Marmont, still committing the error of placing Marshals under other Marshals. Napoleon ordered Marmont to enter immediately upon the task of reorganizing the composition of the 6th corps. He annexed General Drouet's corps to the army of Portugal, and ordered Marshal Bessières to furnish it with horses, mules, provisions, and war matériel, and to enable it, in short, to accomplish that descent upon the Tagus by Plasencia and Alcantara. Being ignorant as yet whether it would be possible to make a new campaign in Portugal, Napoleon regarded the army of Portugal as that which, constantly watching the movements of Lord Wellington, and following him in all his movements, should make head against him in Castille, if he remained on the Mondego; in Estremadura, if he descended upon the Tagus; and should give him battle on the first opportunity, whilst the army of Andalusia, having been reinforced, carried on the siege of Cadiz.

But whilst with an inexhaustible fertility of mind, and unfortunately also, with an equal abundance of illusions, Napoleon re-arranged all his plans; he had foreseen, even before the arrival of the couriers from Andalusia, the embarrassments in which Marshal Soult must find himself. It was not probable in fact, that the army of Marshal Masséna could reach the Tagus before the lapse of a month, and in the meantime every thing foretold that the English would throw themselves en masse in the direction of Estremadura, for the purpose of retaking Badajoz, or at least would direct to this quarter a large detachment which Marshal Soult would find it impossible to resist. Napoleon, therefore, ordered the army of the north to send immediate reinforcements towards

Andalusia; he ordered General Belliard, who was directing under Joseph the movements of the army of the centre, to restore to Marshal Soult all the detachments which belonged to him; and directed Marshal Bessières to send away all the battalions belonging to the fourth, first, and fifth corps, and consequently to the army of Andalusia. He had already sent towards Castille a division of reserve, which was formed of battalions intended to recruit the armies of Andalusia and Portugal; he now recommended Bessières not to retain it, pointing out to him that he might weaken the strength of his forces without danger, since he was protected on the side of Old Castille by the entry into that province of the army under Masséna. He considered that these measures, strict obedience to which he imperiously commanded, would be the means of affording Marshal Soult an immediate reinforcement of twelve or fifteen thousand men, which would repair his losses, and enable him to oppose some resistance to the English, on the frontier of Estremadura.

It was to be feared, however, that before these orders could be put into execution, serious events must take place, either on the frontier of Old Castille, or on that of Estremadura. Lord Wellington's position had become a much stronger one since Masséna's retreat than it had previously been, and both the Portuguese and English had been compelled to acknowledge that he alone had comprehended the kind of warfare which was best suited to oppose the French in Spain. The opposition party in the English Parliament had done homage by the mouth of Lord Grey to his military strategy, and declared that he had proved the groundlessness of all their fears and surpassed their highest hopes. From this time the war party was completely in the ascendant, and definitely in the possession of power; commercial suffering was still, doubtless, very great, and the financial difficulties very embarrassing; but the anxiety which had oppressed all hearts was removed. The Prince of Wales, who had intended to change his ministers as soon as his father's illness should have been considered likely to endure, no longer thought of so doing, although the malady under which George the Third suffered had been declared incurable. The favourable chance which had been offered to Napoleon had vanished, and Lord Wellington, covered with honours, saw all the obstacles which had obstructed his road to fortune crumble before his steps. He now proposed, whilst the bulk of his forces remained in sight of the fortresses Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo, to attempt with the remainder the recapture of Badajoz, and the re-establishment of things in Estremadura on their old footing.

The plan of the English General was only too well suited to existing circumstances; Masséna, in his anxiety to put the army on an effective footing had, as we have said, repaired to Salamanca; and was there surrounded by a demonstrative host which promised much and did nothing. Marshal Bessières, indeed, was so far from fulfilling the promises which he had made of affording succour to the army of Portugal, that he had in some cases even deprived it of resources which were on their way to it. In the meantime Marshal Masséna had been compelled to scatter his army from the summit of the sierra de Gata even to Benavente, near the Asturias, in order to enable it to find subsistence. Two powerful reasons, however, made Masséna anxious to concentrate the army;—it was necessary to prevent the investment of Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo, and there was now an opportunity of striking a vital blow at the English army, since its General-in-Chief and a portion of its strength were absent.

As soon as he had become inspired with the hope of effecting these two objects, Masséna was a different man; where he could command he gave the most absolute orders, and where he could not command, he employed the most earnest entreaties, to the end that he might obtain what was necessary for putting the army into an effective state; but the time employed in collecting supplies, sufficed to permit the English to remain two or three weeks under the walls of Almeida, and it was compelled to surrender.

At length Masséna, who began to put no trust in the promises of Bessières, and to disregard the opposition of his lieutenants, gave orders for the concentration of the army. By means of the good services of the excellent General Thiebault, Governor of Salamanca, and the money provided for the pay of the troops, Masséna had procured a certain amount of biscuit and salted meat, which he intended to introduce into Almeida.

The idea of encountering the English in a pitched battle inspired the soldiers with hope, as it had the General-in-Chief. They were only about forty thousand men, it is true, and carried with them no more than forty pieces of cannon, but they were capable of every heroic effort. Unhappily, with the exception of Montbrun and Fournier, who commanded the cavalry, the generals did not share the ardour of the troops. Loison, always brave, was disconcerted at the distrust felt with regard to him, by the 6th corps, which had not ceased to regret the departure of Marshal Ney. Junot was suffering from the effects of a wound; Reynier, who had not recovered from his fatigues and anxieties, had not a

spirit equal to a great crisis. And Drouet, who had been hitherto of so little use, declared that he was about to quit the army of Portugal. Napoleon, indeed, always more anxious for the army of Andalusia, had ordered that the 9th corps should depart immediately for the Guadiana; but whilst urging Masséna to dismiss it as speedily as possible, he had left to him to decide upon the moment of its departure; Masséna had, therefore, ordered Drouet to follow him, but the latter was as little disposed to attempt any energetic action as the others.

Masséna, relying on himself and his excellent troops, made all wills on this occasion bend to his own, and proceeded towards Ciudad-Rodrigo, with about thirty-four thousand men, having left the division Clausel on the Salamanca route, to preserve his communications; for it was by this route that he expected to receive provisions, munitions of war and reinforcements. But whilst the sturdy aspect of his troops was inspiring Masséna with the hope of obtaining a prompt and brilliant success, he received information of an event, which he might have easily expected, and which diminished without destroying his hopes. Lord Wellington, to whom the rumours of Marshal Masséna's preparations had intimated the nature of his designs, had returned to his army, to prepare it for the contest, to concentrate and reinforce it. But still the French General-in-Chief marched forwards, confident in his own superiority, and in that of his soldiers. On the 1st of May he was on the point of quitting Ciudad-Rodrigo, without awaiting the arrival of some reinforcements promised by Marshal Bessières; but at that moment Bessières himself appeared, and announced that 1500 horses, a battery of six pieces, and thirty teams, would reach the camp in the evening.

The certain hope of this succour, more especially the cavalry, sent a gleam of satisfaction into every countenance. It was resolved to delay the march until the morrow; in the evening the promised reinforcements arrived, and the night was employed in making preparations for departure on the following morning.

The army defiled by the bridge of Ciudad-Rodrigo, over the Aguéda. Whilst traversing the Aguéda, our troops found the English advanced posts on each side of a little river called the Azana, and behind which they retreated after having lost some men, who were either sabied or taken by our cavalry. Their real position was at some little distance on the banks of a stream, the Dos-Casas, deeply intrenched, and presenting those natural defences against an attack, such as the English loved to defend. The English army posted

behind this stream consisted of about forty-two thousand men, of whom about twenty-seven thousand were English, twelve thousand Portuguese, and two or three thousand Spaniards. Lord Wellington had arrived at his camp on the 28th, and personally superintended all its arrangements. On his extreme right, towards the village of Pozo Velho, at the sources of the Dos-Casas, he had placed the Spaniards under their commander Don Julian, that he might have means of readily ascertaining the movements which might be made by the French on that side. Nearer his centre, at the village of Fuentès d'Onoro, he had established his light division under General Crawford, with a portion of the Portuguese troops, and a little further back, three strong divisions of infantry under Generals Spencer, Picton, and Houston. The point at Fuentès d'Onoro was important, for it covered the principal communication possessed by the English with Portugal, namely the bridge of Castelbon over the river Coa. Had they been deprived of this bridge, there would only have remained to them one below Almeida, very insufficient for the passage of an army in retreat, especially when vigorously pursued; this explains why Lord Wellington had collected such a mass of troops in front of and behind Fuentès d'Onoro. On his left, near Alaméda, at a point of the Dos-Casas where it was of a depth that would render its passage a matter of difficulty, he had écheloned the 6th division under General Campbell, farther back towards fort Conception, was the 5th, under General Dunlop, and finally the remainder of the Portuguese so disposed as to form a connecting link between Fort Conception and Almeida. As this position occupied from its one extremity to the other less than three leagues and a half, should Masséna, instead of proceeding directly against Fuentès d'Onoro defile before him, with the purpose of descending upon Fort Conception and Almeida, the English General would be able to cross the Dos-Casas and throw himself upon the flank of the French. And even without crossing the Dos-Casas he would be easily able to concentrate his forces around Fort Conception, which was but partially destroyed, and would prove a valuable point in the manœuvres of a battle. There was but one inconvenience attending this position of Fuentès d'Onoro, and that consisted in the existence of a stream behind it of much the same character as the one in front of it. This stream was the Turones, and was calculated to be either an additional support to the English army, were time afforded for forming behind it in good order, or a source of danger should it be driven towards it in confusion.

Masséna after having remained during the night of the 2nd of May a little in advance of the Azava, took up a position on the morning of the 3rd on the Dos-Casas, in the face of the English. Reynier on the right of the Dos Casas, opposite Almeida; Salignac, with the only division of the 8th corps was on the field; and Drouet with the ninth occupied the centre, between Alaméda and Fuentès d'Onoro, a little in the rear of the Dos-Casas. Loison with the 6th, and Montbrun with the cavalry, were posted directly in front of Fuentès d'Onoro.

When Masséna had reconnoitred the enemy's position, he paused to consider whether, defiling by his right, and executing a flank march, he should follow the course of the Dos-Casas as far as Fort Conception, and there penetrate to Almeida; or whether he should vigorously attack with his left the English right, established at Fuentès d'Onoro, with the view of cutting it off from Castelbon and the Coa, throwing it back upon their left and centre as far as Almeida, then to drive them altogether upon the lower Coa, where their retreat would be very difficult and probably very disastrous. As the first plan involved the peril of a flank march in the presence of the enemy, and of finding in Fort Conception a formidable obstacle, Masséna much preferred the second plan, which offered the opportunity of gaining a victory, the probable result of which would be the retreat of the English to Coimbra, or even as far as Lisbon.

On the 3rd, therefore, about the middle of the day, Masséna ordered General Ferrey, who commanded the 3rd division of the 6th corps, to attack Fuentès d'Onoro, whilst Reynier on the right should throw back the English upon Almeida, and Salignac and Drouet, holding posts of observation in the centre, united the two portions of the army. General Ferrey, preceded by the light cavalry of General Fournier, advanced by the chief road upon Fuentès d'Onoro. General Fournier vigorously charged the English cavalry and light infantry, and drove them in confusion to the village of Fuentès d'Onoro, which General Ferrey then immediately attacked with about three thousand men. This little village of Old Castille, which has become so celebrated, is situated partly on one side of the Dos-Casas, and partly on the other, on the slope of a height; it was surrounded by an enclosure very capable of being well defended, and filled with sharpshooters. It was occupied by Colonel Williams, with four battalions of light troops, and the second battalion of the British 83rd. In addition to the natural barriers which rendered its approach very difficult, the English had closed the principal entrance.

General Ferrey attacked Fuentès d'Onoro with 1,200

men, and left in reserve his second brigade of almost 1,800. Carrying at the bayonet's point all the barriers which had been raised in the principal avenue, he at once drove back the English beyond the Dos-Casas, and followed them to its left bank. Colonel Williams was wounded. Lord Wellington brought up reinforcements, and our troops were forced to retreat. At five in the afternoon Masséna ordered a second and more serious attack to be executed by the whole division Ferrey, and a brigade of the division Marchand. This was an error. The enemy were now on the alert, and Fuentès d'Onoro should have been attacked by the three divisions of the 6th corps led by the brave Loison.

In the second attack our troops speedily obtained possession of the lower part of Fuentès d'Onoro, the right bank as well as the left bank of the stream, and advancing to the foot of the height attempted in their impetuosity to climb it. Overcoming one obstacle after another they arrived almost as far as the summit, and there being exposed to a terrible fire of musketry and artillery found how unequal were their numbers to the accomplishment of such an enterprise. They were driven back to the bottom of the height, and were on the point of being forced to retreat in disorder on the line of the Dos-Casas, when General Ferrey, rallying the troops which had been engaged in the morning, together with the Hanoverian legion and a regiment of the division Marchand, attacked the English with the bayonet and compelled them to regain the position from which they had descended. The result of these actions was that the English remained masters of the upper part of the village, whilst the French had possession of the lower, and of both banks of the stream, and that either side had lost six or seven hundred men in killed or wounded.

If Masséna were not endowed with that foresight and energy which seem to have been possessed by Napoleon alone in modern times, he nevertheless never failed to retain his presence of mind on the field of battle, where most Generals ordinarily lose it; and he was so far from being discouraged by difficulty that the strength of his character was always manifested most clearly and exactly in those circumstances in which other persons usually lose theirs. After having passed the day on the field of battle of Fuentès d'Onoro, he had perceived that in ascending towards his left, and consequently towards the English right, the bed of the Dos-Casas became less deep, and that at this point a slightly undulated plain formed the only separation between us and the enemy. He supposed therefore that on this side he might easily attack and even turn the English, and, driving

their right upon their centre, their centre on their left, realise his first and well considered project of throwing them on the lower Coa, and depriving them of the road which leads to the bridge of Castelbon.

On the evening of the 4th of May, therefore, he executed with the whole army a movement from right to left, from Fuentès d'Onoro to Pozo Velho. He left Reynier before Almeida, with instructions to occupy the attention of the English, by an attack more or less vigorous according to events. He left General Ferrey in the low part of Fuentès d'Onoro, giving him the whole 9th corps to assist him in taking this village as soon as sufficient progress had been made towards Pozo Velho, to render this operation practicable; he sent the divisions Marchand and Mormet of the 6th corps, all the cavalry, and the division Salignac of the 8th corps, (about 17,000 men in all) over against the open ground of Pozo Velho.

On the next day, the 5th of May, the troops had executed their movements betimes. Reynier was in front of Almeida, extending his left towards Fuentès d'Onoro; Ferrey was in the low part of Fuentès d'Onoro, and Drouet behind him with the 9th corps ready to march to his support. The divisions Mermet and Marchand of the 6th corps, and all the cavalry with the exception of that of the guard left a little in the rear, were at the height of Pozo Velho. The division Salignac of the 8th corps was appointed to act as their reserve; the army full of confidence and ardour believed that it was marching to victory.

In the meantime Lord Wellington had divined Masséna's project, and had adapted his movements so as best to meet it. Sending back the light division towards Fuentès d'Onoro, he left Picton with the 3rd division on the heights of Fuentès d'Onoro, and Spencer a little in the rear with the first; he sent towards Pozo Velho, Ashworth's Portuguese brigade, two English battalions, a part of his cavalry, and the whole of General Houston's division, the 7th. Finally he posted Don Julian and his Spaniards more to the right at Nave de Avel. He took great precautions with regard to his right, but they were not such as could effectually oppose the 17,000 men whom Masséna was about to send against him.

On the morning of the 5th, at daybreak, the movement of the French army commenced. Loison marched towards Pozo Velho, having Montbrun on his left with 4,000 dragoons and 1,400 *hussards* and *chasseurs*. Montbrun wished in the first place to disperse Don Julian's Spaniards, and attacking them with his light cavalry, he drove them beyond the Turones. In the meantime, Marchand, deploying by his

left towards the village of Pozo Velho, which, surrounded by a little wood, was guarded by the Portuguese and by a part of the division Houston, directed an attack upon it which was entirely successful, the enemy being driven away with a loss of about two hundred prisoners and a hundred killed or wounded. The brigade Maucune pursued the English beyond the village, and on issuing from it met the cavalry of Montbrun.

At the sight of the English line which was protected by two regiments of cavalry, Montbrun, burning with ardour, could no longer hesitate to attack them; and having obtained from Masséna four pieces of cannon he advanced upon the division Houston, having in front a squadron of the 5th hussars deployed to conceal his cannon, the dragoons being in the centre, a squadron of the 11th chasseurs on the right, and one of the 12th on the left. A hundred sharpshooters advanced in front of these troops in order to provoke the centre of the English line. The 51st (English) made a movement in advance, and was speedily broken by the fire from our guns and the charge of our cavalry. Our troops continued their march against the division Houston, and driving it back separated it from its artillery, which it was on the point of taking, when an unexpected and well directed fire from some of the enemy's sharpshooters enabled the division Houston to retreat behind the Turones, where it found Don Julian. At the same moment it was replaced on the ground it had quitted by Craufurd's light division, which advanced in all haste.

Masséna, perceiving that the English right was broken and driven back beyond the Turones, ordered General Loison to advance his divisions Marchand and Mermet, in order that, debouching from Pozo Velho, they might second the effort of the cavalry, and proceed to the environs of Fuentes d'Onoro. This movement, conducted with vigour, would result in the right wing of the English being thrown back upon their centre, as Masséna had planned. At the same time he threw Montbrun's cavalry upon Craufurd, who prepared to receive it by forming his troops into three squares, with artillery in the intervals between the three.

Our cavalry, led with the most admirable vigour and precision, advanced under a terrible fire from the cannon placed between the English squares. The charge of our light regiments speedily broke the squares on the left and the centre, and fifteen hundred English infantry, with their colonel, surrendered themselves prisoners. The square on the right, however, being protected by the nature of the ground which it occupied, escaped this disaster. Taking

advantage of a momentary confusion amongst our soldiers, arising from a groundless supposition that General Fournier had been killed, a portion of the English who had surrendered recommenced their fire; and Montbrun, perceiving the ravages caused in his ranks by the grape of the English cannon, and seeing that the whole English cavalry was advancing against him, made his light cavalry retreat, and sent to demand the assistance of the cavalry of the guard, and the support of a body of infantry.

The cavalry of the Guard, however, could not act without an order from Marshal Bessières, and remained immovable. The infantry, badly led by Loison, had penetrated into the woods which surrounded Fuentes d'Onoro, chased away the English, arrived at the foot of the ravine which separated it from Fuentes d'Onoro, and commenced a useless fire against Pieton's troops, whilst Ferrey renewed his attack from the Avant Veille.

Montbrun, however, being left unsupported, was unable to renew his attack upon the English infantry, which had this time to reform and replace themselves in line. Spencer with the first division, rallying the Portuguese, placed himself beside Crawford and presented an imposing front supported by a numerous artillery and the whole of the English cavalry. On his left he was in communication with Pieton, who defended Fuentes d'Onoro, and on his right with the division Houston, which was on the other side of the Turones.

This being the state of affairs Montbrun, after having long supported the fire from the English artillery, withdrew his cavalry behind a protecting slope, and thus awaited the recommencement of the battle to renew his exploits of the morning. In the meantime Reynier, believing that he had before him masses of the enemy which in reality were not there, and considering that the task of gaining the battle was not his, confined his operations to insignificant skirmishes. Ferrey furiously attacked Fuentes d'Onoro, and aided by two regiments of the division Claparède, seized the heights above the village, but not being supported he was compelled to abandon them again. Loison, full of good will but erring in his march, and having directed it towards the right instead of towards the left, was stopped by a ravine, which separated him from Fuentes d'Onoro.

Masséna's invincible determination, however, repaired every misadventure. Formidable as was the English right, composed of Spencer's and Crawford's divisions, the Portuguese and the cavalry, he did not despair of forcing it with the divisions Marchand, Mermet, and Salignac, Montbrun's heroic cavalry, and the effects of the execution of the orders

which had been given to Drouet to make a desperate attempt upon Fuentès d'Onoro, and to Reynier to make a serious attack on Alaméda.

It was in such moments as these that Masséna's keen judgment and determined character displayed all their strength. Montbrun, Loison, Marchand, and Mermet were eager to second his exertions. But at the very moment when the attack was about to be renewed and one last blow struck for victory, General Eblé was compelled to announce that there remained very few cartridges, Bessières having failed to supply them. Even this difficulty, which would have been considered fatal by any other man, did not make Masséna despair; he deferred the attack until the following morning, believing that the English would remain in the same position, and being convinced that they could receive no reinforcements, for Picton with the 3rd division was indispensable to the defence of Fuentès d'Onoro, Campbell with the 6th to that of Alaméda, Dunlop with the 5th to that of Fort Conception. He ordered that the baggage waggons brought by Bessières should be sent in all haste to Ciudad-Rodrigo for cartridges and provisions. But Bessières resisted this order, alleging that his baggage train having been on the march for many days without rest was too exhausted to execute the proposed task. What was now to be done? Was Masséna to deprive Bessières of his sword as he had deprived Ney of his? There are difficulties before which the most determined men are forced to yield. To prevent the scandal of any further disturbance, Masséna consented to defer until the morning of the next day the despatch of the waggons to Ciudad-Rodrigo.

Such was this battle of Fuentès d'Onoro which so many obstacles, and so many acts of indocility rendered undecisive, and which the courage of our troops, guided by the skilful generalship of Masséna, must have converted into a brilliant victory, decisive in respect to Spain, and most probably equally so as regarded Europe had they only been properly seconded. The position of the two armies on the following day was singular. From Alaméda to Fuentès d'Onoro the corps of Reynier and Drouet formed a continuous line, opposite the English army along the Dos-Casas. At Fuentès d'Onoro our line was bent and forming almost a right angle, held in blockade beyond the Dos-Casas the right wing of the English turned back upon its centre. Lord Wellington had drawn together his best forces upon this point, and had supplied what the position wanted in natural strength by art, having employed his soldiers, although very much fatigued, in throwing entrenchments through the whole of the night.

Masséna saw with dismay that the time granted for repose to Bessières teams was much more usefully employed by the enemy. Relying, however, on the ardour of his troops he determined to renew the contest. But Generals Fririon, Lazowski, and Eblé, who were as devoted to him as to the honour of their arms, revealed to him those sad truths he would fain have ignored, and informed him that many officers, some of them worn out with fatigue, others summoned to serve in different armies, were not sufficiently resolved to do their duty to be safely relied on in a desperate attack. Reynier was in a state of terror, believing that the whole force of the English was about to overwhelm him; Drouot was on the eve of departure; and Bessières conducted himself as an ambitious man in the presence of one whose fortunes were on the decline.

The General-in-Chief was dissuaded therefore from the course of action he had proposed, and determined to destroy the fortress of Almeida in place of re-victualling it. To effect this purpose it was necessary to find some men who would undertake to carry the necessary order across the English army. Three volunteers for this office presented themselves whose names history ought to preserve; they were Zaniboni, corporal in the 76th of the line, Noel Lami, a sutler of the division Ferrey, and André Tillet, a chasseur in the 6th light. Each of them carried an order to General Brenier to destroy the fortification, and then to make his way across the line of the English posts as far as the bridge Barba del Puerco on the Aguéda; and he was directed to fire a hundred guns to announce his receipt of the General-in-Chief's order.

During the next day, the 7th, Masséna remained in position before the English, who continued immovable behind their entrenchments. In the evening was heard the signal which testified the receipt of the order sent to Almeida. On the 8th Masséna, in order to give General Brenier time to complete the destruction of Almeida, made a threatening movement against the centre of the enemy's position; he continued this pretended movement on the following day, and the English remaining cautiously within their lines, concentrated means of defence on the threatened point, without doubting the intention of the French General.

On the 10th the army, following the example of some of its chiefs, and being ignorant of the Marshal's real intention, began to murmur at being uselessly detained before the enemy, and as General Brenier had now had time to complete his task, Masséna consented to retreat upon the Aguéda. The English followed our troops with extreme caution, fixing their whole attention on the bulk of the army, and paying

no regard to Almeida, which they believed destined to a speedy surrender.

At midnight the army heard during its march a dull explosion, and thus learned that the fortress of Almeida had been destroyed. Reynier left General Hendelet in advance of the bridge Barba del Puerco to receive the fugitive garrison. The next day was expected with the greatest anxiety, for the garrison had eight or nine leagues to pass before it could reach the Aguéda.

General Brenier had some time since undermined the principal works of the fortress, and having received the order on the 7th completed all the necessary preparations on the 10th. At 10 o'clock in the evening he sallied forth with the garrison, leaving 200 sappers under Morlet, the commander of the battalion of engineers, to fire the mines, and rejoin him afterwards by a remote by-way. The departure from the place was made from the quarter least liable to observation, and which was that leading to the Aguéda. The garrison proceeded two leagues without falling in with the enemy, then it met with the advanced posts of Campbell's division and Pack's Portuguese brigade. The latter, wholly giving themselves up to plundering the convoy which followed our troops, permitted them to pass, but General Pack pursued them with the English cavalry of General Cotton. At daybreak they reached Villa de Cuervas, not far from Barba del Puerco, and joined Morlet and his sappers, who after having fired the mines had also arrived to force the line of the enemy's posts. In spite of the attacks of Pack on the one side and Cotton on the other, our brave fugitive garrison succeeded in escaping, and in throwing themselves into the midst of the troops of General Hendelet, which came to meet them. It is said that when Lord Wellington heard the particulars of General Brenier's exploit, he declared that it was equal to a victory; and, with an injustice little worthy of him, laid the blame of the misfortune on General Campbell, who certainly was not more in fault than the rest of the army or the General-in-Chief himself.

Masséna, continuing his retreat, left four months provisions in Ciudad-Rodrigo, remained and reinforced its garrison, and then re-entered Salamanca, to refresh and reorganise his army.

In the meantime, his companion in arms, Marshal Soult, to whom he had rendered a great service, by freeing him from the presence of Lord Wellington, and from that of one or two English divisions, had been even more unfortunate than himself. Scarcely had Masséna's retreat commenced when Lord Wellington sent Hill's corps towards Estre-

madura, and had added to it various detachments, with the intention of giving succour to Badajoz, or by retaking it by a new siege, should the French have already reduced it. An English division accordingly proceeded to invest Badajoz, which was defended by a garrison, determined to resist to the utmost; whilst another body of English, Portuguese, and Spanish troops took up a position on Albuera in order to cover the siege. The 5th corps, under the command of General Latour-Maubourg, was posted a little in the rear, awaiting with impatience succour from Seville, for consisting at most of only eight or nine thousand men after the departure of Marshal Soult, it was reduced to almost nothing when it had furnished the garrison to Badajoz.

Such were the events which had taken place in Andalusia whilst Masséna was fighting the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro and having Almeida destroyed. Marshal Soult having found security re-established in front of Cadiz by the vigour with which Marshal Victor had repulsed the English, and the return of a part of the 4th corps to the province of Seville, had given his attention to the cries of distress which had proceeded from the garrison of Badajoz, which defended itself with the greatest courage, and determined to proceed thither. On the 10th of May he set out with eleven or twelve thousand men to join the remainder of the 5th corps on the road from Seville to Badajoz.

After having rallied the 5th corps Marshal Soult found himself at the head of about 17,000 excellent troops, including 2,500 of the best cavalry. He arrived on the 15th of May at Santa-Martha, within sight of the English army, which was posted at some leagues in advance of Badajoz, on the hills which border the Albuera. Although the Anglo-Spanish army numbered thirty and odd thousand men, and his own amounted to only 17,000, Marshal Soult did not hesitate to attack it, for it was the only means of saving Badajoz, and avoiding the humiliation of seeing the capture of this place, which was his only conquest.

Marshal Beresford commanded the allied army, which comprised Stuart's division (English), the three Portuguese brigades of General Hamilton, and the troops drawn off from the siege of Badajoz.

The Anglo-Spanish army was posted behind the little river Albuera, which might be very easily crossed. Its left was on the village of Albuera, its centre consisting chiefly of English and Portuguese, on the low hills, and its right, comprising all the Spaniards, on the spurs of these hills, but slightly behind them, so as to be scarcely visible. The troops drawn from the siege of Badajoz, passing actually

behind the English line, served for its prolongation and support.

Marshal Soult determined to attack the English on the morning of the 16th of May. He made arrangements for cannonading vigorously, and feigning a serious attack upon the village of Albuera, which was on the enemy's left; but it was against the enemy's right that he determined to make the greatest effort, for he hoped that the English being attacked on their right, which covered their communication with Badajoz, would be the more easily alarmed and beaten, and that the infliction of a reverse upon them in this direction would have the most important results.

Unfortunately he did not have his arrangements put into execution under his personal inspection, and detained too long by his side General Gazan, who, commanding a division, filled also the functions of chief of the staff, and was one of the most energetic and experienced infantry officers in the army. There was, therefore, a want of completeness and precision in the execution of the manœuvres. The detachment on our right which was to cannonade the village of Albuera, took up its position in good time along the stream, and commenced a fire which was equally destructive to the village and to the English troops themselves. The two divisions Girard and Gazan, forming a mass of 8,000 infantry, also duly entered into action, and advancing in close column passed the stream, whilst the cavalry of General Latour-Maubourg threatened the enemy's right. But unhappily a certain want of uniformity in the execution of the manœuvres, occasioned an hour of inaction to the troops beyond the stream, which gave the English time to concentrate the bulk of their forces on the threatened point. The signal of attack having been given, the division Girard rapidly ascended the heights, followed by the division Gazan. The division Girard had scarcely arrived on the height when it found the enemy reaching it almost simultaneously; but although exposed to a most murderous fire this brave division continued to struggle vigorously forward, and succeeded, with the aid of a vigorous charge of our cavalry, in completely routing the enemy's first line, which was composed of English and Spaniards. But at the same moment Marshal Beresford had carried towards his right a strong body of troops which took the division Girard in front and flank, and overwhelmed it with a true and well-sustained fire. In a few minutes almost all the officers were either killed or wounded.

The two divisions were, unfortunately, too closely crowded together to render possible the manœuvres which would have enabled our troops to return the enemy's fire, and they

were, accordingly, compelled to retreat. Fortunately Latour-Maubourg's cavalry coming up in mass and deploying on the English flank held them in check; and General Ruty having skilfully dispersed his artillery on the heights which were opposite those occupied by the enemy, inflicted on them a loss almost equal to that which we had sustained from the fire of their musketry, the Anglo-French army losing about 3,000 in killed and wounded, and the French about 4,000.

Marshal Soult having thus lost 4,000 men out of 17,000, was not anxious to risk a second engagement with the English. He brought in his wounded and took up a position somewhat in the rear. He wrote immediately to Madrid, to Salamanca, and to Paris, to make known his difficulties to Joseph, Marshal Masséna, and Napoleon. Although he had not raised the siege of Badajoz, he had proved to the garrison that he was far from being unmindful of it; and the unskilful manner in which the siege had been first conducted by the English, had added to the hopes which were natural attendants of the courage of the soldiers of the garrison, of the energy and ability of their commanders.

Such was the condition of affairs in Spain in the month of May 1811, such the result of the great exertions made by Napoleon after the peace of Vienna.

In Portugal Marshal Masséna, after the capture of the frontier fortifications, and after six months passed in front of the lines of Torrès-Védras, had been compelled to retreat, and that he might not be forced to behold the capture of the two fortresses, which were the only trophies of his campaign, under his own eyes, he had fought the bloody and indecisive battle of Fuentès d'Onoro. Of the 70,000 men he should have had, he had never in reality had more than 55,000, and these were now reduced to 30,000 exhausted and irritated troops which required to be entirely reorganised.

In the south of Spain, Marshal Soult after having invaded Andalusia, occupied Cordova, Grenada, and Seville, almost without striking a blow, had employed fifteen months in front of Cadiz, in no more important occupation than erecting some batteries around the roadstead. He had captured it is true, the fortress of Badajoz, but had been compelled, even as Masséna, to fight a bloody battle, to save this his only conquest. The 80,000 men he had once had, were now reduced to 36,000, as worn out as those of the army of Portugal, but less disorganized perhaps, because having made war in a rich country, they had not been exposed to such great privations, and because they had not been exposed to such evil example on the part of their immediate commanders.

The army of the centre, under Joseph, was far from numerous, had performed no important operations, and had but just sufficed to maintain communications with Andalusia, to disperse towards Guadalaxara the bands of Empecinado, and to keep the province of Toledo in a state of tranquillity. The army of the north had been perpetually harassed by the guerillas of the two Castilles. One province alone presented an appearance of order and repose, and that was Aragon, where the protracted resistance of Saragossa seemed to have exhausted the hatred of the inhabitants, and where the good policy of General Suchet seemed to have reclaimed their spirits, thoroughly worn out by a great calamity. General Suchet, after having obtained possession of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, had made preparations for besieging Tarragona, the strongest of all the fortifications of Spain. But the surprise of Figueres by the enemy somewhat counterbalanced the satisfactory state of affairs in this part of the country.

To the sad picture presented by the state of the French military affairs in the Peninsula, must be added another not less afflicting, of the court of Madrid. Shut up in his capital, only having command over the army of the centre, consisting of no more than 12,000 effective men, and treated with the greatest disrespect by the various Generals, deprived by the want of finances, of the consolation of bestowing benefits on his favourites, rendered wretched by the reports he received from his two ministers from Paris, and hearing even at Madrid, the echo of his brother's raileries, Joseph—almost overwhelmed by despair, sometimes entertained the idea of abdicating as his brother Louis had done; and being beset on the one side by disgust at the circumstances under which he was at present forced to reign, and on the other by the greatest repugnance to ceasing to reign, he demanded permission to visit Paris, under pretext of the accouchement of the Empress. Napoleon had consented, and Joseph had set out in April in as desponding a state as though the enemy had finally driven him from his capital. This, then, in the month of May 1811, was the result of Napoleon's exertions in regard to Spain.

Why had these two campaigns of 1810 and 1811, from which so much had been hoped, so little answered the expectations which had been founded on them?

To the fault of desiring to rule, to enslave, to transform the world, Napoleon had added the desire of putting his intentions into immediate execution. He had endeavoured, accordingly, to subdue at the same moment both the north and the south of Spain, Valentia, Andalusia, and Portugal.

With this view he had dispersed from Grenada to Badajoz 80,000 of his best troops, and had left the army of Portugal without those reinforcements on which it had reckoned, and without which it was unable to accomplish its task. Besides this unfortunate dispersion of troops must be mentioned the desperate tenacity with which he clung to certain illusions, and which he made the basis, although he was partly aware that they were false ones, of his various plans, and orders to his lieutenants. But as he could not divest himself of some doubt respecting the reality of the forces which he chose to presume were under his Generals' command, he did not dare to give them absolute orders,—knowing well that in giving such at so great a distance from the scene of action he might be ordering what was impossible or what would lead to absolute disaster, he left his commands so undefined that full scope was given for their evasion either from ill will or timidity.

How can we wonder or complain that the errors of the master were increased by those of the lieutenants? What wonder that these distinguished and courageous men should be sometimes careless, inattentive, disunited, jealous! when Napoleon's own great spirit was itself subject to these things,—jealousy, rancour, perturbation, error? How blind and improvident is he who does not foresee that these things will exist, and fails to shape his plans accordingly! That alone is a well judged policy which remains unshaken by the errors of its agents.

If then the great European question, which he had so imprudently transferred to Spain, was not solved in 1810 and 1811, notwithstanding the immense resources devoted to that purpose, we should accuse, not the genius of Napoleon, but his policy, which engendered both his own military errors and those of his lieutenants. After having failed in obtaining the solution of this question in Spain he endeavoured to attain it in the north, and we shall see in the future volumes of this work what was the result of that endeavour.

Genius often adds to its errors the fault of being unwilling to acknowledge them and a desire to attribute them to some other person; and Napoleon, accordingly, recalled Masséna, and disgraced this faithful old companion in arms, who had rendered him so many services, and who had displayed in this campaign, although its issue was unfortunate, rare qualities of character and spirit, and had only succumbed to the force of circumstances.

The old warrior re-entered France, a broken spirited, deserted man; his glory tarnished, his energy gone; and no longer capable of command. Napoleon should have regarded him

with compassion rather than anger, and in his destiny read his own ; for Masséna was the first victim demanded by fortune, and Napoleon himself was to be the second ; with this distinction, that Napoleon deserved his fate and Masséna had not. For Masséna was but the reluctant instrument of those gigantic designs which were to bring upon their author so terrible a punishment, and Napoleon was the author himself. We must add, however, that Masséna also deserved to share in this chastisement, for having consented to take part in the execution of that of which he disapproved. But such is commonly the unfortunate effect of unlimited and irresponsible power—by creating the habit of submission it suppresses the idea of resistance, even on the part of the firmest and most clear-sighted men.

END OF VOLUME XII.

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